



# Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2023

SETTLING IN





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# Foreword

This publication presents a comprehensive international comparison of the integration outcomes for immigrants and their children in OECD, EU and selected other countries. It is the fruit of a co-operation between the European Commission (DG Migration and Home Affairs) and the OECD's International Migration Division, as part of a regular monitoring of comparable indicators of integration across EU and OECD countries.

This publication is the fourth edition of a series that started in 2012 with an OECD pilot report, followed by two joint EU/OECD editions in 2015 and 2018. It draws on the data and information gathered in the three last editions and the broader work on integration issues carried out by the OECD's International Migration Division. It also benefited from data provided by Eurostat, the European Commission, the IOM Migration Research and Training Centre (MRTC) as well as specific data requests to EU and OECD countries. This publication would not have been possible without the support of the delegates to the OECD Working Party on Migration and national statistical offices who provided valuable support in the data collection for this report.

Chapter 1 introduces the issues involved, a comparative overview of integration outcomes and a focus on the evolution of integration outcomes over time. It also presents a classification of countries with similar immigrant populations. Chapter 2 presents contextual information on immigrant populations, including socio-demographic characteristics and composition of the households, compared with those of the native-born, as well as a number of immigrant-specific characteristics like category of entry, duration of stay, and region of origin.

Against the background set out in Chapters 1 and 2, the remainder of the publication goes on to consider actual indicators of integration. Immigrants' skills and labour market integration are described in Chapter 3. It thus examines levels of education, language skills and participation of the immigrant population in training, their labour market outcomes, as well as the quality aspects of immigrants' jobs. Immigrants' ability to reach standard living conditions is described in Chapter 4. It considers several aspects of living conditions: household income, housing conditions, as well as health status and access to healthcare. Chapter 5 looks at the civic engagement of immigrants, such as access to nationality and voting. It also focuses on their social integration: to what extent they are actively involved in the host society, if they perceive any discrimination and the general host-society attitudes towards immigration and their integration.

This publication also includes three special-focus chapters dedicated to present integration outcomes of specific groups. Chapter 6 focuses on the integration of elderly immigrants and very old migrants, that is, foreign-born above the age of 64 and above the age of 74, respectively. Chapter 7 looks at the integration of young people with foreign-born parents. Chapter 8 discusses the integration of third-country nationals i.e. non-EU nationals living in the European Union and European OECD countries and examines outcomes measured on the basis of the EU "Zaragoza indicators" of integration.

This publication has been drafted by Yves Breem (project manager), Alina Winter and Helen Ewald, under the co-ordination of Thomas Liebig (OECD); and Luca Barani (DG Migration and Home Affairs Unit C2

“Legal Pathways and Integration”, European Commission). Jongmi Lee provided statistical assistance. The publication also benefited from contributions by Luca Barani and Elisabeth Kamm as well as several members of the Secretariat International Migration Division. Ken Kincaid provided the editing, and Dominika Andrzejczak, Charlotte Baer and Lucy Hulett publication support.

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# Editorial

Since the publication of the last joint EU-OECD report *Indicators of Immigrant Integration: Settling In* in 2018, major events have impacted migration and migration policy: COVID-19, the fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban and Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, which caused the greatest refugee crisis in Europe since the Second World War. We have seen unprecedented solidarity with Ukrainian refugees, around 4 million of which are now living in the EU alone, under the umbrella of the EU Temporary Protection Directive.

What remains constant is the fact that most migration is regular migration: close to 3 million people receive resident permits in the EU every year, as opposed to approximately 330 000 irregular arrivals in 2022. Across OECD countries, on average over the past decade, there were almost 5 million permanent inflows per year. Migrants help to fill skill gaps and contribute to the economy of host countries, and integration remains as vital as ever. At the EU level, the Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion 2021-2027 provides a framework for EU countries and other stakeholders to act together.

Monitoring the progress made on the integration of migrants and identifying the challenges that lie ahead is key. Over the past decade, the overall situation of migrants' integration has improved in many areas. This is the case, in particular, for integration in the labour market. Many OECD host countries have been facing in recent years significant labour shortages across a wide range of occupations and sectors. At the same time, newcomers tend to have higher educational attainment than before. But better integration policies have also contributed to these improvements. Integration, however, is multifaceted and goes beyond the integration of adults in the labour market. A further promising development is that the education outcomes of migrant children have improved. Participation of migrant children in pre-school has risen almost everywhere. This suggests that the situation is likely to further improve in the future. Also, settled migrants become more fluent in the local language the longer they stay in the host country. After 10 years of residence, immigrants who arrive for family or humanitarian reasons find employment at almost the same level as native-born people, despite the difficulties they faced in accessing the labour market when they first arrived.

But challenges remain. Despite all the positive developments in their labour market situation, immigrants still have lower employment rates than their native-born peers. If immigrants were to find employment as easily as the native-born, an additional 2.4 million people would work and contribute to the economy in the EU alone. Likewise, if immigrants' poverty levels were like those of the native-born, almost 10 million people would lift themselves out of poverty, OECD-wide. Furthermore, more than one in six immigrants live in overcrowded accommodation in the EU – a rate that is 70% higher than that of the native-born, and this gap has widened over the past decade. Particularly worrisome is that more migrants perceive that they are discriminated against now than was the case 10 years ago. This perception does not help their integration efforts into their new host societies.

Monitoring integration outcomes can help counter stereotypes. For example, the EU Special Eurobarometer shows that one in four people believe that the education outcomes of immigrants' children have declined over the past decade. But this is not the case: in most countries, at age 15, migrant children born in the host country have significantly better education outcomes (equivalent to around half a year of learning OECD-wide) than migrant children a decade earlier. In most EU countries, youth born in the country to migrant parents experienced a rise in employment over the past decade that was at least twice as high as among their peers with native-born parents.

The report showcases the need to better communicate the successes and continued challenges on migration and integration issues, and that a better-informed public debate can help. It also shows that a stronger focus on living conditions of migrants is crucial: progress is less visible in this area than in other areas, and this is an increasing concern in OECD countries.

Investing in integration and inclusion policies pays off: the evidence shows that integration is possible, and beneficial for migrants and their families, but also for our economies and societies; equally, failure to integrate is costly. The background of shrinking working populations and high labour shortages in many host countries means that further efforts are needed to integrate migrants and their families.

This third edition is a stepping stone towards better informed integration policies. The report can also facilitate co-operation both among countries and between national authorities and a large variety of stakeholders, especially in the EU context where initiatives already exist to promote such co-operation, such as the European Integration Network. The report also points to areas where further work would be particularly useful, for example the recognition of foreign qualifications, support for the transition from school to work, and tackling discrimination. By providing a comprehensive review of the key integration outcomes and challenges and highlighting the opportunities of good integration, we hope that it will provide a contribution to integration policies of EU and OECD countries.



Mathias Cormann,  
OECD Secretary-General



Ylva Johansson,  
European Commissioner for Home Affairs



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# Acronyms and abbreviations

ACS	American Community Survey (United States)
AES	Adult Education Survey (EU)
AHM	Ad-hoc Module
AROPE	At risk of poverty and exclusion
ASEC	Annual Social and Economic Supplement (see CPS)
ASEW	Australian Survey on Education and Work
BMI	Body Mass Index
CASEN	<i>Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional</i> (Chile)
CCHS	Canadian Community Health Survey
CIS	Canadian Income Survey
CPS	Current Population Survey (United States)
EAPS	Economically Active Population Survey of Korean nationals
ECE	<i>Encuesta Continua de Empleo</i> (Costa Rica)
ECEC	Early childhood education and care
EFTA	European Free Trade Agreement (see glossary for details)
EHIS	European Health Interview Survey
ENAHO	<i>Encuesta Nacional de Hogares</i> (Peru)
ENOE	<i>Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo</i> (Mexico)
EPH	<i>Encuesta Permanente de Hogares</i> (Argentina)
EQLS	European Quality of Life Survey
ESCS	Economic, Social and Cultural Status (see glossary for details)
ESS	European Social Survey
EU	European Union (see glossary for details)
Eurostat	Statistical office of the European Union
EVS	European Value Survey
GEIH	<i>Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares</i> (Colombia)
GSOEP	The German Socio-Economic Panel
GSS	General Social Survey
HES	Household Economic Survey (New Zealand)
IHS	Integrated Household Survey (Israel)
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMD	International Migration Database (OECD)
IMO	International Migration Outlook (OECD)
ISCED	International Standard Classification of Education (see glossary for details)
ISCO	International Standard Classification of Occupations (see glossary for details)
LAC	Latin American countries
LFS	Labour Force Survey
NEET	Not in employment, education or training
NHIS	National Health Interview Survey (United States)
NHS	National Health Survey (Australia)
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PISA	Programme of International Student Assessment (OECD)
SIH	Survey of Income and Housing (Australia)
SILC	Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU)
SILCLF	Survey on Immigrants' Living Conditions and Labour Force (Korea)
TCNs	Third country nationals
TFR	Total fertility rate
WVS	World Value Survey

# Executive summary

This publication presents the largest data collection on characteristics and outcomes of immigrants and their children, covering all EU and OECD countries, across 83 indicators covering labour market, education, living conditions, and social integration. These countries are home to a large and increasing number of immigrants, 54 and 141 million foreign-born, respectively, an increase of 20% each over the past decade.

Immigrant populations differ largely across countries in their sizes and lengths of residence, but also their average ages, education levels, languages, concentrations in densely populated areas and predominant entry categories. These differences largely shape integration outcomes.

In most countries and most indicators, immigrants – especially those born outside the EU – and their children lag behind the native-born and their peers with native-born parents. However, there has been substantial progress over the last decade especially in labour market integration of immigrants, despite the disproportionate decline at the onset of the COVID-19 crisis followed by a quick recovery to pre-2020 levels. This improvement is attributable to a mix of factors such as better integration policies, more favourable labour market conditions than a decade ago, and higher educational levels of recent arrivals. In 2020, 39% of immigrants arrived in the five preceding years in the EU were tertiary-educated and 50% in the OECD, compared with 25% and 35%, respectively, ten years earlier. There was also some improvement in the host-country language mastery of recent arrivals in Europe and the United States, where this trend was particularly strong. This is also an area where the improvement of integration outcomes of immigrants along with duration of residence is highly visible, with 70% of immigrants in the EU with ten years of residence or more having at least an advanced proficiency in the host-country language, compared with 40% of recent arrivals (United States: 74% vs. 63%).

While these results are encouraging, immigrants have generally not, however, caught up with the native-born. More than one-third of all foreign-born in the EU have not attained levels beyond primary education, almost twice the proportion among the native-born. What is more, immigrants struggle to find employment where they fully use their skills. Compared to their native-born peers, immigrants with educational tertiary degrees are less likely to work peers in all countries and are more likely to be overqualified for their jobs almost everywhere. However, host-country degrees reduce overqualification differences with the native-born by 75% EU-wide, and by even more in countries outside the EU.

About one in four young people under the age of 35 is either foreign-born or has foreign-born parents. The outcomes of the native-born children of immigrants aged 15 to 34 follow similar trends as those of foreign-born adults. They also reflect inter-generational improvement, notably lower gaps in educational attainment levels compared to their peers with native-born parents than their parents have vis-à-vis their peers. Youth with immigrant parents are catching up in the labour market, and despite the COVID-19 crisis, their employment rates are now generally higher and unemployment rates lower than a decade earlier. Children of immigrants have also improved their PISA reading scores in both the OECD and the EU, while those of their peers with native-born parents have stayed relatively stable, thereby closing part of the gap, which is nevertheless still high in most countries in Latin America and Europe. What is more, participation of children of immigrants in pre-school has risen virtually everywhere, narrowing, or even closing the attendance gap with children of native-born in many countries.

There was also improvement in other areas. Native-born views on migration have become more favourable in most countries over the last decade. However, there has not been significant improvement in living conditions, which remain an area of concern. Fewer foreign- than native-born own their homes and a disproportionately large share lives in substandard conditions. For example, more than one in six immigrants live in overcrowded accommodation in both the OECD and the EU – a rate that is 70% higher than that of the native-born, and the differences have widened over the past decade in EU countries. In four out of five countries, immigrants are also more likely to live below the relative poverty line of their country of residence than the native-born. Income inequality is larger among foreign- than native-born.

In both the EU and the OECD, about 15% of the foreign-born population is over 64 years of age, a smaller share than among the native-born. Nevertheless, elderly migrants are a growing group in most countries, both in absolute terms and as a share of the total immigrant population. Elderly migrants are more likely to live in (relative) poverty than their native-born peers in most countries, and this incidence has increased over the last decade. Poorer living conditions also remain a key challenge for young children with foreign-born parents. In most countries, the poverty rate of children living in immigrant households is at least 50% higher than that of their peers in native-born households.


Immigrants' social integration is a growing concern, but difficult to assess. Immigrants have lower participation in voluntary organisations than the native-born in most countries and are more likely than the native-born to trust the police and legal system in two-thirds of the countries. The perception of discrimination is a key indicator of social cohesion. It has increased over the last decade in the EU, New Zealand and Canada, particularly among women. Moreover, native-born with foreign-born parents are more likely than foreign-born adults to feel discriminated against based on ethnicity in most countries.

In EU countries, public perception about migrants and their contribution in society is often at odds with available evidence. For example, while there was an increase in the share of highly educated among non-EU migrants, this was not perceived as such in most countries. Likewise, in most longstanding immigration destinations in Europe, while the public suggested that the educational outcomes of children of immigrants were declining, these have strongly improved over the last decade.

## Key facts and figures

### Immigrant populations have become more educated in most countries


Increase in share of highly educated immigrants between 2010 and 2020, change in % points



Immigrant women are on average more educated than their male peers.


### Students with immigrant parents perform better than a decade ago in most countries

Change in PISA reading scores shown in equivalent months of schooling (2009 vs. 2018), 15-year-old children of immigrants



### Labour market outcomes for immigrants improve over time


Employment rates of immigrants by duration of stay



Despite starting at lower levels, immigrant women progress more quickly.


### Highly qualified immigrants find it harder to get a job when educated abroad

Employment rates for tertiary-educated immigrants



### Poverty rates for immigrants and their children still far exceed native-born

Relative child poverty rates (%), children under 16 living in immigrant households and native-born households, 2019



This is despite a drop in child poverty rates in 3 out of 5 countries over the past decade.

### Immigrants are much more likely to live in overcrowded housing than native-born

Overcrowding rates across OECD countries



In two-thirds of EU and OECD countries, overcrowding among immigrants is at least twice as likely as among the native-born and the differences have widened over the past decade.



# 1 Indicators of immigrant integration: Overview and challenges

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This chapter lays the foundation for this publication by providing an analytical framework for assessing integration outcomes. Since cross-country differences in such outcomes hinge upon the composition of their foreign-born populations, the chapter presents a classification of EU and OECD countries based on the size and category of entry of the migrant population as well as their experience with immigration. Exploring these country groupings further, it identifies common integration challenges as well as differences between countries in the same peer group. The chapter then charts progress in integration outcomes along key dimensions.

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# In Brief

## International comparisons in integration outcomes can provide important new insights, but require to take due account of the migrant composition

- Immigrant populations are growing across EU and OECD countries. Together with their descendants, they account for an increasing share of the total population of the host countries. In the EU, nearly one-quarter of the population aged 15 years and above have at least one foreign-born grandparent.
- International comparisons provide policy makers with benchmarks so that they can compare results in their own country with those of other countries. They also highlight common integration challenges and can reveal aspects of integration that are not visible in national data.
- As differences in integration outcomes between countries depends largely on the composition of the foreign-born population, EU and OECD countries can be classified into 13 peer groups based on the size and category of entry of the migrant population as well as their experience with immigration.

## There has been progress in the integration of immigrants on several fronts, but living conditions remain a challenge

- In most areas, immigrants and their children tend to have worse economic and social outcomes than the native-born and their respective children, but gaps tend to narrow across generations and the longer immigrants stay in the country. In particular, the integration of humanitarian and family migrants, who generally arrive with weak attachments to the labour market, takes time.
- Over the past decade, the labour market integration of immigrants has improved as well as the educational outcomes of children of immigrants. Despite this progress, the living conditions of immigrants are not always more favourable than they were a decade ago.
- Between 2011 and 2021, the employment rates of recent arrivals have risen in over two-thirds of countries. The better labour market performance of recent migrants is partly attributable to their higher educational attainment compared with previous cohorts: nearly half were educated to tertiary level in 2020 in the OECD, against less than one-third 10 years earlier.

## 1.1. The importance of accurate data on the integration of immigrants and their children for an informed policy debate

The integration of immigrants and their children continues to be high on the policy agenda across EU and OECD countries. Partly as a response to the surge in inflows during the recent refugee crises of 2015/16 and 2022, many countries have updated and stepped up their integration programmes in recent years. At the same time, the recent widespread labour shortages sparked efforts to draw in additional foreign workers and further stimulated the competition for global talent. While much of the policy attention is focused on the integration of new arrivals, in many countries, they account for only a small share of the overall foreign-born population, which faces itself many integration challenges. Indeed, looking at different indicators of integration, immigrants who have resided in the country for many years as well as their children continue to lag behind the native-born and their respective children in most OECD and EU countries.

Integration of immigrants and their children helps to build inclusive and cohesive societies. It enables migrants to fully participate in society and fosters acceptance for further migration among host societies. Indeed, successful integration is a two-way process, as enshrined in the EU Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion 2021-27. This publication defines integration as the ability of immigrants to achieve the same social and economic outcomes as the native-born, while taking into account their characteristics.

It is crucial to provide policy makers and the public with solid evidence, properly assess integration outcomes and address the obstacles that stand in the way of successful integration and to tackle disinformation. Although integration indicators strongly depend on the composition of the immigrant population and are therefore generally not in themselves a good indication of the effect of integration policies, they enable policy makers to identify challenges, set clear goals and evaluate progress. This chapter discusses the benefits of developing monitoring tools of integration at the international level. It then presents a classification of OECD and EU countries with respect to the size and category of entry of the migrant population as well as their experience with immigration. Lastly, it summarises in a comparative overview some core indicators as well as their evolution over the last decade. As the latest data available at the time of writing is from 2021, the impact of historic outflow of people from Ukraine is not yet captured in the integration indicators in this publication.

### **1.1.1. What is the target population?**

This report defines immigrants as the foreign-born population (see also Box 1.1 on the definition of EU-born). Indeed, while citizenship can change over time, the place of birth cannot. In addition, conditions for obtaining host-country citizenship vary widely, hampering international comparisons. In countries that are more liberal in this respect – such as the countries characterised by migrant settlement, as well as Japan, Korea, Mexico and Türkiye – most foreign nationals may naturalise after five years of residence. Some European countries, such as Sweden, also have relatively favourable requirements for some groups. By contrast, many native-born with foreign-born parents are not citizens of their country of birth in several Central and Eastern European countries and in the German-speaking countries.

### Box 1.1. EU-born and EU mobile citizens

This publication uses the term “EU-born” when referring to a person born in the EU/EFTA area who settles in another EU/EFTA country. This definition is based on the country of birth and differs from the term “EU mobile citizens”, which is based on citizenship and refers to EU citizens residing in another EU member country. In practice, there is a significant overlap between both groups. Out of the about 15 million EU-born and the 12 million EU mobile citizens in the EU, 9.5 million belong to both groups.

However, more than one-third of the individuals born in another EU country (that is, more than 5 million persons) have host-country citizenship and are consequently EU-born but not EU mobile citizens. Furthermore, since EU citizenship is not unconditionally conferred to a person born in the EU, there is also a small group of around 300 000 individuals who were born in another EU member country but are third-country nationals.

At the same time, there are nearly 1 million people born outside the EU who have citizenship of an EU member country (either by birth or due to naturalisation) but currently reside in another EU member country. As a consequence, these individuals are EU mobile citizens but not EU-born. Likewise, nearly 2 million people with the nationality of another EU member state were born in their current country of residence and are therefore EU mobile citizens but not EU-born.

When it comes to defining children of immigrants, most countries consider them as native-born with at least one foreign-born parent, although occasionally this also refers to native-born with foreign nationality. Most countries have little information on native-born with foreign-born parents because information on parental origin is rarely collected. This report avoids the widely used term “second generation migrant” as this term suggests that the immigrant status is perpetuated across generations. It is also factually wrong since the persons concerned are not immigrants but native-born. Similarly, it avoids the term “people with a migrant background” – a term that is often used to encompass both immigrants and their native-born descendants. Indeed, the issues involved in the integration of persons born abroad – especially for those who migrated as adults – and of children of immigrants raised and educated in the host country differ greatly.

There are many reasons why the outcomes of immigrants – particularly those who arrived as adults – tend to differ from those of the native-born population. They have been raised and educated in an environment and often in a language that may be different from that of their host country. Although some of these issues may affect their full integration, they generally become less of a hindrance the longer migrants reside in the host country. The situation of people who are foreign-born but arrived as children when they were still of mandatory schooling age is different from those who came as adults. Indeed, for the latter, certain key characteristics such as educational attainment are barely influenced by integration policy (as education has been acquired abroad), and thus should not be considered as indicators of integration. In contrast, educational attainment is a key indicator for those who arrived as children or are native-born with foreign-born parents.


Finally, issues are also very different when it comes to the native-born with foreign-born parents.<sup>1</sup> As they have been raised and educated in the host country, they should not be facing the same obstacles as their foreign-born parents. In many respects, the outcomes of the native-born offspring with foreign-born parents are thus a better measurement for integration than the outcomes of the foreign-born.

Figure 1.1 provides an overview of the populations that are either foreign-born themselves or have one or two foreign-born parents. The former group is broken down into those who arrived as adults and those who arrived as children during mandatory school age (i.e. before the age of 15). Based on household survey data, around one in seven people living in the EU (see Box 1.2) and one in nine in the OECD is

foreign-born, 54 million and 142 million, respectively. Among these, around one-quarter arrived before the age of 15 in the OECD, a share that is slightly higher in the EU (29%). Native-born with at least one foreign-born parent account for roughly 7% of the total population in the EU and the OECD – around 28 million and 91 million, respectively. While in the United States, United Kingdom and Israel, the majority of the native-born with foreign-born parents have two immigrant parents, in the EU, most are of mixed parentage, i.e. one native-born and one foreign-born parent. Taken together, around one in five are either foreign-born themselves or have at least one foreign-born parent in the EU, a share that is slightly lower in the OECD.

**Figure 1.1. Immigrants and native-born with foreign-born parents**

Total population, 2021 or most recent year



Notes: In Japan, Korea, Mexico and Türkiye, the estimates for immigrant offspring are based on the share observed in PISA 2003 (among the 15-34 native-born) and PISA 2018 (among the less than 15 years old native-born). In Colombia, Costa Rica and Chile, the estimates for immigrant offspring are based on the share observed in PISA 2009 (among the 15-34 native-born) and PISA 2018 (among the less than 15 years old native-born).

StatLink  <https://stat.link/yjr4zi>

Further notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLink.


Immigrants account for around half of the population in Luxembourg, nearly two-fifths in Switzerland and one-third in Australia and New Zealand. At the other end of the spectrum, less than one-tenth of the population is foreign-born in most Central and Eastern European countries, the Asian OECD countries and the Latin American OECD countries. Immigrants outnumber native-born with at least one foreign-born parent in all countries except for some Central and Eastern European countries, as well as Mexico, France and Israel. Overall, half of the population in Australia, Switzerland and Israel and over 70% in Luxembourg are either foreign-born or have at least one foreign-born parent. In other longstanding European destinations, that share ranges between one- and two-fifths. By contrast, in the Latin American countries (except Costa Rica), the Asian countries as well as most Central and Eastern European countries, less than one in ten of the population belong to this group.

### Box 1.2. Methodological note on the treatment of the United Kingdom in the EU context

Due to the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU, the country is no longer included in EU averages and EU totals in this edition. Furthermore, this publication considers immigrants born in the United Kingdom as non-EU born. In a similar vein, UK citizens residing in EU member states are considered third-country nationals (TCNs). However, as they were EU mobile citizens before 2020 and most surveys do not provide detailed information on the country of birth, it is not possible to include them among TCNs in earlier years. While this creates a bias in some time comparisons (see Chapter 8), the impact is limited as UK citizens residing abroad only account for 3.5% of all TCNs in the EU. The proportion is much higher in Ireland, though, which was therefore excluded from all time comparisons in Chapter 8.

Figure 1.2. Immigrants and native-born with at least one foreign-born grandparent

15-year-olds and above, 2021



StatLink  <https://stat.link/i1n4p6>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLink.

While many household surveys collect data on immigrants and their descendants, little is known about the grandchildren of immigrants.<sup>2</sup> For the first time, a special Eurobarometer 519, launched by the European Commission in 2021, allows to estimate their share among EU citizens. Assuming that all TCNs have at least one foreign-born grandparent and adding this share to that of EU citizens with at least one foreign-born grandparent, one finds that in the EU, nearly one-quarter of the population aged 15 years and above have at least one foreign-born grandparent (Figure 1.2). Around half of them were born outside of the EU. In Luxembourg and Latvia, around four-fifths and two-thirds of the population in this age range have at least one foreign-born grandparent, respectively. Shares are also large in longstanding European destinations (except for the Netherlands), where they account for over one-third.

### 1.1.2. How is integration measured?

This publication assesses integration outcomes and their changes over time in relative terms, that is by comparing outcomes of immigrants with those of the native-born (Chapters 2 to 6), the outcomes of the native-born children with foreign-born parents with those of their peers with native-born parents (Chapter 7) as well as TCNs with nationals of the country of residence in Europe (Chapter 8). These indicators are easy to understand and can help to better identify integration challenges. However, they are influenced by the composition of the immigrant population as well as a broad set of circumstances and policies and do not necessarily reflect successes or failures of policy. Indeed, integration policy is just one factor among many and its weight may depend on the country. To properly assess the impact of integration policy, other measures are needed (see Box 1.3).

#### Box 1.3. Assessing integration policy through monitoring and analysis

Target indicators are a common way to measure the success of a specific integration policy. They provide readily available policy targets or benchmarks for a specific group in a pre-defined time horizon. An example would be the aim of lowering the unemployment rate among migrants by 2 percentage points by 2025 in a country in which joblessness is more prevalent among migrants.

Satisfaction surveys among a pre-defined group of beneficiaries are a common way to assess the success of a specific policy designed to reach such targets. While these are relatively easy to administer, they are not an objective measure of effectiveness. What is more, opinions tend to be influenced by many factors not related to the programme objectives.


A more objective way of measuring and monitoring the effect of a policy are ex-ante and ex-post comparisons of outcomes. However, labour market outcomes, for example, may be influenced by overall economic conditions as well as other policy measures (e.g. other labour market policy interventions). Comparing the change in outcomes over time with the change among a comparison group with the same characteristics not affected by the policy can partly control for this. Yet, this method is not free of bias either. In particular, selection effects in programme participation as well as selective dropouts can bias results. More complex study designs, such as randomised control trials, different pre- versus post-programme cut-off times as well as regional pilots, can help to minimise these biases and other confounding factors.

The two most common ways of measuring the outcomes of a target group against those of a reference group are: i) as differences in outcomes (mainly expressed in percentage points, since most indicators are shares or rates) and ii) as a ratio between the two outcomes.

Figure 1.3 depicts the share of low-educated immigrants and native-born. It shows how different measurement methods can yield different country rankings. In this example, the ratio between the share of low-educated immigrants and that of the native-born is comparatively large in Japan and Greece, with immigrants being around twice as likely to be low-educated as the native-born. When it comes to the difference in shares, the ranking of Greece gets even worse, while Japan finds itself in the middle of the distribution. Although both measurements assess differences in the share of low-educated immigrants and native-born, ratios disregard magnitude. In fact, whereas the share of low-educated immigrants in Greece is one of the highest across the OECD, Japan is among the countries with the lowest share. This report consequently presents indicators both as absolute values and discusses differences in percentage points, but rarely as ratios.

Figure 1.3. Comparison of the share of low-educated foreign-and native-born

15-64 year-olds not in education, 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/dfa8q6>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLink.



## 1.2. The added value of international comparison


International comparisons bring much added value to indicators at the national level. Specifically, they:

- a) Provide benchmarks for performance

International comparisons allow countries to compare their outcomes to others. They can provide benchmarks for national performance and help interpret the magnitude of differences. For example, as shown in Figure 1.4, looking at the national level alone is not sufficient to determine whether a 4-percentage point gap in overcrowding rates (see Indicator 4.5 for a detailed definition) between immigrants and the native-born in the United Kingdom is wide or not. However, a comparison at the international level helps to put things into perspective. It shows that the gap in the United Kingdom is narrower than in virtually all other longstanding destinations.

**Figure 1.4. Overcrowding rates at the national and international level in longstanding destinations**

16-year-olds and above, 2020



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

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLink.

- b) Identify common integration challenges

International comparisons also highlight common challenges across countries that are related to the nature of the migration process rather than the host-country specific context. For example, compared with the native-born, immigrants are more exposed to poverty virtually everywhere (Figure 1.5). Socio-economic backgrounds of foreign-born populations vary widely between countries and can only partly account for discrepancies in poverty rates between both groups. Specific labour market obstacles migrants face, such as linguistic barriers and a devaluation of foreign credentials, as well as limited access to social benefits and potentially discrimination can also contribute to higher poverty rates among immigrants.

Figure 1.5. Relative poverty rates

16-year-olds and above, 2020

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
Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLink.

## c) Identify issues that are not visible in national data

International comparisons can also help identify issues that are not visible in national data, notably when there are strong correlations between immigrant presence and other factors of disadvantage. Especially in Europe, it is commonly claimed, for example, that concentrations of immediate descendants of immigrants in the same schools risk impairing the overall educational performance of those schools. Results based on data from the OECD Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) show that in Europe, where immigrant parents are strongly overrepresented among the low-educated, students' educational outcomes tend to be lower when they find themselves in schools with high shares of children of immigrants (Figure 1.6). However, in some OECD countries such as Australia, Canada and Israel, where immigrants are overrepresented among the highly educated, children perform better when they find themselves in schools with many children of immigrants. What emerges in contrast is that, in all countries, children's academic performance is systematically lower in schools with high proportions of children with a low-educated mother. OECD-wide, they lag almost two years behind their peers in schools with few of such students. This can be attributable chiefly to the strong impact mothers' education has on the academic achievements of her children. In this case, international comparisons help target the real problem related to low educational performance: not the high concentration of children of immigrants as such, but the concentration of children with low-educated mothers.

**Figure 1.6. Academic performance by concentration of pupils with at least one foreign-born parent and a low-educated mother**

Difference in PISA mean scores for 15-year-old pupils in schools above the 75/25% threshold and those in schools below the 75/25% threshold, 2018



StatLink  <https://stat.link/xqm7u8>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

### 1.3. Classifying immigrant destination countries

To interpret integration outcomes, differences in the composition of the foreign-born populations between countries must be considered. In particular, the reason for migration tends to have a strong bearing on outcomes. Humanitarian migrants, for example, face specific hurdles when entering the labour market. Due to the forced nature of their migration, they generally have had no time to prepare for their stay, suffer from psychological stress and have, if any, only a weak attachment to the host country. By contrast, labour migrants are often already selected based on their skills and/or their job in the host country and fare much better in the labour market, especially initially (see Figure 1.7 and also Figure 1.11 below).

Yet, information on the reason for migration has been barely collected in household surveys, until recently. From 2021 onwards, the EU-LFS includes a question on the reason for migration biennially, which allows to present integration outcomes for different migrant groups in the EU. Outside of the EU, only few countries collect data on immigrants' legal grounds of stay (e.g. Korea) or are able to link household surveys with their residence permit databases (e.g. Canada), which might differ from the self-reported reason for migration.


As shown in Figure 1.7, in virtually every European country, employment rates are highest for labour migrants, while humanitarian migrants tend to be the least likely to be employed. Migrants who arrive to join family members only slightly outperform humanitarian migrants across the EU, despite an allegedly stronger attachment to the host country.

These and other contextual information are crucial to the proper interpretation of immigrants' outcomes and observed differences with native-born populations. OECD countries vary widely in the size and composition of their immigrant populations depending on, inter alia, geographical, historical, linguistic, and policy factors. For example, while humanitarian migrants and their families make up a large proportion of

the migrant population in Sweden, this share is much lower in countries such as Australia, Canada, or the United Kingdom.

**Figure 1.7. Employment rates of the foreign-born by reason for migration in the EU**

15-64 year-olds, 2021



Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

Recently, the historic outflow of people from Ukraine has had a significant effect on the composition of the migrant population in several countries (see Box 1.4). Notably the Central and Eastern European countries, which were predominantly receiving labour migrants in the past, saw a strong rise in the number of humanitarian migrants. As the latest data available at the time of writing is from 2021, the impact of these intakes is not yet captured in the integration indicators in this publication.

#### Box 1.4. Initial evidence on the integration of refugees from Ukraine

Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, which began on 24 February 2022, has triggered a massive displacement towards OECD countries. As of April 2023, more than 4.7 million Ukrainians had registered for temporary protection in the EU alone. About a million more have moved on, or are foreseen to do so to OECD non-EU countries, notably Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States, Türkiye, and Israel. Despite the uncertainty surrounding their length of stay, many refugees have reached their final destination and are starting to integrate into host societies.

OECD countries responded swiftly to the crisis, granting immigration concessions, and extending different types of support and assistance to the new arrivals. These have included financial assistance and emergency shelter as well as access to education and healthcare.

In most host countries, refugees from Ukraine have also been granted immediate and full labour market access and they benefit from labour market integration support measures, generally provided by Public Employment Services. Furthermore, tight labour markets, pre-existing networks of Ukrainian immigrants and the refugees' relatively high educational attainment favour their labour market

integration. Considering these factors, refugees from Ukraine have been quicker to find employment than other refugee groups in many host countries. Nine months after the beginning of Russia's war of aggression, over 40% were already employed in the Netherlands, Lithuania, Estonia, and the United Kingdom. Elsewhere, the share was lower, but is nevertheless increasing.


Despite their relatively swift entry into the labour market, early evidence suggests that this has often come at the cost of finding jobs at an appropriate skill level. In Spain, for example, where nearly two-thirds of adult refugees are highly educated, only around one in seven is employed in a highly skilled profession. Highly skilled jobs often have substantial entry barriers, requiring potentially lengthy recognition procedures and country-specific qualifications, as well as language skills. Only few Ukrainian refugees report speaking the language of their host country, at least in non-English speaking countries, and many perceive the lack of language skills as a major obstacle in their job search. As a large share of the refugees from Ukraine are mothers with young children, the availability of childcare is also crucial for supporting employment take-up at skills-appropriate levels.

Besides supporting the refugees' entry into the labour market, host countries have also made substantial efforts to scale up their classroom and teaching capacities to accommodate for Ukrainian children. As children account for one-third of all refugee inflows, this has been one of the priorities on the integration policy agenda in most host countries. The number of children attending host-country schools increased substantially at the beginning of the 2022-23 school year, yet available data suggests differences between countries. In November 2022, more than two-thirds of minors were enrolled in Ireland and the Netherlands, but the enrolment levels were only around one-third in Poland. Often this is because Ukrainian students continue to follow the Ukrainian curriculum remotely. However, while distance learning helped to ensure educational continuity for children in the early months of displacement, it can have a more negative impact on their integration longer term.

Source: OECD (2023), "What we know about the skills and early labour market outcomes of refugees from Ukraine", <https://doi.org/10.1787/c7e694aa-en>.

Based on the size and category of entry (labour, family, humanitarian, free mobility) of the migrant population as well as the experience with immigration – all of which shape integration outcomes –, OECD and EU destinations are classified into 13 peer groups with similar structural compositions of their foreign-born populations (Figure 1.8). These peer groups tend to face similar integration challenges, rendering international comparisons between them particularly valuable. Others show rather diverse outcomes as factors not considered in the grouping, such as the size and strength of the economy, also influence integration outcomes. As any classification requires some degree of simplification, it is impossible to accommodate all drivers of complex integration processes. Figure 1.9 shows the outcomes of key indicators across peer groups, and their evolution over time, in a synthetic way.

Figure 1.8. Classification of OECD and EU countries as immigrant destinations according to the characteristics of the foreign-born population, 2021



StatLink <https://stat.link/w0fh65>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

### ***Group 1.1: Settlement countries with selected skills criteria (Australia, Canada, New Zealand)***

These countries are characterised by migrant settlement and immigration is considered part of their national heritage. On average, around one-quarter of the population is composed of immigrants, in addition to around one-sixth who have at least one foreign-born parent. Immigration policies in these countries mainly focus on attracting labour migrants who meet the skilled labour market needs of their economies. As a result, labour migrants and their accompanying family members constitute the bulk of their foreign-born populations. Furthermore, due to longstanding selective immigration, the average share of tertiary-educated migrants exceeds not only that of the native-born population but also that of the foreign-born populations in virtually all other countries. It has grown considerably in Australia and Canada over the last decade and amounts to 60% and 66%, respectively.

Immigrants generally show favourable outcomes in settlement countries (see Figure 1.9). As they are mostly highly educated labour migrants and their families, they fare well in the labour market, are in good health and are less likely to be affected by poverty or live in overcrowded dwellings than immigrants in most other countries. Although they have generally not fully caught up with their native-born peers (with certain exceptions), gaps tend to be narrower than in the OECD overall (see Box 1.5). In addition, more than four-fifths of migrants with ten years of residence or more have obtained host-country citizenship in these countries, a much larger share than in most other OECD countries, where the acquisition of citizenship is more difficult. The high educational attainment of immigrants also seems to benefit their children. Unlike in most other countries, the native-born with foreign-born parents in this country group outperform their counterparts with native-born parents in school and in the labour market.

### ***Group 1.2: Settlement countries with other criteria (Israel, the United States)***

As in the former peer group, settlement has been a constituent element of nation-building in these countries. Immigrants make up one-fifth of the Israeli population and one-seventh of the American one. The vast majority are settled migrants with at least 10 years of residence in the host country (around five-sixths and three-fourths in Israel and the United States, respectively). Israel encourages migration of the Jewish diaspora, while family reunification is an important principle guiding immigration policy in the United States. As a result, nearly two-thirds of permanent immigrants in the United States have moved primarily for family reasons.

Despite a lower share of labour migrants than in the countries included in Group 1.1, immigrants (and their children) boast favourable labour market outcomes, and a comparatively large share is highly educated (43% in the United States and 56% in Israel). Yet, these migrants face difficulties in finding employment commensurate with their qualifications. Around one-third of those in employment are overqualified. In Israel, highly educated migrants are roughly twice as likely to be overqualified as their native-born peers. What is more, migrants still lag behind the native-born in the United States in terms of living conditions.

### ***Group 2.1: Long-standing European destinations with predominantly EU-born/EU mobile citizens (Luxembourg, Switzerland)***

These countries attract large numbers of highly educated labour migrants from the EU/EFTA area. While immigration is longstanding, there have been particularly significant inflows of tertiary-educated migrants over the past decade. As a result, migrants with less than 10 years of residence in the host country account for at least two-fifths of the immigrant populations in these countries.

Due to the high share of labour and free movement migrants (77% in Switzerland and 88% in Luxembourg among permanent flows over the last 15 years), the labour market outcomes of immigrants are generally good. More than 72% of the foreign-born are employed and overqualification rates are among the lowest in the OECD. However, living conditions of migrants are less favourable. Notably, immigrants

disproportionately face challenges in finding adequate housing and depict higher relative poverty rates. In a similar vein, the educational and labour market outcomes of native-born with foreign-born parents lag well behind those of their peers with native-born parents. Furthermore, despite some improvements over the last decade, citizenship acquisition rates among migrants with at least ten years of residence remain low.

***Group 2.2: Long-standing European destinations with predominantly non-EU migrants and a significant share of EU-born/EU mobile citizens (Austria, Belgium, Germany, the United Kingdom)***

Since the 1950s, active “guest worker” policies in these countries attracted predominantly low-educated migrants from countries such as the former Yugoslavia, Türkiye, and Morocco, who carried out unskilled labour during the Post World War II economic expansion. Rather than staying temporarily, as initially foreseen, many of these immigrants eventually settled with their families. The United Kingdom is the exception in this group, as it received better educated labour migrants from its former colonies without having implemented “guest worker” programmes. Since the 1990s, most of these countries have also received significant inflows of humanitarian migrants, in particular Germany and Austria. Due to a surge in humanitarian migration in 2015/2016 as well as continuous inflows of EU mobility migrants over the last decade, the percentage of the foreign-born relative to the total population has grown in these countries. As of 2020, around two in five migrants have resided in their host country for less than ten years. Unlike in the first two groups, the share of highly educated migrants ranges only between 26 and 34% in these countries. However, among EU-born, at least two-fifths are tertiary-educated (except for Germany, where less than one-third is tertiary-educated). Education levels are higher among all migrants in the United Kingdom, where around half hold a tertiary degree.

Although these countries host significant shares of labour migrants or accompanying family members (including those who arrived through free mobility), immigrants’ employment rates are much lower than those of the native-born. Gaps are entirely driven by non-EU migrants and amount to at least 6 percentage points, except for the United Kingdom, where gaps are inexistent. Especially non-EU women face difficulties in the labour market and fare much worse than both non-EU men and their native-born peers. Disadvantages related to the low educational attainment of immigrant parents have often been passed on to their children, who have much lower educational and labour market outcomes than their peers with native-born parents (except for the United Kingdom again). Immigrants in these countries are also more likely to be poor, live in inadequate housing or report poor health compared with their native-born peers, although gaps are much smaller in Germany and the United Kingdom. In Belgium, despite a large share of EU-born, outcomes of immigrants and their children resemble more those in group 2.3 below than those in Austria, Germany and the United Kingdom.

***Group 2.3: Long-standing European destinations with predominantly non-EU migrants (France, the Netherlands)***

Like the countries in group 2.2, France and the Netherlands adopted guest worker programmes to alleviate (unskilled) labour shortages during the post-war economic boom. In addition to these flows, they received significant numbers of labour and family migrants from their previous colonies, resulting in a predominantly non-EU migrant population. Many migrants (nearly 70% in France and 78% in the Netherlands) settled in urban areas with shares continuing to grow. In contrast to countries in Group 2.2, recent arrivals make up only a small share of the immigrant population. As a result, around three-quarters of the foreign-born have resided in their host country for 10 years or more, and the vast majority of these (62% in France and 75% in the Netherlands) hold the citizenship of their host country.

Integration challenges resemble those of peer group 2.2 and are partly linked to the low educational attainment of a significant proportion (over one-quarter in the Netherlands and one-third in France) of the



foreign-born population. Specifically, immigrants experience worse labour market outcomes than the native-born with wide gaps in employment rates (7 percentage points in France and 16 in the Netherlands). Similarly, relative poverty, housing problems and health issues are much more widespread among immigrants than the native-born with widening disparities over the last decade. The native-born youth with foreign-born parents also tend to fare much worse in school and the labour market than their peers with native-born parents.

***Group 3.1: More recent destinations with a significant share of humanitarian migrants (Denmark, Norway, Sweden)***

Since the 1990s, humanitarian migration has been an important driver of migration to these countries and has led to a growing diversity in terms of countries of origin. However, EU/EFTA free mobility and labour migrants still constitute the bulk of the migrant population (except for Sweden), accounting for more than three-fifths of the permanent immigration flows to Denmark and Norway over the last 15 years. Due to growing numbers of labour and free mobility migrants, as well as a surge in humanitarian migration in the aftermath of the Syrian crisis in 2015/2016 (although to a lesser extent in Denmark), the foreign-born share of the populations in these countries has increased by over one-third over the last decade, amounting to on average 16% in 2021. Consequently, nearly half of all migrants have resided in their host countries for less than 10 years and even around one-quarter for less than five years. At least two in five migrants hold a tertiary degree, a share that rose in the decade up to 2020 and is now similar to that of the native-born.

Humanitarian migrants and their families as well as recent non-EU migrants are particularly vulnerable when it comes to their labour market integration and generally fall short of the high economic outcomes of the native-born. As elsewhere, these groups perform poorly in the labour market and experience higher relative poverty rates and worse housing conditions than the native-born. The same holds true for the native-born with foreign-born parents, who lag behind their peers with native-born parents in school and the labour market. Despite these issues, social integration as well as native-born attitudes towards immigration are more favourable than in most other European countries. For example, immigrants who are eligible are much more likely to vote in national elections, show higher trust in the police and the legal system and are more likely to volunteer than immigrants elsewhere. Furthermore, in Sweden, six in seven settled migrants hold the Swedish nationality, while citizenship acquisition rates are much lower in Denmark and Norway.

***Group 3.2: More recent destinations with a significant share of labour migrants (Costa Rica, Greece, Italy, Korea, Portugal, Spain)***

Labour and family migrants account for the bulk of the foreign-born population in these countries. In the Southern European countries, economic growth coupled with fertility decline resulted in labour shortages in low-skilled jobs from the mid-1980s onwards up to the global financial crisis, which were filled by non-European and later also Central and Eastern European migrants. During the same period, in Costa Rica, political stability and favourable economic conditions attracted a growing number of low-educated labour migrants, mainly from Nicaragua and other neighbouring countries. On average, migrants make up around 11% of the respective populations of these countries. In Korea, which receives high numbers of temporary labour migrants, the share is much lower and stands at around 4%.

In Costa Rica, Greece and Italy, immigrants are overrepresented at the lower end of the educational spectrum. Only around one in six hold a tertiary degree. By contrast, following significant growth over the past decade, this share is much larger in Portugal, Korea and Spain, where it stands at around one-third. While overall employment levels of immigrants are similar to or higher than those of the native-born (except Greece and Spain), migrants with a tertiary degree face difficulties in putting their skills fully into practice. They are much less likely to be employed than their native-born peers and those who predominantly work in positions below their skill level. Immigrants are also much more likely to work part-time, hold a temporary

contract or work overtime than the native-born. They also lag behind in terms of living conditions, facing poverty rates roughly twice as high as the native-born as well as much more pronounced housing overcrowding rates. These problems are passed on to their children, who show poor labour market outcomes, both in absolute terms and relative to their peers with native-born parents. Portugal is an outlier in this regard. Due to substantial improvements in integration outcomes over the last decade, gaps between immigrants and the native-born in overcrowding rates are much narrower and the poverty gap even reversed (in favour of migrants). In contrast to the other countries in this peer group, settled migrants in Portugal are also much more likely to acquire citizenship.

***Group 3.3: More recent destinations with predominantly EU-born/EU mobile citizens (Cyprus, Iceland, Ireland, Malta)***

These countries recorded large inflows of labour migrants over the last decade, predominantly from the EU/EFTA area. Around one-third of the foreign-born in Iceland and Ireland have been living in the host country for less than 10 years, while shares in Malta and Cyprus even reach 50 and 60%, respectively. In contrast to the previous group, around two in five migrants are tertiary educated, with an even larger proportion in Ireland (56%).

Partly linked to the advantageous socio-economic background of immigrants, differences in labour market performance and living conditions are generally marginal in these countries, if any. Yet results vary between countries and there are country-specific integration challenges in certain domains. For example, highly educated immigrants experience high incidences of overqualification in Iceland and Malta, where they are, respectively, roughly four and three times more likely to work in a job below their qualification level than the native-born. Furthermore, in Cyprus, migrants are around twice as often affected by relative poverty as the native-born. In Iceland, native-born children of immigrants face difficulties integrating into the school system, with half lacking basic reading skills at the age of 15.

***Group 4.1: Emerging destinations with a foreign-born population traditionally shaped by border changes and/or by national minorities and with a recent growing share of foreign-born (Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovak Republic, Slovenia)***

The foreign-born population in these Central and Eastern European countries has been shaped by national minorities originating from neighbouring countries (as in Hungary) and border changes, mainly related to nation-building in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century. As a result, citizenship acquisition rates among settled migrants are among the highest in the OECD. In recent years, countries in this group have also witnessed significant inflows of predominantly labour migrants from Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. Accordingly, recent migrants (with less than 10 years of residence) account for around one-third of the migrant population, with an even larger share in Bulgaria (41%). Despite growing inflows, immigrants still make up a relatively small proportion of the overall population (less than 7%), except for Slovenia, where every seventh person is foreign-born. The share of migrants holding a university degree rose in all four countries but still varies widely, ranging from 18% in Slovenia to 52% in Bulgaria.

Similarly, integration outcomes are heterogenous. In Hungary, immigrants (and their native-born children) fare well in the labour market and enjoy living conditions that are broadly similar to those of the native-born. This is also the case in the Slovak Republic, albeit to a lesser extent. By contrast, in Bulgaria, they struggle integrating into the labour market and in Slovenia, they are disproportionately affected by relative poverty and poor housing conditions.

Figure 1.9. Overview of integration outcomes of the foreign-born population and their native-born offspring

				Employment rate		Over-qualification		Poverty rate		Overcrowding rate		Health status		Acquisition of nationality		PISA scores		
				Foreign-born	2021/2011	Foreign-born	2021/2011	Foreign-born	2020/2010	Foreign-born	2020/2010	Foreign-born	2020/2010	Foreign-born (gap with OECD average)	2020/2010	Native-born offspring of foreign-born	2018/2009	
Longstanding destinations (more than 50 years of significant migration flows)	Settlement countries	With selected skills criteria	Australia	○	○	○	-	+	+	+	○	..	..	+	○	+	○	
			Canada	○	+	+	..	○	+	+	..	+	○	+	○	+	+	+
			New Zealand	+	..	○	+	+	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	+	+	+
		With other criteria	Israel	+	..	-	..	+	+	..	..	..	..	..	..	+	○	○
			United States	+	+	+	+	○	○	○	+	○	○	+	+	+	+	+
	Longstanding European destinations	With predominantly EU-born/ EU mobile citizens	Luxembourg	+	+	+	○	-	-	○	○	○	+	-	+	-	+	-
			Switzerland	-	○	+	+	○	○	○	-	-	+	-	○	-	-	-
		With predominantly non-EU migrants and a significant share of EU-born/ EU mobile citizens	Austria	-	○	○	-	-	○	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	+
			Belgium	-	+	+	+	-	+	○	-	-	○	○	○	○	-	○
			Germany	-	+	○	-	+	+	○	○	○	○	-	○	-	-	+
United Kingdom			○	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	○	-	○	-	+	○	○	
With predominantly non-EU migrants	France	-	+	+	○	-	-	○	-	-	○	○	○	○	○	+	+	
	Netherlands	-	+	○	○	-	-	○	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	
More recent destinations (20 to 50 years of significant migration flows)	With a significant share of humanitarian migrants	Denmark	-	+	○	-	-	○	-	○	-	○	..	-	-	-	○	
		Norway	-	○	-	-	-	-	○	-	+	+	○	-	-	○	○	
		Sweden	-	+	○	+	-	-	-	-	..	..	+	+	-	+	+	
	With a significant share of labour migrants	Costa Rica	+	..	-	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	○	..	
		Greece	○	-	-	+	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	-	+	○	-	
		Italy	○	○	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	○	○	
		Korea	○	-	○	-	..	..	-	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		Portugal	+	+	..	..	+	+	○	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	○	
	Spain	○	+	-	○	-	○	-	○	-	-	-	-	-	○	○		
	With predominantly EU-born/EU mobile citizens	Cyprus	○	○	○	+	-	○	+	○	+	○	-	-	-	..	..	
Iceland		○	○	-	-	○	+	○	○	○	○	..	..	+	+	-		
Ireland		+	+	○	+	○	-	○	-	○	-	○	-	-	+	○		
Malta		+	+	-	-	+	+	+	○	+	+	○	-	○	+	..		
Emerging destinations (less than 20 years of significant migration flows)	With a foreign-born population shaped by border changes and/or by national minorities	With a growing share of foreign-born	Bulgaria	-	..	..	..	+	○	-	-	+	+	..	..	..	..	
			Hungary	+	+	+	○	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	○	+	-	
			Slovak Republic	+	+	○	-	+	+	+	-	○	-	+	+	○	..	
		Slovenia	-	+	○	-	○	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	○	+	
	With a declining share of foreign-born	Croatia	○	+	+	+	○	○	+	+	+	+	+	+	○	○	+	
		Estonia	○	+	-	..	○	-	+	+	-	+	-	+	○	+	+	
		Latvia	○	+	+	+	○	-	+	+	○	○	-	+	+	+	○	
		Lithuania	-	+	○	-	+	-	+	+	○	-	+	○	+	○	○	
	With recent significant humanitarian migration flows	Chile	+	..	-	..	+	..	+	..	+	..	..	..	..	..	+	
		Colombia	+	..	..	..	+	..	-	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		Finland	-	+	○	..	○	+	○	-	○	-	○	-	-	-	-	
		Türkiye	-	-	+	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
	With recent significant labour migration flows	Czech Republic	+	+	○	-	+	○	○	○	○	○	-	○	-	○	+	
		Japan	○	+	+	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
Poland		+	+	○	-	○	○	+	-	○	○	..	..	..	..			
With predominantly national returnees born abroad	Mexico	-	○	+	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	-	○		
	Romania	-	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	-	-	..	..	..		

Note: 2018/2021: “+/-”: immigrant or native-born offspring outcomes (compared with native-born or native-born with native-born parents) are more/ less favourable than on average in the OECD; “O”: no statistically significant difference (at 1% level) from the OECD average.

Evolution between 2009/11 and 2018/21: “+/-”: more than a 2 percentage point change to the favour/to the detriment of immigrants or native-born offspring, “O” between a +2 percentage point change and a -2 percentage point change, for PISA: “+/-”: more than a 10 point increase/decrease in immigrants’ average reading scores, “O” between a +10-point change and a -10 point change; the evolution refers to absolute values, not differences vis-à-vis the native-born. “..” data are not available, or sample size is too small.

**Group 4.2: Emerging destinations with a foreign-born population shaped by border changes and/or by national minorities and with a declining share of foreign-born (Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania)**

As in peer group 4.1, a significant share of the foreign-born in these countries were born abroad due to border changes in the early 1990s or form part of national minorities from neighbouring countries. At least four in five immigrants (and even 96% in Croatia) have resided in their host country for more than 10 years. Together with Poland, these countries host the largest shares of elderly among the immigrant population in the OECD. In Estonia and Latvia, over two-fifths of immigrants are aged 65 or above. Until recent refugee inflows (see Box 1.4), new arrivals were limited and could not offset the population ageing of the foreign-born. Therefore, the foreign-born population in these countries has declined over the last decade, in stark contrast to all other OECD countries, bar Israel and Cyprus. As of 2021, around one in seven people is foreign-born in these countries, with a smaller share in Lithuania (6%).

In the Baltic countries, integration outcomes are closely related to the age structure of the foreign-born population. With many working age immigrants being close to retirement age, participation as well as employment rates are lower among the foreign- than the native-born. Furthermore, health issues among immigrants are of growing concern. They disproportionately suffer from overweight and are less likely to report good health than the native-born, even after considering immigrants' higher age. Relative poverty rates of immigrants also exceed those of the native-born (except for Lithuania) and especially old age poverty has increased considerably over the last decade, among immigrants and the native-born alike. By contrast, as more than four in five migrants are homeowners, integration outcomes related to housing tend to be more favourable. Croatia differs from the other countries in terms of integration, showing generally smaller or inexistent gaps both in labour market outcomes and living conditions.

**Group 4.3: Emerging destinations with recent significant humanitarian migration flows (Chile, Colombia, Finland, Türkiye)**

This group encompasses a heterogenous set of countries, which had a small immigrant population until the early 2010s but have seen large numbers of humanitarian migrants arriving over the last decade. Consequently, the foreign-born population has increased considerably in all four countries, most notably in Colombia. While Chile and Colombia have received predominantly humanitarian migrants from Venezuela, who share the same language and have relatively high formal educational attainment levels, Finland and Türkiye host significant shares of refugees from Asian countries such as Syria and Iraq, where education levels are more diverse. As a result, integration outcomes vary widely between these four countries. Immigrants are more likely to be employed than the native-born in Chile and Colombia, while the reverse holds true in Finland and Türkiye. Furthermore, in Colombia, two-thirds of immigrants live in overcrowded dwellings, a share that is more than twice as high as among the native-born. By contrast, in Chile and Finland, housing conditions of immigrants are much more similar to those of the native-born.

**Group 4.4: Emerging destinations with recent significant labour migration flows (Czech Republic, Poland, Japan)**

These countries have received growing inflows of labour migrants from geographically close countries as population ageing and labour shortages have increased the need for foreign labour. As parts of these flows are temporary, the foreign-born population is still relatively small (2% of the total population in Poland and Japan, and 8% in the Czech Republic, where a significant part of the foreign-born population has been shaped by border changes in the early 1990s). Educational levels of migrants in these countries vary, with large shares of tertiary-educated in Poland and Japan (60 and 47%, respectively) and a much smaller proportion of around one-third in the Czech Republic. Given that most immigrants arrived for employment purposes, economic integration outcomes are generally favourable. For example, immigrants' employment

rates have increased considerably over the last decade and now exceed those of the native-born, albeit only slightly, in Japan. Indicators on living conditions are only available for the Czech Republic and Poland. In these countries, gaps tend to be smaller than in most other OECD countries.

#### **Group 4.5: Emerging destinations with predominantly national returnees born abroad (Mexico, Romania)**

These countries have a large diaspora, and the foreign-born offspring of national returnees account for a significant share of their foreign-born population. Because return migration has increased in recent years, the foreign-born in these countries are much younger than in other OECD countries. More than one-third are below the age of 15, and a significant share has reached the working age only recently. As the foreign-born populations are still rather small, evidence on integration outcomes is limited. The scarce evidence shows that, despite higher educational attainment, the foreign-born fare worse in the labour market than their native-born peers, which might be partly attributable to their younger age. Gaps in employment rates are relatively wide and have increased over the last decade.


#### **Box 1.5. Methodological note: Measuring gaps of migrants in the EU and OECD**

Integration outcomes vary considerably between countries and are shaped by the respective national context. Against this backdrop, it is useful to look at OECD- or EU-wide results of integration outcomes. For each indicator, this report shows the outcome of all immigrants residing in the OECD and EU vis-à-vis that of the native-born – the so-called **OECD/EU total**. In contrast to the **OECD/EU average**, i.e. the mean of the outcomes for all OECD or EU countries, this estimate considers all OECD/EU countries as a single entity, to which each country contributes proportionately to the size of its native- or foreign-born population. However, as immigrants are unequally distributed across OECD and EU countries, **OECD- or EU-wide gaps** between immigrants and the native-born need to be interpreted with care. For example, only five destinations (Germany, France, Austria, Spain and Italy) host over two-thirds of the roughly 54 million immigrants living in the EU, while accounting for less than 60% of the native-born population. Consequently, the situation in these countries is reflected to a greater extent in the average indicator values of the foreign-born compared with those of the native-born, while the opposite is true for countries with a comparatively small share of immigrants. For certain indicators, this compositional effect can obscure gaps visible at the country level.

One approach to account for this imbalance is to weigh the gap between the foreign- and native-born by the size of the foreign-born population – the so-called **OECD- or EU-wide adjusted gap**. This puts more weight on gaps found in countries with a large immigrant population. Figure 1.10 contrasts gaps in OECD and EU totals with the weighted gaps for selected indicators. The weighing does not exert a strong effect on most core indicators, including employment, unemployment, overqualification rates, and the perceived health status. However, the indicator on membership rates in voluntary organisations shows that, in certain cases, results can change substantially. Participation rates in voluntary organisations are below average among the native-born in countries with a large share of native-born (e.g. Poland and Romania) and above average among the foreign-born in countries with a large share of immigrants (e.g. Germany and Austria). Consequently, although immigrants lag behind the native-born in two-thirds of countries, the EU total shows similar participation rates among both groups. However, after weighing gaps by the size of the foreign-born population, the native-born are 11 percentage points more likely to participate in voluntary organisations than immigrants. Weighing EU-wide gaps by the size of the foreign-born population also has a significant impact on poverty rates, overcrowding rates, the share of elderly living in a substandard accommodation and unmet medical needs, albeit to a lesser extent. Similar but slightly smaller effects were found when applying this method to OECD-wide gaps.

Figure 1.10. Gaps between immigrants and native born at a glance

	Employment rates	Overqualification rates	Poverty rates	Overcrowding rates	Perceived health status (good health)	Membership in voluntary organisations
Australia	(2.6)	8.6	3.0	4.8	..	4.1
Austria	(6.3)	13.8	20.4	22.6	(7.1)	(6.9)
Belgium	(7.4)	5.3	17.0	11.6	(6.4)	(8.8)
Bulgaria	(11.8)	..	2.3	14.2	8.5	..
Canada	(0.5)	3.7	(6.6)	1.7	1.3	2.2
Chile	16.2	25.0	(10.7)	4.6	..	(7.8)
Colombia	5.1	..	(1.0)	33.3	..	(6.3)
Costa Rica	5.5	23.2	..	..	..	..
Switzerland	(6.3)	0.2	6.4	5.3	(5.4)	(15.2)
Cyprus	(0.0)	12.6	15.4	3.7	7.6	4.5
Czech Republic	5.7	8.7	1.7	8.1	(2.7)	2.6
Germany	(9.4)	13.3	1.9	7.5	1.3	(18.1)
Denmark	(6.7)	12.4	12.0	11.7	(2.7)	(12.5)
Estonia	(3.2)	18.6	10.8	(0.7)	(5.2)	..
Greece	(2.5)	22.8	14.1	20.2	3.6	..
Spain	(2.9)	17.4	22.2	10.2	(4.9)	..
Finland	(7.2)	14.2	4.1	8.9	..	..
France	(7.1)	6.4	16.3	12.0	(5.5)	(5.3)
Croatia	1.7	(0.1)	7.1	(3.1)	3.2	(9.5)
Hungary	7.4	0.5	0.2	(4.9)	4.4	0.3
Ireland	2.6	5.8	4.0	4.3	(1.2)	5.6
Iceland	(3.5)	31.9	5.3	8.9	..	(8.4)
Israel	13.8	15.9	(2.0)	..	..	..
Italy	1.2	30.8	13.6	25.8	5.5	..
Japan	0.7	(0.5)	..	..	..	..
Korea	0.0	11.6	..	26.3	..	..
Lithuania	(4.4)	7.3	(3.2)	(6.7)	(3.2)	..
Luxembourg	8.0	1.0	13.1	6.1	(0.0)	..
Latvia	(3.1)	1.7	8.6	(4.5)	0.2	2.4
Malta	6.1	20.1	3.6	(0.9)	9.4	(2.9)
Mexico	(9.4)	(7.0)	..	..	..	..
Netherlands	(15.9)	9.7	16.5	5.6	(7.4)	(7.0)
New Zealand	3.7	6.7	(1.4)	..	..	(2.6)
Norway	(7.8)	20.6	13.5	10.5	4.4	(10.2)
Poland	10.2	11.3	6.0	4.6	1.2	..
Portugal	6.9	..	(3.1)	4.9	8.5	..
Romania	(7.9)	..	..	..	..	..
Sweden	(14.1)	10.5	18.6	17.2	..	(16.5)
Slovenia	(4.3)	8.3	10.5	13.7	..	(6.5)
Slovak Republic	4.3	10.6	(0.9)	0.2	(1.1)	..
Türkiye	(7.5)	(1.5)	..	..	..	..
United Kingdom	0.1	5.6	1.4	4.1	(0.3)	3.8
United States	2.3	1.5	8.5	11.5	0.0	(8.5)
EU average gap	(2.2)	10.4	7.8	5.9	(0.3)	(3.1)
EU-wide gap	(4.5)	12.0	10.0	7.7	(0.2)	0.8
<b>EU-wide adjusted gap*</b>	<b>(5.7)</b>	<b>11.7</b>	<b>11.9</b>	<b>12.2</b>	<b>(1.2)</b>	<b>(10.7)</b>
OECD average gap	(1.0)	10.3	7.0	8.9	(1.3)	(4.4)
OECD-wide gap	1.5	0.7	7.3	8.0	2.0	2.8
<b>OECD-wide adjusted gap*</b>	<b>(1.3)</b>	<b>5.7</b>	<b>7.8</b>	<b>10.6</b>	<b>(0.5)</b>	<b>(7.1)</b>

StatLink  <https://stat.link/miqxnr>

Note: \*Adjusted gaps are weighed by the size of the foreign-born populations of each country. A negative (positive) figure implies that the rates are lower (higher) for immigrants than for the native-born. Negative figures are shown in brackets.

Further notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLink.

## 1.4. The evolution of integration outcomes over time

To provide a long-term vision on potential integration progress, it is crucial to monitor integration outcomes over time. This publication pursues several approaches to gauge progress in integration outcomes. For virtually all indicators, it compares the situation of the immigrant and native-born population with that a decade earlier.<sup>3</sup> Whenever possible, it also compares outcomes of migrants with a different length of stay in the host country. Furthermore, it analyses intergenerational progress in educational outcomes.

The migration landscape across the OECD has changed significantly over the last decade. Due to growing numbers of migrants benefitting from free mobility alongside inflows of humanitarian migrants in Europe and South America since 2015, the foreign-born population has increased virtually everywhere. Overall, integration outcomes in the OECD tended to improve over the last decade, although there is significant variation between countries and across indicators.

Labour market outcomes of immigrants improved substantially in the OECD after the protracted economic downturn starting in 2007/2008. Between 2011 and 2021, employment rates of immigrants increased nearly everywhere, reducing prior gaps with the native-born. In most countries, differences between immigrants and the native-born have also become smaller for (long-term) unemployment rates, involuntary part-time employment, temporary contracts and overqualification rates. These positive trends were observed despite the disproportionately strong negative impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on migrant workers. While the crisis temporarily put the decade-long progress to a halt, outcomes bounced back more strongly for migrants. In 2021, they already returned to or even exceeded pre-crisis levels in most countries.

Not only better labour policies and more favourable economic conditions might have driven this progress but also changes in the socio-economic composition of the immigrant populations. In 2020, nearly half of all recent migrants (with less than 5 years of residence) in the OECD held a university degree, compared with less than one-third a decade earlier. As educational attainment improves access to the labour market, recent arrivals in 2021 are more likely to work than their peers a decade earlier in over two-thirds of countries. There has been growth in the employment rate of recent migrants of around 4 percentage points in the EU and even more in the United States and Canada.

In a similar vein, in most countries, native-born children with foreign-born parents are slowly catching up with their peers with native-born parents, both in terms of academic achievements and labour market outcomes. Two-thirds of countries reported progress in the reading performance of children of immigrants between 2009 and 2018, while the performance of their counterparts with native-born parents remained stable across both the EU and OECD. In addition, despite the COVID-19 pandemic, all key labour market indicators (employment, unemployment and overqualification rate) have improved between 2012 and 2020 among young adults in the EU. Progress has been more pronounced among the native-born with foreign-born parents than among their peers with native-born parents. This was generally not the case outside of the EU.

The picture is more mixed when it comes to the living conditions of immigrants. In around half of countries, relative poverty rates decreased more among immigrants than the native-born, while in the other half, the foreign-born experienced a steeper increase in relative poverty than the native-born. A similar pattern was observed for overcrowding rates. Only with respect to health did most countries achieve significant advances in the 2010s for both the foreign- and the native-born. It seems that the COVID-19 pandemic did not halt this trend, although this could also be due to biases in self-reported data or, in some countries, interviews conducted before the global spread of the disease. Progress in living conditions was also uneven across countries. For example, across the EU, overcrowding rates increased among immigrants while declining among the native-born, but this was not the case outside of the EU. Nevertheless, even within the EU, there are wide discrepancies. While in Portugal and Finland, for example, living conditions of immigrants have converged towards the level of the native-born (except for housing in Finland), they drifted further apart in the Netherlands, Sweden and France.

The evolution of indicators on social integration and civic engagement has also been less clear-cut. Partly due to more stringent requirements to acquire citizenship as well as changes in the immigrant composition, citizenship acquisition rates have dropped over the past decade in slightly less than two-thirds of countries. Furthermore, voter turnout in national elections among migrants with the host-country nationality declined between 2002-10 and 2012-20 across the EU, although the reverse was observed in the United States. Yet trust in public institutions, such as parliament, has increased among immigrants in the EU over the past decade, even more so than among the native-born. The picture is similarly ambiguous when it comes to social cohesion. Although in the EU, more native-born think positively about migration today than a decade ago, perceived discrimination has increased.


### 1.4.2 Integration tends to improve when migrants stay longer

Another way of measuring progress in the integration process is to compare outcomes of immigrants with a different length of stay in the host country. Generally, integration outcomes improve when migrants stay longer in the host country. However, there are considerable differences between different migrant categories.

Figure 1.11 shows employment rates for the EU as a whole by reason for migration, duration of stay and gender. Results should be interpreted with caution as nonresponse rates for the question on the reason for migration are relatively high (above 40%) in Austria, Estonia and Denmark. Progress in labour market integration is particularly visible among humanitarian and family migrants, who tend to have only weak attachments to the labour market in the host country upon arrival. In 2021, only around half of all recent immigrant men who came for family reasons were employed. EU-wide employment rates of recent immigrant men who migrated for humanitarian reasons were similar, although this group tends to perform worse in most countries. This is attributable chiefly to the favourable labour market outcomes of recent Venezuelan refugee arrivals in Spain, whose shared language, family ties and high educational levels ease their integration. After ten years of residence, shares peak at around 70% for both humanitarian and family migrant men but remain slightly under the level of their native-born peers at 74%.

**Figure 1.11. Employment rate by reason for migration, duration of stay and gender in the EU**

15-64 year-old migrants in the EU, 2021



Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.




Women who migrate for family and humanitarian reasons struggle even more to enter the labour market, with less than one-third and one-quarter being employed, respectively, in the first five years of their stay. However, after ten years of residence, employment rates reach nearly 60% for both groups. By contrast, both male and female labour migrants have high employment rates from the start, which decline slightly with length of stay.


### 1.1.3. Integration tends to improve over generations

For certain indicators, retrospective measures of parental outcomes are available, which allow to measure progress in integration over generations. For example, the 2019 EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU SILC) survey asks respondents about the highest educational attainment of their parents. This allows to compare intergenerational educational mobility of native-born people with at least one foreign-born parent with that of their peers with native-born parentage. As young people with highly educated parents cannot experience upward educational mobility, they are not considered here. These data show that native-born with foreign-born or mixed parentage have higher chances of experiencing upward educational mobility than their peers with native-born parents. Across the EU, 54% of the former group managed to exceed their parents' educational attainment, compared with only 47% of the latter (Figure 1.12).

**Figure 1.12. Share of youth with higher educational attainment than their parents**

16-34 year-olds not in education with medium- or low-educated parents, 2019



StatLink  <https://stat.link/rpf5m6>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLink.

Another way to chart intergenerational progress across countries is to compare the outcomes of native-born children of immigrants with those of immigrants who arrived as children in the same age group. This approach captures the outcomes of the two groups at the same point in time and environment. Yet, inferences about intergenerational integration progress are likely to be biased due to the different parental arrival times of those who arrived as children and those who are native-born offspring of immigrants. If recent arrivals show better (or worse) integration outcomes from the onset, a comparison of their outcomes with those of the children from previous cohorts will (over-) understate intergenerational integration progress. Based on this method, results from Chapter 7 suggest that certain integration outcomes have

improved over generations. Across the OECD, native-born children with foreign-born parents outperform their immigrant counterparts who arrived before the age of 15 when it comes to school performance and housing conditions. By contrast, they fare similar or worse with respect to labour market integration outcomes (employment, unemployment, over-qualification). However, this result can partly be attributed to a more advantaged socio-economic background of younger immigrant cohorts, on average.

## 1.5. Conclusion

EU and OECD countries are home to an increasing number of immigrants and their children, and their integration continues to be high on the policy agenda in many countries. Monitoring integration outcomes at the international level can provide important insights in this context. It helps to provide benchmarks, identify common integration challenges across countries and gather useful information that cannot be obtained by only using national data. As differences in integration outcomes also hinge upon the composition of the foreign-born populations, international comparisons between countries with similar main features of the foreign-born population are particularly valuable. Against this backdrop, OECD and EU countries have been classified in this report into 13 peer country groups, which share similarities in terms of the size and category of entry of the migrant population as well as their experience with immigration. While integration outcomes vary widely between countries, each country faces certain challenges and there is no universal champion. Indeed, in most countries and most integration domains, immigrants and their children lag behind the native-born and their respective children. However, there has been substantial progress over the last decade in some areas, especially when it comes to the labour market integration of immigrants. This improvement is attributable to higher educational levels of recent arrivals, better integration policies and more favourable labour market conditions than a decade ago. Furthermore, integration outcomes tend to improve when migrants stay longer in the country and across generations. While these results are encouraging, there is still a long way to go to fully close the gap between immigrants (and their children) and the native-born (and their respective children).

## Annex 1.A. Overview of the structure of the publication

Annex Table 1.A.1 presents an overview of the characteristics and the areas of integration included in this publication, with a detailed list of the indicators presented for each area.

### Annex Table 1.A.1. Contextual information and areas of integration of immigrants and their children considered in the publication

	Description	Measured by
Characteristics (Chapter 2)	The socio-demographic background characteristics of immigrants drive integration outcomes. They include age, gender, family structure, living conditions, and geographical concentration. In addition to such factors, which also apply to the native-born, there are certain immigrant-specific determinants like category of entry, duration of stay, and region of origin. A grasp of how they differ from country to country and how immigrants fare relative to the native-born is a prerequisite for understanding integration outcomes.	Foreign-born share of population by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Rural or urban area</li> <li>- Gender</li> </ul> Fertility Immigrant households Household composition Immigration flows by legal category Distribution of the immigrant population by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Duration of stay</li> <li>- Regions of origin</li> </ul>
Skills and the labour market (Chapter 3)	Immigrants' skills and how they integrate into the labour market are fundamental to becoming part of the host country's economic fabric. Skills and qualifications are obviously indicators of immigrants' ability to integrate in the host society. They have a strong bearing on career paths and influence what kind of job they find. Employment is often considered to be the single most important indicator of integration. Jobs are immigrants' chief source of income and confer social standing. However, while employment is important per se, job quality is also a strong determinant shaping how immigrants find their place in society.	Distribution of the immigrant population by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Educational attainment</li> <li>- Place of education</li> <li>- Language proficiency</li> </ul> Access to adult education and training Employment rate Labour market participation rate Unemployment rate Long-term unemployment rate Share who fear losing or not finding a job Share of inactive who wish to work Share of employees working: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Long hours</li> <li>- Part-time</li> <li>- Involuntary part-time</li> </ul> Jobs distribution by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Types of contracts</li> <li>- Job skills</li> </ul> Over-qualification rate Share of self-employed Reason for being self-employed Proportion of revenue coming from the main client for self-employed Firm size
Living conditions (Chapter 4)	This chapter presents a range of indicators on living conditions, namely immigrants' income, housing, and health.	Median income Income distribution Relative poverty rate Share of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) Home ownership rate Share of renters at market rate Share of renters at reduced rate

	Description	Measured by
		Overcrowding rate Share of substandard dwellings Housing cost overburden Share of people reporting difficulties in accessing non-recreational amenities Share of people reporting at least one major problem in their neighbourhoods Share of people reporting good health status or better Share of overweight individuals Share of daily tobacco smokers Share of people who report unmet medical needs Share of people who report unmet dental needs Share of people that find affording healthcare difficult Share of households not having used any health- or dental care services over the past 12 months
Civic engagement and social integration (Chapter 5)	Social integration is difficult to measure. The indicators presented here are related to citizenship take-up, participation in elections and in voluntary organisations, trust in host-country institutions and a range of indicators related to public opinion.	Acquisition of citizenship rate National voter participation rate Host-country perceptions of the presence of immigrants Perceived economic and cultural impact of immigration Membership rates in voluntary organisations Share of people who trust in the police, the parliament or the legal system Share of people who think that integration of immigrants is very or fairly successful Host-society views on the evolution of integration outcomes Perceived social integration factors for a successful integration Self-reported discrimination based on ethnicity, nationality or race, by parental origin
Integration of the elderly immigrant population (Chapter 6)	Elderly migrants are a growing group in most countries. Yet as they reach the final stage of their lives, little is known about their integration challenges and outcomes. Those challenges are difficult to identify, as elderly migrants are often very different from other migrant cohorts. They reflect long-standing migration flows, whose characteristics may be far from following cohorts. In most longstanding destinations, the aged immigrant population has been shaped by arrivals of low-educated “guest workers” and subsequent family migration. This chapter presents a first-time overview of select indicators for this group before the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic.	Share of elderly and very old Relative poverty rate Share of substandard dwellings Share of elderly reporting good health status or better Access to professional homecare
Integration of young people with foreign-born parents (Chapter 7)	Youth with foreign-born parents who have been raised and educated in the host country face challenges that are different from those of migrants who arrived as adults. This chapter presents their educational outcomes, indicators on the school to work conditions, along with indicators on living conditions and social integration that are particularly pertinent for this group. It compares outcomes for native-born children of immigrants with those of children of native-born and of immigrants who arrived as children.	Youth with foreign-born parents by: -Parental origin -Educational attainment Children with foreign-born parents Participation in Early Childhood Education and Care Concentration of students with foreign-born parents in schools Literacy scores Low school performers in reading Share of resilient students Sense of belonging at school Share of students who report having been bullied Share of students who feel awkward and out of place at school Share of students who agree that immigrants should be treated as equal members of society

	Description	Measured by
		Share of students who treat people with respect regardless of their “cultural background” Share of students being able to overcome difficulties when dealing with people from “other cultural backgrounds” Share of students who think that most of their teachers have some discriminating attitudes towards other cultural groups Dropout rates NEET rate Share of youth with a higher educational attainment than their parents Employment rate Unemployment rate Overqualification rate Share of employment in the “public services” sector Relative youth poverty Relative child poverty Youth overcrowding rates Child overcrowding rates Share of young people who have a quiet place to study National voter participation rate Self-reported discrimination based on ethnicity, nationality or race, by parental origin
Third-country nationals (Chapter 8)	This chapter considers the full set of “Zaragoza indicators” for third-country nationals (TCN) in the European Union and other European OECD countries, along with additional pertinent indicators. It compares their outcomes with those of nationals of the country of residence and other EU nationals.	Share of TCN, by: -age -duration of stay -regions of nationality -educational attainment Employment rate Labour market participation rate Unemployment rate Share of self-employed Firm size Overqualification rates Median income Income distribution Relative poverty rates Home ownership rate Share of renters at market rate Share of renters at reduced rate Share of people reporting good health status or better Share of TCN with long-term residence status

## New features of this edition

Following three previous publications in 2012, 2015 and 2018, this is the fourth edition of *Indicators of Immigrant Integration*. To provide a holistic view on integration, presented in an easy to grasp format, it introduced a number of new features compared to the previous publications.

First, new indicators have been added to this edition as a response to current integration challenges. For example, the COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated how lifestyle and access to healthcare affect health risks. The national lockdowns implemented during the pandemic have also highlighted the importance of living in decent housing conditions. Against this backdrop, this edition of *Indicators of Immigrant Integration* presents a more extensive set of indicators on living conditions. It covers new aspects of housing and

health, such as the housing costs overburden rate, characteristics of the neighbourhood, health risk factors and access to healthcare. Furthermore, it explores marginalisation by including an indicator on poverty and social exclusion risks.

### Annex Box 1.A.1. How to read this publication

This edition of *Indicators of Immigrant Integration* has a new structure for the presentation of each indicator. A box with the indicator context at the beginning of each indicator does not only provide the definition, as previously, but, where appropriate, explains the importance of the respective indicator for immigrant integration as well as potential measurement issues. It is followed by three paragraphs. The first paragraph describes the current situation across OECD and EU countries. The second paragraph traces the evolution of the indicator over the past decade. The third paragraph discusses contextual factors explaining differences across countries. It generally does so along four main categories: gender, education, EU/non-EU origin (for EU countries) and the duration of stay. At the end of each page, a “main findings” box summarises the most important takeaways.

In addition, the fight against social exclusion has become increasingly important on the policy agenda. To better grasp this reality, this edition presents several new indicators on social integration, including the participation in voluntary organisations. As social cohesion, a critical factor for integration, also depends on the attitudes of the host society, the chapter also covers several new indicators on the views on integration of the native-born. It further contrasts opinions on the development of integration outcomes with reality.

Third, for the first time, this edition includes a special chapter on the integration of elderly immigrants, that is, the foreign-born over the age of 64. This group is growing rapidly in many OECD and EU countries and tends to face multiple vulnerabilities. Yet to date, relatively little is known about their integration outcomes. As elderly migrants are mostly inactive with regards to education and employment, the special chapter focuses on their living conditions.

Finally, this publication is accompanied by a comprehensive interactive webpage. Making use of the latest advancements in data visualisation technologies, the web tool serves as a user-friendly explorer of the indicators of this edition. It consists, to the extent possible, of five parts – i) cover page with a link to the complete publication, ii) comparative overview of integration outcomes, iii) indicator navigator by chapter and iv) metadata. The indicator navigator page, a key part of the tool, allows browsing a full set of integration indicators in comparison with the situation a decade ago. In addition, users can look beyond averages for most indicators by going through different disaggregation dimensions. The interactive figures and tables with indicator-specific reading notes are expected to promote a better understanding and enhance the visibility of the work on indicators of immigrant integration. The web tool is accessible via a dedicated webpage ([oe.cd/indicators-immigrant-integration](https://oe.cd/indicators-immigrant-integration)).

## Annex 1.B. Data sources and limitations

The indicators in this publication are predominantly based on data from household surveys. Compared to censuses, which generally only happen every five or ten years and only cover a limited range of integration outcomes, they are carried out at frequent intervals (often yearly) and offer a more extensive data source on integration outcomes. Furthermore, while administrative data is only available for a few countries and follows national rules and definitions (for example how employment is registered), household surveys generally use standardised ways of gathering information. However, some limitations should be considered.

First, given that the target population tends to be limited to people living in ordinary dwellings, certain groups of immigrants, such as undocumented migrants or temporary workers, international students in residences and humanitarian migrants in refugee camps, might fall through the cracks of data collection. In some countries, these groups account for a large share of the foreign-born population. In Türkiye, for instance, the EU Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) in 2021 covers less than 1 million working-age immigrants born in Asia, although there are 2.2 million working-age refugees from Syria alone in that country.

Second, to ensure the widest country coverage possible, this publication combines surveys from different sources. However, it is not always possible to harmonise different data sources due to the different ways in which questions are posed, especially when it comes to social and living conditions. For example, average participation rates in voluntary work are measured differently (membership versus participation during the last month) in the two cross-national surveys used in this publication. As a result, results are not fully comparable between both surveys. Yet both surveys still provide valuable insights into gaps between immigrants and the native-born, the focus of this publication.

Third, some outcomes are easier to measure than others. Many indicators on social integration or on health outcomes rely on subjective measurements, such as attitudes, feelings and perceptions. These tend to be strongly influenced not only by the different national contexts in which the questions are posed, but also by the general awareness of the issue, the current public debate or highly mediatised incidents close to the day of the survey. For example, cross-country differences in self-reported discrimination are not only the result of varying frequencies of incidences of discrimination, but also reflect the extent to which immigrants are sensitised to the issue.

Fourth, the COVID-19 pandemic hampered many data collections. The health situation resulted in staff shortages and restrictions implemented to curb the spread of the pandemic prolonged field inquiries across the OECD. As a result, many surveys have been delayed and national labour force surveys which were continued often showed a picture that was heavily impacted by the crisis. This has changed in 2021 with labour force data becoming gradually available. While nearly all labour force indicators are based on recent data, several other indicators rely on data collected before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Lastly, the fact that most household surveys are being carried out in repeated intervals allows for a time comparison for virtually all indicators. However, in addition to structural changes in the immigrant population over time, methodological changes may impact comparability due to so-called “breaks in statistical time series”. This was for example the case for the EU Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) in 2021. To improve harmonisation, the new Integrated European Social Statistics Framework Regulation (IESS regulation) introduced several changes in the survey design of the EU-LFS. These include, inter alia, the limited use of paper assisted interviews, harmonised definitions of the target population (all persons in ordinary households residing in a member state for at least six months of a year) and a fixed sequence of questions. There are now also clear rules on estimations of the labour market status of family workers, persons on parental leave or seasonal workers during off-seasons. The impact of these changes varies

across countries, depending on the pre-IESS adopted definitions. This publication addresses the break in series by adjusting all core labour market outcomes before 2021 by a country-specific adjustment factor (based on the ratio between the adjusted and unadjusted values provided by Eurostat). As there are no adjusted values disaggregated by place of birth, the same correction factors were used for both foreign-born and native-born outcomes. This exercise thus rests on the assumption that the break in series affected both the native- and foreign-born in the same way.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> For example, the EU Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion 2021-2027 covers both third-country nationals and EU citizens with a “migrant background”, i.e. citizens who had a third-country nationality and became EU citizens through naturalisation in one of the EU Member States as well as EU citizens who have a third country “migrant background” through their foreign-born parents.

<sup>2</sup> One notable exception here is the Trajectories and Origins 2 Survey (TeO2) (2019-2020) in France, which includes a question on the country of birth of respondents’ four grandparents.

<sup>3</sup> The time horizon of 10 years was chosen for practical purposes. While some indicators change from year to year (e.g. employment rates), others are of structural nature and only change after some time (e.g. educational outcomes, housing conditions).



# 2 Composition of immigrant populations and households

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This chapter looks at the sizes of immigrant populations (Indicator 2.1) and the socio-demographic background characteristics of immigrants, which drive integration outcomes. They include age (see Chapter 6), gender (Indicator 2.2), differences in fertility (Indicator 2.3) geographical concentration (Indicator 2.4) and household and family structure (Indicators 2.5 and 2.6). In addition to such factors, which also apply to the native-born, there are certain immigrant-specific determinants like category of entry (Indicator 2.7), duration of stay, and region of origin (Indicator 2.8). A grasp of how they differ from country to country and how immigrants fare relative to the native-born is a prerequisite for understanding integration outcomes.

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# In Brief

## More than one in ten inhabitants is an immigrant

- The OECD is home to 141 million immigrants who account for more than 10% of the population. The share in the EU is slightly higher at 12% of the population, around 54 million foreign-born.
- Nearly one-third of immigrants in the OECD live in the United States, but that proportion has fallen by 3 percentage points over the last decade. Germany is the largest host country in the EU, being home to 25% of all foreign-born residents in the Union.
- The overall number of foreign-born has increased by 20% in both the OECD and EU over the past decade. The free movement of people in EU/EFTA and recent inflows of humanitarian migrants have been the key drivers of growth in foreign-born populations. Among the countries which have seen the largest increases in the population shares of their foreign-born populations are the Nordic countries, Malta, and two Latin American countries (Chile, Colombia) which previously had small immigrant populations.

## In most countries a larger share of migrants are women

- In the EU and OECD, women account for 51% of immigrants. Most long-term foreign-born residents are women, because women tend to live longer and are overrepresented among family migrants. Shares are highest in countries with aged immigrant populations (Latvia and Estonia) and low-educated labour migrants working in homecare (e.g. Italy and Cyprus).
- Due to the ageing of the foreign-born population and the large inflows of mainly male humanitarian migrants in 2015-16, the share of women in immigrant populations has dropped in the last 14 years in three-quarters of EU countries. At the same time, it increased in most non-EU countries and in some EU countries that had experienced large-scale immigration of low-skilled labour prior to the 2007-08 crisis.
- Immigrant women tend to have more children than their native-born peers. Their total fertility rate is 2.02 children in the EU and 2.46 in the United States, much higher than the 1.44 and 1.58 children per native-born woman, respectively. Fertility gaps between foreign- and native-born women are widest in countries where large shares of women have arrived as family migrants and/or are low-educated, such as in France, Germany, the United States and Costa Rica.

## Family reasons remain the most common admission category OECD wide, while in the EU most migrants benefit from free mobility schemes

- The intra-European free mobility of people has driven almost half of all permanent flows in the EU over the last 15 years. The driving category in the OECD overall, and specifically in the United States and France has been family migration, and labour migration in most settlement countries.
- In 2021, annual permanent immigration flows accounted for 0.6% of the EU's total population and 0.4% of the OECD's. Shares were highest in European countries with traditionally high intra-EU migrant intakes, such as Luxembourg (3.2%), Switzerland (1.4%) and Belgium (0.9%), as well as in Canada (1.1%). They are lowest (below 0.2% of the population) in Asian and Latin American OECD countries.

## Most immigrants have lived in their host country for at least a decade

- More than two-thirds of migrants in both the OECD and the EU have been resident in their host countries for 10 years or more. Migrants who arrived within the last five years account for at least 30% only in countries with recent humanitarian or largely temporary labour migration (e.g. Chile, Korea, Japan, Sweden, Bulgaria and Cyprus).
- Half of the EU immigrant population originates from European countries, with 30% coming from other EU member states. Foreign-born from other EU countries constitute a large majority in Luxembourg (75%), Hungary (62%) and the Slovak Republic (57%). Due to colonial legacies and guest-worker migration following World War II, a large share of foreign-born also come from Africa in France, Portugal, the Netherlands and Belgium, and from Latin America and the Caribbean in Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands. In the Nordic countries, due to humanitarian migration, a considerable share of immigrants were born in Asia (primarily the Middle East).
- In Asia, more than 79% of migrants are from Asian countries. In Canada and Australia, too, more than half of the foreign-born are from Asia, while over 50% of migrants in the United States were born in Latin America.

## Immigrants are more likely to live in urban areas than the native-born

- In all OECD countries, immigrants are overrepresented in densely populated areas, especially in longstanding destination countries and in Central and Eastern European countries. In the EU, over half of immigrant adults live in a densely populated area, against less than two in five of the native-born.
- Given the overall urbanisation trend among the native-born, and efforts to disperse labour and humanitarian migration, shares of the foreign- and native-born living in densely populated areas were more evenly balanced in 2020 than in 2012.
- Settling in a city is common practice among highly educated, recent and non-EU migrants and is even more widespread among recent migrants in the EU's largest immigrant countries, except in most Nordic countries, where new humanitarian migrants are distributed across the country.

## Immigrants are more likely than the native-born to live alone, or with children

- Across the EU, 12% of households are managed by at least one immigrant. Around two-thirds are immigrant-only households and one-third are mixed – where one responsible person is foreign- and the other native-born. Most households that comprise solely immigrants are managed by non-EU migrants.
- Outside Europe, shares of immigrant households are particularly numerous in Australia, New Zealand and Israel, where at least two in five households are managed by at least one immigrant. By contrast, shares are low in countries with small foreign-born populations like Mexico and Korea.
- Immigrant households are slightly larger than native-born ones in most countries, by 0.2 people EU-wide. This is not the case in some Latin American OECD countries, the Netherlands, Israel and most of Central and Eastern Europe.
- Immigrants are overrepresented among households with children, but also among single-person households. In fact, the single-person household is the most common living arrangement among immigrants in most countries, though families (adults with children) are most common in the United Kingdom, Ireland, Greece and Spain.

## 2.1. Size of the immigrant population

### Indicator context

The immigrant population is taken to be all people born outside the country in which they are resident. They may also be referred to as “the foreign-born”.

In 2021, the EU was home to 54 million immigrants, who account for 12% of its population. That share is slightly lower in the OECD, where 141 million foreign-born residents make up more than 10% of the total population. Immigrants represent more than one-fifth of the population in settlement countries like Australia, Canada and New Zealand. They also account for respectively slightly less than one-third and one-half of the population in Switzerland and Luxembourg. Both are longstanding destination countries with particularly large inflows from the EU/EFTA free mobility area over the past two decades. By contrast, most Asian, Latin American and Central European OECD countries have small immigrant populations which in 2021 accounted for less than 2.5% of the total populations of Mexico, Poland and Japan.

The overall number of immigrants has increased by more than 20% over the past decade, from 114 to 141 million in the OECD and from 44 to 54 million in the EU. The percentage of the foreign-born relative to the total population has grown in most countries, by over 2 percentage points in half of countries. The free movement of people in the EU/EFTA and recent inflows of humanitarian migrants in Europe and South America since 2015 have been the key drivers of growth in foreign-born populations. Their total number in the Nordic countries, for instance, has climbed by almost 50% – a rise of at least 2.5 percentage points in the overall population share of the 5 countries and over 5 points in Sweden and Iceland. In Malta, the share of the foreign-born has almost tripled, while increases have also been significant in countries with small immigrant populations in 2011. In Chile and Romania, the share of the foreign-born has actually more than tripled. And in Colombia it has climbed by almost 20 times due to the large inflows of humanitarian migrants from Venezuela. By contrast, new arrivals have not offset the ageing of the foreign-born population in Israel and the Baltic countries, which are among the few countries that have seen a drop in the foreign-born as a share of the total population. In the case of Israel, the fertility rate – one of the highest in the OECD – has also contributed to the decline in the share of the foreign-born.


The distribution of the immigrant population by country of residence has diversified between 2011 and 2021 in both the OECD and the EU. Although nearly one-third of immigrants in the OECD live in the United States, that proportion has fallen by 3 percentage points. Germany is increasingly the largest host country in the EU, being home to 25% of all foreign-born residents. By contrast, the overall “market share” among other main recipient countries in the EU (e.g. France, Spain and Italy) has declined.

### Main findings

- The EU is home to 54 million immigrants, who account for 12% of its population’s stock. That share is slightly lower in the OECD, whose 141 million foreign-born residents account for more than 10% of the total population.
- Over the last decade, the immigrant population has increased in virtually all countries – by more than 20% overall in both the OECD and the EU.
- Among the countries which have seen the largest increases in the population shares of their foreign-born populations are the Nordic countries, Malta, and a number of Latin American countries (Chile, Colombia) that previously had small immigrant populations.

**Figure 2.1. Foreign-born shares of populations**


All ages, 2011 and 2021 or most recent year



StatLink <https://stat.link/ic4xdv>

**Figure 2.2. Distribution of the foreign-born population by host country**

2011 (inner ring of circle) and 2021 (outer ring)



StatLink <https://stat.link/jvoasw>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 2.2. Share of women

### Indicator context

This indicator relates to the shares of people who declared themselves women in immigrant (or foreign-born) populations.

Whereas men account for the bulk of new immigrants in most countries, women make up most residents. Just as women tend to live longer, family migrants (where women are overrepresented) tend to stay longer in the host country. In the EU and the OECD, women account for 51% of immigrants of all ages, with higher shares (at least 54%) in Estonia, Latvia and Israel – countries with the largest proportions of immigrants aged over 65, where women are overrepresented because their life expectancy is longest. Female migrants are also overrepresented in Costa Rica and most Southern European countries, especially in Cyprus and Italy, which have attracted low-educated labour migrants over the last 20 years. Many work in the homecare sector where women are strongly overrepresented. At the other end of the spectrum, male foreign-born outnumber their female peers in most Nordic countries, Malta and Germany, all countries with recent large intakes of humanitarian migrants. Immigrant women are also underrepresented in countries where migrants have often come for employment and are concentrated in heavily male-dominated sectors, as in manufacturing and construction. This is the case in Central European countries and Korea. Indeed, women make up less than 46% of the immigrant population in Korea, Slovenia and the Czech Republic.

EU-wide, the female share of the immigrant population has remained stable over the last 14 years. Yet, shares have dropped in two-thirds of EU countries – by at least 6 percentage points in Lithuania, Malta and Poland. That pattern was driven mainly by two factors: first, the ageing (and associated mortality) of the immigrant population in Central and Eastern Europe as new immigration failed to offset female migrant deaths; second, large inflows of mainly male humanitarian migrants in the past decade, particularly in 2015-16. Such factors did not affect immigration in non-EU countries as much, so shares of women in immigrant populations have risen in most non-EU countries over the last 14 years. They also rose in some EU countries that experienced large-scale male labour immigration until the 2007-08 economic downturn, when some immigrant men lost their jobs and left host countries, while others were joined by their families, such as in Spain and Ireland. The share of women also grew considerably in Korea, largely due to marriage migration.


In the EU, EU-born are more likely than those from a third country to be women, a trend driven chiefly by the situation in Germany. In that country, EU-born women outnumber their male peers, while the opposite is true among non-EU migrants. Actually, while EU-born are more likely to be women in around two-thirds of EU countries, non-EU migrants are more likely to be women in all EU countries – except Slovenia, Romania, Sweden, Austria and Germany.

### Main findings

- In the EU and OECD, women account for 51% of immigrants. Shares are higher in countries with aged immigrant populations and low-educated labour migrants working in homecare (e.g. in Italy and Cyprus).
- Due to the ageing of the foreign-born population and humanitarian immigration, the share of women in immigrant populations has dropped in the last 14 years in two-thirds of EU countries, while it increased in most non-EU countries, especially Korea, as well as in Spain and Ireland.

Figure 2.3. Share of women among immigrants


All ages, 2021



StatLink <https://stat.link/s7crp3>

Figure 2.4. How shares of women in the immigrant population have evolved

All ages, between 2007 and 2021



StatLink <https://stat.link/324vr8>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 2.3. Fertility rate

### Indicator context

The total fertility rate (TFR) is the number of children that would be born alive to a woman during her lifetime if she were to spend her childbearing years bearing children in accordance with the age- and group-specific fertility rates of a given year.

TFRs are representative only of the female population that has given birth in the country of residence. Research shows that immigrant fertility may be disrupted, as women with a migration project usually prefer to delay their first birth until right after settling in the new host country. Therefore, the TFRs may be mechanically higher than what the “lifetime fertility” (children ever born at the end of fertile life of a specific cohort) would be. The reliability of these rates also depends on the reliability of the registration of vital statistics, on one hand, and the reliability of resident population estimates, on the other hand. Reliability is lower in countries which use a different reference year for their birth statistics and their population estimates. Estimates might also be biased in countries where the share of women/mothers with unknown countries of birth is high.

The TFR among immigrants was 2.02 children per woman in the EU in 2019 and 2.46 in the United States, much higher than the 1.44 and 1.58 children per native-born EU and US women, respectively. Foreign-born women had on average over 0.5 more children than their native peers in one-third of countries. Gaps between foreign- and native-born in total fertility are widest: in longstanding European destinations with high shares of non-EU immigrants from countries of high fertility (bar the Netherlands); in American OECD countries and most Southern European countries; and in Lithuania and Poland. Gaps exceed 0.8 child per woman in the two EU countries with the largest immigrant populations (Germany and France), the United States and Costa Rica. As explained in the box above, TFRs of immigrant women are higher than the lifetime fertility because some delay birth until right after migration. This is particularly true in countries where large shares of women have arrived as family migrants and/or are low educated. In the EU, the fertility of women born outside EU/EFTA is almost always higher than that of their EU-born and native-born peers, reaching 2.27 children EU-wide. By contrast, immigrant women have less children than native-born women in parts of Central and Eastern Europe, Australia, Türkiye, Japan, Israel, Iceland and Denmark. In Japan, TFR is lower among migrant women because many foreign-born women are international students or technical intern trainees with limited leave to remain. Mixed marriages in Japan are also more prone to divorce. TFRs are similar between the foreign- and native-born in Malta, Cyprus, Ireland and the Netherlands.

TFRs among both the foreign- and native-born fell between 2010 and 2019 in most countries for which data were available. Fertility trends in both groups are broadly similar, with some notable exceptions. In Ireland, the overall drop in TFR was driven solely by native-born women, while the rate among immigrants for the whole period remained unchanged. Conversely, TFRs declined among foreign-born women in Austria, Luxembourg and Portugal, while slightly increasing among their native-born peers. TFRs rose only among foreign-born women in Slovenia, and Malta.


### Main findings

- The total fertility rate is 2.02 children per immigrant woman in the EU, much higher than the 1.44 children per native-born woman.
- Fertility gaps between foreign- and native-born women are widest in Costa Rica, the United States, France and Germany.



Figure 2.5. Total fertility rate


Women aged 15 to 49, 2019



StatLink <https://stat.link/9ltrw8>

Figure 2.6. How total fertility rates have evolved

Women aged 15 to 49, between 2010 and 2019



StatLink <https://stat.link/bydtk9>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 2.4. Concentration in densely populated areas

### Indicator context

Economic opportunities and housing are not equally distributed across the country, with marked differences notably between densely populated and less populated areas.

A densely populated area is defined as a cluster of contiguous built-up grid cells with a certain minimum population threshold (generally at least 50 000 persons) and a minimum population density (generally at least 500 inhabitants per square kilometre). In European countries, the density measure is based on the number of individuals per square kilometre. In non-European countries, concentration is measured using municipality or metropolitan area boundaries with varying population thresholds, rendering both not fully comparable.

In all countries, immigrants are overrepresented in capital-cities and their metropolitan areas, where jobs and diasporas are concentrated. In the EU, more than half of foreign-born adults live in a densely populated area, while less than two in five native-born do. Immigrants are especially concentrated in most longstanding destination countries and Central and Eastern Europe. Outside Europe, immigrants are more heavily concentrated in densely populated areas than the native-born in the settlement countries and Latin America.

Foreign-born concentration in densely populated areas has grown in around two-thirds of countries between 2012 and 2020, in accordance with the overall urbanisation trend. As concentration increased even further for native-born in most countries, differences between the native- and foreign-born have dwindled, pointing to more evenly balanced urbanisation, partly due to efforts to disperse labour and humanitarian migration. In Central Europe, Ireland and some other countries, however, gaps have widened.


EU-wide, 59% of recent migrants (less than five years of residence) live in densely populated areas, compared to 52% of their long-settled peers (10 years or more). Compared with settled migrants, new arrivals are particularly likely to live in densely populated areas in Portugal, Ireland and Luxembourg. In Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Iceland, where new humanitarian migrants are distributed across the country based on national legislation which allows them to choose their place of residence only after some years, settled migrants are actually more likely to live in densely populated areas than their recent peers. Immigrants born outside the EU are especially concentrated in densely populated areas. EU-wide, their share in 2020 was 58%, 13 percentage points higher than among EU-born and 19 points more than the native-born. The highly educated, whatever their place of birth, are more likely to live in urban areas virtually everywhere, where highly skilled job opportunities are concentrated. Only in Belgium and the United Kingdom are the low-educated – both foreign- and native-born – more likely to live in urban areas.

### Main findings

- In all countries, immigrants are overrepresented in densely populated areas, especially in most longstanding destination countries and Central and Eastern European countries.
- In most countries, shares of the foreign- and native-born living in densely populated areas were closer in 2020 than in 2012.
- Immigrants born outside the EU are particularly concentrated in densely populated areas. EU-wide, their share in 2020 was 58%, 13 percentage points higher than among EU-born and 19 points more than among native-born.

**Figure 2.7. Shares of individuals living in densely populated areas**


Population aged 15 to 64, 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/irvf30>

**Figure 2.8. How shares of individuals living in densely populated areas have evolved**

Population aged 15 to 64, between 2010/12 and 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/0wcuyx>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 2.5. Immigrant households

### Indicator context

An immigrant household is a group of persons who share the same dwelling, where: i) at least one responsible person of the household (see glossary) is an immigrant (loose definition); or ii) all responsible persons of the household are immigrants (strict definition). The strict definition applies in this publication, unless otherwise stated. The average sizes of households are calculated for entirely foreign-born or entirely native-born households.

Across the EU, 12% of households are managed by at least one immigrant. In around two-thirds of these, all responsible persons of the household are immigrants, while around one-third of them are mixed – where one responsible person is foreign- and the other native-born. Immigrant households are particularly numerous in Australia, New Zealand and Israel, where at least two households in five are managed by at least one immigrant. Mixed households account for more than 30% of households with at least one foreign-born responsible person in: Central European countries, where the migrant population has been built by border changes, nation-building and national minorities; Portugal, Malta and Greece; and longstanding immigrant destinations with predominantly non-EU migrants (Germany, France and the Netherlands). By contrast, in other Southern European countries, Luxembourg, Estonia and Latvia, the vast majority of households with at least one foreign-born responsible person are managed solely by immigrants.

In the EU, over two-thirds of households that comprise solely immigrants are managed by non-EU migrants. Foreign-born from a third country are less common in mixed households, although they still account for over three-fifths of households with one foreign- and one native-born responsible person EU-wide. Austria, Belgium and Switzerland are the only countries where EU-born are the most widely represented in mixed households. Just 0.2% of households in the EU comprise one EU-born and one non-EU immigrant responsible for the household.


Immigrant households are larger than native-born ones in most OECD and EU countries. They are on average 0.2 people larger EU-wide and more than 0.5 larger in Spain, the United-States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Colombia, Costa Rica and Luxembourg. However, native-born households are larger, on average, in two-fifths of countries, as in Mexico, Chile, Israel, the Netherlands, and most of Central and Eastern Europe. As the number of children impacts on the size of a household, native-born households in Mexico and Israel, where native-born families are more likely to have children than immigrant ones, tend to be larger. Accordingly, in some Central and Eastern European countries where the foreign-born are older, native-born households are more than twice as likely to have children as their foreign-born peers. In the Netherlands, immigrant households are smaller, as most are single persons (see Indicator 2.6).

### Main findings

- Across the EU, 12% of households are managed by at least one immigrant. Outside Europe, shares of immigrant households tend to be much higher.
- Mixed households are more common among households with at least one foreign-born responsible person in Central European countries, Portugal, Greece, Malta and in longstanding immigrant destinations with predominantly non-EU migrants.
- Immigrant households are larger than native-born ones in most countries, though not in Israel, some Latin American countries, the Netherlands, and most of Central and Eastern Europe.

Figure 2.9. Households managed by immigrants


2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/w0ivvf>

Figure 2.10. Household sizes

Households with solely immigrant or native-born responsible persons, 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/us39i2>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 2.6. Immigrant household composition

### Indicator context

Households are divided into four categories: i) single-person households: one adult, no children; ii) adults without children; iii) single-parent families: single-parent households with at least one child; iv) families: adults with at least one child.

Almost 40% of immigrant households in the EU are single-person arrangements without children. Families and adults without children each make up 28% of all immigrant households, and 5% are single-parent families. Single-person households are the most common living set-up among immigrants in most European countries, Korea, Australia and Canada. Families are, however, the most common arrangements in most Latin American countries, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Greece and Spain. The United States has about half as many single-person households as in the EU, and as many families with children as without. Overall, around one-third of immigrant households have children in both the EU and the OECD, a share that rises to more than half in Ireland. By contrast, over 70% of immigrant households do not include any child in Central and Eastern European countries, where shares of older immigrants are greatest. Households without children also make up the vast majority of immigrant households in settlement countries with many labour migrants; longstanding European destinations where labour migrants who entered during the “guest worker” era are ageing; and in countries with large recent intakes of humanitarian migrants, such as Sweden and Norway.

The foreign-born are more likely to live alone than their native-born peers in over two-thirds of countries in the EU. This pattern is especially true in countries with older immigrant populations, such as the Baltic countries and Israel. This is also the case in longstanding destinations like Germany and the Netherlands, or countries like Italy that have recently taken in single labour migrants. By contrast, in most non-European countries and in European countries that usually attract immigrants from other EU countries (Luxembourg and Switzerland), the native-born are more likely to live alone than immigrants.

In three-fourths of countries, immigrants are also more likely than the native-born to live in households with adults and at least one child. The most widespread native-born living set-up is the household with adults without children, which includes couples without children, parents living with their adult children, and flat shares. In most OECD countries with ageing populations, elderly native-born couples indeed increase the incidence of households with adults but no children in the household. In countries where immigrants are on average younger than the native-born (see Indicator 6.1), immigrant households are more likely to be families, with the largest gaps in Spain, Greece, Finland, Ireland and some Latin American countries. Single-parent households are also more widespread among the foreign- than the native-born in two countries out of three. Although the incidence is usually only slightly higher, it is double in countries like Finland, the Netherlands and Belgium.

### Main findings

- The single-person household is the most common living arrangement among immigrants in most countries. Families (i.e. adults with children) are however the most common arrangements in the United Kingdom, Ireland, Greece, Spain and some Latin American countries.
- Immigrants are overrepresented among single-person households without children and in families with children.

**Table 2.1. Composition of households**

Percentages (4 columns on the left) and differences in percentage points (4 columns on the right), 2020

	Immigrant households				Difference (+/-) with native-born households +: higher than the native-born -: lower than the native-born			
	No child in the household		One child or more in the household		No child in the household		One child or more in the household	
	Single person	More than one adult	Single person	More than one adult	Single person	More than one adult	Single person	More than one adult
	Total=100				Difference in percentage points			
Australia	35.2	31.7	5.3	27.8	-3.3	-1.1	-1.1	+5.6
Austria	36.3	30.1	4.1	29.5	-3.8	-10.1	+2.8	+11.2
Belgium	42.0	22.9	8.2	26.8	+6.0	-17.2	+4.3	+6.9
Canada	36.8	30.0	6.6	26.6	-3.8	-4.3	+0.1	+8.0
Chile	14.7	28.5	9.3	47.4	-2.3	-11.3	+1.2	+12.3
Colombia	13.4	16.9	8.4	61.4	-3.8	-13.5	-0.1	+17.6
Costa Rica	12.7	23.3	8.8	55.2	-3.1	-17.3	+2.0	+18.1
Croatia	25.8	46.3	0.8	27.0	+1.2	-1.5	-0.7	+0.9
Cyprus	28.3	36.9	4.9	30.0	+8.3	-14.0	+3.0	+2.7
Czech Republic	43.2	30.3	4.4	22.1	+13.4	-11.1	+1.2	-3.5
Denmark	44.0	27.5	6.0	22.5	-2.2	-5.3	+1.8	+5.6
Estonia	53.6	35.7	2.3	8.5	+11.9	+4.5	-1.3	-15.1
Finland	39.9	17.8	7.0	35.3	-6.6	-16.8	+4.0	+19.4
France	37.5	31.1	5.1	26.3	+0.9	-6.9	+1.3	+4.8
Germany	49.6	25.3	4.1	21.0	+4.6	-10.8	+0.8	+5.4
Greece	23.7	34.5	1.9	39.9	-2.9	-17.1	+1.3	+18.7
Hungary	48.6	33.7	0.7	17.0	+16.5	-9.8	-1.5	-5.1
Iceland	39.8	31.5	3.9	24.8	+3.2	-1.8	-1.6	+0.2
Ireland	21.1	27.1	8.6	43.2	-9.3	-12.1	+3.8	+17.7
Israel	35.1	44.2	0.4	20.3	+17.0	+15.3	-2.1	-30.2
Italy	39.5	23.8	5.3	31.5	+6.8	-20.7	+2.5	+11.5
Korea	50.8	30.8	5.3	13.1	-4.7	-9.8	+1.7	+12.7
Latvia	46.1	43.0	1.5	9.4	+12.4	+6.4	-3.2	-15.6
Lithuania	43.3	44.8	1.6	10.3	+11.2	+3.0	-1.7	-12.5
Luxembourg	32.0	31.7	6.5	29.7	-12.1	-5.8	+1.5	+16.4
Malta	50.7	25.8	3.9	19.6	+22.7	-15.1	+0.3	-7.9
Mexico	34.7	32.6	6.8	25.9	+23.9	-1.9	+2.7	-24.7
Netherlands	56.4	18.0	6.4	19.2	+16.9	-21.0	+4.0	+0.1
New Zealand	30.1	33.2	6.1	30.6	-10.8	0.0	-2.4	+13.2
Norway	56.9	16.0	7.5	19.6	+8.2	-14.7	+3.4	+3.1
Poland	57.9	31.9	1.7	8.6	+30.3	-10.8	+0.4	-19.9
Portugal	25.2	37.6	6.8	30.4	+3.0	-13.1	+3.6	+6.6
Slovak Republic	46.0	36.5	4.0	13.5	+29.6	-14.6	+3.2	-18.1
Slovenia	32.8	39.4	1.4	26.4	+3.9	-3.4	-0.8	+0.4
Spain	20.6	32.5	5.4	41.5	-7.1	-15.3	+3.5	+18.9
Sweden	48.6	18.9	6.7	25.8	+1.2	-12.9	+1.9	+9.8
Switzerland	35.8	32.6	4.1	27.5	-6.2	-8.4	+1.8	+12.7
United Kingdom	24.5	31.2	6.6	37.8	-8.6	-10.7	+2.2	+17.0
United States	22.4	36.7	4.8	36.1	-8.8	-5.2	-0.3	+14.3
<b>OECD total (34)</b>	<b>31.2</b>	<b>32.0</b>	<b>5.2</b>	<b>31.5</b>	<b>-4.3</b>	<b>-8.7</b>	<b>+1.3</b>	<b>+11.7</b>
<b>EU total (26)</b>	<b>39.0</b>	<b>27.5</b>	<b>5.2</b>	<b>28.2</b>	<b>+3.5</b>	<b>-13.3</b>	<b>+2.4</b>	<b>+7.3</b>

StatLink  <https://stat.link/I9m60c>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 2.7. Immigration flows by legal category

### Indicator context

Legal category of migration largely influences the integration path in labour market and society.

Permanent immigrants are foreign nationals who received a residence permit that either grants them the right to stay permanently or can be indefinitely renewed. This section considers: permanent immigration flows as a percentage of the total population; their composition by legal category of entry.

In 2021, 5 million immigrants were granted permanent residence in the OECD countries. The number was 2.4 million in the EU countries considered. Recent permanent inflows accounted for 0.6% of the EU's total population and 0.4% of the OECD's. Recent permanent immigrants make up the highest shares of the population in the European countries with traditionally high EU migrant intakes, such as Luxembourg (3.2%) and Switzerland (1.4%) and Belgium (0.9%), as well as in Canada (1.1%). They are slightly lower in Australia, New Zealand and Germany (over 0.6%), and much lower in OECD countries with large immigrant-intake, such as the United Kingdom (0.5%), France (0.4%) and the United States (0.2%). New permanent inflows in 2021 made up less than 0.2% of the population in Asian and Latin American OECD countries.

In 2020, the COVID-19 crisis caused the sharpest drop on record in migration flows. Most countries have not recovered from this decline. Nevertheless, immigration as share of the population in 2021 were significantly higher than in the decade before 2020 in about half of countries, especially in Poland, Portugal and the Czech Republic. Other countries experienced a relative decline in 2021, with the steepest falls in Luxembourg, the countries that kept their borders closed the longest (Australia and New Zealand), and those that took in large numbers of humanitarian migrants in the previous decade (Norway and Sweden).

Although it is difficult to clearly assess whether mobile EU citizens within the EU come on a temporary or permanent basis, the estimated free intra-EU movement of labour and people has driven almost half of all permanent flows in the EU over the last 15 years, and at least three-quarters in Luxembourg, Ireland and Switzerland. It accounted for more than family migration (28%) and labour migration (14%) of third-country nationals EU-wide. In the OECD, family migration (36%), free movement (28%), and labour migration and accompanying dependents (14% + 7%) have driven inflows over the last 15 years. Family migration represented behind nearly two-thirds of immigration to the United States and over 40% to France. Labour migration (including accompanying family) drove more than three-fifths of permanent flows into Australia and New Zealand with their large-scale labour migration programmes. Despite recent rises, humanitarian migration accounted for less than 10% of all permanent flows into the OECD and EU. Nevertheless, they represented over 15% of flows into Germany and Finland, and about a quarter into Sweden.


### Main findings

- In 2021, annual permanent immigration flows accounted for 0.6% of the EU's total population and 0.4% of the OECD's – respectively 2.4 and 5 million.
- Due to the COVID-19 crisis, inflows as shares of the population were still lower in 2021 than in 2010-19 in around half of countries, especially in Norway, New Zealand, Australia and Sweden.
- The intra-EU movement of labour and people has driven almost half of all permanent flows in the EU over the last 15 years. The driving category has been family migration in the United States and France, and labour migration in Australia and New Zealand.




Figure 2.11. Inflows of permanent migrants

Share of the total population (all ages), in 2010-19 and 2021



StatLink <https://stat.link/6r0ja5>

Figure 2.12. Categories of entry, 2005-20



StatLink <https://stat.link/zdc6jp>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 2.8. Duration of stay and regions of origin

### Indicator context

The challenges newcomers face are different from those settled immigrants face. They need to learn the language, find a job, and build networks. Challenges may also differ according to the country of birth, which is often a proxy for category of migration where this is not available.

This section considers immigrants who arrived recently (less than 5 years ago) and those who settled (10 years or more). The region of birth differentiates between immigrants from Asia, Africa, Europe (including Türkiye), Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as Canada/United States/Oceania.

In the EU and the OECD, more than two-thirds of the foreign-born have been in their host country for at least 10 years, while less than 17% of the overall immigrant population are recent arrivals. Settled migrants account for an overwhelming majority of the foreign-born in Croatia (96%) and the Baltic countries, where many are foreign-born due to nation building or border changes, as well as in Israel. Similarly, in some longstanding migrant destinations and settlement countries (the United States, France and the Netherlands), around three-quarters of the foreign-born have resided in their host-country for 10 years or more. The same holds true of the Southern European countries (except Cyprus and Malta), which saw a decline in their labour migrant intake in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. In countries whose intake is predominantly related to recent humanitarian or labour migration (e.g. Japan, Korea, Sweden, Bulgaria and Cyprus), recent migrants account for at least 30% of the foreign-born population. In Colombia, around eight immigrants in ten arrived less than five years previously, in Chile two-thirds, and in Korea one-half.


Half of the EU's immigrant population originates from European countries, with 30% coming from other EU member states. In around two in five EU countries, immigrants from Europe account for more than 70% of the foreign-born. EU-born constitute a large majority in Luxembourg (75%), Hungary (62%) and the Slovak Republic (57%). In over a quarter of EU countries, though, most immigrants come from outside Europe – partially due to colonial legacies and so-called guest-worker migration following World War II. In some longstanding destinations, such as France, 61% of the foreign-born come from Africa, as do 28% of the foreign-born in Belgium. In the Netherlands, shares of African, Asian and Latin American immigrants are similar in size (around 20% each). In Portugal, over one-third of migrants were born in Africa and Latin America (chiefly Brazil), while over two in five migrants in Spain are from Latin America. In the Nordic countries (except Iceland), characterised by significant humanitarian flows, a considerable share of immigrants, between 30% and 44%, were born in Asia (mainly the Middle East). In Japan and Korea, more than 79% of immigrants are from Asian countries. In Canada and Australia, too, more than half of the foreign-born are from Asia, while over 50% of migrants in the United States were born in Latin America. This is also the case for more than nine in ten immigrants in Chile, Colombia and Costa Rica.


### Main findings

- More than two-thirds of migrants in both the OECD and the EU have been residents in their host countries for 10 years or more.
- Around one-half of the EU's immigrant population comes from other European countries, 30% being born in EU27 member states.
- Immigrants outside Europe also tend to originate from the same region or neighbouring countries. More than 79% of immigrants in Japan and Korea are from Asia, more than 9 in 10 in Latin American countries were born in the Americas, as were half of US immigrants.

**Figure 2.13. Duration of stay among immigrants**


Population aged 15-64, 2020




StatLink  <https://stat.link/dvu2ob>

**Figure 2.14. Regions of birth**

Population aged 15 to 64, 2020



StatLink  <https://stat.link/5cn86k>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.



# 3 Skills and the labour market

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Immigrants' skills and how they integrate into the labour market are fundamental to becoming part of the host country's economic fabric. Skills and qualifications are indicators of immigrants' ability to integrate in the host society. Employment is often considered to be the single most important indicator of integration. However, while employment is important per se, job quality is also a strong determinant shaping how immigrants find their place in society. This chapter looks at immigrants' level of education (Indicator 3.1), their uptake of further training (3.2), host-country language proficiency (3.3) and examines their labour market outcomes (3.4 and 3.5). It presents indicators of labour market exclusion (Indicators 3.6 and 3.7) and consider the characteristics of immigrants' jobs: types of contracts (Indicator 3.8), working hours (3.9 and 3.10) as well as the skill levels of jobs (3.11). It analyses if migrants are overqualified for their job (Indicator 3.12) and the incidence of self-employment (3.13).

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# In Brief

## Recent migrants are better educated than previous cohorts

- In countries with high shares of labour migration such as the settlement countries, immigrants are educated to higher levels than the native-born. In contrast, over one-third of immigrants in the EU (35%) are low educated, while only one in five of the native-born are (20%).
- Over the last decade, the share of the highly educated among the immigrant population rose in all countries, except Mexico.
- Very-low education (no completed lower secondary education) is a particular challenge. EU-wide, the share of very low-educated migrants is around three times that of the native-born. In the United States, 84% of the working-age very low-educated population are immigrants.
- Adult education helps immigrants to close the gap with the native-born in formal education. However, immigrants are less likely to participate in such education in most European countries, although not significantly in half of them. Gaps in participation with the native-born have widened in around half of all countries in the 2010s.
- In the EU, 62% of immigrants state they have at least advanced proficiency in the language of their host-country, as do 72% in settlement countries and 50% in Korea. Shares are largest in Central Europe, Portugal, Spain as well as in English-speaking destinations. They are lowest in Malta, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, the Netherlands and Finland.
- Settled immigrants are almost twice as likely to report language proficiency than recent arrivals (40% for recent vs. 70% for settled migrants), EU-wide. In the United States, the increase associated with duration of residence is smaller (63% vs. 74%). The participation in language courses is associated with a 2 percentage points higher probability of achieving advanced proficiency among migrants who arrived with no more than intermediate language skills.

## Immigrant employment rates have risen over the last decade, and the COVID-19 pandemic did not leave lasting scars

- Immigrant employment rates have risen over the last decade in the majority of countries. While immigrants are still less likely to be employed as native-born in Europe, immigrant employment rates are higher in most non-European OECD countries.
- The unemployment rates of the foreign-born exceed those of the native-born in four out of five countries. They are twice as high across the EU. Gaps are narrower outside Europe. Higher education helps protect against unemployment everywhere, though highly educated immigrants are worse affected by joblessness than their native-born peers. If highly educated immigrants had the same employment rate as their native-born counterparts, the EU would have over 1 million more highly educated people working.
- Despite a sharp increase in unemployment with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, joblessness has become less prevalent in most countries among both foreign- and native-born in the last decade. Likewise, employment rates have regained pre-pandemic levels.

## Many immigrants fear labour market exclusion

- The fear of job loss is higher among immigrants than the native-born in virtually all countries.
- Immigrants are more likely than their native-born peers to be long-term unemployed in around half of the EU. Outside the EU, long-term unemployment affects both groups equally.
- Many immigrants want to work but do not look actively for a job. Involuntary inactivity is more common among the foreign- than the native-born and has increased over the last decade, more markedly among immigrants than among their native-born peers in the EU, though not outside.
- Self-employment is one option for immigrants to avoid marginalisation. In two-thirds of countries, immigrants are more likely to be self-employed than the native-born. Overall, 30% of self-employed immigrants are self-employed because they lack an alternative, against 20% among the native-born.

## Immigrants more often hold temporary contracts and work involuntary in part-time

- Immigrants are more likely to work with temporary contracts in European and Asian countries, though not, generally, in the settlement countries and Latin American OECD countries. The gap between foreign- and native-born workers more than halves after 10 years of residence in the EU, vanishing almost completely in half of countries.
- Immigrants are also more likely to work part-time in half of countries, especially in Southern European and the Baltic countries, though not in countries with incidence of part-time work among the native-born; e.g. the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Austria and Switzerland.

## Finding a skill-adequate job remains a challenge

- Over the last decade, the skills level of immigrant occupations has risen, narrowing the gap with the native-born in one-third of the countries. Nevertheless still 30% of elementary jobs are held by migrants in the EU, a level that exceeds 50% in German-speaking countries, Cyprus, Norway and Sweden.
- Immigrants with tertiary degrees are less likely to work than their native-born peers in all countries. In virtually all countries, those who work are also more likely to be overqualified for their jobs than the native-born. EU-wide, 47% of tertiary educated immigrants are either overqualified or not in employment, against 30% of the native-born. A host-country degree reduces the immigrant overqualification gap by 75% EU-wide, and by even more in North America, German-speaking countries, France, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

## Despite their higher education, the labour market outcomes of migrant women often lag behind their male peers

- Overall, female immigrants OECD- and EU- wide have higher education levels than their male peers. Their higher education does however not translate into better labour market outcomes. Only 57% of migrant women in the EU have a job against 73% of their male peers and 65% of native-born women. Gender gaps between foreign-born men and women are slightly smaller in the settlement countries, but larger in the United States, Korea and Latin American countries, much more than among the native-born.
- Immigrant women also have lower-skilled jobs than the native-born in most countries. The skilled-job gap between women is particularly wide in Southern Europe and longstanding destination countries in Europe.
- Foreign-born women are as likely as native-born women to work in part-time jobs, and part-time activity among female migrant workers has gradually declined in both the EU and the OECD over the last decade. Involuntary part-time remains overall highest among migrant women, especially for family reasons.

### 3.1. Educational attainment

#### Indicator context

While high educational attainment does not determine an immigrant's successful integration in the host society, it almost always spells better labour market outcomes (see other indicators below) than low educational attainment.

The International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) divides educational attainment into three levels: i) low, no higher than lower-secondary (ISCED levels 0-2); ii) medium, upper-secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary (ISCED Levels 3-4); iii) high, tertiary education (ISCED Levels 5-8).

More than one-third of immigrants in the EU (35%) are low-educated – almost double the proportion among the native-born (20%). That relatively large share is attributable chiefly to non-EU migrants, 40% of whom attain only a low level of education in the EU, a figure that is even higher in Southern Europe (bar Portugal) and Germany. Outside Europe (except for the United States, Japan and Korea), by contrast, the foreign-born are less likely than their native-born peers to be low-educated, especially in Latin America (bar Costa Rica). When it comes to people across the OECD with no more than primary education (very low-educated), 19% are foreign-born. EU-wide, the share of very low-educated migrants is around three times that of the native-born. While differences tend to be less pronounced outside Europe, immigrants account for 84% of very low-educated, working-age adults in the United States. They are also less likely to be highly educated in the EU. However, the difference in the share of the highly educated between immigrants and native-born is much smaller (3 percentage points). In non-European countries, immigrants have higher levels of education in the settlement countries, Mexico, Chile and Türkiye.

The share of the highly educated rose in all countries (except for Mexico) during the decade to 2020. In about half of countries, high-level educational attainment grew more among migrants than the native-born. Increases were most pronounced among women. Overall, female immigrants are more likely to be highly educated than men, although gender gaps are narrower than among the native-born. Recent migrants are better educated than the native-born and previous cohorts: 39% were educated to tertiary level in 2020 in the EU and 50% in the OECD, against 25% in the EU and 35% in the OECD 10 years earlier.

In the EU and the OECD, more than half of immigrants obtained their tertiary diploma abroad. In countries with large and longstanding shares of international students (e.g. France, the settlement countries) and those where the foreign-born population mostly arrived as children before border changes (e.g. Croatia), the majority of the highly educated foreign-born have been educated in the host country. Conversely, most highly educated immigrants are foreign-educated in the United States and in countries attracting many labour migrants (including through free mobility). Highly educated EU-born, who benefit from facilitated diploma recognition within the EU, are more likely to be foreign-educated than their non-EU born peers.


#### Main findings

- The low-educated share of immigrants in the EU is nearly twice that of the native-born. In the EU, 20% of the very low-educated are foreign-born, compared to 84% in the United States.
- Recent migrants are better educated than previous cohorts virtually everywhere: 39% were tertiary-educated in the EU and 50% in the OECD in 2020, versus 25% in the EU and 35% in the OECD in 2010). Recent migrants are more likely to be highly educated than the native-born.
- In the EU and OECD, over 50% of immigrants obtained their tertiary diploma abroad.



Figure 3.1. Low- and highly educated


15-64 year-olds not in education, 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/moylxa>

Figure 3.2. How shares of the highly educated have evolved

15-64 year-olds, between 2010 and 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/798jck>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 3.2. Access to adult education and training

### Indicator context

Adult education helps immigrants to unlock their potential and reduce the gap with the native-born in formal education. It enables them to upgrade and update their skills and so adapt to labour market changes, which in turn improves their career prospects.

This indicator, which is available only for European countries, measures the shares of adults who, within the last four weeks, have participated in any courses, seminars or conferences, or received private lessons or instruction outside the regular education system.

Immigrants are less likely to participate in adult education and training than the native-born in most countries, although often not by much. They lag furthest behind the native-born in most of the Nordic countries, Southern Europe (bar Portugal) and France. Immigrants are more likely than the native-born to take part in adult education only in Portugal and in Central and Eastern Europe. In about three countries in five, foreign-born improved their participation in adult education over the last decade – in line with a general increase of upskilling and reskilling activities – though to a lesser extent than among the native-born. Indeed, participation gaps actually widened in around half of all countries, although they recently narrowed in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. They increased significantly in Portugal, Poland and the Czech Republic, where immigrants were already more likely to participate in adult education.

Lower immigrant participation in adult education may be associated with poor knowledge of and advice about learning opportunities, which is more widespread among groups that are most in need. Women are less likely to participate in adult education and training in nearly all European countries, though gender gaps are wider among the native- than the foreign-born. Therefore, while female participation rates are similar between the two groups EU-wide, male rates are slightly lower among immigrants than native-born.


The low-educated are less likely than the highly educated to attend adult education and training. There is usually no big difference between low- and medium-educated immigrants and native-born, while highly educated immigrants are less likely to participate in adult education than their native-born peers in most countries. Low-educated immigrants take up training in greater proportions than their native-born peers in around half of countries, especially Denmark and Austria. Attendance is greater among some vulnerable migrant groups, with new arrivals, for example, more likely than the native-born to attend training in two countries in three. They are also more than twice as likely as settled migrants in Belgium and Spain and in some countries with large recent intakes of humanitarian migrants (e.g. Germany and Austria). Recent migrants are, though, less likely to participate in adult education than settled migrants in Greece, Cyprus, Malta and Sweden. Take-up is generally of a similar level among non-EU and EU-born, although non-EU rates are significantly lower in Switzerland, the Nordic countries and Central Europe.

### Main findings

- Immigrants are less likely to participate in adult education than the native-born in most countries, although not significantly in half of them.
- Gaps in participation in adult education between the foreign- and native-born widened in around half of all countries over the last decade, although gaps narrowed after COVID-19.
- There is usually no difference between low- and medium educated immigrants and native-born in access to adult education, and newly arrived immigrants are actually more likely than native-born to attend training in two countries in three.

**Figure 3.3. Participation in adult education and training**


15-64 year-olds outside the regular education system, 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/satzdh>

**Figure 3.4. How participation in adult education and training has evolved**

15-64 year-olds outside the regular education system, between 2010 and 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/xd4ih8>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

### 3.3. Language proficiency

#### Indicator context

Proficiency in the host-country language is the most important skill for migrants to develop, as it allows them to participate fully in society and the labour market in their new place of residence.

This indicator measures the share of the foreign-born who report having advanced skills in the host-country's main language or who declare that it is their mother tongue.

In the EU, 62% of immigrants state they have at least advanced proficiency in the language of their host-country, as do 72% in Australia and the United States and 50% in Korea. Shares are larger in English-speaking destinations and in countries where many immigrants are native speakers of the host-country language (e.g. Croatia, Hungary, Portugal and Spain). By contrast, less than half of all immigrants report fluency in the host-country language in Malta, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, the Netherlands and Finland.

Between 2014 and 2021, language proficiency among immigrants fell in two-thirds of countries. In the EU, share of immigrants reporting advanced proficiency in the host-country language declined by 3 percentage points. The fall was partly attributable to an increase in new arrivals, even if newcomers in 2021 had higher proficiency than those in 2014. In contrast, in the United States, the share of English-proficient immigrants has grown by 6 percentage points, and even more so among recent migrants. Language skills generally improve with time spent in the host country. Among settled immigrants in the EU, roughly 7 in 10 report proficiency in the host-country language – almost twice the rate among recent arrivals (4 in 10), and over twice among those who are non-native speakers. This trend is less visible in the United States, where advanced proficiency is more common among recent migrants while the increase associated with duration of residence is smaller (63% for recent arrivals vs. 74% for settled immigrants).


Among immigrants who stated that they arrived in an EU country with no more than intermediate skills in the host-country language, 50% of the beginners and 70% of those with intermediate skills achieve advanced proficiency after at least 5 years of residence. Attending language courses can facilitate the learning process and is associated with a 2-percentage point greater probability of achieving advanced language proficiency – after controlling for sociodemographic characteristics (age, education, gender, EU/non-EU origin); migration-related characteristics (length of stay, reason for migration, initial language skills); and host-country differences. EU-wide, nearly three-fifths of all immigrants reporting a need of language training have attended classes since their arrival, a share that has decreased in around two-thirds of countries since 2014. Across the EU, the share of EU-born who report advanced proficiency in their host-country language is 10 percentage points greater than among their non-EU born peers, who tend to be less proficient in the language upon arrival and generally educated to lower levels.

#### Main findings

- In the EU, 62% of immigrants state they have at least advanced proficiency in the language of their host-country, as do 72% in Australia and the United States and 50% in Korea.
- In the EU, settled immigrants are almost twice as likely as recent arrivals to report proficiency in the host-country language (40% for recent vs. 70% for settled migrants). In the United States, the increase associated with duration of residence is smaller (63% vs. 74%).
- Attending language courses is associated with a 2-percentage point greater probability of achieving advanced language proficiency among migrants who have no more than intermediate language skills when they arrive in the host country.

**Figure 3.5. Advanced host-country language proficiency**


15-64 year-old foreign-born, 2021



StatLink <https://stat.link/e17yfk>

**Figure 3.6. Percentage of foreign-born with advanced host-country language proficiency in the main host-country language who had at most intermediate language skills before migrating**

15-64 year-old foreign-born with at least 5 years of residence since migration, 2021



StatLink <https://stat.link/eoatm4>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

### 3.4. Employment and labour market participation

#### Indicator context

Jobs are immigrants' chief source of income and help them take their place in society.

The employment rate is the share of 15-64 year-olds who, during the reference week, worked at least one hour, or who had a job but were absent from work (ILO definition). The participation/activity rate is the share of 15-64 year-olds who is active (employed and unemployed).

Across the EU, 65% of immigrants are employed, compared with 69% of the native-born. The majority are in employment in all countries, with the notable exception of Türkiye, where not only the foreign- but also the native-born employment rate lies below 50%. The foreign-born show particularly high employment rates of over 70% in the settlement countries, in longstanding destinations with predominantly EU-born, and in some Central European countries with a rising number of labour migrants, such as Poland and Hungary. In total, the foreign-born accounted for 13% of the employed population in both the EU and the OECD in 2021, while it was 11% in 2011.


In most longstanding destinations in Europe, as well as in the Nordic countries, employment rates are higher among the native- than the foreign-born in Europe. Gaps are widest in the Nordic countries (except Iceland) and those European destinations with predominantly non-EU immigrant populations. By contrast, immigrants are more likely to be in employment outside Europe (except for Australia, Canada, Korea and Mexico), particularly in Chile and Israel, where immigrant employment rates outstrip those of the native-born by at least 14 percentage points.

Immigrant activity rates tend to exceed those of the native-born in countries with large recent inflows of labour migrants, such as Southern, Central and Eastern European countries, as well as in most countries with predominantly EU-born. With few exceptions, outside of Europe, too, particularly in Latin America (bar Mexico) and Israel, labour force participation is greater in immigrant than native-born populations. The opposite, however, is again true of most longstanding European destinations and the Nordic countries, due mainly to comparatively higher levels of inactivity among foreign-born women. Indeed, they are 17 percentage points more likely to be inactive than their native-born peers in the Netherlands, and around 9 points in France and Belgium. Immigrant activity rates also lag behind those of the native-born in the Baltic countries, where many working-age foreign-born people are close to retirement age.

In the early phase of the COVID-19 pandemic, immigrants experienced a disproportionately sharp decline in their employment rates, followed by a particularly strong rebound in 2021. As a result, immigrant employment rates, like those of the native-born, have now nearly regained their pre-COVID levels. As countries recovered from the labour market downturn linked with the 2007-08 Great recession, there has been growth of 4 percentage points in the employment rate of immigrants in the EU and 6 points among the native-born over the last decade. Native-born employment has increased in virtually every country, while it has improved in over four-fifths of countries among immigrants. In the Central and Eastern European countries with high numbers of recently arrived labour migrants, in most English-speaking OECD countries and in Denmark, the rise has been more pronounced among immigrants than their native-born peers. Consequently, immigrants have narrowed or, as was the case in Poland and Croatia, reversed the employment gap with the native-born. By contrast, native-born employment showed steeper increases in long-standing European destinations such as the Netherlands, Germany and the Baltic countries. Immigrants' employment levels have deteriorated only in a handful of countries, most notably in Korea, Türkiye and Greece. At the same time, employment among the native-born slightly increased or remained stable in the two latter countries, increasing the gap with immigrants.

Figure 3.7. Employment and participation rates


15-64 year-olds, 2021



StatLink <https://stat.link/yp65w>

Figure 3.8. How employment rates have evolved

15-64 year-olds, between 2011 and 2021



StatLink <https://stat.link/mbvyej>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

Gender gaps in employment rates are larger among the foreign- than the native-born in virtually all countries. Only 57% of migrant women in the EU have a job against 73% of their male peers and 65% of native-born women. Gender gaps between foreign-born men and women are slightly smaller in the settlement countries, but larger in the United States, Korea and Latin American countries. The EU-wide employment rate of EU-born is 3 percentage points higher than among the native-born. Non-EU migrant employment levels, however, are significantly lower in two-thirds of countries. Gaps with respect to the native-born are at least 10 percentage points in the Nordic countries and the longstanding European destinations (except for Luxembourg and the United Kingdom), partly because of the low employment rates among women in this group. EU-wide, only 52% of non-EU women are in work against 65% of the native-born. Yet although employment rates tend to improve with length of stay, in particular for non-EU migrants, even settled immigrants fare worse than the native-born both in longstanding European destinations with many non-EU migrants (bar the United Kingdom) and in the Baltic and Nordic countries.

Educational attainment improves access to the labour market, albeit to a lesser extent for immigrants than the native-born. EU-wide, the gap between highly and low-educated immigrant employment rate is 21 percentage points, against 35 points among the native-born. The same pattern emerges outside Europe (except for Australia). Indeed, in all countries, immigrants with tertiary degrees are less likely to work than their native-born peers. EU-wide, the gap is 10 percentage points, widening further in for example Southern Europe, Germany and Estonia. Differences are narrower, though, in the settlement countries, the United Kingdom and most of Central and Eastern Europe. If highly educated immigrants were as likely to be employed as their native-born counterparts, there would be over 1 million more highly educated people working in the EU. One reason for the lower employment rates of highly educated immigrants is that foreign degrees are devalued in virtually every labour market in the OECD. Only in the Slovak Republic, Korea, Luxembourg and Canada are immigrants trained abroad more likely to be employed than those who qualified in the host-country. Across the EU, employment rates among immigrants educated in the host country are 12 percentage points higher compared to their foreign-educated peers. Despite the better labour market outcomes of immigrants with a host country degree, they still lag behind their native-born peers in almost all countries, except the United States, the United Kingdom, Portugal, and few Central and Eastern European countries.

By contrast, low-educated immigrants outperform their native-born peers in over two out of three countries, with employment gaps of around 30 percentage points in Israel and the United States. The opposite, however, holds true in the Nordic countries (bar Iceland and Finland), the Baltic countries and in most longstanding European immigrant destinations which predominantly host non-EU migrants. Gaps are widest in Sweden and the Netherlands, where they exceed 13 percentage points. However, in several Southern, Central and Eastern European countries, most notably Hungary and the Czech Republic, low-educated non-EU migrants are more likely to work than their native-born counterparts.


## Main findings

- Whereas employment rates in Europe, Australia, Korea and Mexico are usually lower among immigrants than the native-born, the opposite is true in other OECD countries.
- Despite the slump caused by the COVID-19 crisis, employment rates among immigrants and the native-born have regained pre-crisis levels and increased over the last decade.
- Immigrants with tertiary degrees are less likely to work than their native-born peers in all countries, while the opposite is true of low-educated migrants in over two-thirds of countries.
- If highly educated immigrants were as widely employed as their native-born counterparts, there would be over 1 million more highly educated people working in the EU.
- Across the EU, employment rates are 12 percentage points higher among immigrants educated in the host country than abroad.




**Figure 3.9. The employment rates of the foreign-born by level of education**

Differences in percentage points with native-born, 15-64 year-olds not in education, 2021



**Figure 3.10. The employment rates of the highly educated foreign-born, by place of education**

15-64 year-olds not in education, 2020



Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 3.5. Unemployment

### Indicator context

An unemployed person is one without, but available for, work and who has been seeking work during the reference week (ILO definition). The unemployment rate is the percentage of unemployed in the labour force (the sum of employed and unemployed individuals).

In four out of five countries, there is a higher incidence of unemployment among immigrants than among the native-born. Gaps are particularly wide in longstanding destinations with many non-EU migrants, in most Southern European countries, and in the Nordic countries. Across the EU, the immigrant unemployment rate (12%) is twice that of the native-born, peaking at a factor of three in Sweden. Outside of Europe, disparities are much less pronounced, with immigrants' unemployment rates in Chile actually 3 percentage points below of the native-born.

Since 2011, unemployment has fallen by around 3 percentage points in the EU and OECD among foreign- and native-born alike. Indeed, it has abated in both groups in around three-quarters of countries, but risen in others, however – by up to 5 points in Türkiye and Chile. With the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, immigrant unemployment rose sharply, by over 2 percentage points (in the United States, the Baltic countries and Sweden, for example), before regaining pre-pandemic levels in most countries in 2021. The rebound was similar among the native-born, following a lower increase.


Higher education helps protect against joblessness, while the low-educated are more exposed to it virtually everywhere. However, highly educated immigrants still lag behind their native-born peers, with gaps in unemployment between the two groups actually increasing with education in most countries. The most prominent exception where gaps are smaller among the highly educated is Sweden, where differences between the low-educated foreign- and native-born reach 18 percentage points. While unemployment levels are similar among native-born men and women, joblessness hits immigrant women hardest – it is 3 percentage points higher than for immigrant men in the EU and 1 point higher in most non-European OECD countries. Immigrant gender gaps peak at over 10 points in Costa Rica and Greece. Unemployment among non-EU migrants is 14% EU-wide, against 8% among their EU-born peers, with non-EU women experiencing the highest rate, at 15%. Recent migrants, too, are more likely to be jobless than their settled peers in virtually all countries. In Croatia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Sweden, their unemployment levels are at least double those of immigrants with at least 10 years of residence.

### Main findings

- The unemployment rates of the foreign-born exceed those of the native-born in four out of five countries, and are twice as high across the EU. Gaps are narrower outside Europe.
- Despite a sharp increase in unemployment with the onset of the pandemic, joblessness has become less prevalent in most countries among both foreign- and native-born in the last decade.
- Higher education helps protect against unemployment virtually everywhere, though highly educated immigrants are worse affected by joblessness than their native-born peers. Migrant women, particularly those born outside the EU, are more prone to unemployment than both native-born women and immigrant men.

Figure 3.11. Unemployment rates


15-64 year-olds, 2021



StatLink <https://stat.link/qbg3j5>

Figure 3.12. How unemployment rates have evolved

15-64 year-olds, between 2011 and 2021



StatLink <https://stat.link/xe1g64>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

### 3.6. Risks of labour market exclusion

#### Indicator context

The risk of labour market exclusion is a greater threat to the foreign-born, as they lack the social networks to support the mental and financial stress of exclusion. Long spells of unemployment rob immigrants of the opportunity to speak the host-country language and socialise in the workplace.

The long-term unemployment rate is the share of job seekers who have been without a job for at least 12 months. This section also examines the share of people who consider it likely, or very likely, that they will be or become unemployed in the next 12 months, or the share of those who are worried that they will lose their job or not find one.

In around half of European countries, the foreign-born are more likely to be long-term unemployed than their native-born peers, especially in the Nordic countries (except Finland), Luxembourg, Lithuania and Belgium. By contrast, in the Southern European countries, in some Central and Eastern European countries and in non-European OECD countries (bar Canada and Israel), long-term unemployment is at least as widespread among the native-born as among immigrants. Immigrants from non-EU countries and those who have resided in the host country for at least 10 years are disproportionately affected by long-term unemployment. Immigrant women, too, are more likely to be long-term unemployed compared to both native-born women and their male peers in the longstanding European destinations (bar the United Kingdom), most Central and Eastern European countries, Australia and Costa Rica.

The long-term unemployment rate increased dramatically in the wake of the 2007-08 economic downturn. Then, between 2011 and 2021, it declined in two-thirds of countries (despite a resurgence during the COVID-19 pandemic). The drop was generally steeper among the foreign- than the native-born, with long-term unemployment gaps between the two groups consequently narrowing, especially in the settlement countries and most longstanding European destinations with large non-EU intakes, particularly Germany and the Netherlands. The situation has evolved much less favourably, however, in the Southern European countries which, except for Spain and Malta, have seen sizeable increases in structural unemployment, particularly among the foreign-born. In Greece, the long-term unemployment rate of the foreign-born climbed by 21 percentage points and in Italy by 9 points – nearly twice the rate of the native-born.


Because they grapple with barriers in the host country's labour market, the fear of job loss and long-term unemployment is much more prevalent among immigrants than their native-born peers. Comparisons between 2006 and 2016 reveal that fear of labour market exclusion has become more widespread nearly everywhere. That increase, attributable chiefly to the global economic downturn, was more pronounced among the foreign-born as they are more exposed to the risk of job loss during a recession.

#### Main findings

- Immigrants are more likely than their native-born peers to be long-term unemployed in around half of the EU, especially in the Nordic countries (except Finland), Luxembourg, Lithuania and Belgium. Outside the EU, long-term unemployment affects both groups equally.
- Over the last decade, the long-term unemployment rate has declined in two-thirds of countries, with the decline being generally more marked among the foreign-born jobseekers.
- The fear of job loss and long-term unemployment is much more prevalent among immigrants than the native-born in virtually all countries.

**Figure 3.13. Long-term unemployment rate**


Unemployed population, 15-64 year-olds, 2021



StatLink <https://stat.link/bytwfj>

**Figure 3.14. Fear of being unemployed**

15-year-olds and over (ESS), 2016, and 15-64 year-olds (WVS), 2017/20, self-reporting they are “(very) likely to be unemployed and looking for work in the next 12 months” (ESS) or “worried about losing/ not finding a job” (WVS)



StatLink <https://stat.link/3ibdww>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

### 3.7. Involuntary inactivity

#### Indicator context

Although immigrants are generally less likely than the native-born to participate in the labour market, their economic inactivity is not always a choice. It may be attributable to illness, discouragement or family responsibilities, as gender roles may differ between host- and origin country.

This indicator relates to economically inactive individuals (whom the ILO defines as neither employed nor unemployed) who wish to work but may not for different reasons. Discouraged people are those who do not seek work because they believe that no suitable jobs are available.

At 28% versus 18%, involuntary inactivity is more widespread among the foreign- than the native-born in the EU. Differences are smaller outside the EU. The share of inactive immigrants who would like to work exceeds that of their inactive native-born peers in virtually all countries. Some 5% of the economically inactive immigrants and native-born in the EU do not look for work because they believe nothing suitable is available for them. In non-EU countries, levels are below 2% in both groups (bar New Zealand). Particularly in Greece and Iceland are immigrants significantly more likely than the native-born to be discouraged. Family responsibilities are the most common reason for immigrants not seeking a job despite wanting to work in both the EU and the OECD. In most countries, health is only a minor reason (except in most Nordic countries, the Slovak Republic and Lithuania), especially among immigrants.

Over the last decade, involuntary inactivity has become more prevalent in the EU, rising 3 percentage points among the native-born and 6 points among the foreign-born. In contrast, involuntary inactivity in both groups has changed only slightly in the United States and the United Kingdom. It has grown among immigrants in around three-quarters of countries and among the native-born in roughly two-thirds. The increase among immigrants has been particularly pronounced in Portugal and Poland.


Women are generally less likely to be involuntarily inactive, with the gender gap among immigrants significantly wider than among the native-born – 7 percentage points in the EU and the United States. Involuntarily inactive men are most likely to be discouraged workers, while women are more involuntarily inactive for family reasons – migrant women almost twice as much EU-wide. Moreover, EU-born or immigrants who have spent less than 10 years in the host country are more likely to be involuntarily inactive than their non-EU peers and longer-term residents. While the incidence of involuntary inactivity ascribable to family responsibilities declines with an immigrant's duration of stay in the host country, the opposite is true for illness. Involuntary inactivity is consistently more frequent among immigrants than their native-born peers at all levels of education. While discouragement is the chief reason for inactivity among low-educated immigrants (although less so than among their native-born peers), those with high levels of education are most often involuntarily inactive for family reasons.

#### Main findings

- In virtually all countries, involuntary inactivity is more common among the foreign- than the native-born. Family responsibilities are the primary reason for involuntary inactivity for immigrants and, in particular, among foreign-born women.
- Over the last decade, involuntary inactivity has increased more markedly among immigrants than among their native-born peers in the EU, though not outside the EU.
- Low-educated immigrants are most often involuntarily inactive because they feel discouraged, albeit to a lesser extent than their native-born peers.

Figure 3.15. Involuntary inactivity due to discouragement or other reasons


Inactive foreign-born (F) and native-born (N) 15-64 year-olds, 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/rwnfq2>

Figure 3.16. How shares of involuntary inactivity have evolved

Inactive 15-64 year-olds, between 2010 and 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/z5b0lj>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

### 3.8. Types of contracts

#### Indicator context

Temporary work contracts generally do not offer the job security that makes it possible to look ahead, draw up plans or build financial security. They make it hard to obtain loans or housing, for instance.

In most countries, temporary work denotes any kind of wage-earning employment governed by a fixed-term contract, including apprenticeships, “temp” agency work, and paid training courses. In Australia, temporary work is defined as work without paid leave.

Almost everywhere, immigrant workers are more likely than the native-born to have temporary contracts, with EU-wide shares of 17% versus 10%. In half of European countries, as well as in Asian OECD countries, they are at least 5 percentage points more likely, with gaps particularly wide in more recent destinations. In Korea, more than half of all immigrants are temporary workers, much more than among the native-born. Outside Europe and Asia, shares of temporary workers are similar between the foreign- and native-born in the settlement countries, but immigrants are less likely to have such contracts in Chile and Costa Rica. Women are generally more likely to work in temporary jobs than men, with the gender gap wider among immigrants in half of countries. In countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy and Spain, by contrast, immigrant women are less likely to have temporary jobs than their male peers.

While shares of native-born workers on temporary contracts have only slightly changed in most countries over the last decade, they have dropped among the foreign-born in two-thirds of countries (and by 2 percentage points EU-wide) and risen in only a few. As a result, the temporary work gap between the two groups has narrowed in many countries, particularly in Southern Europe (bar Italy and Malta). In most countries, the share of immigrants with temporary contracts fell between 2019 and 2021 – chiefly because workers lost their jobs or returned to their countries of origin during the COVID-19 pandemic. In some countries (e.g. Canada and the United Kingdom), the drop in temporary contracts reflected a genuine downward trend disrupted by the COVID-19 crisis.

Differences in shares of foreign- and native-born workers on temporary contracts are widest in countries with large intakes of low-educated, non-EU born or recent migrants. Recent migrants rely particularly heavily on temporary contracts, as do low-educated workers. At the same time, in virtually all countries (bar Australia, Portugal and Greece), temporary contracts are still more prevalent among highly educated immigrants than their native-born peers – as much as 5 percentage points more across the EU. A temporary contract can often be the first step into the labour market. Recent arrivals are at least twice as likely to work in temporary jobs as settled immigrants in four-fifths of EU countries. The gap between the foreign and the native-born more than halves after 10 years of residence in the EU and largely diminished in half of countries, especially in Cyprus, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Austria.


#### Main findings

- Immigrants are more likely to work with temporary contracts in European countries and Asia, although this is generally not the case in the settlement countries and Latin America.
- Shares of immigrants in temporary work dropped over the last decade in two-thirds of countries. That trend was chiefly attributable to the COVID-19 crisis, which primarily affected temporary jobs.
- The gap between shares of foreign- and native-born workers on temporary contracts more than halves after 10 years of residence in the EU, vanishing almost completely in half of countries.



**Figure 3.17. Workers with temporary contracts**


Wage-earning 15-64 year-olds not in education, 2021



StatLink <https://stat.link/nr0dyz>

**Figure 3.18. How shares of temporary contracts among workers have evolved**

Wage-earning 15-64 year-olds not in education, between 2011 and 2021



StatLink <https://stat.link/08e43k>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

### 3.9. Working hours

#### Indicator context

The number of hours immigrants work helps gauge their participation in the labour market. Part-time work prevents immigrants from contributing their full potential to the host-country's economy, while working long hours may harm work-life balance, physical health and social integration.

Part-time work is defined here as working less than 30 hours a week, while long hours are over 50 hours a week. Part-time work is measured here as a share among overall employment.

Across the OECD and EU, women are more than three times more likely than men to work part-time. In the EU, 37% of immigrant women work part-time (against 9% of their male peers), while under 30% do outside Europe. The sole exception is Japan, where 47% of both foreign- and native-born women work part-time. Immigrant women are more likely than their native-born peers to work part-time in half of countries, albeit only slightly in most countries. Gaps are widest in the Baltic and Southern European countries. By contrast, in the countries with high incidences of part-time work – i.e. the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Austria, Switzerland – native-born women are far more likely to have part-time contracts.

The lower the level of education, the more widespread part-time work is. That correlation holds true for native- and foreign-born in the EU, but much more so for the native-born in Austria and the United States. Part-time work is also more common among settled immigrants, compared with recent arrivals in the EU (by 5 percentage points), but not in some of the Nordic countries, Southern Europe and Australia, where the opposite is true. Although the incidence of part-time work is low among males, migrant men in the EU, Japan and Mexico do resort to it more often than their native-born peers. The 2007-08 economic downturn saw part-time work spread in OECD and EU countries. Since 2011, however, the share of immigrant women working part-time has declined by 6 percentage points in the EU and 4 points in the OECD. The decline has been gradual, resuming after the COVID-19 crisis, and much steeper among foreign- than native-born women in less than half of countries.


In three-fifths of countries, the native-born are more likely than the foreign-born to work long hours, although not significantly in most European countries. They are more likely, though, in Iceland, Australia, the United States and many European longstanding destinations. Conversely, immigrants are significantly more likely to work long hours in countries such as Colombia, Costa Rica and Korea. The length of working hours is influenced by the occupational and sector-related gendered distribution of jobs held, as well as by educational attainment. In both the OECD and the EU, men are twice as likely as women to work long hours, although gender gaps are narrower among immigrants. Highly educated immigrants are more likely to work long hours than their native-born peers in most countries, while the reverse is true for low-educated migrants.

#### Main findings

- Immigrants are more likely to work part-time in half of countries, especially in Southern European and the Baltic countries, though not in countries with the highest incidence of part-time work, i.e. the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Austria and Switzerland.
- Part-time activity among female migrant workers has gradually declined in both the EU and the OECD over the last decade. That decline has continued since 2019, even after the pandemic.
- In two-thirds of countries, the native-born are more likely than foreign-born to work long hours, although differences in most European countries are small.

Figure 3.19. Part-time workers


Employed individuals not in education, 15-64 year-olds, 2021



StatLink <https://stat.link/5jptz6>

Figure 3.20. How shares of part-time female workers have evolved

Employed women not in education, 15-64 year-olds, between 2011 and 2021



StatLink <https://stat.link/vxhoe2>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

### 3.10. Involuntary part-time

#### Indicator context

Some immigrants work part-time because they are unable to find a full-time job or because of family expectations. Involuntary part-time reduces workers' earnings and prevents them from fully utilising their skill potential.

Involuntary part-time workers would like to work longer hours.

In virtually all countries, a majority of part-time foreign- and native-born workers state they would not want to work longer hours. Around 30% of immigrants would want to, however, against 20% of their native-born peers. They are at least 15 percentage points more likely in the Nordic countries (bar Denmark), Spain, Greece and Switzerland. In most countries, the recovery from the 2007-08 economic downturn saw a resumption of full-time jobs and a fall in involuntary part-time work. With falls of 9 percentage points EU-wide and 17 points in the United States over the past decade among the foreign-born, involuntary part-time work has generally declined more among immigrants than the native-born. As a result, the difference in shares of immigrants and native-born in involuntary part-time work has narrowed by a fifth in the EU, by about a third in the United States and almost by half in the United Kingdom. And the pandemic did not stop that trend – except in the United States and among the foreign-born only.

Although part-time work is particularly widespread among women, 42% of foreign-born male part-time workers EU-wide would like to work longer hours. The share of immigrant men wishing to work more is 17 percentage points higher than among immigrant women, a difference similar to that observed in the United States. The gender gap in involuntary part-time work is narrower among the native- than the foreign-born in the EU and the United States, but wider in Australia, Spain and Italy. In Luxembourg and Norway, while native-born men are more likely to work part-time against their will, foreign-born men are less likely.


In the EU, Australia and the United Kingdom, involuntary part-time workers account for at least 8 percentage points more of the low- than highly educated native-born workers. Among immigrants, by contrast, shares are similar for high and low levels in two-fifths of European countries and Australia. As for involuntary part-time work among native-born in the United States, it does not fall as educational attainment rises, though among migrants it is higher (by 14 percentage points) among the low- than highly educated. New arrivals also struggle to avoid part-time work everywhere. In the EU and Australia, 43% of recent migrants working part-time are involuntary part-time workers – twice as high as the native-born in the EU and 40% more in Australia. Settled migrants, too, remain more likely than their native-born peers to be involuntary part-time workers everywhere except Australia, Latvia and Cyprus. The same is true for non-EU migrants, who are 11 percentage points more likely than EU-born to work part-time involuntarily in the EU.

#### Main findings

- EU- and OECD-wide, 30% of part-time immigrant employees want to work longer hours, against 20% of their native-born peers, with wider gaps in Spain, Greece, Switzerland and most Nordic countries.
- The recovery from the 2007-08 economic downturn saw an increase in the number of full-time jobs and a fall in involuntary part-time work, especially among immigrants.
- New arrivals struggle to avoid involuntary part-time work. The share of recent migrants in involuntary part-time jobs is twice that of the native-born in the EU. And even settled migrants are more likely than the native-born to be involuntary part-time workers.

**Figure 3.21. Workers in involuntary part-time employment**


Part-time workers not in education, 15-64 year-olds, 2021



StatLink <https://stat.link/5uaqid>

**Figure 3.22. How shares of involuntary part-time workers have evolved**

Part-time workers not in education, 15-64 year-olds, 2011 and 2021



StatLink <https://stat.link/ct8fib>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

### 3.11. Job skills

#### Indicator context

The job skills indicator compares shares of workers in low- and highly skilled jobs. The International Standard Classification of Occupations describes those who hold high-skilled jobs as senior managers, professionals, technicians and associate professionals (ISCO Levels 1-3). Low-skilled jobs are elementary occupations that require simple, routine tasks and, often, physical effort (ISCO 9).

In the EU, 19% of immigrant workers hold low-skilled jobs, against 7% of native-born populations. They are overrepresented in elementary occupations in virtually all countries. In Slovenia, Southern Europe, Nordic countries and most longstanding destinations in Europe, immigrants are at least three times as likely to work in low-skilled jobs as their native-born peers. Immigrants hold around 30% of elementary jobs in the EU and the settlement countries, and over 50% in most German-speaking countries, Cyprus, Norway and Sweden. Only in most settlement countries, Türkiye, Portugal, Mexico and Central Europe are they significantly overrepresented in highly skilled rather than elementary occupations. EU-wide, the share of the native-born in highly skilled work exceeds that of the foreign-born by 12 percentage points.

Nevertheless, the job skills gap between foreign- and native-born has narrowed over the last decade. EU- and OECD-wide, the share of immigrants with highly skilled jobs has climbed 7 percentage points, compared to 4 points among the native-born. The growth of highly skilled immigrant work is attributable chiefly to Germany, where it was four times that of the native-born. Indeed, around half of countries saw faster improvement among the foreign- than the native-born. Overall, the skills level of immigrant employment grew over the last decade. In 2021, more than one-third of recent arrivals EU-wide held highly skilled occupations in 2021 – a share only just over one-fifth in 2011.


Foreign- and native-born women are overrepresented at both ends of the skills spectrum. EU-wide, they boast greater shares of highly skilled jobs than men – foreign-born women 4 percentage points more and native-born women 7 points more. Similarly, they hold higher shares of elementary jobs – 9 and 2 points, respectively. Immigrant women have lower-skilled jobs than native-born women in most countries, even in Israel and Canada, where immigrant men outperform native-born males. In countries where immigrants hold the largest shares of elementary jobs (Southern European and longstanding destination countries in Europe), gaps with the native-born are at least 8 percentage points wider among women than men. Non-EU migrants are more likely to hold low-skilled occupations than their EU peers in all European countries, with the exceptions of Hungary, Lithuania and the United Kingdom. In European longstanding destinations, Nordic and Southern European countries, EU-born are still on average twice as likely to work in low-skilled jobs as the native-born.

#### Main findings

- Around 30% of elementary jobs are held by immigrants in the EU, a level that exceeds 50% in most German-speaking countries, Cyprus, Norway and Sweden.
- There was a general rise in the skills level of immigrant occupations, significantly narrowing the gap with the native-born in one-third of countries, particularly Germany.
- Immigrant women have lower-skilled jobs than the native-born in most countries, even in Israel and Canada, where immigrant men outperform the native-born. The job skills gap between women is wide in Southern Europe and European longstanding destination countries.

**Figure 3.23. Low-skilled and highly skilled employment**


Employed individuals, 15-64 year-olds, 2021



StatLink <https://stat.link/npek7>

**Figure 3.24. How shares of workers in highly skilled occupations have evolved**

Employed individuals, 15-64 year-olds, between 2011 and 2021



StatLink <https://stat.link/26dwkt>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 3.12. Overqualification

### Indicator context

Immigrants, especially those with foreign qualifications, face many difficulties getting their credentials valued in the host country. They struggle to find suitable jobs that match their skills. Overqualification translates into lower marginal returns to education and may also lead to lower motivation.

The overqualification rate is the share of the highly educated (see Indicator 3.1) who work in a job that is ISCO-classified as low- or medium-skilled – i.e. ISCO Levels 4-9.

Around one-third of highly educated immigrants in the OECD and EU are overqualified for their jobs – 12 percentage points more than among the native-born in the EU. Immigrant women are more overqualified than men, while there is generally little or no difference between native-born women and men inside or outside Europe. The overqualification gaps between foreign- and native-born are greatest in Israel, Latin America (bar Mexico), Korea, and most Nordic and Southern European countries. They are marginal in the settlement countries and non-existent in a range of other countries, including Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Switzerland and Türkiye. EU-wide, 47% of highly educated immigrants are either overqualified or not in employment, against 30% of their native-born peers.

Overqualification rates dropped continuously in half of countries between 2011 and 2021, among both the foreign- and the native-born. In most Central European countries and Austria, however, immigrant and native-born overqualification both grew over the last decade, albeit by more among immigrants.

Highly educated immigrants with foreign qualifications are more likely to be overqualified in part because they struggle to have their credentials valued. Indeed, in the EU, they are more likely to be overqualified than anyone educated in a host country and twice as likely as the native-born. The sole exceptions are the Baltic countries and Luxembourg. The overqualification gaps between the domestically and foreign-educated are widest in Nordic countries, Southern Europe (except Greece) and European longstanding immigration destinations. Host-country degrees reduce the immigrant overqualification gap by 75% EU-wide, and entirely (or almost entirely) in North America, German-speaking countries, France, Sweden and the United Kingdom. In Europe (except for Germany, Ireland and the United Kingdom), foreign-educated non-EU migrants are more likely to be overqualified than their EU-born peers, who benefit from automatic or at least facilitated recognition. Recent arrivals are more likely than settled migrants to be overqualified – by 4 percentage points OECD- and EU-wide. Rates in 2021 were lower than a decade before in two-thirds of countries; the United States, Germany and Austria being notable exceptions.


### Main findings

- Overqualification is more prevalent among immigrants than the native-born. EU-wide, 47% of tertiary educated immigrants are either overqualified or not in employment, against 30% of the native-born.
- Host-country degrees reduce the immigrant overqualification gap by 75% EU-wide, and by even more in North America, German-speaking countries, France, Sweden and the United Kingdom.



**Figure 3.25. Overqualification rates**


Highly educated people in employment, 15-64 year-olds, 2021



StatLink <https://stat.link/0x3ejk>

**Figure 3.26. How overqualification rates have evolved**

Highly educated people in employment, 15-64 year-olds, between 2011 and 2021



StatLink <https://stat.link/hxk4c5>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

### 3.13. Self-employment

#### Indicator context

Self-employment is often a way to avoid marginalisation in the job-market. However, where successful, self-employment can also provide important economic opportunities, for immigrants and the host-country society alike.

The self-employed create and work in their own activities or firms. They include entrepreneurs, the liberal professions, artisans, traders, and other freelancers (excluding agriculture). Self-employment is measured as the percentage of self-employed among those in employment.

In slightly less than two-thirds of countries, the share of the foreign-born self-employed exceeds the native-born – by more than 5 percentage points in Central and Eastern Europe and Colombia. By contrast, native-born self-employment is more widespread in Korea (almost fourfold), Japan, Iceland, Italy, Greece and the remaining Latin American countries. EU-wide, migrant businesses tend to be smaller than those of their native-born peers. The vast majority (71%) operate without any employees, compared to 68% of native-born firms. In Australia, 63% of migrant firms are sole proprietors, compared to 61% of native-born entrepreneurs. What is more, only in a few Central and Eastern European countries does the share of migrant-owned businesses with over 11 employees exceed that of native-born entrepreneurs. Personal preference is the main reason for self-employment among both groups in the EU. However, 30% of immigrant self-employed state that they are in this situation because they have no alternative, compared with 20% of the native-born. A single main client accounts for most of the business revenue of one in four foreign-born entrepreneurs, while this is the case in one in three among their native-born peers.

In over two-thirds of countries, self-employment has become an increasingly common form of economic activity for the foreign- and native-born alike over the last decade. Its growth has been most pronounced, at 5 percentage points, in the Baltic countries (bar Estonia), parts of Southern Europe, and the Slovak Republic. There was a slowdown due to the COVID-19 pandemic in around half of countries, with the share of self-employment falling among both native- and immigrants between 2019 and 2021.


Barriers to self-employment within immigrant populations tend to be greater than among their native-born peers. Immigrants may struggle with adjusting to the host-country's business environment, regulations, and language. As time is a crucial factor in building up capital stock and professional networks, recent migrants have lower self-employment rates than settled migrants in all countries (bar Lithuania and the Slovak Republic). Having degree-level qualifications helps immigrants launch their businesses, with self-employment being slightly more common among highly educated immigrants than their low-educated peers in the EU (12% versus 10%). The opposite is true among the native-born, among whom self-employment is partly driven by the poorly educated in Southern Europe. Shares of female self-employment are lower than those of men virtually everywhere, regardless of country of birth.

#### Main findings

- In two-thirds of countries, the share of self-employed among immigrants exceeds the share among the native-born, except in Italy, Greece, Asia and most Latin American countries.
- Self-employment is motivated chiefly by personal preference. However, 30% of immigrants are self-employed because they have no alternative, compared to 20% among the native-born.
- Despite the slightly adverse effect of COVID-19 on self-employment in half of countries, it has grown among both foreign- and native-born in the EU and the OECD in the past decade.

**Figure 3.27. Self-employed workers**


15-64 year-olds in employment, excluding those in the agricultural sector and those in education, 2021



StatLink <https://stat.link/gicteu>

**Figure 3.28. How shares of self-employed have evolved**

15-64 year-olds in employment, excluding those in the agricultural sector and those in education, between 2011 and 2021



StatLink <https://stat.link/me813x>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.



# 4 Living conditions of immigrants

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This chapter presents a range of indicators on living conditions; namely, immigrants' income, housing, and health. It looks first at disposable household income (Indicator 4.1) and the risk of poverty (Indicators 4.2 and 4.3). It then considers housing indicators: tenure (Indicator 4.4), the incidence of overcrowding (Indicator 4.5), general housing conditions (Indicator 4.6), housing costs (Indicator 4.7), as well as the characteristics of the area where immigrants live (Indicator 4.8). Finally, it analyses self-reported health (Indicator 4.9), health risk factors (Indicator 4.10) and the lack of medical treatment (Indicator 4.11).

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# In Brief

## Immigrants are on average much more likely to be poor than the native-born, and income inequality is wider

- The median immigrant household income is over 90% that of the native-born in the EU and OECD. Immigrant incomes are, however, less than 80% those of their native-born peers in countries with large shares of non-EU and low-educated migrants, such as in longstanding European destinations (bar Germany), Southern Europe (bar Portugal) and Sweden.
- The distribution of immigrant income is highly unequal. Income inequality tends to be greater among the foreign- than the native-born. Recent cohorts of immigrants are more likely than 10 years ago to be in the highest income decile in most countries, especially in Portugal, France and the United States.
- Immigrants are more likely to live below the relative poverty line of their country of residence than the native-born in four out of five countries: notably in most European countries and the United States, though not in Latin America and Israel. Over the last decade, the share of immigrants living in relative poverty has fallen in slightly more than half of all countries.
- Immigrants are much more likely to be at risk of poverty and social exclusion (AROPE) than the native-born virtually everywhere in Europe, especially in Greece and Spain, where one in two immigrants is in this situation. The only exceptions are a few Central European countries with small immigrant populations and Portugal.

## Fewer foreign- than native-born own their homes and many live in bad housing conditions

- In all countries (except Estonia and Latvia), native-born home ownership rates exceed those of the foreign-born. Immigrants are only around half as likely as their native-born peers to own their home in the EU. Gaps are widest in parts of Southern Europe, Latin America and Korea.
- Although home ownership increases with duration of stay, it remains much lower in all countries (bar Estonia, Latvia and Hungary) than those of the native-born even among settled migrants. In the EU, foreign-born from other EU countries are more likely to own their homes than their non-EU counterparts (51% versus 37%).
- Irrespective of tenure, migrants are more likely to live in overcrowded and substandard housing than the native-born. More than one in six immigrants live in overcrowded accommodation in both the OECD and the EU – a rate that is 70% higher than that of the native-born in the EU. What is more, 26% of immigrants live in substandard housing, against 20% of the native-born.
- In the EU, overcrowding increased among immigrants, but declined among native-born. It has fallen among the foreign-born in the United States, the United Kingdom, Greece and Luxembourg.
- In the EU, around one immigrant in five reports paying over 40% of their disposable income on rent, compared to roughly one in eight among the native-born. Housing subsidies substantially narrow the gap between immigrants and the native-born in Germany, France and the Netherlands.
- Areas with housings in bad conditions are more likely to be rundown neighbourhoods. Therefore, immigrants are more likely to report problems with air quality, noise, litter or traffic in their neighbourhoods than the native-born, at 19% against 15% EU-wide. When accounting for differences in population density (immigrants are more likely to live in cities), gaps between the native- and foreign-born become narrower in most countries.

## Health status of immigrants differs strongly by country of residence, but overall fewer report unmet medical needs than a decade ago

- Immigrants report similar or better health than the native-born in three-fifths of countries, even after considering their lower age on average. Overall rates are highest in the settlement countries. Immigrants report lower health status than the native-born in most longstanding European destinations and most Baltic countries.
- Perceived health has improved over the last decade in most countries among both foreign- and native-born.
- Immigrants are less likely to be overweight than the native-born in half of countries. The incidence of overweight among immigrants tends to increase with duration of stay in countries where the overall incidence of overweight is high, while falling in those where it is low.
- Around 5% of both foreign- and native-born report unmet medical needs in the EU and unmet hospital needs in Australia. Shares of unmet medical needs have declined among both the foreign- and the native-born in most countries, though not among the foreign-born in Poland, Estonia, Belgium and the United Kingdom.
- Immigrants are less likely to use healthcare and dental care services than their native-born peers. They are more likely than the native-born to report struggling to afford healthcare.

## 4.1. Household income

### Indicator context

Income inequality can contribute to marginalise people and to erode social cohesion. Furthermore, low incomes may hamper immigrants' ability to build a financially secure future for their family.

A household's annual equivalised disposable income is total earnings per capita from labour and capital adjusted by the square root of household size. Median income divides all households into two halves: one receives less and the other more. The 10% of the population with the lowest income are in the first decile and the 10% with the highest income are in the tenth.

The median immigrant household income in the EU was almost EUR 18 000 in 2020, lower than in the OECD (around EUR 22 000). It is around 90% that of the native-born in the EU overall, as well as in Australia and Canada, and less than 86% in the United States and Colombia. Immigrants' incomes are lower than those of the native-born in most countries – at least 23% less in longstanding destinations with many non-EU migrants (bar Germany), Southern Europe (bar Portugal) and Sweden. EU-wide, non-EU migrant incomes are 84% those of their EU-born peers. Even lower is the median income of low-educated immigrants – two-thirds that of their highly educated peers in the EU and less than half in the United States. Although education improves immigrant household income in all countries, being highly educated does not close the gap with the native-born. Highly educated immigrants in the EU show a 13% lower income than their native-born peers (4% lower in the United States). By contrast, among the low-educated, again compared with their native-born peers, immigrant income is only 3% lower in the EU, and even 4% higher in the United States.

While immigrants are overrepresented in the lowest income decile and underrepresented in the highest, their situation has improved in 1 in 4 countries over the last decade. The strongest improvements came in Finland, Greece, the United Kingdom and Portugal. In most countries, the cohorts of immigrants who arrived in the last 10 years were less likely to be in the lowest income decile and more likely to be in the highest in 2020 than recent cohorts in 2010. The trend was particularly strong in most Nordic countries, Portugal, France, Greece and the United States.

Income inequality (ratio between the tenth and the first decile) among the foreign-born tends to be wider than among their native-born peers outside Europe (bar Israel and Australia). In the United States, the OECD country with the highest level of income inequality, income in the top decile outstrips the bottom by a factor of 7.1 among the foreign-born, and 6.5 among the native-born. Income inequality is also greater among immigrants in European longstanding destinations, as well as in Spain and Denmark. However, income inequality is lower than that of the native-born in around one-quarter of countries, such as Estonia and Lithuania. Over the last decade, immigrant income inequality has declined in 2 EU countries in 5, albeit to a lesser degree than among the native-born.


### Main findings

- Median immigrant household income is lower in most countries – around 90% that of the native-born in the EU, Australia and Canada, and less than 86% in the United States and Colombia.
- Recent cohorts of immigrants are more likely to be in the highest income decile than 10 years ago in most countries, especially in Portugal, France and the United States.
- Income inequality among the foreign-born tends to be wider than among the native-born.




**Figure 4.1. Median income of the foreign-born as a percentage of native-born**

16-year-olds and above, between 2010 and 2020



**Figure 4.2. How the distribution of the lowest and highest income deciles have evolved for the foreign-born**

16-year-olds and above, between 2010 and 2020



Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 4.2. Relative poverty

### Indicator context

The relative poverty rate (or at-risk-of-poverty rate) is the proportion of individuals living below the country's poverty threshold. The Eurostat definition of the poverty threshold used here is 60% of the median equivalised disposable income in each country.

EU-wide, 26% of the foreign- and 16% of the native-born live in relative poverty. Differences are of a similar magnitude in the United States (8 percentage points), while moving in the opposite direction in New Zealand, Latin American OECD countries and Israel. In 4 out of 5 countries, the foreign-born are more likely than their native-born peers to experience poverty. In Europe, differences between the foreign- and native-born are wide in all longstanding destinations (save Germany), most Southern European countries, and those with considerable humanitarian intakes, e.g. Sweden.

Over the last decade, poverty rates have remained stable among the native-born in the EU, while falling slightly among immigrants. Outside Europe, relative poverty has become less prevalent among both groups (bar the native-born in the United States). In slightly more than half of countries, the share of immigrants living in relative poverty has declined, as it has among the native-born. By contrast, increases among the foreign-born have been particularly stark in the Netherlands (by 10 points), as well as in Sweden and some Central and Eastern European countries. Virtually everywhere, changes in foreign-born relative poverty, whether positive or negative, were more pronounced than among their native-born peers.


High levels of education – and, consequently, better chances of (stable) employment – are a buffer against relative poverty, albeit to a lesser degree among immigrants than the native-born. Relative poverty is more common among the foreign-born in countries with predominantly low-educated, non-EU migrant populations. As a result, one-third of non-EU migrants experience poverty, compared to less than a quarter of their EU-born peers. The low-educated foreign-born are also more likely to be poor, at 36% EU-wide. However, gaps with the native-born remain of a similar magnitude at all levels of education – around 10 points. This pattern is less true outside the EU, with differences between the highly educated foreign- and native-born no more than 3 percentage points in the United States and the United Kingdom. What is more, at 16%, immigrants in employment are twice as likely as their native-born counterparts to live below the relative poverty line in the EU. Similar gaps are found in the United States (24% vs 14%).

### Main findings

- Immigrants are more likely than the native-born to live below the relative country's poverty line across the EU (26% versus 16%). In longstanding European destinations, the share is often at least twice as high as among the native-born. Immigrants are less likely to be in relative poverty outside Europe, however, except in the United States, Canada and Australia.
- Between 2010 and 2020, relative poverty became less prevalent among migrants in slightly more than half of countries. However, fluctuations (either positive or negative) in the shares of those who do live in relative poverty were more pronounced than among their native-born peers.
- Immigrants in employment nevertheless remain twice as likely as their native-born counterparts to live in relative poverty EU-wide (16% vs 8%). Similar gaps are found in the United States (24% vs 14%).

Figure 4.3. Relative poverty rates


16-year-olds and above, 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/6bpf2c>

Figure 4.4. How poverty rates have evolved

16-year-olds and above, 2010 to 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/n9yja4>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

### 4.3. At risk of poverty or exclusion (AROPE)

#### Indicator context

People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) lack the opportunity and resources to participate actively in the economic, political, social and cultural life of the host country.

This indicator, available for European countries only, indicates the share of people who are either at risk of poverty (Indicator 4.2), and/or severely materially and socially deprived, and/or living in a household with very low work intensity (less than 20% of the total combined work-time potential of all adults in the household during the previous year).

In the EU, around three in ten immigrants are at risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE), against less than a fifth of the native-born. They are more likely to be AROPE in virtually all European countries, especially in Greece and Spain, where one in two immigrants is in this situation. Immigrants are more at risk in over 12 percentage points in most of Southern Europe, some longstanding destinations and Nordic countries. By contrast, in Portugal, most Central and Eastern European countries, as well as Malta, where the foreign-born population has higher average levels of educational attainment, there are little or no differences. Non-EU migrants are much more AROPE than their EU-born peers in virtually all European countries. EU-wide, roughly two in five non-EU migrants are affected, against only around one in four of the EU-born.

Over the last decade, the share of the foreign- and native-born population at risk of poverty or social exclusion has fallen across the EU by 1 and 3 percentage points, respectively. It declined in two out of three countries among the foreign-born, and in four out of five among the native-born. Except for some Central and Eastern European countries, where drops occurred, as well as Cyprus and Ireland, they have been steeper among the foreign-born. Consequently, gaps between the two groups have narrowed in several countries, particularly Finland and Iceland. By contrast, in some Southern European countries, as well as Sweden, Norway, France and the Netherlands, the share of immigrants who are AROPE has increased, while remaining unchanged among their native-born peers.


Although the level of education decreases the risk of poverty or social exclusion considerably, the wide gaps between the foreign- and native-born in exposure to the risk persist at high educational attainment. Indeed, in two-thirds of countries, even highly educated immigrants are at least twice as likely to be AROPE as their native-born peers: 18% vs 8% EU-wide. Another important determinant is duration of residence. Newcomers face specific barriers to the labour market and do not always enjoy full access to government transfers. As a result, they are at much greater risk of living in poor economic and social conditions, particularly in the Nordic countries and longstanding European destinations which are home to predominantly non-EU migrants. In most of these countries, being a settled migrant nevertheless closes the gap with the native-born by at least 40%.

#### Main findings

- Immigrants are much more likely to be at risk of poverty and social exclusion (AROPE) than the native-born virtually everywhere in Europe, especially in Greece and Spain, where one in two immigrants is in this situation. Exceptions are a few Central European countries and Portugal.
- Over the last decade, the share of the migrant population that is AROPE has fallen in around two-thirds of countries. Declines are usually steeper than among the native-born population.
- In two-thirds of countries, even highly educated immigrants are at least twice as likely to be AROPE as their native-born peers: 18% vs 8% EU-wide.

Figure 4.5. At risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) rates


16-year-olds and above, 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/pey6vx>

Figure 4.6. How AROPE rates have evolved

16-year-olds and above, between 2010 and 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/9df8s4>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 4.4. Housing tenure

### Indicator context

Housing tenure shapes migrants' settlement intentions and their sense of belonging. Home ownership, for example, secures housing and is associated with neighbourhood and civic engagement, better (mental) health, and higher net wealth.

This indicator relates to the share of homeowners among individuals aged 16 and over, to tenants who rent accommodation at the market rate, and to those who rent at reduced rates.

Home ownership among the native-born population in the EU is nearly twice that of the foreign-born. In all countries (except Latvia and Estonia), native-born home ownership rates exceed those of the foreign-born, with widest gaps (of at least 35 points) in parts of Southern Europe, Latin America and Korea. Unlike the native-born, immigrants have no housing inheritance from their parents. Moreover, immigrants face obstacles to home ownership in the form of lower financial means, lack of knowledge of the host country's housing market, and discrimination when purchasing property. Despite their more limited means, foreign-born renters across the EU are only slightly more likely than their native-born peers (by 2 percentage points) to live in dwellings at a reduced rate. Indeed, in more than two-thirds of countries, migrant tenants are less likely than their native-born counterparts to rent accommodation below the market rate. A notable exception is France, where seven immigrant tenants in ten occupy housing at a reduced rate, against half of native-born tenants.

Over the last decade, ownership rates among the foreign-born have declined slightly in the OECD overall (by 1 percentage point), but more steeply in the EU (-6 points). In around two-thirds of countries, owning their home has become less likely for immigrants, especially in Korea and countries with ageing foreign-born populations –e.g. Bulgaria (home ownership down 28 points) and Poland (down 21 points). It has also fallen steeply in countries with large recent intakes of humanitarian migrants, such as the Nordic countries. At the same time, the proportion of foreign-born renting at reduced rates has risen in just over half of countries, while that of immigrants renting at the market rate increased in three-quarters of countries.


Home ownership rates rise with duration of stay in the host country, which partly explains why they are lower in countries with many recent immigrants. However, even settled migrants (with more than ten years of residence) are still much more unlikely than the native-born to own their homes in all countries (bar Estonia, Latvia and Hungary). Non-EU migrants are also less likely than EU-born– 37% versus 51% to be homeowners.

### Main findings

- Home ownership is more common among the native-born than the foreign-born in virtually all countries.
- Although foreign-born home ownership increases with duration of stay, it remains much lower than those of the native-born in all countries (except Estonia, Latvia and Hungary), even among settled immigrants.
- Between 2010 and 2020, home ownership among the foreign-born fell in both the EU and OECD by 6 and 1 percentage points, respectively. As for the share of immigrant tenants renting at reduced rates, it rose, albeit more slowly than the share of tenants renting at the market rate.

Figure 4.7. Rates of home ownership


16-year-olds and above, 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/yl8053>

Figure 4.8. How home ownership rates have evolved

16-year-olds and above, between 2010 and 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/q4lw1h>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 4.5. Overcrowded housing

### Indicator context

Living in overcrowded accommodation can damage immigrants' mental health and their ability to integrate in social and economic life. It also increases the risk of COVID-19 infections, which is disproportionately high among immigrants.

A home is considered overcrowded if the number of rooms is less than the sum of 1 living room, plus 1 room for each single person or the couple responsible for the household, plus 1 room for every 2 additional adults, plus 1 room for every 2 children.

Over one-sixth of immigrants live in overcrowded housing in both the OECD and the EU – a share that is 70% more than among the native-born in the EU. Overcrowding is more widespread among the foreign-born than the native-born in virtually all countries. In two-thirds of countries, overcrowding among immigrants is at least twice as likely as among the native-born, and more than three times as likely in over one-third of countries. The widest disparities are in Colombia, Korea, Southern European countries (particularly Italy and Greece), Nordic countries, and in European longstanding destinations (especially Austria).

Over the last decade, the foreign-born overcrowding rate has risen by 3 percentage points in the EU, while falling 3 points among the native-born, thereby enhancing disparities. Native-born overcrowding has increased by more than 1 percentage point in just about one in five countries, while rising in three out of five among immigrants, particularly in Italy, some Nordic countries and some longstanding destinations with many non-EU migrants. By contrast, overcrowding among immigrants and native-born has declined in Portugal and most Central and Eastern European countries. It has dropped only for immigrants in the United States, the United Kingdom, Greece, Luxembourg and Malta.

Overcrowding gaps between the foreign- and native-born are widest in countries where low incomes of immigrants restrict the choice of housing – i.e. in countries with the largest shares of non-EU, low-educated and recent migrants, as well as foreign-born renters. In longstanding European destinations, Sweden and Southern Europe, overcrowding rates among the non-EU born are on average twice those of EU-born. EU-wide, recent migrants are also almost twice as likely as those who are settled to live in overcrowded housing, and 3 times as likely in Sweden, one of the countries with the highest share of the recently arrived foreign-born. Among both the foreign- and native-born, overcrowding is also more common in rented than owned accommodation, with rates over three times higher in the EU and the United States among immigrant tenants. However, irrespective of tenure, immigrants are more likely to live in overcrowded housing than the native-born in the vast majority of countries. Foreign-born owners in Finland, Malta and parts of Central and Eastern Europe are, however, less likely to live in overcrowded housing than their native-born peers. This is also true among rent-paying foreign-born tenants in Luxembourg, Malta, Latvia and Croatia.


### Main findings

- Over one-sixth of immigrants live in overcrowded housing in both the OECD and the EU – a share that is 70% higher than that of the native-born in the EU. The widest disparities are in Colombia, Korea, Southern and Northern Europe, and longstanding European destinations.
- Irrespective of tenure, immigrants are generally more likely to live in overcrowded housing.
- In the last decade, overcrowding tended to rise among the foreign-born, but to fall among the native-born in the EU. It has fallen only for immigrants in the United States, the United Kingdom, Greece, Luxembourg and Malta.



Figure 4.9. Overcrowding rates


16-year-olds and above, 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/1ezajc>

Figure 4.10. How overcrowding rates have evolved

16-year-olds and above, between 2010 and 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/xrns1i>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 4.6. Housing conditions

### Indicator context

Immigrants are at risk of living in poor housing, as they may lack knowledge of the housing market, have frequently limited financial means, and may face discrimination from proprietors.

This indicator shows the share of adults living in substandard accommodation. Accommodation is considered substandard if, for example, it is too dark, does not provide exclusive access to a bathroom, or if the roof leaks.

EU-wide, 26% of immigrants and 20% of the native-born live in substandard housing. In around three-quarters of countries, the foreign-born are more likely to live in deprived accommodation, by as much as 13 percentage points in Spain and 10 points in Denmark and the Netherlands. By contrast, the native-born are overrepresented among occupants of substandard housing in Cyprus, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Baltic countries, Canada and Australia. Closer scrutiny of housing problems reveals that immigrants in the EU are more likely than the native-born to grapple with major construction defects (20% versus 15%) or lack of facilities to keep a comfortable temperature (10% versus 5%). EU-wide, 6% of the foreign-born live in accommodation that is both overcrowded and substandard – twice as much as among the native-born.

Over the last decade, the proportion of individuals living in substandard housing has dropped among the foreign-born in around half of countries, but in over two-thirds among the native-born. Shares of both immigrants and the native-born in substandard accommodation declined in e.g. Italy, Greece and many Central and Eastern European countries with ageing populations. Immigrants' housing conditions worsened, however, between 2010 and 2020, but remained stable among the native-born in Spain, the Netherlands and Norway.


Housing conditions are generally better in owned homes than rented accommodation, particularly when it is rented at a reduced rate. As immigrants are underrepresented among homeowners in virtually all countries, they are more likely to live in substandard housing. Among tenants who pay rent (particularly those at a reduced rate), there is little difference EU-wide (less than 2 percentage points) in the standard of housing between foreign- and native-born tenants. As for homeowners, differences are larger but remain relatively low (3 points). Nevertheless, immigrants remain slightly more likely to live in substandard housing, regardless of tenure. In Sweden, however, the native- and foreign-born face similar risks, again regardless of their tenure, while in Ireland and some Central and Eastern European countries, immigrants are less likely to live in substandard accommodation (in all types of tenure bar free-of-charge accommodation).

### Main findings

- Immigrants are more likely to live in substandard housing than their native-born peers (26% versus 20%), while 6% live in deprived and overcrowded accommodation (twice the share of the native-born).
- Housing conditions have improved among immigrants in half of countries: the same is true of the native-born in over two-thirds of countries.
- Immigrants remain more likely than the native-born to live in substandard housing, regardless of tenure. There is only little difference EU-wide in the standard of housing between foreign- and native-born, when tenure is taken into account. There are no differences between the two groups in Sweden, regardless of tenure.

**Figure 4.11. Substandard accommodation**


16-year-olds and above, 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/b9j6i1>

**Figure 4.12. How the shares of individuals living in substandard accommodation have evolved**

16-year-olds and above, 2010 and 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/x4eyq8>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 4.7. Housing cost overburden rate

### Indicator context

Immigrants are particularly vulnerable to high housing costs, as they are more concentrated in urban areas, struggle to access affordable accommodations and tend to earn lower incomes. Housing cost burdens hamper their ability to save, keeping them at an economic disadvantage.

The housing cost overburden rate is the percentage of households that spend over 40% of their disposable income on rent. It does not include housing subsidies, unless stated otherwise.

EU-wide, around one-fifth of immigrant renters are overburdened by housing costs, against one-eighth of the native-born. While housing cost overburden rates are higher overall in non-European countries (save Australia), immigrants are nevertheless more likely to be under financial strain to pay their rent, although to a lesser extent. Only in Slovenia, New Zealand and most Nordic countries is that strain lower among the foreign-born. Housing subsidies narrow the gap in the housing cost overburden rate between immigrants and the native-born by 2 percentage points in the EU, while closing it in New Zealand. Although those subsidies halve the gap in some countries with large immigrant populations, such as Germany, France and the Netherlands, they make no substantial difference in most countries. In the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland, foreign-born actually receive less housing subsidies despite their higher poverty.

Although housing cost overburden rates have fallen over the last decade in more than half of countries among both foreign- and native-born, the situation has improved more for immigrants in three out of five countries. In Slovenia, the United Kingdom and Nordic countries with large recent intakes of humanitarian migrants (except Denmark), rates have dropped among immigrants but risen among the native-born, so closing the gap observed in 2010. The opposite was the case in e.g. Germany, Ireland and Malta. In Switzerland, Latvia, Luxembourg, France and the United States, immigrants are now more likely to be overburdened by rent than the native-born, unlike in 2010.


The greater access of the low-educated to housing at reduced rate in most countries does not compensate for lower incomes: they are more overburdened by housing costs than their highly educated peers. However, differences between the foreign- and native-born are wider among the highly educated than their low-educated peers in two-thirds of countries, with notable exceptions such as France, Germany and Ireland. In Greece and all Nordic countries (except Denmark), low-educated immigrants are actually less likely than their native-born peers to spend 40% of their income on rent, while those with tertiary education are more likely. The Nordic countries (except Denmark) are also among the few where recent migrants are less overburdened by housing costs than settled migrants despite being poorer, which points to those countries' affordable housing capacity for newcomers. Even with lower incomes, non-EU migrants have a lower housing cost overburden rate than their EU peers in the EU (17% vs 21%).

### Main findings

- One-fifth of immigrants are overburdened by housing costs in the EU, against one-eighth of the native-born. Gaps tend to be narrower outside Europe. Housing subsidies substantially reduce the gap between immigrants and the native-born in Germany, France and the Netherlands.
- In Slovenia, the United Kingdom and Nordic countries (except Denmark), gaps in housing cost overburden rates between the foreign- and native-born have closed over the last decade.
- In the Nordic countries (except Denmark), low-educated and recent migrants are less overburdened by housing costs than their native-born and settled peers, unlike other countries.

**Figure 4.13. Housing cost overburden rate**


16-year-olds and above renting their dwellings, 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/xfkyi6>

**Figure 4.14. How housing cost overburden rates have evolved**

16-year-olds and above renting their dwelling, between 2010 and 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/lge482>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 4.8. Characteristics of the neighbourhood

### Indicator context

Neighbourhood characteristics can affect integration outcomes, such as economic opportunities, living conditions and civic engagement, as well as the quality of schooling.

This indicator, which is only available for European countries, shows the shares of adults, aged 18 and over, who report struggling to access non-recreational amenities (banking facilities, grocery shops or supermarkets) and experience least one major problem in their neighbourhoods (noise, air quality, litter or heavy traffic).

EU-wide, 21% of the native- and 15% of the foreign-born report to struggle to access non-recreational amenities in the neighbourhoods where they live. Overall, in two-thirds of EU countries, the native-born population reports poorer access to amenities than immigrants – by as much as 23 percentage points in Portugal and 10 points in Estonia. By contrast, the foreign-born in Croatia, Italy, Austria, Denmark and Cyprus report greater access difficulties, by 17 points in Croatia and 9 in Italy. Among immigrants, the EU-born report slightly more often that accessing non-recreational amenities is harder than their non-EU-born peers. When it comes to recreational amenities (green spaces, cinemas, theatres, cultural centres) and public transport, the overall picture in the EU is similar - foreign-born access is 8 points less difficult.

Larger proportions of foreign- than native-born live in rundown neighbourhoods. In the EU, the share of immigrants who report at least one major vexation (noise, air quality, litter or heavy traffic) exceeds that of the native-born (19% versus 15%). The pattern is especially true of longstanding immigration countries, such as the Netherlands, where the gap is 13 percentage points, and France and the United Kingdom, both with 6 points. In roughly a quarter of countries, by contrast, the native-born are more likely to experience major concerns in their neighbourhood, especially when it comes to heavy traffic. Among immigrants, those born outside the EU are as likely as their EU-born peers to report at least one important issue.


In the EU, immigrants are more likely to live in rundown parts of large urban areas (see Indicator 2.4). While these areas generally enjoy better access to amenities than rural areas (where the native-born are overrepresented), city-dwellers are also more likely to have to contend with serious matters like noise, air quality, litter or traffic. Factoring an area's population density reduces differences in the native- and foreign-born experience in most countries – both in neighbourhood issues and access to non-recreational amenities. Indeed, with regard to access to amenities, adjusting for both the neighbourhood's population density and working hours further reduces differences. What is more, as the native-born are more likely to be in employment in many countries, they may struggle to access non-recreational amenities if their standard working hours coincide with the amenities' opening times.

### Main findings

- In most European countries, immigrants are more likely to report concerns associated with rundown neighbourhoods, while finding it easier than the native-born to access amenities.
- Factoring in different population densities and working hours (access to non-recreational amenities being more difficult outside standard working hours) narrows differences between native- and foreign-born experiences of the neighbourhood in most countries – both in neighbourhood issues and access to non-recreational amenities.

**Figure 4.15. Difficulties in accessing non-recreational amenities in the neighbourhood**


18-year-olds and above, 2016



StatLink <https://stat.link/e5jo27>

**Figure 4.16. Major problems with air quality, noise, litter or traffic in the neighbourhood**

18-year-olds and above, 2016



StatLink <https://stat.link/5pnrsm>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 4.9. Reported health status

### Indicator context

Self-reported health status is measured by the share of individuals who rate their health as good or better. As health status is strongly age-dependent, the share of immigrants who report good health is adjusted to estimate outcomes as if the immigrant age structures were the same as those of the native-born.

In 2020, higher shares of the native- than foreign-born claimed good health in half of countries, especially Switzerland, Estonia, and longstanding destinations with many non-EU migrants (except in Germany and the United Kingdom). In Austria and Belgium, most of the gap is driven by non-EU migrants' self-reported poorer health. In the other half of countries, by contrast, immigrants reported health that was similar to or better than that of the native-born, for instance, in Norway, the United States, and countries where the immigration population has been shaped by labour migrants, as in Australia, Canada and Southern European countries (except Spain).

Shares of the foreign- and native-born reporting good health rose in most countries over the last decade, though not in the United Kingdom or the United States. Estonia and some Southern European countries saw much sharper increases in reports of good health among the foreign-than the native-born. By contrast, immigrants reported declining and the native-born rising health in around one-quarter of countries.

Factors, such as age (which this indicator controls for), levels of education, and behaviours in countries of destination and origin (see Indicator 4.10), affect health status and perceptions. Recent migrants also feel healthier in all countries (except Belgium, Switzerland and Greece). This may be due to the fact that they are positively selected compared to the overall population in their countries of origin (the so-called “healthy migrant effect”, which fades over time). Perceived health status also has a strong gender component, albeit to a lesser extent outside Europe. Women (particularly foreign-born) are less likely to report good health than men in virtually all countries. That gender dimension is particularly strong among immigrants in Norway, Portugal and most countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In Ireland and the United Kingdom, where there is no difference in self-reported health status between male and female native-born, immigrant women are at least 5 percentage points less likely to report good health than their male peers. Low-educated people (whatever their country of birth) are also much less likely to report good health than their highly educated peers. However, in most countries where immigrants are less likely to report good health than the native-born, this situation persists across educational levels, although the gap is much smaller among the tertiary-educated in Switzerland, the Netherlands and France and reversed in Lithuania.


### Main findings

- Immigrants are as or more likely than native-born to report good health in half of countries. They are less likely in most longstanding European destinations and most Baltic countries.
- Perceived health increased over the last decade in most countries among the foreign- and native-born.
- Lower shares of women than men report good health in all countries. Gender gaps are larger among the foreign-born.



**Figure 4.17. Self-reported good health status**


16-year-olds and above, 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/myvuc7>

**Figure 4.18. How shares of foreign- and native-born in self-reported good health have evolved**

16-year-olds and above, between 2010 and 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/do5isb>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 4.10. Risk factors for health

### Indicator context

Smoking and obesity are two major individual risk factors for chronic diseases.

People with a body mass index (BMI) of 25 and over are considered overweight. BMI is a person's weight in kilograms divided by the square of their height in metres. The share of overweight immigrants might be underestimated, since studies show that BMI cut-offs for overweight are lower for most ethnic groups. The share of tobacco smokers includes people who report smoking daily. Alcohol consumption is not covered as heavy episodic drinking is not available by country of birth.

Shares of overweight people vary widely by country and between immigrants and the native-born. Overweight prevalence is significantly lower among immigrants than the native-born in around half of countries. Examples are the Nordic countries (except Sweden), as well as Malta and the United States. In the other half of countries, by contrast, immigrants are more likely to be overweight than their native-born peers, especially in the Baltic countries, Slovenia and France. In Italy, Ireland or Germany, no strong differences emerged between the two groups.

The likelihood of being overweight depends on daily diet, which is related to attitudes and culture in countries of origin. However, since it also depends on diet in countries of residence, incidence of overweight usually increases with duration of stay in countries where prevalence is high, while falling in those where it is low. In virtually all countries, the low-educated are more frequently overweight than the highly educated, among the native- and foreign-born alike. In the EU, greater proportions of the low-educated native- than foreign-born are overweight, although controlling for the younger age structure among the foreign-born closes the gap. In the United States, by contrast, low-educated immigrants are more likely to be overweight than their native-born peers. And when it comes to gender, men are more overweight than women, regardless of their place of birth. In almost all European countries, the gender gap is particularly wide among EU-born.


Other behaviours are important health-risk factors. One example is smoking tobacco on a daily basis, more widespread among immigrants than the native-born in most countries. EU-born are more likely to smoke daily than the native-born in over three-quarters of countries. The widest gaps between foreign- and native-born are in Austria, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta. The smoking attitudes of immigrants have a strong gender bias – much more so than the native-born. In fact, greater shares of foreign- than native-born men smoke daily in two-thirds of countries, while the opposite is true among women in most countries. In the Netherlands, for instance, immigrant men are almost twice as likely as native-born men to smoke daily, while immigrant women are slightly less likely than their native-born peers.

### Main findings

- Overweight prevalence is significantly lower among immigrants than the native-born in around half of countries.
- Incidence of overweight among immigrants usually increases with duration of stay in countries where the incidence is also high, while falling in those where it is low.
- Gender differences in tobacco consumptions are large among immigrants. Immigrant men are more likely to smoke than native-born men in two-thirds of countries, while the opposite is true among women in most countries.

**Figure 4.19. Overweight**


15-year-olds and above with a body mass index of 25 and over, 2019



StatLink  <https://stat.link/9i6b34>

**Figure 4.20. Daily tobacco smokers**

15-year-olds and above who report smoking daily, 2019 or most recent year



StatLink  <https://stat.link/hv39aj>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 4.11. Access to healthcare and unmet healthcare needs

### Indicator context

Immigrants may face linguistic, financial, administrative and cultural barriers to accessing healthcare services and may subsequently encounter unmet healthcare needs.

The indicator for unmet healthcare needs shows the (age-adjusted) share of individuals who report that, over the previous 12 months, they have not received medical or dental healthcare despite being in need. The indicators for access to healthcare measure: (i) the share of individuals who find affording healthcare rather or very difficult and (ii) the share of households not having used any healthcare or dental care services in the previous 12 months.

In 2020, the share of immigrants reporting unmet medical needs EU-wide was similar to that of the native-born (around 5%). The same was true of Australia, where there were no significant differences in unmet hospital needs between the two groups. Indeed, differences were narrow (less than 1.5 percentage points) in most countries. However, the foreign-born were significantly more likely to report unmet medical needs in Belgium and Croatia (by around 4 percentage points), and in Estonia (by 5 points). The native-born were slightly more likely in Canada. As for the EU, reports of needing but not receiving medical care were slightly more frequent among immigrants born outside the EU and recent migrants arrived over the last ten years than among the native-born. What is more, reports of unmet dental needs were more common among the foreign-born (11%) than the native-born (8%) – and even more common among recent arrivals (15%), the non-EU born (14%) and low-educated migrants (13%).

Between 2010 and 2020, the (age-adjusted) shares of the foreign- and native-born who reported unmet medical needs fell slightly in the EU. While the situation improved among both groups in most countries (particularly Latvia, Croatia and Germany), unmet medical needs nevertheless increased sharply among both native- and foreign-born in Poland (by 10 and 12 percentage points, respectively) and Estonia (10 points both). They also grew among immigrants in Belgium by 5 percentage points.


Generally, immigrant households (where all responsible persons of household are foreign-born) are less likely than their native-born peers to use healthcare services virtually everywhere (77% versus 83% EU-wide). They also pay fewer visits to the dentist or orthodontist (44% of foreign- versus 46% of native-born households). Immigrants generally face more barriers to healthcare in the form of language proficiency, health literacy, financial constraints and possibly also legal access. Accordingly, at 36% versus 30% EU-wide, immigrants struggle more to afford healthcare services than the native-born in all EU countries, except for Cyprus. Indeed, immigrants EU-wide are more likely than their native-born peers to report difficulties in affording emergency healthcare (26% versus 24%), mental health services (39% versus 35%), and dental care (43% versus 37%).

### Main findings

- Shares of immigrants and native-born who report unmet medical needs are similar at around 5% in the EU and Australia (unmet hospital needs). They are slightly lower among immigrants in Canada.
- Between 2010 and 2020, reported unmet medical needs fell among both foreign- and native-born in the majority of countries.
- Virtually everywhere, immigrants struggle more to afford healthcare, and are less likely to use healthcare and dental care services than their native-born peers.

**Figure 4.21. Unmet medical needs**


16-year-olds and above, 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/9c2idg>

**Figure 4.22. How shares of individuals reporting unmet medical needs have evolved**

16-year-olds and above, between 2010 and 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/cugl3m>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.



# **5**

## **Immigrant civic engagement and social integration**

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Social integration is difficult to measure. The indicators presented here are first related to citizenship take-up (Indicator 5.1), participation in elections (Indicator 5.2), and host-country degree of acceptance of immigration (Indicators 5.3 and 5.4). The chapter then looks at the participation in voluntary organisations (Indicator 5.5), the perceived incidence of discrimination against immigrants on the grounds of ethnicity, race or nationality (Indicator 5.6) and the level of trust in host-country institutions (Indicator 5.7). Finally, it explores a range of indicators related to public opinion on integration (Indicators 5.8, 5.9 and 5.10).

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# In Brief

## A lower share of settled immigrants has host-country citizenship today than a decade ago in most countries and those who do, remain less likely to vote than the native-born

- Slightly over half of settled immigrants, i.e. foreign-born with 10 years of residence in the country, have host-country citizenship in the EU and around four in five in the settlement countries, on average. Shares of such foreign-born with host-country nationality dropped between 2010 and 2020 in two-thirds of countries – by 9 percentage points across the EU.
- The acquisition of host-country nationality is less likely among individuals born in the same region. In fact, only 45% of immigrants from Europe have acquired EU host-country nationality and only 52% of LAC-born residents have citizenship in the United States. However, the acquisition rate is generally higher among immigrants from developing countries.
- Almost three-quarters of immigrants with host-country nationality took part in the most recent national elections in both the OECD and the EU – against four native-born in five. In the Netherlands, German- and English-speaking European countries, voter turnout is higher among immigrant women than men, while the reverse is true among the native-born.

## Native-born views on immigration have become more favourable

- Half of the native born in the EU and Australia have no strong view – positive or negative – on immigration. In the United States and Korea, around 38% and 28% of the native-born think their country should limit immigration to protect their way of life, while in the United States 35% were of the opposite opinion and in Korea 29%. The native-born generally have more positive opinions when asked more specific questions on immigrants' impacts on their country's culture and, to a lesser extent, on its economy than to broad generic questions.
- Views of the native-born have become more favourable towards immigration in most countries over the last decade. Young people tend to have more positive views than the elderly almost everywhere and are also more likely to interact with immigrants.
- Direct social interaction with migrants is associated with more positive views. Compared to the relatively small size of their non-EU migrant populations, native-born have widespread social interaction with the non-EU born in Southern European countries, Ireland and Denmark, but more limited interaction in the Baltic countries and Croatia.

## Immigrants are less often active in voluntary organisations than the native-born

- Immigrants are less likely to join voluntary organisations than the native-born in most countries. Gaps exceed more than 15 percentage points in Sweden, Switzerland and Germany. In Canada, Italy, Spain and the Czech Republic, by contrast, rates of participation in voluntary activities are rather similar.
- Foreign-born membership falls particularly short when it comes to trade unions, political parties and leisure groups. Immigrants are, however, more likely to join voluntary faith-based groups.



## Perceived discrimination increased while immigrants generally trust the host-country institutions more than the native-born do

- In the EU, 15% of the foreign-born report feeling discriminated against on the grounds of ethnicity, nationality, or race. Shares are around 20% in Italy, France, the Netherlands, Korea and Canada. Shares are lowest in Central Europe and Ireland. Between 2010-14 and 2016-20, perceived discrimination increased in the EU, New Zealand and Canada, particularly among women. The reverse was true in the United States and Australia.
- Younger and more recent migrants are more likely to perceive discrimination. The same is true among men in the EU and the United States. Perceived discrimination is particularly acute among immigrants from North and sub-Saharan Africa in the EU and Canada, while Latin American- and Asian-born migrants tend to be worse affected in Australia.
- Given the often-lower expectations towards institutions in the country of origin, immigrants are more likely than the native-born to trust the police and legal system in two-thirds of host countries. In the EU, immigrants from non-EU countries have greater levels of trust than EU-born in host-country institutions. EU-wide trust in public authorities has grown since the early 2000s, and generally more strongly among the foreign-born. However, immigrants' trust in public authorities tends to decline with length of residence.

## Factual knowledge on the evolution of integration outcomes remains limited and public opinion differs strongly by country

- In 2021, 47% of EU citizens in the EU perceived the integration of non-EU migrants in their country as successful. Views were most positive in Ireland and some Central European countries, and most negative in Sweden, Latvia and France. Views of integration are always more positive at local than national level, with around three EU citizens in five saying that it is successful in their city or area.
- Most EU citizens have distorted views on non-EU migrants' characteristics and the evolution of their integration outcomes over the last decade. Whatever the indicator considered, less than 43% of respondents' perceptions of the evolution of integration outcomes reflect the true picture. For example, despite an increase in shares of highly educated among the non-EU migrants in virtually all countries, most countries perceived the opposite, especially in France and in Central and Eastern European countries.
- Different socio-economic groups share very similar views on the successful integration of non-EU migrants in their country. Gender, employment status and level of education have little direct association EU-wide. However, younger EU citizens, those living in cities and those who feel more informed and interact more extensively with non-EU migrants generally view their integration more positively.

## European societies perceive language skills as a key factor for social integration and finding a job as the key obstacle but also acknowledge migrant specific needs

- EU-wide, the chief obstacle to integration according to EU citizens is finding a job. Two-thirds of respondents also think that the limited efforts of immigrants themselves to fit in and the discrimination against them are major obstacles to their integration in society.
- Overall, among social factors, speaking one of the host country's official languages is most frequently considered important for the integration of non-EU migrants, followed by the sharing of host-country values and norms. Even higher shares of respondents, however, mention factors not directly linked with social integration, such as contributing to the welfare system and being educated and skilled enough.

## 5.1. Acquisition of nationality

### Indicator context

The conditions under which host countries grant nationality vary widely. Many have recently given naturalisation and citizenship more important roles in the immigrant integration process.

As nationality at birth is usually not available, acquisition of nationality (also known as citizenship) relates here to the share of foreign-born who have resided in the host country for at least 10 years and hold its nationality. The duration of stay to be eligible for nationality in OECD and EU countries is generally no more than 10 years. Shares may be overestimated in countries with a large number of nationals born abroad (e.g. France, the United Kingdom, Portugal) or foreign-born individuals sharing the same national heritage and that had, or were conferred, citizenship upon arrival (e.g. Croatia, Germany, Hungary, the Slovak Republic).

The share of settled foreign-born (over 10 years of residence) who have host-country citizenship is over one-half in the EU and around two-thirds in the United States. Shares are higher in: i) European countries where the foreign-born population belongs to national minorities who enjoy automatic or streamlined access to nationality; ii) settlement countries, Sweden and Portugal, who all facilitate the acquisition of citizenship. By contrast, in countries where dual citizenship is not legally permitted (or was not until recently), immigrant citizenship rates are much lower – particularly in Luxembourg, many Southern European and Baltic countries. Immigrant women are more likely to have host-country citizenship than their male peers EU- and OECD-wide (by 3 and 10 percentage points, respectively). This higher female rate is partly attributable to marriage to host-country citizens, a procedure that facilitates the acquisition of nationality.

Shares of settled foreign-born with host-country nationality dropped between 2010 and 2020 in slightly less than two-thirds of countries – by 9 percentage points across the EU. This is partly attributable to tougher criteria for acquiring citizenship, particularly language proficiency, and to changes in the composition of migrants. In some countries, such as the Czech Republic, for instance, the decline is also due to mortality of elderly foreign-born who automatically obtained citizenship upon nation-building.


Immigrants born in the same region as their host country are less likely to have host-country nationality. In fact, only 45% of immigrants from Europe (see glossary) have host-country nationality in the EU, which is attributable to the EU legislation that enshrines freedom of movement between EU countries (see Indicator 8.14). In the United States, for example, only 52% of LAC-born residents have citizenship, partly linked with the large share of irregular migrants from this region. Acquisition of citizenship is usually more widespread among the foreign-born from developing countries. In two-thirds of countries, African or Asian migrants account for the highest share of migrants with host-country nationality. Historical ties also affect the acquisition of citizenship, e.g. African and Brazilian migrants in Portugal and the LAC-born in the Netherlands.

### Main findings

- Slightly over half of settled immigrants have host-country citizenship in the EU. Shares are higher in non-European countries, particularly in the settlement countries.
- Shares of settled immigrants with host-country nationality dropped between 2010 and 2020 in slightly less than two-thirds of countries – by 9 percentage points EU-wide.
- The acquisition of host-country nationality is less likely among individuals born in the same region of birth as the country of residence, and higher among those from developing countries.

**Figure 5.1. Acquisition of nationality**


15-year-olds and above, host-country nationals among settled immigrants, 2010 and 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/2mzp8d>

**Figure 5.2. Acquisition of nationality by region of birth**

15-year-olds and above, host-country nationals among settled immigrants, 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/h69x43>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 5.2. Voter participation

### Indicator context

For those who are eligible, immigrants' participation in elections reflects their desire to have a say and play a part in the host country's society by getting involved and choosing those who govern it.

Voter participation refers to the share of eligible voters (with host-country nationality) who report that they cast a ballot in the most recent national parliamentary election in the country of residence.

On average, 73% of immigrants with host-country nationality in both the OECD and the EU report that they participated in their host country's most recent national elections – less than the native-born rate of around 80%. Voter participation differs only slightly between the native-born and the foreign-born with host-country nationality in Israel, most Central and Eastern European countries, Denmark, or longstanding destinations like France and Canada. Turnout is higher among women than men among both foreign- and native-born voters in around half of countries, but greater among immigrant women and native-born men in the Netherlands, Austria, Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

Native-born turnout grew in slightly more than three countries in five compared with the first decade of the 2000s, but in only half among the foreign-born. However, the rise was much more pronounced among immigrants than the native-born in most countries, in particular Spain and Denmark. As a result, the turnout gap between native- and foreign-born narrowed in more than half of countries. By contrast, native-born turnout climbed e.g. in Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic, but declined among the foreign-born, thereby widening the gap.


Higher age and education are often associated with higher voter turnout among the native-born, but differences in native- and foreign-born voter turnout remain constant in the EU, regardless of these factors. Gaps between the foreign- and native-born persist, irrespective of level of education. There are exceptions, though. Low-educated migrants are more likely to vote than their native-born peers e.g. in Belgium (where voting is compulsory), the United Kingdom, Estonia, Israel and the United States, while highly educated ones are less so. The apparent absence of a turnout gap between the foreign- and native-born in France and Slovenia is attributable to the higher turnout among highly educated migrants. Like acquiring host-country citizenship (a prerequisite for voting in national elections), becoming interested in host-country politics takes time. As a result, voter participation is driven by settled immigrants – those who have lived in the country for over 10 years. EU- and OECD-wide, turnout is over 20 percentage points lower among migrants who are already host-country citizens but have less than ten years of residence. Among settled immigrants, it is still around 4 points lower than among the native-born.

### Main findings

- Of immigrants with host-country nationality, 73% took part in the most recent national elections in both the OECD and the EU – compared to around 80% of the native-born. In the Netherlands, Austria, Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, voter turnout is higher among immigrant women than men, while the reverse is true among the native-born.
- Voter turnout gaps between foreign- and native-born persist at all levels of education. However, low-educated migrants are more likely to vote than their native-born peers e.g. in Belgium, the United Kingdom, Estonia, Israel and the United States. The same holds true of highly educated immigrants in France and Slovenia.

**Figure 5.3. Self-reported participation in most recent election**


18-year-olds and above with the nationality of the country of residence, 2012-20



StatLink <https://stat.link/mhk7of>

**Figure 5.4. How self-reported participation in most recent election has evolved**

18-year-olds and above with the nationality of the country of residence, between 2002-10 and 2012-20



StatLink <https://stat.link/thdagl>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

### 5.3. Host-society attitudes towards immigration

#### Indicator context

The nature of a host society's perception of its immigrant population is critical: positive attitudes facilitate integration.

This indicator for EU countries is the average response (on a scale from 0 to 10) to the question: "Is [this country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?". It includes similar questions for Australia, Korea and the United States.

Half of the native-born in the EU held no particular view in 2020 on whether "immigrants make their country a better or a worse place to live in". A quarter had positive views, one-quarter negative ones. Respondents in the Nordic countries and Ireland were most positive, in contrast to Italy and Central European countries (bar Poland and Slovenia). Views on migration flows were broadly equally distributed in the United States and Korea, but more polarised in the former country: respectively 38% and 28% of the native-born aged 18 and over in 2021 agreed that the country should limit immigration to protect their way of life, while 35% and 29% thought the other way around. Similarly, 35% of the native-born in the United States called for less immigration, and 24% for more. In Australia, 35% of the native-born in 2021 also said there were too many immigrants, but only 16% that there were too few. Attitudes are less positive in Latin American countries, where half of respondents declare that arrival of immigrants harm them, up to 80% in Colombia.

Native-born attitudes to immigrants became more supportive in most countries in the 2010s, as economies recovered from the 2007-08 economic downturn. Negative perceptions did strengthen in Italy, Sweden and Central European countries, however. While it is still too early to assess the impact of the pandemic on European views of immigration as the survey was conducted in many European countries before the pandemic, it is possible in Australia which restricted migration flows (except in critical sectors). Indeed, the proportion of the native-born who deemed the number of immigrants too high dropped by 14 percentage points between 2018 and 2021 to its lowest level since 2011.


The native-born respond more positively to more specific questions on immigrants' impacts on their country. They are more likely to reply that immigration enriches the host-country culture – and more so in Nordic countries and longstanding destinations. They also take a more positive view of immigration's economic impact in most countries, although to a lesser extent. Portugal, Germany, Switzerland, Costa Rica and the Nordic countries are the most positive, where at least 40% of respondents have a positive view. Opinions are more favourable in Australia, where 83% of native-born endorse the statement that immigrants are generally beneficial for the economy. By contrast, one-fifth of Colombians and only one-quarter of Koreans hold the view that immigration positively influences the economy/development.

#### Main findings

- Half of the native-born in the EU and Australia have no strong positive or negative view on immigration. Views are more polarised in the United States, where positive and negative views of immigration restrictions are evenly distributed and few native-born have a neutral opinion. In Latin American countries, half of respondents have a negative opinion.
- Views of the native-born have improved in most countries over the last decade. Young people tend to have more positive perceptions than the elderly almost everywhere.
- The native-born tend to voice slightly more positive views of the impact of immigration on the host country's culture and, to a lesser extent, on its economy.

**Figure 5.5. Host-country perception of the presence of immigrants**


Native-born 15-year-olds and above, mean score on a scale from 0 to 10 to the question: “Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?”, 2010 and 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/nrue4h>

**Figure 5.6. Host-country perception of the economic impact of immigrants**

Native-born 15-year-olds and above, with a score from 7 to 10 (with a scale from 0 bad to 10 good) to the question: “Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]’s economy that people come to live here from other countries?”, 2010 and 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/yrsd83>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 5.4. Interaction with immigrants

### Indicator context

Interactions between foreign- and native-born can ease prejudice and enhance social cohesion.

This indicator refers to the share of EU nationals who interact socially with non-EU born at least once a week. Interaction ranges from a few minutes conversation to a joint activity.

Out of 5 native-born EU citizens, 2 stated in 2021 that they interact socially with immigrants from non-EU countries at least once a week. Among them, half do so on a daily basis and half on a weekly basis. An additional 1 in 5 respondents interacts once a month and 1 in 10 interacts once a year. Those interactions may have been disrupted by the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic. Because interaction is correlated with the size of the non-EU migrant population living in the country, the native-born have only limited interactions with non-EU migrants in Central and Eastern European countries, where the immigrant population is rather small. By contrast, countries with large non-EU born populations are those where the native- and foreign-born interact the most, with shares of over 40% of native-born interacting in most Nordic, Southern European and longstanding destination countries. Compared with the relative size of their non-EU migrant populations, interaction is more widespread than expected in Southern Europe, Ireland and Denmark. Conversely, there is little stated interaction in the Baltic countries and Croatia, despite much larger populations born outside the EU.

Several sociodemographic factors shape social interactions between native- and foreign-born communities. In the EU, for instance, younger individuals, men, the better-educated and the employed are more likely than the rest of the population to interact with non-EU migrants. The share of EU citizens aged under 25 who interact weekly with non-EU migrants is 53%, 22 percentage points higher than among EU citizens aged 55 or older. The size of the place of residence is also associated with the extent of social interaction, with almost half of respondents reporting interaction with immigrants in large cities, where they are concentrated, against less than one-third in rural areas (where they are under-represented).

EU citizens who themselves were born in another country are more likely to interact with the non-EU foreign-born community than those born in the host country. While only 38% of the native-born interact weekly with non-EU migrants, 54% of the foreign-born EU citizens do so. Moreover, in the EU, native-born respondents with at least one foreign-born parent or grandparent are much more likely to interact weekly with such immigrants compared to other native-born – around 45% of those with EU parentage or grandparents from the EU, and around 55% among those with non-EU ties. Many social interactions with non-EU migrants go hand-in-hand with a more positive view of immigration and integration. People who interact weekly with non-EU migrants are more likely to believe their integration is successful (see Indicator 5.8) and feel better informed about immigration and integration. EU citizens who do not interact with non-EU migrants on a weekly basis are one-third less likely to consider immigration an opportunity.


### Main findings

- Interactions with non-EU migrants are linked with the size of the non-EU born population. EU citizens state that they have more interaction with the non-EU born than expected in Southern Europe, Ireland and Denmark, but more limited interaction in the Baltic countries and Croatia.
- Young people and urban dwellers are more likely to interact with non-EU migrants.
- Greater social interaction with non-EU migrants tends to be associated with more positive views of immigration and integration.



**Figure 5.7. Social interaction with immigrants in the EU**

15-year-olds and above who interact with non-EU migrants at least once a week, 2021




StatLink <https://stat.link/68ktq0>

**Figure 5.8. Social interaction with immigrants in the EU according to the relative size of the non-EU migrant population**

y-axis: 15-64 year-olds born outside the EU as percentage of the total population, 2020;

x-axis: 15-year-olds and above who interact with non-EU migrants at least once a week, 2021

% of 15-year-olds and above who interact with non-EU migrants at least once a week



StatLink <https://stat.link/d1rfwk>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 5.5. Participation in voluntary organisations

### Indicator context

Participation in voluntary work allows immigrants to form social ties with the host community, improve proficiency in the host country's language and build professional skills.

This indicator refers to the share of people aged 15 years old and over who reported membership of a voluntary organisation (e.g. sport, leisure, faith, art and culture, trades unions charity) at the time of the survey.

In some two out of three countries, foreign-born are less likely to belong to a voluntary organisation than the native-born. Differences are most pronounced in Estonia, in most longstanding European destinations, the United States and in the Nordic countries. Gaps exceed more than 15 percentage points in Sweden, Switzerland and Germany. And excluding participation in faith-based organisations, the same pattern emerges. In Canada, Italy, Spain and the Czech Republic, by contrast, there is little or no difference between foreign- and native-born participation in voluntary work.

Over the last decade, the foreign-born membership of voluntary organisations has risen in most European countries. The largest rises came in Germany, Cyprus and Slovenia, where, in the latter country, the gap between foreign- and native-born dwindled. The opposite can be observed e.g. in the Nordic countries, where, except for Sweden, the foreign-born show a lower propensity to volunteer today than ten years ago. The steepest declines in membership among the foreign-born occurred in Estonia, the Netherlands and Iceland – by at least 11 percentage points.


Across the OECD, immigrant volunteers are more likely to be engaged with religious organisations than the native-born (27% versus 21%). In charities and educational and consumer groups, there were no differences in foreign- and native-born membership rates. By contrast, with the exception of the Southern European countries and Canada, immigrants are less likely to join sports clubs and recreational groups. In the Nordic countries and the longstanding immigrant destinations in Western Europe (bar Belgium), gaps in membership rates are wider than 8 percentage points. The same holds true of the membership of trade unions and political parties, albeit to a lesser extent. The lower propensity to volunteer among immigrants might be related to linguistic, cultural and socio-economic factors. Voluntary activity is less common among the low-educated, where immigrants are over-represented. However, immigrants educated to low levels actually participate more in voluntary work EU-wide than their native-born peers, while the opposite is true among the highly educated. When it comes to EU-born, they are almost always more likely to volunteer than their non-EU born peers – 64% versus 53% EU-wide.

### Main findings

- Immigrants are less likely to join voluntary organisations in two out of three countries.
- Foreign-born membership rates have risen in most countries but declined e.g. in the Nordic countries (except Sweden) and the Netherlands.
- Foreign-born membership falls particularly short when it comes to trade unions, political parties and leisure groups. Immigrants are, however, more likely to join voluntary faith-based groups.

**Figure 5.9. Membership of voluntary organisations**


15-year-olds and above, 2017/21



StatLink <https://stat.link/n3cty9>

**Figure 5.10. How participation in voluntary organisations has evolved**

15-year-olds and above, 2008/09 and 2017/20



StatLink <https://stat.link/vwits9>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 5.6. Perceived discrimination

### Indicator context

Although the perception of discrimination may not necessarily denote actual discrimination, it is an important indicator of the sense of equal treatment and, therefore, of overall social cohesion.

For European countries, this indicator refers to the share of immigrants who consider themselves members of a group that is discriminated against on the grounds of ethnicity, nationality or race. In Australia, Korea and New Zealand, the indicator builds on personal experience. In the United States it draws on reported discrimination in the workplace only, and in Canada with respect to COVID-19.

EU-wide, 15% of immigrants consider themselves part of a group that is discriminated against, with shares exceeding 10% in more than half of all countries. Self-reported discrimination is particularly common among the foreign-born in Italy (21%) and the longstanding destinations of many non-EU migrants (except Germany), such as France (20%) or the Netherlands (19%). By contrast, in Central and Eastern European countries, discrimination tends to be less widespread (except Estonia). Combining these findings with those of the Eurobarometer 2021 reveals that countries with the greatest perceived discrimination are also those where EU citizens most frequently agree that discrimination is an obstacle to integration. Discrimination against foreign-born is, however, less widely acknowledged as an issue in Austria, Estonia or the Czech Republic, while very widely recognised in Sweden. Outside Europe, shares of immigrants self-reporting personal discrimination peak in Korea at 20% and in Canada at 19% (since the onset of the pandemic). Workplace discrimination (which is not measured elsewhere) tends to be lower in the United States (11%).

Between 2010-14 and 2016-20, the share of migrants identifying as members of a discriminated group has increased by 2 percentage points in the EU, mainly among women. Migrants from Africa are not only the group most likely to report discrimination but are also now far more likely to self-report discrimination compared to five years ago – with a rise in discrimination of 5 percentage points. Outside Europe, there have been slight falls among immigrants in the United States and Australia, but rises in Canada and New Zealand, particularly among women.


The incidence of self-reported discrimination tends to diminish with age and as migrants settle. In Europe, non-EU migrants are slightly more than twice as likely as their EU-born counterparts (9% versus 19%) to identify as members of a discriminated group. Perceived discrimination is particularly acute among immigrants from North and sub-Saharan Africa in the EU and Canada, while Latin American- and Asian-born migrants report to be worse affected in Australia. The experience of discrimination is less widespread among the foreign-born who have host-country nationality, enjoy high levels of educational attainment, and have work. Lastly, while migrant women are less likely than their male peers to report discrimination in the EU and the United States, the reverse is true in Canada and New Zealand.

### Main findings

- In the EU, 15% of the foreign-born report feeling discriminated against. Shares are highest in Italy, France, the Netherlands, Korea and Canada, and lowest in Central Europe and Ireland.
- Younger and more recent migrants are more likely to perceive discrimination. The same is true among men (as opposed to women) in the EU and the United States.
- Between 2010-14 and 2016-20, perceived discrimination increased in the EU, New Zealand and Canada, particularly among women and among immigrants from Africa. The reverse was true in Australia and the United States.

Figure 5.11. Self-reported discrimination, by duration of residence


15-64 year-olds, 2012-20



StatLink <https://stat.link/du87bt>

Figure 5.12. Immigrants' self-reported discrimination, by characteristics

15-64 year-olds, 2016-20



StatLink <https://stat.link/j7kgpc>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 5.7. Trust in public authorities

### Indicator context

Trust in public institutions by immigrants is a key indicator of social cohesion and is strongly linked to immigrants' feeling of being an equal, accepted member of the host society.

The indicator relates to the share of individuals who report trusting the police, parliament, or the legal system (the executive, congress, and Supreme Court in the United States).

Across the EU, immigrants are more likely than their native-born peers to state that they trust the police – 61% versus 54%; parliament, albeit to a lesser extent – 30% versus 20%; and the legal system – 45% versus 33%. The picture is similar outside the European continent, where immigrants are more likely everywhere to trust in public institutions, especially when it comes to parliament (bar Israel). In two-thirds of countries, immigrants are more likely than the native-born to trust the police and legal system, and have greater trust in parliament in five out of six countries. The gap between native- and foreign-born trust in the police is particularly wide in the United States, Cyprus, and some Central- and Eastern European countries. The gap between native- and foreign-born trust in the legal system is starkest in Canada, New Zealand, Spain and Belgium (at least 15 percentage points). By contrast, immigrants are less likely than the native-born to trust the police and the legal system in the Czech Republic and Baltic countries, where overall trust is low. Immigrants are also less confident in these institutions than their native-born peers in the Nordic countries with high levels of trust.

Between 2002-10 and 2012-20, trust in public institutions grew in both groups across the EU, albeit slightly more among the foreign-born. Shares of both foreign- and native-born who trust the police increased by around 7 percentage points, while trust in parliament (3 points) and the legal system (4 points) also grew. Some notable exceptions were Cyprus and Spain, where trust in the legal system and parliament fell among immigrants and native-born alike. Trust has also waned in the United States among both groups in all types of institutions – particularly Congress.


Immigrants may be more trustful in host-country institutions because the situation in their country of origin breed lower confidence, according to research. As this effect weakens over time, trust is lower among settled immigrants than their newly arrived peers in around 4 out of 5 countries. There is a constant gender gap when it comes to trusting in institutions: both native- and foreign-born women are around 5 percentage points less likely than their male peers to trust parliament or the legal system. Lastly, while low-educated migrants are slightly less likely than their highly educated peers to trust in host-country institutions (e.g. 61% versus 65% for the police), differences between the native-born are wider (e.g. 50% versus 61% for the police).

### Main findings

- Immigrants are more likely than the native-born to trust the police and legal system in two-thirds of countries. Across the EU, 61% of immigrants report that they trust the police and 45% the legal system, compared with respectively 54% and 33% of the native-born. Immigrants are more trustful of host-country institutions outside Europe, too.
- In the EU, trust in public authorities has grown since the early 2000s, although more strongly for the foreign-born. This is in contrast to the United States, where trust in public institutions has declined among both groups.
- Immigrant trust in public authorities tends to decline with length of residence.

Figure 5.13. Self-reported trust in the police


15-64 year-olds, 2012-20



StatLink <https://stat.link/1ewcix>

Figure 5.14. Self-reported trust in the legal system

15-64 year-olds, 2012-20



StatLink <https://stat.link/19vn03>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 5.8. Host-society views on integration

### Indicator context

The way members of host societies perceive the integration of immigrants reflects overall attitudes towards them and integration outcomes. Positive views of integration are indicative of broader social cohesion.

This indicator (available only for EU countries) refers to the share of EU nationals who think that the integration of non-EU migrants is very or fairly successful, at national or local level.

In 2021, 47% of EU citizens thought that the integration of non-EU migrants was successful in their country. Views differed widely between countries, with no patterns common to countries with broadly similar immigrant populations. For instance, only a quarter of respondents think that integration is successful in Sweden, much less than in other countries with large recent intakes of humanitarian migrants. Similarly, around one-third of respondents voice positive views of integration in Latvia and France – again much lower than in other Baltic and longstanding immigration countries. By contrast, most respondents positively perceive integration in countries with high shares of non-EU labour migrants, like Ireland or some Central European countries, though not in all Southern Europe – Italy and Greece voice more negative sentiments.

Views of integration are virtually always more positive at local than national level, with around 3 EU citizens in 5 saying that it is successful in their city or area. Gaps in view of integration at national and local levels are widest in most longstanding destinations (particularly France and Belgium), Sweden and Austria.

Different socio-economic groups share very similar views on the successful integration of non-EU migrants in their country. There is little difference regarding gender, employment status and level of education EU-wide. However, respondents under 25 years old and those reporting living in large cities believe that integration is significantly more successful than their older peers and those living in smaller cities and villages. Broadly speaking, EU citizens who feel more informed or who interact more frequently with immigrants from outside the EU view integration positively. The same is true of EU citizens with foreign-born parents or grandparents.

Views at national level of the integration of immigrants were more positive in 2021 than four years previously in two-thirds of countries. The greatest improvements came in most Central European countries and Germany, where the share of respondents who considered the integration of non-EU migrants was successful rose by at least 8 percentage points. By contrast, views are now significantly less positive in Croatia, Slovenia, Austria and Finland. A majority (53%) of EU citizens consider their national governments do not do enough to actively promote immigrant integration, and 69% consider that doing so is a necessary long-term investment.


### Main findings

- In 2021, 47% of EU citizens in the EU perceived the integration of non-EU migrants in their country as successful. Views were most positive in Ireland and some Central European countries, and most negative in Sweden, Latvia and France.
- EU citizens who feel more informed or who interact more extensively with non-EU migrants generally view their integration more positively.
- Most EU citizens (53%) consider their national governments do not do enough to actively promote immigrant integration, and 69% consider that doing so is a necessary investment.



**Figure 5.15. Host-society views on the integration of non-EU migrants in the EU**


EU citizens, 15-year-olds and above who think that integration is very or fairly successful, non-response excluded, 2021



StatLink <https://stat.link/5zk6mj>

**Figure 5.16. Host-society views on the integration of non-EU migrants, by several characteristics, EU27**

EU citizens, 15-year-olds and above who think that integration is very or fairly successful, non-response excluded, 2021



StatLink <https://stat.link/zd4ccoq>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 5.9. Host-society perception of trends in integration outcomes

### Indicator context

How the host society perceives trends in immigrants' integration outcomes and how far from or close to the actual situation its perceptions are reflect the public's degree of knowledge of integration issues and its opinions of migrants. The indicators considered are employment, poverty, level of education and educational attainment.


This indicator (only available for EU countries) compares perceived evolution in key integration outcomes of foreign-born from non-EU countries over the last 10 years with the actual evolution of the situation over that time. Perceived evolution is drawn from EU citizens' responses to Eurobarometer 2021, and the actual evolution from the most recent data published in this report. Actual evolution is considered positive/negative when the evolution over the last 10 years in the indicator concerned is +/-2 percentage points or +/-10 PISA score points. In between, evolution is considered non-significant, therefore stable.

Irrespective of the indicator considered, most EU citizens have an inaccurate perception of how immigrants' integration has evolved over the last decade. When it comes to the percentage of immigrants having jobs (approximated as the employment rate), most respondents in one-quarter of EU countries consider that the evolution they perceive is the actual evolution, while only in Greece, Cyprus and the Netherlands they perceive the trend in migrants' employment rates as more positively than it in fact is, and less positively in almost 3 in 5 countries. EU-wide, only 39% of respondents believe that the evolution in their country is going in the same direction as the evolution that actually occurred, while 52% perceive the trend in employment rates less positively than in reality, and 9% more positively. The latter is often the case in Southern European countries (except Spain and Portugal), where non-EU migrants' employment rates have fallen, or at best remained stable. In many Central European countries and most longstanding destinations, by contrast, where employment rates have actually climbed, most respondents perceive that evolution as less positive than it actually was – three-quarters of respondents in Hungary, France and Latvia. Countries where views of the evolution in immigrant employment are closest to reality are Ireland, Portugal, Malta and Estonia.

Considering immigrant men and women separately slightly modifies the distorted views of trends of non-EU migrants' employment rates. EU citizens perceive the evolution of employment rates of non-EU men and women as similar, although men have in practice enjoyed an increase in employment in slightly more countries. EU-wide, 48% of respondents perceive the evolution in the employment rate as less positive for non-EU men than it actually was, whereas only 42% do so for non-EU women. In Spain, most respondents think that the evolution in the employment rate of non-EU born men was worse than it actually was, and the evolution in the rate of non-EU born women better. In the Netherlands, where the employment rates of non-EU born men and women have remained stable, half of respondents think that non-EU women's labour market situation has improved. Only one-third of respondents share that perception for non-EU men.

**Figure 5.17. How the evolution of non-EU migrants' employment rates was perceived in the EU**


EU citizens, 15-year-olds and above, perception in 2021 over the last ten years compared with the actual evolution of the employment rate



StatLink <https://stat.link/27almn>

**Figure 5.18. How the evolution of non-EU migrants' poverty rates was perceived in the EU**

EU citizens, 15-year-olds and above, perception in 2021 over the last ten years compared with the actual evolution of the poverty rate between 2010 and 2020



StatLink  <https://stat.link/7k0fq8>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

When it comes to the non-EU migrant poverty rate, EU citizens felt it had evolved more positively than it actually did. That was the perception among 40% of respondents, while 41% of EU citizens' perceptions painted a realistic picture, and 19% thought poverty grew worse than in reality. In almost all countries where non-EU migrant poverty rates increased over the last decade, most respondents perceived rises in poverty as lower than in reality, particularly in Lithuania, Spain and Italy. In Southern European countries, where non-EU migrant poverty rates dropped, that drop was in line with most respondents' perceptions. However, other countries which experienced a decline are less aware of this evolution. In Poland and Finland, for example, respondents perceived the evolution as less positive than the actual evolution.

Educational attainment among the foreign-born population, including that from non-EU countries, has improved over the last 10 years (see Indicator 3.1), with new inflows of better educated migrants. However, respondents in most countries fail to recognise the observed increase in shares of highly educated non-EU migrants. In Central and Eastern European countries, in particular, as well as in France, one-third of respondents at most are aware that the level of education of non-EU migrants has risen over the last decade. And the overall share of awareness is only 42% EU-wide. Only in one-third of countries, especially from Southern Europe, are most perceptions closer to reality.


Unlike immigrant adults, the educational outcomes of the native-born offspring of immigrants have improved over the last decade in one-third of EU countries only and have remained relatively stable in most other countries. In the EU, 38% of respondents are aware of the trends in their country, a similar share (38%) indicate that educational outcomes have been more positive, while only 24% believe the educational outcomes of immigrants' children have declined. Respondents in Southern European and most Nordic countries believe educational outcomes evolved more positively than they actually did. This perception is particularly true of countries where outcomes (as measured in PISA scores) have dropped the most: in Greece, Finland, the Netherlands and Hungary, around 7 respondents out of 8 think that the evolution was more positive. By contrast, in most longstanding destinations (except Belgium and the Netherlands), Sweden and the Czech Republic, where the educational outcomes of the offspring of immigrants improved significantly, most respondents perceived the evolution negatively. The greatest awareness of actual trends was found in countries which are home to a small foreign-born population such as the Baltic countries and Eastern European destinations.

## Main findings

- Most EU citizens have inaccurate perception of how non-EU migrants' integration outcomes have evolved over the last decade. Independent of the indicator considered, less than 43% of respondents' perceptions of the evolution of integration outcomes reflect the true picture.
- Most respondents in Southern Europe (except Spain and Portugal) perceive the evolution of the employment rate of non-EU migrants as more positive than it actually was, while many Central European countries and most longstanding destinations have the opposite perception.
- Although there was an increase in shares of highly educated non-EU migrants, most countries perceived the opposite, especially in France and in Central and Eastern European countries.
- Respondents in Southern European and Nordic countries (bar Sweden) perceived the evolution of educational results of the children of immigrants as more positive than it actually was. Respondents thought the opposite in most longstanding destinations, Sweden and the Czech Republic, even though the educational performance of the offspring of immigrants improved significantly.

**Figure 5.19. How the evolution of non-EU migrants' levels of education was perceived in the EU**


EU citizens, 15-year-olds and above, perception in 2021 over the last ten years compared with the actual evolution of share of highly educated between 2010 and 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/copkg0>

**Figure 5.20. How the evolution of children of immigrants' education outcomes was perceived in the EU**

EU citizens, 15-year-olds and above, perception in 2021 over the last ten years compared with the actual evolution of the PISA reading score between 2009 and 2018



StatLink <https://stat.link/rmuin1>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 5.10. Social factors perceived as necessary for successful integration

### Indicator context

Understanding what the host society perceives as the drivers of a successful integration process helps policy makers to identify public concerns and possible support for certain integration policies.

This indicator, available only for EU countries, summarises the social factors which EU nationals believe important for helping and hampering the successful integration of persons born outside the EU in the host country.

The social factors that the EU population considers important for the successful integration of non-EU migrants are the same in virtually all EU countries. Speaking the country's official language is most important – cited by 85% of respondents in the EU. In Finland, however, language proficiency is narrowly outperformed by acceptance of the values and norms of the host society, an important integration factor in other countries, too – for 77% of respondents EU-wide. Indeed, it is as likely to be cited as an important integration criterion as any economic factor, such as contributing to the welfare system and being well educated and skilled enough to find a job. To a lesser extent, having friends is also important for around two-thirds of respondents EU-wide. Sharing the host-country's cultural traditions is deemed less important, however, as less than 50% of respondents think so in less than one-third of countries, most notably the Nordic countries, Germany and the Netherlands. Sharing cultural traditions is most important in new immigrant destinations, such as Southern European countries, Hungary and Ireland.


In around half of EU countries, at least two-thirds of respondents think that inadequate efforts of immigrants themselves are one of the biggest obstacles to their integration in the host-country society. This idea is particularly widespread in Southern Europe (especially in Greece), Finland and the Netherlands. However, in countries with longer histories of immigration (e.g. France, Sweden and the Netherlands), discrimination against immigrants is deemed an even bigger barrier to integration. EU-wide, around two-thirds of respondents consider discrimination, inadequate efforts to fit in, and high concentrations of immigrants in some areas as major obstacles for integration. However, none of these problems are perceived as important as finding a job – the chief obstacle to integration according to EU citizens. Although at least 3 respondents in 5 view lack of interaction between immigrants and host-country nationals and negative portrayals of immigrants in the media as obstacles to integration, these figures are still consistently lower than those for other obstacles mentioned before.

### Main findings

- Overall, speaking the host country's official language is considered the most important social factor for the integration of non-EU migrants, followed, at equal shares, by the acceptance of host-country values and norms, contributing to the welfare system and being educated and skilled enough.
- EU-wide, the chief obstacle to integration according to EU citizens is finding a job.
- EU-wide, two-thirds of respondents think that the limited efforts of immigrants themselves to fit in and the discrimination against them are major social obstacles to their integration in the host society.

**Figure 5.21. Social factors for successful integration of non-EU migrants in the EU**


EU citizens, 15-year-olds and above who think that the respective factor is important for successful integration of immigrants in the country, 2021



StatLink <https://stat.link/guqpyw>

**Figure 5.22. Social obstacles to successful integration of non-EU migrants in the EU**

EU citizens, 15-year-olds and above who think that the respective factor is an obstacle to successful integration of immigrants in the country, 2021



StatLink <https://stat.link/khlmbr>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.





# 6 Integration of the elderly immigrant population

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Elderly migrants are a growing group in most countries. Yet, as they reach the final stage of their lives, little is known about their integration challenges and outcomes. Those challenges are difficult to identify, as elderly migrants, reflecting long-standing migration flows, are often very different from other migrant cohorts. In most longstanding destinations, the aged immigrant population has been shaped by arrivals of low-educated “guest workers” and subsequent family migration. This chapter presents a first-time overview of select indicators for this group before the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. It first describes the size and the age composition of the elderly population (Indicator 6.1). Then it looks at their living conditions, namely poverty (Indicator 6.2), housing conditions (6.3) and perceived health (6.4). The last indicator investigates their access to professional homecare (Indicator 6.5).

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# In Brief

## Despite migrants being younger on average than the native-born in most countries, the elderly migrants are a growing group of concern

- In both, the EU and the OECD, about 15% of the foreign-born population is over 65 years of age, a smaller share than among the native-born populations in most countries. In about a third of countries, however, the foreign-born are more likely to be over 65 than the native-born.
- Foreign-born populations are getting older in most OECD and EU countries. The share of the elderly among migrants grew in two-thirds of countries over the last decade. Aging is however slower than among the native-born, for which the shares of elderly increased in all countries.
- The age structure of immigrants reflects past migration flows, trends in return migration after retirement and mortality patterns. The share of elderly migrants is lowest in countries with comparatively more recent immigration (for example Latin America) and highest in countries where the foreign-born population was shaped by nation-building, border changes and national minorities (such as in the Baltic countries).

## Relative poverty rates increased over the last decade while elderly migrants' housing conditions improved

- Around one in four elderly migrants lives in relative poverty EU-wide. Shares in the United States and Australia are even higher at over 40%. Elderly migrants are more likely to live in relative poverty than their native-born peers in most countries, especially in longstanding destinations, the United States, Southern Europe and Sweden. In Malta and Cyprus, which attract wealthy retirees, poverty rates are higher among the native-born elderly.
- Over the last decade, the poverty rate among elderly migrants has increased by around 4 percentage points, while slightly decreasing among the native-born in both the EU and the OECD. The situation deteriorated even more among migrants aged 75 years and above.
- Housing conditions of the elderly have improved over the last decade. Nevertheless, elderly migrants are more likely than their native-born peers to live in substandard dwelling in the Czech Republic, Nordic countries and most long-standing destinations, but less likely in the Baltic countries. Non-EU elderly migrants are the most likely to live in substandard accommodation in Europe.

## Differences in reported health status and access to care between immigrants and the native-born are small, but access to professional homecare is an issue for both

- In most OECD countries, shares among elderly foreign- and native-born reporting to be in good health are similar. About 40% of elderly migrants claim they are in good health in the EU. Shares are the highest at over 60% in North America and lowest in the Baltic countries.
- Over the last decade, the shares of elderly migrants reporting good health increased in around two-thirds of countries for the foreign-born and nearly all countries for the native-born.
- Most households with elderly persons in need of professional homecare do not receive such services. Only 34% of households that include elderly migrants in need of such assistance received support, against 36% of the native-born. Households with elderly migrants were much less likely to receive such support in most Southern European countries and Belgium.
- Unlike their native-born peers, single elderly migrants are less likely to receive professional homecare than those living with other migrant members, while they may be the most in need.

## 6.1. Age of the immigrant population

### Indicator context

Elderly people are those aged 65 years or older. Given that health issues usually arise at an older age, this chapter also considers very old people, i.e. those aged 75 years or older. Shares of elderly people are the percentages of the foreign- and the native-born populations.

Elderly people (aged 65 and above) account for higher shares of their respective population than their foreign-born peers in both the OECD (18% versus 15%) and the EU (21% versus 15%). Differences are similar in the EU when it comes to very old people (75 and above), who make up 6% of the immigrant population but 10% of the native-born in the EU. In two-thirds of countries, the native-born are more likely to be elderly and very old than the foreign-born. The opposite prevails, however, in most Central and Eastern European countries (where the composition of the elderly foreign-born population has been shaped by nation-building, border changes and national minorities), as well as in Türkiye and some settlement- and long-standing destinations (e.g. Australia, Canada and France). Populations of elderly immigrants are largest in the Baltic countries. In Latvia and Estonia, they account for over 44% of the foreign-born.

The age profiles of the elderly migrant population differ from one country to another, reflecting past migration flows, trends in return migration after retirement, and mortality patterns. In the bulk of OECD countries, elderly migrants are mainly between 65 and 74 years old. OECD- and EU-wide, 42% of elderly migrants are 75 and over. That share is, however, smaller in countries where significant migration inflows started only in the 2000s and few migrants have reached very old age – as in Southern Europe, Ireland, Mexico and Chile. In Poland, by contrast, where national minorities shaped the foreign-born population after World War II, or in Korea, at least two-thirds of foreign-born elderly people are very old. In fact, over 15% of elderly migrants are 85 and older in Poland, Bulgaria, Korea and Norway.


While shares of the elderly and very old native-born have grown in all countries over the last decade, the same is true of immigrants in only two-thirds of countries. Increases in shares of elderly people have been stronger among the native-born in 7 countries out of 10 and, among the very old, in 8 out of 10. However, that is not the case in France, the United States, Greece, the Baltic countries and Croatia. In many other Central and Eastern European countries, shares of elderly and very old migrants have dropped over the last decade, as they have died and younger cohorts of migrants have arrived. Similar trends are observed in most Nordic countries and Chile, albeit to a lesser extent.

### Main findings

- Shares of the elderly native-born exceed those of their immigrant peers in two-thirds of countries in both the EU and the OECD. Cross-country differences in shares of the elderly are much wider among the foreign- than the native-born.
- Elderly migrants are mainly between 65 and 74 years old in most countries. They are older in Poland, Bulgaria, Korea and Norway.
- While shares of the elderly native-born have grown in all countries over the last decade, this is true of immigrants in only two-thirds of countries.

**Figure 6.1. Elderly and very old people**


As percentage of foreign-born and native-born populations, 2020




StatLink  <https://stat.link/gal5zr>

**Figure 6.2. How shares of elderly people have evolved**

As percentage of foreign-born and native-born populations aged 65 years and above, between 2010 and 2020



StatLink  <https://stat.link/ne8ja2>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 6.2. Relative poverty

### Indicator context

The relative poverty rate is the proportion of individuals living below the relative poverty threshold. The Eurostat definition of that threshold is 60% of the median equivalised disposable income in each country. The rate is computed for the elderly (65 and over) and very old people (75 and over).

In the EU, 26% of elderly and 28% of very old migrants live in relative poverty, compared to 19% and 22% of their native-born peers. In the United States and Australia, relative poverty rates exceed 40% among the foreign-born elderly and affect up to 48% of very old migrants in the United States. Indeed, there is more poverty among foreign- than native-born elderly and very old migrants in most countries – by at least 10 percentage points in longstanding immigration destinations (except Germany and the United Kingdom), the United States, Southern European countries (except Portugal) and Sweden. By contrast, in Malta and Cyprus, which attract many wealthy retirees, the native-born elderly are more likely to be poor. The native-born are also significantly more likely to be in relative poverty in Canada, New Zealand, and some Central and Eastern European countries.

Over the last decade, the poverty rate of elderly migrants has increased by around 4 points, while falling slightly among the native-born elderly in both the EU and the OECD. It has worsened even more among very old migrants in both the EU and the OECD but declined only slightly among their native-born peers. Relative poverty rates among elderly have more than doubled among immigrants in Italy and the Netherlands, while decreasing slightly and increasing slightly, respectively, among their native-born counterparts. In Baltic countries, those rates have risen considerably among the foreign- and native-born elderly and very old (by at least 18 percentage points), albeit to a greater extent among the native-born.

Elderly migrants are more likely to be poor than their native-born peers at all levels of education. Highly educated elderly migrants are more than twice as likely as their native-born peers to live in relative poverty in the EU, and three times as likely in half of EU countries. Elderly migrants born outside the EU are more likely than their EU-born counterparts to be poor in virtually all EU countries. Family status, home ownership rates (lower among immigrants), as well as the characteristics of jobs held prior to retirement, are important factors affecting relative poverty.


One-third of the elderly in the EU, foreign- or native-born, are living alone, which is true for 22% of foreign- and 29% of native-born in the United States. The elderly who live alone are even more at risk of poverty, that is around 20 points higher relative poverty rates on average than the rate for the whole elderly migrant population for EU and OECD countries. That penalty is smaller among the foreign-born in most European countries, though not outside Europe. The penalty is heaviest in Central and Eastern Europe. More than 40% of elderly migrants living alone are in relative poverty in slightly less than two-thirds of countries, while their native-born peers are poor in around half of countries.

### Main findings

- In the EU, 26% of elderly migrants live in relative poverty, and even more outside Europe. They are more likely than their native-born peers to be poor in most countries, especially in longstanding immigration destinations, the United States, Southern Europe and Sweden.
- Over the last decade, the elderly migrant poverty rate has increased by around 4 percentage points, while declining slightly among the native-born elderly in both the EU and the OECD. The situation worsened even more among very old migrants.

**Figure 6.3. Relative poverty rates of the elderly**


65-year-olds and above, 2019



StatLink <https://stat.link/sg94tf>

**Figure 6.4. How the relative poverty rates of the elderly have evolved**

65-year-olds and above, between 2010 to 2019



StatLink <https://stat.link/2xcohg>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 6.3. Housing conditions

### Indicator context

Housing conditions are a key determinant of the well-being of the elderly. Living in substandard accommodation increases the risk of poor health and can lead to social isolation.

This indicator (available for European countries only) shows the share of people aged 65 and above and 75 and above living in substandard accommodation, e.g. too dark, no exclusive access to a bathroom, or leaking roof.

In the EU, one-sixth of elderly migrants live in substandard housing, a share similar to that of their native-born peers. The foreign-born elderly are more likely than their native-born peers to reside in substandard accommodation in 3 countries in 5, especially in the Czech Republic, Nordic countries and most longstanding destinations. While very old migrants (aged 75 and above) are less likely than those aged between 65 and 74 to live in such housing, the very old native-born are more likely to in virtually all countries. The EU-wide share of very old native-born in deprived housing is 4 percentage points higher than that of their foreign-born peers. Unlike their peers aged 65 to 74, very old migrants are better housed than the native-born e.g. in Spain, Austria and France, as are very old and elderly immigrants in the Baltic countries (except Estonia). The same applies to Malta, which hosts many wealthy elderly migrants.

The housing conditions of the elderly have improved over the last decade. In some 3 out of 4 countries, the share of foreign-born elderly people living in deprived accommodation has dropped and, in most countries, to an even larger extent among the very old. The same trend emerges among the native-born, among whom, the decline tends to be steeper than among the foreign-born elderly (-8 versus -5 percentage points, respectively, EU-wide), and similarly steep in both groups when it comes to the very old. As a result, the gap between the elderly foreign- and native-born has widened in some countries.

A lack of financial resources and knowledge of the housing market, as well as discrimination by property owners, may hamper the access of elderly migrants to adequate housing. Such obstacles affect non-EU elderly migrants more widely than their EU-born peers and, in virtually every European country, they are more likely to live in substandard accommodation. The accommodation gap exceeds 11 percentage points in Austria, Sweden and the Netherlands. The elderly who live alone are also more likely to reside in substandard housing than the elderly population as a whole for both the native- and the foreign-born. Living alone is particularly detrimental to living in good housing conditions for immigrants in Spain, Greece and Slovenia. Furthermore, in virtually all countries, homeownership, which reduces the risk of living in substandard accommodation, is less widespread among the foreign- than the native-born elderly – 60% versus 85% EU-wide.


### Main findings

- Elderly migrants are more likely than their native-born peers to live in substandard housing in Nordic countries and most longstanding destinations, but less likely in the Baltic countries. Very old migrants are better housed than their peers aged 65 to 74, but very old native-born are not.
- In the EU, the share of elderly migrants living in substandard housing has declined over the last decade, and to an even larger extent among very old migrants. The improvement was even more marked among the native-born elderly, though similarly marked for the very old people.
- Living alone when elderly is associated with poor housing, especially among immigrants.



**Figure 6.5. Substandard accommodation of the elderly**


65-year-olds and above, 2019



StatLink <https://stat.link/g8lz2k>

**Figure 6.6. How the substandard accommodation rates of the elderly have evolved**

65-year-olds and above, between 2010 and 2019



StatLink <https://stat.link/fomu0l>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 6.4. Reported health status

### Indicator context

Feeling healthy is associated with better prospects of living independently, engaging in social relationships, and enjoying good quality of life.

This section considers the shares of elderly people (65 and over) and the very old (75 and over) who perceive their general health (physiological and psychological) as “good” or “very good”.

Across the EU, four in ten elderly and three very old migrants in ten report good health – shares similar to those of the native-born. In North America, Australia, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, elderly immigrants are less likely to report good health than their native-born peers (even more so when very old), which indicates that old age is associated with a weaker healthy migrant perception (see Indicator 4.9). Poorer health among elderly immigrants is also observed in longstanding European destinations, especially Belgium and the Netherlands. The opposite prevails in Southern Europe, Hungary and Slovenia, where elderly migrants are more likely than their native-born peers to report good health.

Over the last decade, the share of the elderly reporting good health rose by around 8 percentage points in the EU among both immigrants and the native-born. Self-perceived health improved among the elderly and very old in around two-thirds of countries among the foreign-born and in almost every country among the native-born. The steepest increases in the shares of elderly and very old migrants reporting good health came in Greece, Italy, Slovenia and France – outstripping the elderly native-born. In the Netherlands and Spain, by contrast, the share of elderly migrants in good health dropped by at least 10 percentage points, while climbing among the native-born. In the United Kingdom, the decline in self-reported health among the native-born was not seen among immigrants. In the United States, in contrast, where the situation among the immigrants also remained stable, there was some increase among the native-born.


Elderly migrants born in the EU are 8 percentage points more likely to report good health than their non-EU born peers, who generally have fewer financial resources, weaker social networks, and more limited access to healthcare systems. Furthermore, reports of good health are generally more widespread among men than among women in the OECD, irrespective of their place of birth. Living alone is particularly detrimental to health, especially at an older age. In 7 out of 10 countries, self-perceptions of poor health among the elderly living alone are greater among the native- than the foreign-born. In countries that once traditionally took in guest workers (such as France and Germany), as well as in parts of Southern Europe, elderly migrants living alone are actually more likely to report good health than other elderly migrants, unlike their native-born peers everywhere else (except in Latvia and the United States).

### Main findings

- Two elderly migrants in five claim they are in good health in the EU. Shares are similar to those reporting good health among the native-born, but are much lower than those of the native-born in North America and some long-standing European destinations.
- Over the last decade, shares of elderly people reporting good health increased in nearly all countries among the native-born and in around two-thirds among the foreign-born. The Netherlands and Spain reported substantial declines for foreign-born elderly.
- In countries that took in large numbers of “guest workers” (e.g. France and Germany), and Southern Europe, elderly migrants living alone are more likely to report good health than other elderly migrants, while the opposite is true almost everywhere among their native-born peers.

**Figure 6.7. Self-reported good health status of the elderly**


65-year-olds and above, 2019



StatLink <https://stat.link/jaeio6>

**Figure 6.8. How shares of aged foreign-born and native-born in self-reported good health have evolved**

65-year-olds and above, between 2010 to 2019



StatLink <https://stat.link/947f15>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 6.5. Access to professional homecare

### Indicator context

Professional care enables the elderly with disabilities and chronic ill health to keep their autonomy. Receiving such care is strongly associated with better quality of life.

This indicator (only available in Europe and for 2016) shows the share of households with people aged 65 and over and 75 and over who receive professional homecare. Access to professional homecare depends largely on the institutional framework. Unfortunately, there is no country-level information on the elderly in institutional care because household surveys do not cover people living permanently in residential care or nursing homes. Informal homecare is discussed only briefly, as there is no comprehensive measurement of such care at country level and only data on informal homecare provided by other members of the household are available.

Of EU households with elderly immigrant members in 2016, 6% benefited from professional homecare – the same share of households with elderly native-born people. As for households with very old migrants, 13% receive such care. Elderly and very old migrants are more likely than the native-born to receive professional homecare in one country in four. Elderly migrants are equally likely in Sweden, Germany, and most Central and Eastern European countries. However, households with elderly foreign-born members are less likely to be recipients in other long-standing EU destinations, especially Belgium. This, however, is not the case for very old migrants e.g. in France, where proportionately higher shares benefit from professional homecare than among households with very old native-born. In most European countries, single elderly native-born persons are more likely to receive professional homecare than households with many native-born members. Surprisingly, though, the opposite is the case when it comes to elderly migrants. Exceptions to that trend include the Netherlands, Greece and the United Kingdom.


According to the 2016 European Quality of Life Survey, 41% of the native-born elderly in the EU who received long-term homecare in the previous 12 months benefited from informal care (mostly from family members, friends, and neighbours), while 54% received professional homecare. Greater shares of migrant than native-born elderly people accessed professional homecare, with only one-third receiving informal care at home (though mostly not from family or friends). However, professional homecare is not accessible to most foreign- or native-born elderly people in need. The EU Survey on Income and Living Conditions finds an average of only 34% of households with elderly migrants in need of professional homecare received it in 2016, against 36% of their native-born peers. At country level, the share ranges from 60% in France and the Netherlands to 10% in the Baltic countries, with consistently lower shares for households with elderly migrants. In half of all cases, households did not receive professional homecare for their elderly, irrespective of place birth, because they could not afford it.

### Main findings

- Most households with elderly native- or foreign-born members in need of professional homecare do not receive it – and the foreign-born elderly are slightly unlikely to access it.
- Households with elderly migrants are at least as likely to receive professional homecare as those with elderly native-born members in Sweden, Germany, and most Central and Eastern European countries, but much less likely in most Southern European countries and Belgium.
- Unlike their native-born peers, a household consisting of a single elderly migrant is less likely to receive professional homecare than one with multiple migrant members.

**Figure 6.9. Professional homecare received**

Households including a person aged 65 and above, 2016



Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.



# 7

## Integration of young people with foreign-born parents

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Youth with foreign-born parents who have been raised and educated in the host country face challenges that are different from those of migrants who arrived as adults. This chapter compares outcomes for native-born children with foreign-born parents with native-born children with native-born parents and immigrants who arrived as children. After considering some basic characteristics that help situate young people with foreign-born parents (Indicators 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3), this chapter presents their access to education (7.4 and 7.5), their educational outcomes (7.6 and 7.7), and how they feel treated in the education system (7.8 and 7.9). After summarising their levels of education (Indicator 7.10), it describes indicators on school to work transition (7.11 and 7.12), along with intergenerational educational mobility (7.13), labour market outcomes (7.14 and 7.15) and job characteristics (7.16 and 7.17). It then looks at indicators of living conditions (Indicators 7.18 and 7.19) and social integration (7.20 and 7.21).

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# In Brief

## The share of young people with foreign-born parents is increasing

- Across the EU, 23% of young people between the age of 15 and 34, are either foreign-born themselves or have foreign-born parents. Native-born with at least one foreign-born parent account for 10% EU-wide. The respective share in the OECD is 28%, of which half are native-born with at least one foreign-born parent. Among children under the age of 15, the share is slightly higher in the EU (25%) and similar OECD-wide (28%).
- The share of young people with one or two foreign-born parents among the population aged 15 to 34 years old increased over the last decade by 2.3 percentage points EU-wide, and 2.6 points OECD-wide.
- There are more native-born young people (15-34) of mixed parentage than with two foreign-born parents in Australia, New Zealand, Israel and, save in German-speaking countries, in most EU countries. By contrast, children under 15 with two foreign-born parents outnumber those of mixed parentage in most longstanding immigrant destinations, most Southern Europe, Sweden, Norway and Canada.

## Children of immigrants continue to face challenges in school but there are signs of catching up

- Children in foreign-born households are less likely than those in native-born households to attend Early Childhood Education and Care (ECEC) in most countries, but their attendance rate has increased over the last decade almost everywhere, closing the gap with children of native-born. In the EU, the benefit of preschool is almost a year of schooling for children of immigrants, much more than for their peers with native-born parents (less than half a year).
- More than half of pupils with foreign-born parents in the OECD and the EU go to schools in the highest quartile of shares of children who are also of foreign-born parentage. Concentrations of pupils with foreign-born parents increased over the last decade in almost all countries, especially in the United Kingdom, Italy and the Nordic countries.
- In Latin America and Europe, children of immigrants have lower reading skills than their peers with native-born parents. The reverse is true in most other non-European countries.
- In the EU, 29% of native-born pupils with foreign-born parents lack basic reading skills, against 38% of their peers with immigrant parents and 18% of those with native-born parents.
- Native-born children of immigrants have improved their reading scores in both the OECD and the EU, while those of their peers with native-born parents have stayed relatively stable, thereby closing part of the gap.
- The gap in reading literacy between the two groups remains in most countries, regardless of schools' socio-economic intake, except in Italy, France, Costa Rica, Spain and the United Kingdom, where the gap closes.
- Considering only disadvantaged pupils, the share of top performers in reading is higher among native-born children of immigrants than among their peers with native-born parents in most countries, although not in non-European countries, the United Kingdom and France.



- EU-wide, young adults with immigrant parents are less likely than their peers of native-born parentage to be highly educated (32% vs 40%) and more likely to be low-educated (21% vs. 14%). The opposite is true in non-EU countries. The shares of highly educated young adults with foreign-born parents have increased in the EU and OECD over the last decade.
- In the EU, native-born young people with at least one foreign-born parent are more likely to better their parents' educational attainment than the offspring of native-born parents.
- The dropout rate in the EU is 11% among the native-born with foreign-born parents – higher than their peers of native-born parentage in most EU countries and at 8%, much higher than among their native-born peers also in Japan. Rates are generally higher among boys. Dropout rates have fallen over the last eight years, irrespective of parents' country of birth.

### Native-born with foreign-born parents are catching up in the labour market

- Around 17% of native-born young people with foreign-born parents, in both the OECD and the EU, are neither in employment, education or training (NEET). These rates are higher than among their peers of native-born parentage in virtually all EU countries, though not everywhere outside the EU.
- In most countries, native-born young people of foreign-born parentage are less likely to be in employment than their peers of native-born parentage, and more likely to be unemployed. Employment gaps are highest in Belgium and Spain. The gap is partially closed among those who are highly educated, but not in the United States and France among others.
- Despite the COVID-19 crisis, labour market outcomes were better for native-born with foreign-born parents in 2021 than in 2012. Their employment rates were higher and unemployment lower, especially in the countries where poor outcomes are observed, thereby closing the gap with those with native-born parentage. Unemployment rate, however, increased among native-born with foreign-born parents in the United States.
- Almost a quarter of highly educated youth with foreign-born parents aged 25 to 34 are formally overqualified for the jobs they hold in the EU. The young native-born of foreign-born parentage are more likely to be overqualified for their job than their peers with native-born parents in most longstanding European destinations, but generally not outside the EU.
- The native-born of foreign-born parentage are underrepresented in the public services in most countries, especially in the EU but not in Israel, the United Kingdom and Sweden.

### Poorer living conditions and intersectional discrimination remain key challenges

- In virtually all countries, children under 16 in immigrant households are more at risk of living in relative poverty than those in native-born households. Their relative poverty rate is at least 50% higher in most countries.
- More than one-third of children in immigrant households live in overcrowded accommodation in the EU, against less than one in five in native-born households. This difference disappears between children of foreign- and native-born parents from the age of 25.
- In the EU, more than one in five native-born with foreign-born parents feel part of a group that is discriminated against based on ethnicity, nationality and race. Native-born with foreign-born parents are more likely to feel this way than foreign-born adults, except for Israel, Austria and the United States. This might be due to better knowledge of their rights and greater awareness of discriminatory practices.
- Perceived discrimination has increased between the periods 2010-14 and 2016-20. This development was driven by increased levels among groups at risk of intersectional discrimination including women, young people born to non-EU-born parents and individuals raised in a foreign language.

## 7.1. Youth aged 15 to 34 years with foreign-born parents

### Indicator context

Young people with foreign-born parents are divided into four categories: a) native-born with two foreign-born parents; b) native-born with mixed parentage (one native- and one foreign-born parent); c) foreign-born who immigrated as children (arriving in the host country before the age of 15); d) foreign-born who immigrated as adults (at 15 years old or over, not a focus of this chapter). Native-born with native-born parents are thus those with two native-born parents.

Across the EU, 23% of young people aged 15 to 34 are either foreign-born themselves or have foreign-born parents. The native-born account for 10%, of whom 4% have foreign-born parents and 6% one native- and one foreign-born parent. A further 3% are childhood arrivals, while 10% came as adults. The share of young people with foreign-born parents is higher in OECD countries at 28%. Of those, 8% are native-born of foreign-born parentage, 6% are of mixed parentage, 5% immigrated as children, and 10% arrived as adults. Young people (whether native- or foreign-born) with at least one foreign-born parent represent 22 million people in the EU and 60 million in the OECD – 42% live in the United States, 10% in Germany, 7% in both France and the United Kingdom, and 5% in Canada and Australia.

Countries that are home to the largest overall shares of foreign-born are also those which have the largest shares of young people with foreign-born parents. More than half of the young in Luxembourg, Australia and Switzerland are of such parentage, as are 45% in New Zealand and almost 40% in Sweden, Canada and Austria. The shares of native-born with at least one foreign-born parent remains above 15% in other longstanding immigration countries. In a number of countries, this group outnumbers those who are foreign-born themselves, e.g. in Israel, France, the Netherlands and the United States. The youth of mixed parentage is more numerous than that with two foreign-born parents in Australia, New Zealand, Israel and in most EU countries, while the reverse is true in German-speaking countries, the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada. Young immigrants who arrived as adults outnumber twofold those who arrived as children in most EU countries and Australia, while numbers of child and adult arrivals are most similar in the United States and Canada.


In countries for which data are available, young people with foreign-born parents have increased as a share of all youth over the last decade by 2.3 percentage points EU-wide, and 2.6 points OECD-wide. In the EU, the rise was similar to that of foreign-born youth. By contrast, shares of young immigrants declined in the United States, Israel and all non-EU European countries. Shares of the native-born with at least one foreign-born parent climbed in most countries, with the steepest increases observed in the United States (by 3.4 percentage points), Spain (3.5 points) Finland (4 points) and Austria (6 points). By contrast, the shares of native-born with at least one foreign-born parent fell slightly in Australia and France and dropped by 7 percentage points in Israel.

### Main findings

- EU-wide, 23% of 15-34 year-olds have at least one foreign-born parent. That share is 28% in the OECD, where half have at least one foreign-born parent and the other half are immigrants.
- There are more native-born youth of mixed parentage than with two foreign-born parents in Australia, New Zealand, Israel and, except in German-speaking countries, in EU countries.
- The share of native-born youth with foreign-born parents increased 2.3 percentage points EU-wide and 2.6 points OECD-wide, a rise similar to that of foreign-born youth in the EU.

Figure 7.1. Young people with foreign-born parents


15-34 year-olds, 2021



StatLink <https://stat.link/e80jlt>

Figure 7.2. How the youth population has evolved

15-34 year-olds, between 2012 and 2021



StatLink <https://stat.link/4io2yv>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 7.2. Children under 15 years old with foreign-born parents

### Indicator context

Children under 15 with foreign-born parents fall into three categories: a) native-born with two foreign-born parents; b) native-born with mixed parentage (one native- and one foreign-born parent); c) foreign-born.

One in four children (13.5 million) in the EU are either foreign-born themselves or have foreign-born parents: 12% had two foreign-born parents, 8% were of mixed parentage, and only 4% were foreign-born themselves. In the OECD, the proportion of children who are foreign-born or have foreign-born parents is higher, at 28%, due to the greater share (15%) of children with two immigrant parents. Of all 37 million children with foreign-born parents in the OECD, 43% reside in the United States, around 10% in both the United Kingdom and in Germany, and 8% in France.

In Luxembourg, nearly four in five (78%) children have foreign-born parents, by far the largest share in the EU and the OECD. Shares are also relatively high in Cyprus, Austria and Australia, at over two in five children. By contrast, in Central and Eastern European countries, where the immigrant population is much smaller and ageing, only one in five children has foreign-born parents, mostly of mixed parentage. Furthermore, children with two foreign-born parents are more numerous than those of mixed parentage in all longstanding immigrant destinations (save the Netherlands), most Southern European countries, Sweden, Norway and Canada. By contrast, young adults of foreign-born parentage in Europe are mostly of mixed parentage, except in German-speaking countries (see Indicator 7.1).


Over the last decade, the share of native-born children of foreign-born parentage has grown significantly in all countries – with the exception of Greece and the Central and Eastern European countries. EU-wide, the increase is 4 percentage points, twice as high as among 15-34 year-olds. The rise has been steepest in Norway (9 percentage points), Finland (10 points) and Cyprus (11 points). Denmark, Italy and Ireland have also experienced large increases, albeit to a lesser extent. By contrast, the proportion of foreign-born children has remained fairly unchanged EU-wide, with less than one-quarter of countries reporting significant increases. The most pronounced leaps, of around 5 percentage points, come in Luxembourg, as well as Sweden and Germany, which took in comparatively large arrivals of humanitarian migrants in 2015-16. In contrast, Ireland, Spain and Greece are among the few countries recording drops in the proportion of foreign-born children.

### Main findings

- One in four children in the EU are either foreign-born or have foreign-born parents. Half have two foreign-born parents, one-third are of mixed parentage, and one-sixth are foreign-born themselves. In the OECD, the share of children with foreign-born parents is even higher, at 28%.
- Unlike the young aged between 15 and 34 years old, children under 15 with two foreign-born parents outnumber those of mixed parentage in all longstanding immigrant destinations (save the Netherlands), most Southern European countries, and in Norway, Sweden and Canada.
- The share of native-born children with foreign-born parents has increased by 4 percentage points across the EU, while the share of foreign-born children has remained stable.

Figure 7.3. Children with foreign-born parents


0-14 year-olds, 2020



StatLink  <https://stat.link/0qjsw8>

Figure 7.4. How the share of children of immigrants has evolved

0-14 year-olds, between 2010 and 2020



StatLink  <https://stat.link/ntw85x>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

### 7.3. Regions of parental origin

#### Indicator context

Regions of origin in the OECD context are groups of countries of origin (see glossary for a detailed explanation of the grouping). Region of parental origin is the father's region of birth for native-born with two foreign-born parents (aged 15 to 34) and the country of birth for foreign-born who arrived as children (before the age of 15). Foreign-born offspring with EU-born parentage are those who have at least one parent born in another country that is part of the European free mobility zone.

EU-wide, 51% of the native-born with two immigrant parents have a father born in Europe, followed by 26% with fathers of African origin, 18% of Asian, and 5% of Latin American. At country level, native-born with fathers from Africa make up the largest group in France (65%), Portugal (55%) and Belgium (52%), while Asian parentage is most common in Denmark (45%). European origin is the largest group for all other EU countries, except Spain. As for the foreign-born who arrived in the EU as children, 52% come from non-European regions – especially Asia (21%), Latin America (16%) and Africa (14%). In the European Union, having a foreign-born parent from another EU country is much more common among native-born with mixed parents (one native- and one foreign-born parent) than those with two foreign-born parents. While 48% of native-born children of mixed parentage have one EU- or EFTA-born parent, only 18% do among the native-born offspring of two foreign-born parents.

In the United States, around nine in ten native-born children with foreign-born parents have fathers from either Latin America (67%) or Asia (24%), followed by Africa and Europe (both 4%). The same is true of the foreign-born who arrived in the United States as children, with eight in ten originating from Latin America and Asia (54% and 26%, respectively), followed by 12% from Europe and 6% from Africa. In Canada and Australia, around 45% of the native-born offspring of foreign-born parents have fathers born in Asia. With regard to broad regions of paternal origin, young people are most diverse in Canada and the Netherlands, and most homogeneous in Luxembourg where most native-born with foreign-born parents have EU-born parentage.


Data for the EU are not comparable over time due to definitional changes in Germany. In the United States, the regions of birth of the foreign-born fathers of native-born children have remained largely stable over the past decade. In Canada, by contrast, the share of native-born of European parentage decreased between 2011 and 2016 by 8 percentage points, while that of all other regions of birth of the fathers has grown, particularly for Asia.

#### Main findings

- EU-wide, 65% of the native-born offspring of two foreign-born parents have fathers born outside Europe, while 47% of the foreign-born who arrived as children came from non-European countries.
- In the United States, two-thirds of native-born children with foreign-born parents have fathers from Latin America. In Australia and Canada, almost one in two native-born offspring of foreign-born parents have fathers born in Asia.

Figure 7.5. Regions of birth of the father of young people with foreign-born parents


15-34 year-olds, 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/cmprzj>

Figure 7.6. Regions of birth of the father of young people with foreign-born parents, by country

15-34 year-olds, 2020/21



StatLink <https://stat.link/w96knr>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 7.4. Early childhood education and care (ECEC)

### Indicator context

Evidence shows that children, especially those who are disadvantaged, who attend early childhood education and care are more likely to succeed, first at school then as adults in the labour market. ECEC is even more important for the children of immigrants, who have weaker ties with the host-country language in early childhood.

Attendance rates in formal childcare and preschool services are defined as paid care services for children aged 2-5 that are provided either through organised structures (e.g. nursery school and childcare centres) or through direct arrangements between parents and care providers, even if only for a few hours per week.

Across the EU, the vast majority (88%) of children in immigrant households attend some type of preschool education and care, while less than two-thirds do so in the United States and Australia. In most countries, ECEC attendance among children in immigrant households is below that of their peers from native-born households. This is especially true in Cyprus, the Netherlands and Italy. There is however no significant difference in access to ECEC between children in native- and foreign-born households in the German-speaking countries, Spain or the United States.

While ECEC attendance has increased over the last decade in two-thirds of countries, it has risen for children in immigrant households in almost all countries, narrowing or even closing the gap with native-born households. In the EU (especially Spain) and Norway, the increase is over 2.5 times greater than ECEC attendance for children in native-born households. ECEC attendance has even dropped in the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Belgium and the United States, while growing in immigrant households.

The opportunity to attend ECEC depends on the provision of preschool services (lower outside Europe) and their cost (usually higher outside Europe). Gender norms in countries of origin may also restrict parents' use of ECEC – if mothers, for example, bear the full burden of child rearing, they participate less in the labour market. ECEC attendance in the EU is 3 percentage points lower in households where all members are non-EU born than among households where they are all EU-born. This under-representation in ECEC is particularly troublesome because children who attend preschool have higher PISA reading scores at 15 years old, even after accounting for socio-economic background. The benefit of preschool after that account is almost a year of schooling in the EU (37 points) for children of immigrants, who benefit much more from ECEC than their peers with native-born parents (15 points only). The benefit is greatest in Germany and Italy, at almost 1.5 school years, as well as in Austria and Portugal (1 year) – more than for children with native-born parents. Preschool generally yields less pronounced advantages for foreign- and native-born offspring in Australia, North America and the Netherlands (around 10 points for both).


### Main findings

- Although the vast majority of children in immigrant households attend ECEC in Europe, in most countries, their attendance rates are below those in native-born households.
- Although ECEC attendance has increased over the last decade in half of countries, it has risen in virtually all countries among children in immigrant households, closing a large part of the gap.
- The benefit of preschool in the EU is almost a year of schooling at 15 for children of immigrants, much more than for their peers with native-born parents (less than half a year). Preschool yields less pronounced advantages for either group in the Netherlands or outside Europe.



**Figure 7.7. Early childhood education attendance rates by parents' or guardians' place of birth**


2-5 year-olds, 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/rhmc60>

**Figure 7.8. How attendance rates in early childhood education have evolved**

2-5 year-olds, between 2010 and 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/3ragmh>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 7.5. Concentrations in schools of pupils with foreign-born parents

### Indicator context

High concentrations of pupils of foreign-born parentage in schools may adversely impact those pupils' learning progress if coupled with concentration of socio-economic disadvantage.

This section considers shares of pupils either foreign-born or with at least one foreign-born parent who attend the quartile of schools with the heaviest concentrations of such children.

Both EU- and OECD-wide, over half of 15-year-old pupils with at least one foreign-born parent go to the quartile of schools with the highest shares of pupils who also have one or more foreign-born parents. School concentrations of the children of the foreign-born are particularly high in countries where immigrant populations are small. In Türkiye and most Central European, Latin American and Asian OECD countries, at least 60% of the children of immigrants attend schools with the greatest concentrations of such children. This proportion exceeds 70% in Japan, Poland and Korea. Children of immigrants are much less concentrated in the same schools in countries with large shares of people with foreign-born parents, such as in the settlement countries or longstanding European destinations. Less than 40% of pupils of foreign-born parentage attend the most concentrated schools in Luxembourg, Ireland, Switzerland and New Zealand. However, concentrations remain above the OECD average in the United Kingdom, the United States and the Baltic countries.


Except in the Baltic countries (bar Estonia), Mexico and Israel, the share of pupils with at least one foreign-born parent increased OECD- and EU-wide between 2009 and 2018. In many countries, rises were almost twice as high in the most concentrated schools as in other schools. Overall, shares increased the most in the United Kingdom, Italy and the Nordic countries. Indeed, in 2018 there were higher concentrations than in 2009 of the children of the foreign-born in schools in most countries – though not in countries where populations of foreign-born parentage are more dispersed, as in Luxembourg and New Zealand. Concentrations have actually eased over the last decade in Greece and not significantly increased in the Netherlands, Switzerland or Canada. Among countries where shares of pupils with foreign-born parents have dropped, falls have been greatest in the most concentrated schools, which points to declines in concentrations of pupils with foreign-born parents.

### Main findings

- More than half of pupils with foreign-born parents in the OECD and the EU go to schools with the highest shares of children who are also of foreign-born parentage. Concentrations of such children in schools are actually higher in countries with small immigrant populations.
- Concentrations of pupils with foreign-born parents have increased over the last decade in most countries, especially in the United Kingdom, Italy and the Nordic countries.

**Figure 7.9. Concentrations of children of immigrants in schools**


15-year-old pupils with at least one foreign-born parent who attend schools in the quartile of schools with the highest shares of children of immigrants, 2018



StatLink <https://stat.link/syrz0k>

**Figure 7.10. How concentrations of children of immigrants in schools has evolved**

15-year-old pupils with at least one foreign-born parent, between 2009 and 2018



StatLink <https://stat.link/a89ous>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 7.6. Reading literacy

### Indicator context

The ability to read has broad implications for life chances.

Reading literacy scores in the language of the country of residence are drawn from OECD PISA tests of students at age 15. A 40 PISA score point gap is equivalent to roughly a year of school.

In virtually all European and Latin American countries, the native-born with foreign-born parents lag behind their peers of native-born parentage in literacy. EU-wide, the gap in reading scores reaches 34 points – almost a school year – and exceeds a year e.g. in all Nordic countries and longstanding European destinations (save the United Kingdom). In most non-European countries outside Latin America, by contrast, native-born children of immigrants outperform their peers with native-born parents. When it comes to foreign-born 15-year-olds, they lag behind both former groups virtually everywhere.

Over the last decade, the reading scores of native-born children of immigrants have improved in two-thirds of countries. EU-wide, they have improved by 8 points, whereas those of their peers of native-born parentage have been relatively stable in both the EU and the OECD. In the United States, New Zealand and Canada, for example, where native-born pupils with foreign-born parents have improved their reading scores by at least 13 points, they now outperform their peers of native-born parentage. In certain EU countries, by contrast, their scores fall more steeply than those of their peers with native-born parents – by over 35 points in Finland, the Netherlands and Greece.


Immigrant families' often less privileged socio-economic backgrounds impair their children's' literacy. Across the OECD, pupils considered most deprived by the PISA index of Economic, Social, and Cultural Status (ESCS, based on the pupil's family background) lag more than two years behind their privileged peers, irrespective of their parents' origin. Outside the EU, native-born pupils of foreign-born parentage and underprivileged ESCS score better in reading than socio-economic peers with native-born parents. At the EU-level and in the United Kingdom, their results are similar. While the native-born pupils of foreign-born parentage and privileged ESCS also perform better than their peers with native-born parents in non-European countries and Luxembourg, they do not in Europe, where the children of immigrants still lag behind. After controlling for ESCS, the reading gap between the native-born of foreign- and native-born parentage vanishes in Spain and the United Kingdom and, though still at 19 points (half a year of schooling), halves in the EU. Native-born pupils of foreign-born parentage who speak a foreign language at home particularly struggle in reading. Outside Europe, they lag half a year behind their peers who speak the host-country language at home. In the EU, they are up to one year behind.

### Main findings

- In Latin America and Europe, children of native-born parents outperform their native-born peers with immigrant parents in reading. The reverse is true in most other non-European countries.
- The native-born children of immigrants have improved their reading scores in both the OECD and the EU, while those of their peers with native-born parents have stayed relatively stable.
- After controlling for socio-economic status, the gap in reading performance between the native-born with native- and foreign-born parents halves in the EU, though it is still half a year – mainly because privileged pupils with foreign-born parents continue to lag behind their peers.

Figure 7.11. Mean PISA reading score


15-year-old pupils, 2018



StatLink <https://stat.link/6neurc>

Figure 7.12. How mean PISA reading scores have evolved

15-year-old pupils, between 2009 and 2018



StatLink <https://stat.link/1b2u9d>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 7.7. Pupils who lack basic reading skills at the age of 15

### Indicator context

Poor basic reading proficiency hinders young people with immigrant parents in their labour market integration and understanding of the host society.

Pupils who lack basic reading skills at 15 years old (i.e. low-school performers) score no higher than Level 1 (or 407 points) in PISA assessments of reading proficiency. The share of resilient students is the percentage of pupils the most deprived by the PISA index of ESCS (see Indicator 7.6), but whose reading scores are in the top quartile of pupils.

EU-wide, 29% of the native-born children of immigrant parentage lack basic reading skills at 15 – a higher share than among their peers of native-born parentage (18%), but far lower than among those who are foreign-born (38%). In the settlement countries and Türkiye, by contrast, the native-born with foreign-born parents are slightly less likely to perform poorly at school than 15-year-olds with native-born parents – the opposite of all Latin American and European countries (except for Hungary). In Mexico and one-third of European countries, the disparity is over 15 percentage points, especially in Nordic and longstanding immigration countries. OECD- and EU-wide, the share of native-born immigrant offspring who perform poorly at schools has dropped slightly (by about 1 percentage point) over the last decade, while it has risen among the native-born with native-born parents.

Pupils in the lowest ESCS quartile are more likely to lack basic reading skills at 15, although some achieve reading scores from the top quartile. That share of resilient students among the native-born with immigrant parents in the EU is 10%, slightly below those of native-born parentage. Underprivileged children of immigrants outperform their peers with native-born parents in non-European countries, the United Kingdom and France. However, they lag behind in other European countries, with differences of up to 10 percentage points in the Nordic countries, Estonia and Luxembourg. The share of resilient students among native-born children of immigrant has risen by around 4 percentage points in both the OECD and EU over the last decade.


In addition to children's ESCS, the children of immigrants often lag behind their peers with native-born parents because many of them study in schools that serve disadvantaged areas (approximated by the schools' ESCS, i.e. average ESCS of pupils in each school). In most countries, however, the gap in reading literacy between native-born pupils of foreign- and native-born parentage persists in schools regardless of ESCS. Most of the gap closes, however, in Italy, France, Costa Rica, Spain and the United Kingdom, after considering schools' ESCS.

### Main findings

- In the EU, 29% of native-born pupils with foreign-born parents lack basic reading skills, against 38% of their foreign-born peers and 18% of those with native-born parents. Native-born children of immigrants are also more likely to perform poorly in Latin America, but less likely to do so in other non-European countries.
- The share of top performers in reading among disadvantaged pupils is higher among the children of native-born than among their native-born peers with immigrant parents in most countries, although not in non-European countries, the United Kingdom and France.
- The gap in reading literacy between native-born pupils with foreign- and native-born parents remains in most countries after considering schools' socio-economic intake. However, the gap closes in Italy, France, Costa Rica, Spain and the United Kingdom.

Figure 7.13. Low reading performance


15-year-old pupils, 2018



StatLink <https://stat.link/w24dff>

Figure 7.14. How shares of low reading performance have evolved

15-year-old pupils, between 2009 and 2018



StatLink <https://stat.link/tosukl>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 7.8. Sense of belonging and well-being at school

### Indicator context

The lack of a welcoming school environment can harm well-being at school among pupils with foreign-born parents. Their chances of thriving in the education system, key to their integration, are thus affected.

Well-being at school is estimated as the share of pupils who feel awkward and out of place (i.e. not belonging) at school and the share of pupils/or who have been bullied – i.e. who report at least “a few times a month” that other pupils “left me out of things on purpose”; “made fun of me”; “threatened me”; “took away or destroyed things that belonged to me”; “hit or pushed me around”; or “spread nasty rumours about me”.

At 22%, native-born pupils with foreign-born parents across the OECD and EU are as likely as their peers with native-born parents to experience bullying at school. However, native-born children of immigrants report being bullied more frequently than do those of native-born parentage in over two-thirds of European countries, with shares in excess of 30% in most Central European and Baltic countries, as well as in Italy and Türkiye. By contrast, pupils with native-born parents are more likely to feel bullied e.g. in Oceanian OECD countries, the United States and the United Kingdom. In the vast majority of countries, immigrant pupils are more likely to report being bullied at school than the native-born, irrespective of parental origin. The incidence is 27% OECD- and EU-wide. In Portugal and Germany, rates are almost twice as high for immigrant children than for their native-born peers.

Shares of pupils who feel awkward and out of place at school bring out similar trends. The sense of not belonging at school is generally more widespread among the offspring of immigrants than of native-born in two-thirds of countries, especially in Türkiye, Mexico and Southern Europe. The reverse prevails in some of the settlement countries and parts of Central Europe in particular. Again, foreign-born pupils who arrived as children are even more likely than native-born children of foreign- and native-born parents to feel awkward and out of place at school in virtually all countries.

A school’s average ESCS makeup (see Indicator 7.7) influences pupils’ well-being. In schools that serve deprived areas, where the children of immigrants are overrepresented in Europe, being bullied at school tends to be widespread among pupils. However, those who are native-born with native-born parents are more likely to be affected in such schools in more than two-thirds of countries. Such bullying lessens in most countries, as ECSC rises. While in most countries children of immigrants are being less bullied in deprived schools than their peers with native-born parents, the reverse is the case in privileged schools e.g. in most European longstanding destinations with predominantly non-EU migrants, Italy, Costa Rica, Norway and the United States.


### Main findings

- Native-born pupils of foreign-born parentage report both a weaker sense of belonging and lower well-being at school than their peers with native-born parents in most European countries. The opposite is true in the settlement countries, however.
- Immigrant offspring are less prone to bullying than children of native-born parentage in schools serving underprivileged areas, but more so in socio-economically privileged establishments.



Figure 7.15. Pupils who experience bullying


15-year-old pupils, 2018



StatLink <https://stat.link/p0snqc>

Figure 7.16. Pupils who feel awkward and out of place at school

15-year-old pupils, 2018



StatLink <https://stat.link/uxjk1w>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 7.9. Perception of global and intercultural issues at school

### Indicator context

Acceptance of and respect for people from different cultural backgrounds foster social cohesion and the development of more inclusive societies.

This section considers the share of pupils who agree that immigrants should be treated as fully equal members of society. It also draws on pupils' self-reported respect for people from other cultural backgrounds, of their ability to overcome difficulties when interacting with them, and of the perceived discriminating attitudes of their teachers towards other cultural groups, defined as at least one of the following: having misconceptions, saying negative things, blaming, having lower expectations.

EU-wide, half of native-born pupils with native-born parents agree that immigrants should be treated as fully equal members of society. Accordingly, about 60% of children, regardless of parental origin, believe that they can overcome difficulties when interacting with people from different cultural groups in both the EU and the OECD. In all countries, at least 65% of pupils, regardless of parental origin, also report treating people from other cultures with respect. Among native-born pupils of native-born parentage, shares are smaller in many Central European countries, Italy, Austria and Türkiye. By contrast, these shares are highest in non-EU OECD countries, Ireland, Spain and Portugal. There is a high correlation between the views of children of native-born and those of children of immigrants in most countries, when it comes to treating people from other cultures with respect and overcoming difficulties when interacting with them. However, views are much less similar between children of native- and foreign-born when it comes to agreeing on the equal treatment of immigrants. Pupils with foreign-born parents are more likely to support that idea than those with native-born parents – by over 10 percentage points, both OECD and EU-wide.

Self-reported respect for people from other cultures, regardless of parental origin, is at least 8 percentage points more widespread among women than men in the EU and the OECD. Additionally, both EU- and OECD-wide, pupils with native-born parents rated as most affluent by the PISA ESCS (see Indicator 7.6) are around 10 percentage points more likely to report showing respect for people from other cultural backgrounds than their most socio-economically deprived counterparts. For pupils with foreign-born parents, the gap is slightly narrower, but still amounts to 6 percentage points.


EU- and OECD-wide, one-third of native-born children of immigrants think “most” of their teachers have some discriminating attitudes towards other cultural groups, against one-quarter of their peers with native-born parents. Shares among children of immigrants are highest – over two in five – in Türkiye, Greece and Lithuania, while they are lowest in non-European countries, Portugal, Hungary and the United Kingdom. Children of immigrants perceive the discriminating attitudes of their teachers stronger in schools with a larger share of foreign-born students. The attitude most often mentioned in this respect is that teachers have lower academic expectations for students of different cultural groups.


### Main findings

- There is a very high correlation between the views of children of native- and foreign-born parents in most countries. More than 60% of both groups in all countries think they treat people from other cultures with respect and overcome difficulties when interacting with them.
- EU- and OECD-wide, one-third of native-born children of immigrants think most of their teachers have some discriminating attitudes towards other cultural groups, in particular that they have lower academic expectations.

**Figure 7.17. Pupils who agree that immigrants should be treated as equal members of society**


15-year-old pupils, 2018




StatLink  <https://stat.link/285zak>

**Figure 7.18. Pupils who claim to treat people with respect regardless of their cultural background**

15-year-old pupils, 2018



StatLink  <https://stat.link/vyfslb>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 7.10. Young adults' educational attainment

### Indicator context

In contrast to foreign-born who arrived as adults, where educational attainment is a contextual indicator, the educational attainment levels of youth with foreign-born parents who arrived as children or are native-born show the success of the education system in providing children of immigrants with the levels of educational attainment needed to succeed in the labour market and society at large.

The International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) divides educational attainment into three levels: i) low, no higher than lower-secondary (ISCED Level 0-2); ii) medium, upper-secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary (ISCED Levels 3-4); iii) high, tertiary education (ISCED Levels 5-8). Youth is referred to here as persons aged 25 to 34.

EU-wide, native-born young adults of foreign-born parentage aged 25 to 34 are less likely than their peers of native-born parentage – at 32% versus 40% – to be highly educated, and more likely – at 21% versus 14% – to be low-educated. Overall, in countries characterised by poorly educated migrant populations, young native-born with foreign-born parents also tend to show lower educational attainment than their peers of native-born parentage. Gaps are widest in longstanding European destinations (bar France) and the Nordic countries. When it comes to young native-born of non-EU parentage in the EU, they are even larger. By contrast, the native-born with foreign-born parents are more likely to be highly educated than the offspring of the native-born in non-EU countries. Differences are widest in the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia, although not as pronounced as the differences between highly educated immigrant and native-born adults in those countries. In the United States, the offspring of native- and foreign-born parentage show similar educational attainment, while immigrant adults are less likely to have high levels of education than the native-born.

Over the last decade, the share of the highly educated among the youth has increased by around 8 points in the EU and OECD among immigrants who arrived as children, and by about 4 points among young native-born with foreign-born parents. The positive trend among young native-born people of foreign-born parentage has been particularly pronounced in Australia (+20 percentage points) and Denmark (27 points). The only countries which registered a decline in the share of highly educated among the native-born youth with foreign-born parentage were Canada and Finland.


Women, regardless of parental origin, are more likely than men to be highly educated in all countries. The only exception is the United Kingdom, where native-born women with foreign-born parents lag slightly behind their male peers. Overall, gender differences in education are less pronounced between men and women with foreign-born parents, especially in the Nordic and settlement countries.

### Main findings

- EU-wide, young native-born with foreign-born parents are less likely than those of native-born parentage to be highly educated – 32% versus 40%. The opposite is true in non-EU countries.
- The shares of both highly educated young native-born with foreign-born parents and immigrants who arrived as children increased over the last decade in all countries, bar Canada and Finland.
- Young women, regardless of parental origin, are more likely than men to be highly educated in all EU and OECD countries, but gender differences in education tend to be less pronounced between men and women with foreign-born parents.


**Figure 7.19. Low- and highly educated, by parental origin**

25-34 year-olds not in education, 2020



**Figure 7.20. How the rates of highly educated have evolved, by parental origin**

25-34 year-olds not in education, between 2012 and 2020



Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 7.11. Dropout

### Indicator context

Young people who leave school prematurely lack the credentials for successful labour market entry and are prone to long-term social and economic disadvantage.

The dropout rate is the share of early school leavers, i.e. young people aged 15 to 24 who are neither in education nor training, and have gone no further than lower-secondary school.

The dropout rate among native-born of foreign-born parentage is 11% in the EU, compared with 8% for their peers with native-born parents, making them more likely to leave school early in most EU countries. By contrast, they are as likely as their peers with native-born parents to drop out in e.g. the United States and the United Kingdom, and only around half as likely in the settlement countries. The widest differences in dropout rates between pupils of foreign- and native-born parentage come in German-speaking countries, Portugal, Italy, Denmark and Finland – at least 4 percentage points. In Japan, rates for children of immigrants aged 15 to 18 (8%) are five times those of their peers with native-born parents. Dropping out tends to be even more likely for immigrants arrived as children. Their dropout rate in the EU is 17%, 9 percentage points higher than among the native-born with native-born parents.

Dropout is more of a concern for pupils from poor socio-economic backgrounds, who are overrepresented in many European countries. Because they tend to be more disadvantaged, native-born youth of non-EU parentage are more likely to drop out than those with EU-born parents in all European countries, bar the Netherlands. Differences between the native-born of non-EU and native-born parentage are on average 4 percentage points. Leaving school at an early stage is also more common among young men than women, whatever their parentage. While gender gaps in dropout rates are similar among the native-born of foreign- and native-born parentage in the United States, rates in the EU are 6 percentage points higher among native-born boys of foreign-born parentage than girls, and 4 points higher among boys with native-born parents. Although there are no data on the reasons why the native-born of foreign-born parentage drop out, the 2016 EU Labour Force Survey included some information on early school-leaver immigrants arrived as children. EU-wide, 31% dropped out because studies failed to meet their needs or interests (especially in France), 19% because they wished to start working (especially in Spain), 13% reported doing so due to the difficulty of studies and 11% for family reasons. The cost of studying was not a significant reason. Immigrant youth were less likely than the native-born to report to have dropped out for health reasons or the level of difficulty, but more likely because the studies failed to meet their needs or interests.


There has been a decline of around 3 percentage points in native-born pupils leaving school early in the last eight years in the EU, whatever their parents' country of birth. Gaps between their dropout rates and those of their peers with native-born parents declined in half of EU and OECD countries where data are available, particularly France and Austria. By contrast, they widened in the United Kingdom.

### Main findings

- The dropout rate in the EU is 11% among native-born with foreign-born parents, higher than their peers of native-born parentage in most European countries and Japan, but not elsewhere.
- Dropout rates are higher among boys, even more so among the native-born of foreign-born parentage. Immigrants arrived as children who drop out in the EU do so chiefly out of lack of interest, and the desire to start working.
- Dropout rates have fallen over the last eight years in most countries.

Figure 7.21. Drop-out rates


15-24 year-olds, 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/103of5>

Figure 7.22. How the drop-out rates have evolved

15-24 year-olds, between 2012 and 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/vgmiyt>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 7.12. Not in employment, education or training

### Indicator context

The transition from school to work can be particularly challenging for young people with foreign-born parents, as they tend to have fewer social networks and poorer knowledge of the local labour market and must also fight discrimination. They are thus at greater risk of being neither in employment, formal education nor training (NEET), which can have long-term negative implications for their career trajectories.

This indicator shows the proportions of young adults who are NEET.

In both the OECD and the EU, around 17% of native-born young people with foreign-born parents are NEET. Native-born with foreign-born parents are more likely to find themselves NEET than their peers with native-born parents in most countries – by up to 10 percentage points in France and Belgium. In contrast, the NEET rates of the native-born with foreign- and native-born parents are similar e.g. in the United States and the United Kingdom, and slightly lower among immigrant offspring in the settlement countries. By contrast, with the exception of the Southern European countries and Hungary, the native-born youth with foreign-born parents are more likely than their peers of native-born parentage to find themselves NEET in all EU countries. Immigrants who arrived as children face similar issues as the native-born with foreign-born parents. The NEET rates of both groups are broadly similar in around two-thirds of countries with available data.

Despite the wholesale increase observed at the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic, NEET rates dropped by 3 percentage points among the native-born with foreign-born parents between 2012 and 2020, both OECD- and EU-wide. In the United States, they dropped similarly, while they increased over the same period, in Switzerland and Luxembourg.

Some population groups are more likely to be NEET than others. Young women are more at risk than young men in most countries, both EU- and OECD-wide. In all countries where overall NEET rates are higher among the young native-born of foreign-born parentage, both men and women are more likely to find themselves in a NEET situation than their peers with native-born parents. The low-educated are also cause for concern. In Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and many EU countries, NEET rates among low-educated youth are at least twice those of the highly educated, with the native-born of foreign-born parentage overrepresented among the poorly educated in Europe. However, even among the highly educated, the native-born of foreign-born parentage are more likely to find themselves in a NEET situation than their peers with native-born parents in all countries, bar Greece, Switzerland and Israel.


### Main findings

- Among native-born young people with foreign-born parents, one in six is NEET in both the OECD and the EU. Their NEET rates are higher than those of their peers of native-born parentage in most EU countries, though not everywhere outside the EU.
- NEET rates have dropped over the last decade, regardless of the parental origin.
- Young women and the poorest educated are more likely to be NEET. However, even the highly educated with foreign-born parents show higher NEET rates than those with native-born parents.



Figure 7.23. NEET rates


15-34 year-olds, 2020/21



StatLink <https://stat.link/ia5bre>

Figure 7.24. How NEET rates have evolved

15-34 year-olds, between 2012 and 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/ilo8aw>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 7.13. Intergenerational educational mobility

### Indicator context

Young people with foreign-born parents are often strongly motivated to attain higher education. Upward educational mobility allows them to catch up with their peers of native-born parentage and to thrive economically and socially later in life.

This indicator, which is only available for European countries and for young people with at least one foreign-born parent, considers the share of young people who exceed their parents' educational attainment, both medium-educated (ISCED Levels 3-4) and low-educated (ISCED Levels 0-2).

Across the EU, most native-born young people with at least one foreign-born parent (54%) exceed their parents' levels of educational attainment. The share of those who do is higher than among their peers of native-born parentage (47%) as well as among immigrants who arrived as children in the host country (44%). Native-born young people with at least one foreign-born parent outperform their peers of native-born parentage e.g. in the longstanding immigrant destinations (save Austria and Switzerland) where immigrant adults are strongly overrepresented among the low-educated, as well as in the Baltic countries. They outstrip the native-born young with native-born parents by the widest margins in Germany, with 23 percentage points, and Sweden with 17. In the Southern European countries, Croatia and the Czech Republic, by contrast, intergenerational education betterment is more common among the native-born with native-born parents than for their peers of mixed or foreign-born parentage.

Over the past eight years, intergenerational education mobility has increased in most countries, more strongly among the native-born of mixed or foreign-born parentage than among those whose parents are native-born. There was no progress for the native-born with at least one foreign-born parent, however, in most Central European countries, France Italy, Spain and Switzerland.


Several factors – such as the educational system, support structures, the educational aspirations of parents and their children, gender and age – affect the intergenerational transmission of disadvantages. In virtually all countries, women experience stronger intergenerational progress than men. This is even stronger for native-born female youth with foreign-born parentage who outperform – in terms of intergenerational progress – their peers with native-born parents, while this is not the case for men. Intergenerational betterment is partly driven by the overrepresentation of foreign-born parents in the lower educational strata. If only the educational progress of children with low-educated parents is considered, differences remain in most countries but disappear in France and Belgium.

### Main findings

- Native-born young people with at least one foreign-born parent are more likely to better their parents' educational attainment than the native-born offspring of native-born parents – 54% versus 47%.
- Young native-born women with foreign-born parentage outperform – in terms of intergenerational progress – their peers with native-born parents, while this is not the case for men.
- Over the past eight years, intergenerational mobility has increased in most countries among native-born young people with at least one foreign-born parent. There was no progress for native-born with at least one foreign-born parent, however, in most Central European countries, France Italy, Spain and Switzerland.

**Figure 7.25. Youth with higher educational attainment than their parents**


16-34 year-olds not in education with medium- or low-educated parents, 2019



StatLink <https://stat.link/cke0m5>

**Figure 7.26. How educational mobility has evolved**

16-34 year-olds not in education with medium- or low-educated parents, between 2011 and 2019



StatLink <https://stat.link/m7vkb5>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 7.14. Employment

### Indicator context

The youth employment rate is the share of 15-34 year-olds not in education who, during a given reference week, worked at least one hour, or who had a job but were absent from work (ILO definition). See Indicator 3.4 for further details.

Only slightly more than two-thirds of native-born youth with foreign-born parents are in employment – 68% in the OECD and 67% in the EU. Among the native-born of native-born parentage, the rate is at around three-quarters. As for immigrants who came as children, around 72% are in work in the OECD and EU. In most countries, the native-born of foreign-born parentage are less likely than their peers with native-born parents to be employed. Exceptions are the settlement countries, Greece, Cyprus, Slovenia and Hungary. Employment gaps between the native-born of native- and foreign-born parentage are at least 20 percentage points in European destinations with many non-EU immigrants, such as Belgium and Spain. As for immigrants who arrived as children, they have similar or slightly higher employment rates than the native-born with foreign-born parents in the vast majority of countries.

Despite a short overall fall in employment after the pandemic-related economic crisis in 2020 in both the OECD and EU, rates were higher than in 2012 after the 2007-08 Recession. Over the last eight years, except for Switzerland and Luxembourg and the settlement countries, the overall rise in employment benefitted the native-born with foreign-born parents at least twice as much as their peers with native-born parents in most EU countries with available data.


Lower employment rates among young people with foreign-born parents are partly due to their lower levels of education in most countries (see Indicator 3.1). However, being highly educated does not close the employment gap with the native-born of native-born parentage in the United States or France, and only partially in other European countries (bar Switzerland). Gaps between young, highly educated, foreign-born offspring and their peers with native-born parents are still narrower than between highly educated foreign- and native-born working-age adults in most countries – the opposite to what is observed among the low-educated. In the EU, employment rates are particularly low among native-born youth with parents born outside the EU, whereas those of EU parentage have similar outcomes to those of native-born parentage. In virtually all countries, young native-born men are more likely to be employed than young women. In e.g. Finland, Luxembourg, Norway and Israel, however, native-born men with foreign-born parents lag behind their female peers, while both genders' employment rates are similar in Spain, Canada, Switzerland and Sweden.

### Main findings

- In most countries, native-born young people of foreign-born parentage are less likely to be employed than their peers of native-born parentage and immigrants who arrived as children.
- Employment rates are higher than a decade ago in most countries, thereby closing the gap with those with native-born parentage.
- In most countries, employment rates of native-born youth with foreign-born parents are lower than those with native-born parentage, regardless of education level.

**Figure 7.27. Employment rates, by parental origin**


15-34 year-olds not in education, 2020/21



StatLink <https://stat.link/bqj26y>

**Figure 7.28. How employment rates have evolved, by parental origin**

15-34 year-olds not in education, between 2012 and 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/p7vm3h>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 7.15. Unemployment

### Indicator context

An unemployed person is one without, but available for, work and who has been seeking work during a given reference week (ILO definition). The unemployment rate is the share of unemployed in the labour force aged 15-34 and not in education (the sum of employed and unemployed individuals). See Indicator 3.5. for further details.

In most countries, unemployment rates for young native-born with foreign-born parents are higher not only than those of their peers with native-born parents but also than those of young foreign-born arrived as children. EU-wide, a full 17% of the native-born of foreign-born parentage are unemployed, against 10% of their peers with native-born parents and 12% for foreign-born arrived as children. Differences in unemployment rates between the two groups are widest in longstanding European destinations with large shares of non-EU migrants (especially France, Belgium and Austria), as well as in the Czech Republic, Spain, Italy and Finland. Among other countries, in France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United States, the native-born with foreign-born parents even lag behind immigrants who arrived as children.

Even though youth unemployment rates have risen in most countries in the early phase of the COVID-19 pandemic, they are nevertheless lower in most countries than at the beginning of the past decade. What is more, in the EU, the fall was steeper among the native-born with foreign-born parents than their peers with native-born parents. In the United States, by contrast, the unemployment rate of the native-born with native-born parents returned to the post 2007-08 economic downturn level, while remaining higher among the native-born with foreign-born parents. In Norway and Finland, unemployment rose in both groups.


Higher shares of young people of foreign-born parentage are in the 15-24 age group, who have less work experience and lower degrees. Therefore, in most countries, the unemployment rates of 15-24 year-olds are more than twice as high as those of their peers between 25 and 34. However, the native-born with foreign-born parents continue to be more likely to be unemployed than their peers of native-born parentage. This holds true at all levels of education, with higher rates of at least 3 percentage points in both the EU and the OECD. Among native-born youth with both foreign-born parents, those of non-EU origin are more likely to be jobless than their peers with at least one EU parent. Young men are also more prone to unemployment than young women in virtually all countries. While gender gaps in unemployment rates are usually small among the native-born with native-born parents, they are wider among those with foreign-born parents, especially in Latvia, Germany, Finland and Spain. The exceptions are Luxembourg and Switzerland, where native-born women with foreign-born parents are more likely to be unemployed than their male peers.

### Main findings

- The native-born with foreign-born parents are more likely to be unemployed than their peers with native-born parents in most countries, especially in longstanding European destinations. EU-wide, a full 17% of the native-born of foreign-born parentage are unemployed, against 10% of their peers with native-born parents and 12% for foreign-born youth.
- Young men are generally more likely to be unemployed than young women, and such gender gaps tend to be wider among native-born with foreign-born parents.
- Youth unemployment dropped between 2012 and 2020, despite the COVID-19 pandemic. The same is not, however, true of the native-born with foreign-born parents in the United States.

Figure 7.29. Unemployment rates, by parental origin


15-34 year-olds not in education, 2020/21



StatLink <https://stat.link/whxlfid>

Figure 7.30. How unemployment rates have evolved, by parental origin

15-34 year-olds not in education, between 2012 and 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/rdaq59>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 7.16. Overqualification

### Indicator context

Being overqualified on a first job after graduation can threaten long-term career prospects and waste potential. Young people with foreign-born parents often face specific obstacles in finding jobs at their skill level, due to discrimination, insufficient networks, and poor knowledge of the labour market.

Overqualification rate is the share of the highly educated (see 3.1) who work in a job rated low- or medium-skilled by the International Standard *Classification of Occupations* (ISCO Levels 4-9). See Indicator 3.12 for further details.

Almost a quarter of the highly educated native-born with foreign-born parents aged 25 to 34 are formally overqualified for the jobs they hold in the EU. In the United Kingdom and non-European countries where overqualification is more widespread overall, native-born youth of foreign-born parentage and childhood-arrival immigrants are less or as likely to be overqualified as their peers with native-born parents. By contrast, rates are higher among the young of foreign-born parentage in most other European destinations, except for the Netherlands and Sweden. In France and Austria, overqualification among the native-born with foreign-born parents is over 6 percentage points higher than among their peers with native-born parentage. In Germany, Belgium and Switzerland, childhood-arrival immigrants are the most overqualified, with rates at least 3 points higher than those of the native-born of native-born parentage.

Overqualification dropped between 2012 and 2020 in most countries, regardless of parental origin. The decline was steeper at 5 percentage points among native-born with foreign-born parents in the EU, while the native-born with native-born parentage saw only a marginal improvement. In particular, this group saw only little change in overqualification in the Netherlands or Germany in the last eight years, while overqualification declined by more than 10 percentage points among foreign-born offspring in these countries.

Finding a suitable job that matches the degree obtained is easier for the socio-economically advantaged with wider social networks, among whom the native-born children of foreign-born are underrepresented, particularly if those immigrants are of non-EU parentage. In France, 29% of young people of non-EU parentage are overqualified, 6 points more than those of EU parentage. The gender impact on overqualification varies by country. In Switzerland, Canada and the United States, overqualification is more of an issue among men, regardless of parental origin, but impinges more on women in Australia. In France and Belgium, only native-born young men with foreign-born parents are more likely to be overqualified than their female peers.


### Main findings

- The highly educated young native-born of foreign-born parentage are more likely to be overqualified than their peers with native-born parents in most longstanding European destinations, but not in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden or outside the EU.
- Overqualification has dropped over the last eight years among native-born youth with foreign-born parentage in most countries with available data, while the trend was more mixed for their peers with native-born parents.
- Overqualification is a much more acute issue for the native-born of non-EU parentage.



**Figure 7.31. Overqualification rates, by parental origin**


25-34 year-olds, highly educated people in employment, 2020.



StatLink <https://stat.link/wy0ihk>

**Figure 7.32. How overqualification rates have evolved, by parental origin**

25-34 year-olds, highly educated people in employment, between 2012 and 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/nsk4pm>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 7.17. Employment in the public service sector

### Indicator context

The full participation of immigrants and their children in the public sector increases their visibility in everyday life. It influences perceptions in society and acts as a role model for the private sector. Greater diversity in public sector staff can also help strengthen understanding for the needs of young people of foreign-born parentage and acknowledgement that they are part of society.

This indicator shows the share of public service employees (encompassing public administration, healthcare, the social services, and education) among the youth population (15-34) in employment.

Although they usually have host-country nationality, the native-born offspring of foreign-born parents are underrepresented in the public service sector in most countries. Just 1 in 6 is employed in the public service in the EU against 1 in 4 of their peers with native-born parents. And, proportionately, public employee immigrants who arrived as children outnumber those born in the country to foreign-born parents. The largest shortfalls vis-à-vis youth with native-born parents are in longstanding European destinations (bar the United Kingdom) where many foreign-born parents are non-EU born. In Austria, native-born with foreign-born parents are only half as likely to be employed in the public services as their peers of native-born parentage. Gaps are also large in Germany, where, just as in Austria, a still significant share of foreign-born offspring does not have the respective country's nationality and therefore may not be able to access all segments of the public sector.

There are only few differences by parental origin in non-European countries. The only countries where foreign-born offspring are overrepresented in the public services are Israel, the United Kingdom and Sweden, where at least one-third are employed in this sector. There is an even higher share in Sweden among native-born with non-EU born parents. The United Kingdom and Sweden have had equal opportunity policies in place in the public service for two decades, with also almost 40% of childhood-arrival immigrants in Sweden being public service employees.


In seven countries in ten, the share of native-born young adults of foreign-born parentage working in the public services has risen over the last eight years. The largest increases – at least 6 percentage points in the United Kingdom, Finland and Germany – were steeper than among their peers with native-born parents. Conversely, young adults of foreign-born parentage are for example less likely to work in the public service sector than eight years ago in Austria, the Netherlands and France. The fall is weaker among their peers of native-born parentage.

### Main findings

- The native-born of foreign-born parentage are underrepresented in the public services in most countries, especially in the EU. Only in Israel, the United Kingdom and Sweden are they not.
- In most countries, the share of native-born public service sector workers of foreign-born parentage rose in most countries between 2012 and 2020 – especially in the United Kingdom, Finland and Germany, though not in Austria, the Netherlands or France, where it dropped.

Figure 7.33. Shares working in the public service sector, by parental origin


15-34 year-olds in employment, 2020/21



StatLink <https://stat.link/qjie1b>

Figure 7.34. How shares of those working in the public service sector have evolved, by parental origin

15-34 year-olds in employment, between 2012 and 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/3g7q6n>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 7.18. Relative child and youth poverty

### Indicator context

Growing up below the relative poverty line can have adverse (long-term) impacts on children's well-being, education and health. Young people with migrant parents are at a higher risk, as their parents have lower income on average and might not always be aware of existing financial support.

The relative poverty rate (or at-risk-of-poverty rate) is the proportion of under-16s and 16-34 year-olds living below the country's poverty threshold. The Eurostat definition of the poverty threshold used here is 60% of the median equivalised disposable income in each country. See Indicator 4.2 for further details.

The overall share of children under 16 in immigrant households living in relative poverty is 32% in the EU. In virtually all countries, including Canada and the United States, immigrant offspring under 16 are more at risk of living in relative poverty than children in native-born households – at least twice as likely in about half of all countries. Disparities are particularly wide in Spain, most of the Nordic countries, and longstanding destinations with predominantly non-EU migrants (bar Germany, where the poverty rate is relatively low). In the United States and Spain, more than half of children in immigrant households are poor. It is in Latvia and the Czech Republic where relative child poverty levels are lowest and of similar levels in both groups. What is more, children living in non-EU immigrant households are 10 percentage points more likely to live in relative poverty than those in households of EU-born.

The relative poverty rates of young people reveal a similar overall picture. In the EU, the share of native-born 16-34 year-olds with foreign-born parents living in relative poverty is 24% and 30% in the United States, more than among their peers with native-born parents. However, these poverty differences are less pronounced than those among the under-16s – half of the size, or even less, in half of countries – and very narrow, at 3 percentage points, in Switzerland and Sweden.


Between 2009 and 2019, the share of children under 16 in immigrant households living in relative poverty fell slightly in the EU and in the United States, by 1 and 2 percentage points, respectively. The decline among their peers in native-born households was even less. Poverty rates among children in immigrant households dropped in three out of five countries (and in three out of four countries in native-born households). Falls in child poverty rates in immigrant households were steepest in Germany, at 24 points, Greece, Iceland and Finland (around 20 points). In these countries, rates barely dropped or slightly increased, however, among their peers in native-born households. By contrast, countries that saw the steepest climbs in the poverty rates of children in immigrant households simultaneously recorded slight drops in native-born households. These countries (e.g. Netherlands, Sweden and Spain) now report the widest gaps in relative child poverty between the foreign- and native-born.

### Main findings

- Poverty rates of children living in immigrant households in EU and OECD countries are higher than among their peers in native-born households – at least twice as high in half of all countries.
- Over the last decade, child poverty rates in immigrant households declined in slightly in three out of five countries (and in three-quarters of countries in native-born households).
- Native-born 16-34 year-olds with foreign-born parents are also more likely to be poor than their peers of native-born parentage, though these poverty gaps are less pronounced than those that affect under-16s in most countries – half of the size, or even less, in half of countries.

**Figure 7.35. Relative child poverty rates**


Children under 16, 2019



StatLink <https://stat.link/dkvhcu>

**Figure 7.36. How relative child poverty rates have evolved**

Children under 16, between 2009 and 2019



StatLink <https://stat.link/tj8gne>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 7.19. Overcrowded housing

### Indicator context

Growing up in overcrowded accommodation may impact children's and young people's school performance, well-being and health, and can cause lifelong harm. As immigrants are more likely to reside in urban areas, work in low-paid jobs and, on average, live in larger households, their children are at a higher risk of living in overcrowded housing.

A dwelling is considered to be overcrowded if the number of rooms is less than the sum of one living room for the household, plus one room for each single person or the couple responsible for the dwelling, plus one room for every two additional adults, plus one room for every two children. See Indicator 4.5 for further details.

More than one-third of children under 16 in immigrant households live in overcrowded accommodation in the EU, compared to one-fifth of their peers in native-born households. Overcrowding rates are much higher for children in immigrant than in native-born households in all countries with the exception of Malta. In the vast majority of countries, rates are at least twice as high as for children in native-born households. A closer look reveals that disparities in overcrowding in the EU are partly driven by children whose parents were born outside the EU. Such children tend to be overrepresented among those living in poverty (see Indicator 7.18). The high overcrowding rates are partly driven by the overconcentration of immigrants in urban areas, where the incidence of overcrowding is more pronounced.

A similar pattern emerges among the young (16-34 year-olds) who live in overcrowded conditions. However, the overcrowding gap between native-born young people with immigrant- and native-born parentage is narrower than for children in almost every country. The reason can be ascribed in part to the fact that, on graduating, young people are more likely to move into their own households, where they are no longer compelled to share the same living conditions as their parents. Indeed, if only young adults aged 25 to 34 are considered, differences in the incidence of overcrowding between native-born young people of foreign- and native-born parentage fade almost completely in the EU.


People living in overcrowded dwellings have no room where they can be alone and concentrate. The vast majority of 15-year-old pupils OECD- and EU-wide state that they have a quiet place to study. But, in three countries in four, the native-born with foreign-born parents are less likely than their peers of native-born parentage to have such a space. The largest gaps between the two groups are observed in Iceland and among countries in Europe and America with higher shares of pupils of foreign-born parentage from disadvantaged backgrounds: in the Southern European countries, France, Germany, Costa Rica, Mexico and the United States, for example.

### Main findings

- More than one-third of children in immigrant households live in overcrowded accommodation in the EU, against one-fifth in native-born households.
- Native-born pupils with foreign-born parents are less likely than their peers with native-born parents to have a quiet place to study at home in most countries, especially in Iceland, the Southern European countries, France, Germany, Costa Rica, Mexico and the United States.

**Figure 7.37. Child housing overcrowding rates**


Children under 16, 2019



StatLink <https://stat.link/fzsr15>

**Figure 7.38. Young people with a quiet place to study**

15-year-old pupils, 2018



StatLink  <https://stat.link/648uyp>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 7.20. Voter participation

### Indicator context

Voter turnout is an indicator of civic engagement. Although the native-born of foreign- and native-born parentage grow up in the same society, the obstacles faced by foreign-born parents (e.g. little awareness of voting rights or host-country politics) may indirectly impinge on their children.

This indicator refers to the share of 18-34 year-olds with the nationality of the country of residence who report that they cast a ballot in the most recent national parliamentary election in the country.

EU-wide, the self-reported turnout of native-born youth with two foreign-born parents is 58% – lower than their peers of native-born parentage (66%). Differences between the two groups are widest in European destinations with high shares of non-EU migrant parents. Turnout among the native-born with one foreign-born parent is also lower, at 65%. In the United States and Canada, there is only little difference in turnout between native-born with native- and foreign-born parents. Whereas the latter are even slightly more likely to vote than their peers of native-born parentage in the United Kingdom and Israel. The lowest turnout among young voters with foreign-born parents was in France, Switzerland and Slovenia, where gaps with their peers of native-born parentage were wide. Indeed, in Switzerland and Slovenia, native-born offspring voters were almost twice as likely as their peers of foreign-born parentage to vote in the last national election. Across the EU, foreign-born young people who arrived before the age of 15 report slightly higher participation (61%) than the native-born of foreign-born parentage, although they continue to lag behind voters of native-born parentage by 6 percentage points. Of all groups, the naturalised foreign-born youth who arrived after the age of 15 remain least likely, at 45%, to cast their vote at the ballot box.

Between 2002-10 and 2012-20, self-reported voter participation in the EU declined slightly among the young of foreign- and native-born parentage and those who arrived before 15. While gaps between voters of foreign- and native-born parentage widened particularly in Sweden (by 15 percentage points), Slovenia and Switzerland, they narrowed in Estonia and the United States. In New Zealand, the United Kingdom and Israel, differences also decreased thanks to higher self-reported turnout among youth of native-born parentage (bar New Zealand).

While there is no gender difference in voter turnout between the young of native-born parentage and the foreign-born who arrived before they were 15, young women with one or two foreign-born parents are less likely by 3 to 4 percentage points to participate in national elections than their male peers in the EU. What is more, while the young born in the EU who arrived before they were 15 are more likely to cast a vote than their non-EU migrant counterparts (66% versus 59% EU-wide), non-EU migrants arrived after the age of 15 are more likely to vote (49%) than their EU-born counterparts (32%).


### Main findings

- In the EU, electoral turnout is higher among young people of native-born parentage (66%) than their peers with two foreign-born parents (58%). The same is true, albeit to a lesser extent, in Northern America, though not in the United Kingdom and Israel.
- Between 2002 and 2020, gaps between young people of foreign- and native-born parentage have widened significantly in Sweden, Slovenia and Switzerland (by 10 to 15 percentage points), while vanishing almost entirely in Estonia.
- Young women with one or both foreign-born parent(s) are less likely to vote than their male peers.



**Figure 7.39. Self-reported participation in most recent election, by parental origin**


18-34 year-old with the nationality of the country of residence, 2012-20



StatLink <https://stat.link/tlksb6>

**Figure 7.40. How self-reported participation in the most recent election has evolved, by parental origin**

18-34 year-old with the nationality of the country of residence, between 2002-10 and 2012-20



StatLink <https://stat.link/a1t4mk>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 7.21. Perceived discrimination

### Indicator context

Discrimination is a key factor behind the persistent disadvantages faced by young people of foreign-born parentage and is a threat to social cohesion.

This indicator refers in Europe to the share of people with foreign-born parents who consider themselves members of a group that is discriminated against on the grounds of ethnicity, nationality or race. In New Zealand, the indicator builds on personal experience; since the beginning of COVID-19 in Canada. In the United States it draws on reported discrimination in the workplace.

Across the EU, more than one in five native-born young people of foreign-born parentage feel as a member of a group that is discriminated against on the grounds of ethnicity, nationality, or race. In Canada and New Zealand, around one in four report to have experienced discrimination on grounds of ethnicity, culture, race, or colour (since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in Canada). Around one native-born of foreign-born parents in thirteen experience discrimination in the workplace in the United States. While over 30% report instances of discrimination in the Netherlands and France, less than 10% do so in Slovenia and Ireland. Except in Israel, Austria and the United States, perceived discrimination is more widespread among the native-born with foreign-born parents than among the foreign-born adults – possibly due to better knowledge of individual rights and greater awareness of discriminatory practices.

Comparisons between the periods 2010-14 and 2016-20 across European countries show a considerable increase, of 5 percentage points, in perceived discrimination. This increase is entirely driven by young native-born with foreign-born parents from non-EU countries, whereas their peers with EU-born parents perceive a decline. In addition, reports of discrimination have almost doubled among non-native speakers who are native-born with foreign-born parents, while not changing among those who are native speakers. A rise in perceived discrimination was also observed among groups at risk of intersectional discrimination, such as women or low-educated young native-born with foreign-born parents.


While young women with foreign-born parents were slightly more likely to report discrimination than their male peers in the EU in 2010-14, this drastically changed in 2016-20. By then, they were 11 percentage points more likely than their male peers. In the EU, there is an even greater disparity in the evolution of perceptions of discrimination between native-born of non-EU and EU-born parents, with the former being three times more likely to feel discriminated (while 50% more likely in 2010-14). Furthermore, around 30% of native-born with foreign-born parents whose first language at home is a foreign language say they belong to a group that is discriminated against – twice the share in 2010-14. When the first language at home is that of the country of residence, only 20% do. Perceptions of discrimination are also more common among the native-born with foreign-born parents who are neither in education nor in training (NEET). The highly educated and citizens of the country of residence are also more likely to report discrimination.

### Main findings

- In the EU, more than one in five native-born young people with foreign-born parents feel part of a group that is discriminated against on the grounds of ethnicity, nationality and race.
- Except for Israel, Austria and the United States, native-born young people of foreign-born parentage are more likely to feel discriminated against than foreign-born adults.
- Perceived discrimination increased between the periods 2010-14 and 2016-20 – driven by increased levels among women, people born to non-EU-born parents and those raised in a foreign language.

**Figure 7.41. Self-reported discrimination, by parental origin**


15-34 year-olds, 2012-20



StatLink <https://stat.link/e8ul70>

**Figure 7.42. Self-reported discrimination of native-born youth with foreign-born parents who say they belong to a discriminated group**

15-34 year-olds, 2016-20



StatLink <https://stat.link/52681f>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.



# 8

## Third-country nationals in the European Union and European OECD countries

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This chapter considers the full set of “Zaragoza indicators” for third-country nationals (TCN) in the European Union and other European OECD countries, along with additional pertinent indicators. It compares their outcomes with those of nationals of the country of residence and other EU nationals. The chapter looks first at their size and composition (8.1) as well as duration of stay and origin (8.2). It then analyses outcomes in employment and activity (8.3), unemployment (8.4), self-employment (8.5), overqualification (8.6), educational attainment (8.7), income (8.8), poverty (8.9), housing tenure (8.10), health (8.11), long-term resident status (8.12), participation in voting (8.13), the acquisition of nationality (8.14), and perceived discrimination (8.15).

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# In Brief

- In the European Union (EU), rights and regulations of foreigners differ by nationality. While those with a foreign EU nationality enjoy equal access to the labour market and social support as nationals, nationals of a non-EU country do not. Assessing integration outcomes in Europe thus benefits from a distinction between EU and non-EU foreign nationality. Foreigners are not identical to the foreign-born, as individuals can naturalise. Also, in some countries, individuals born to foreigners are not automatically nationals even if born in the country.

## EU mobile citizens and non-EU foreigners are two distinct and growing groups

- In 2020, the EU was home to 36 million foreign nationals. Close to two-thirds of these foreigners were third-country nationals (TCNs). TCNs thus represented 5% of the total EU population – close to 23 million individuals. The remaining third of foreigners were EU mobile citizens, accounting for about 3% of the total EU population – about 13.4 million people.
- In almost every EU country, shares of both groups increased over the last decade. Particularly the TCN population with the nationality of an Asian country has doubled in size EU-wide, mainly due to a surge in humanitarian migration from this region. However, the most important origin region of TCNs of working age remains Europe outside of the EU, at 35%.
- TCNs tend to be younger than nationals on average. The bulk of TCNs are between 25 and 54 years old. Many non-EU foreigners arrive in the EU at prime working age, and likelihood of obtaining nationality increases with time. Nevertheless, EU-wide, half of TCNs have lived in their host country for 10 years or longer. Shares are even higher in Spain, Italy and Greece.

## Non-EU nationals have worse labour market outcomes than nationals and EU mobile citizens, a finding only partly linked to education

- In the EU, 56% of TCNs have a job, compared with 68% of nationals and 70% of EU mobile citizens. Labour market outcomes of TCNs increase with duration of residence. Fewer than half of recently arrived TCNs have jobs, against 61% of those who have been in the country for at least 10 years. Less than 50% of female TCNs have jobs in half of EU countries, especially in longstanding destinations (e.g. Belgium) and most Nordic and Southern European countries.
- Most non-EU nationals who settled in the EU over the last decade have much higher education levels than previous cohorts. Still, almost half of TCNs, EU-wide, are low educated, against only one-fifth among their national peers. In turn, only 23% of TCNs EU-wide are tertiary educated, while 32% of nationals are.
- In one-third of countries (especially in Southern Europe and the Czech Republic), low-educated TCNs have higher employment rates than their national peers.
- Only 68% of tertiary educated TCNs in the EU are employed, against 87% of their national peers. Differences between nationals and TCNs are wider among the highly than the low-educated in virtually all countries, especially Austria and Switzerland.
- Around two in five tertiary educated TCNs are overqualified for their job, compared with roughly only one in five nationals. In Italy and Portugal, tertiary educated TCNs are around 4 times as likely as nationals to be overqualified. While overqualification rates are lower among TCNs with host-country degrees, TCNs continue to fare worse than nationals in virtually all countries. EU-wide, TCN women experience a particularly high overqualification rate of 44%.

## Alongside worse labour market outcomes, third country nationals face more difficult living conditions than EU mobile citizens and nationals across the EU

- EU-wide, two TCNs in five live in relative poverty. They are more than 1.5 times as likely to be poor as EU mobile citizens and 2.5 times as likely as nationals. Poverty rates have increased among TCNs and EU mobile citizens in around half of all countries, while remaining stable among nationals in most countries.
- Almost one in four TCNs belong to the lowest household income decile, rising to one in three in countries such as Austria, Belgium and France. Overall, gaps in median income between non-EU and national households widened over the last decade.
- Given their weaker economic position, only 24% of third-country nationals own their homes, compared with 73% of nationals. Surprisingly, TCNs are also underrepresented in accommodation rented at a reduced rate.

## In part due to national legislation, political participation and take up of nationality differs strongly by country for both EU-born and non-EU migrants, though a larger share of people born outside the EU acquire citizenship

- Non-EU migrants are more likely to acquire host-country citizenship than those born in another EU country. Across the EU, 57% of non-EU migrants with 10 years of residence have host-country citizenship, against 44% of EU-born. Exceptions are some Central and Eastern European countries, where the immigrant populations have been shaped by national minorities.
- In virtually all countries, highly educated non-EU migrants are more likely to naturalise. In part, this relates to host-country language skills and economic self-sufficiency requirements.
- Voter turnout in the most recent election among nationals born in a third country is lower than among their native-born peers in most EU countries. However, they were more likely to vote in national elections in 2010-18 than in the previous decade, while native-born were slightly less likely to do so.

## Self-reported discrimination is more widespread among non-EU foreigners than EU mobile citizens

- EU-wide, 20% of TCNs feel that they belong to a group that is discriminated against on the grounds of ethnicity, nationality, or race. That share is only 10% among EU mobile citizens. While the share among non-EU foreigners decreased between 2002-08 and 2012-18, it remains high, especially in Belgium (34%) and France (29%).
- The incidence is higher among male and low-educated TCNs. Perceived discrimination is largest among TCNs from Sub-Saharan Africa (30%) and North Africa (31%).

## 8.1. Size and composition by age and gender

### Indicator context

A third-country national (TCN) in this chapter is a foreign citizen who resides in an EU country and has the nationality of a non-EU-27 country.

In 2020, almost two-thirds (23 million) of the 36 million foreign nationals living in EU countries – 5.1% of the total EU population of all ages – were third-country nationals (TCNs), also termed non-EU nationals. More than one-quarter of all TCNs in EU countries reside in Germany and over 15% in Spain, France and Italy. TCNs account for a comparatively high proportion of the population (over 7%) in longstanding European immigrant destinations, such as Luxembourg and Austria, as well as in most of the Southern European countries. However, the largest share resides in Latvia and Estonia, where many Soviet nationals did not obtain host-country citizenship in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union. At the other end of the spectrum lie the Central European countries where, except for Slovenia and the Czech Republic, less than 2% of residents are of non-EU nationality. In most other EU countries, though, TCNs actually outnumber nationals from other EU countries. There are, however, exceptions: Belgium hosts twice as many EU mobile citizens as TCNs, the Slovak Republic three times more, and Luxembourg five times.

As for age, 77% of TCNs EU-wide are of working age (15 to 64 years old), compared to 63% for nationals. The gap is even wider when only TCNs in the primary working age bracket (25-54 years old) are considered. Indeed, they account for the bulk of the TCN population. As many non-EU nationals arrive in the EU at prime working age, and as the chances of obtaining host-country nationality increase with time, they are on average much younger people. While 1 in 5 nationals is over 64, only 1 in 14 TCNs is. Notable exceptions are Latvia and Estonia, where non-EU citizens are older than the national population, with more than one-third aged 65 and over. In most countries, the offspring of TCNs cannot apply for host-country nationality until they are 12, and in some countries until they are 18. Therefore, among children, non-EU nationals are overrepresented before the age of 10 years only.

In almost every EU country, shares of both TCNs and EU mobile citizens have increased over the last decade. While in most Southern and Central European countries, the rise in the share of TCNs was below 1 percentage point, it exceeded 1.5 points in countries with large non-EU populations, such as Germany and France. Even steeper increases were observed in Sweden, Ireland and Luxembourg, where the number of non-EU nationals almost doubled. In Latvia and Estonia, by contrast, the non-EU population declined, due mainly to natural deaths. United Kingdom citizens are TCNs in 2020 but EU mobile citizens in 2010. This impacts the time comparison, but only slightly as the UK citizens are a small share of TCNs EU-wide (3.5%), and only significantly in Ireland, which as a result was excluded from all time comparisons.


### Main findings

- The EU was home to 23 million TCNs in 2020. They account for higher proportions of the population in longstanding and Southern European destinations and lower proportions in most Central and Eastern European countries.
- TCNs are overrepresented in the working-age population and tend to be of younger average age than nationals.
- The share of non-EU27 nationals increased slightly over the decade to 2020 in almost every EU country. In that year, they made up 5% of the EU population in 2020, compared to 4% in 2010.



Figure 8.1. Proportion of third-country nationals


All ages, 2010 and 2020



StatLink  <https://stat.link/45cynb>

Figure 8.2. Age distribution in the EU, by citizenship

All ages, 2020



StatLink  <https://stat.link/4ybo98>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 8.2. Duration of stay and regions of nationality

### Indicator context

Duration of stay denotes the length of time that a TCN has spent in a country since his or her arrival. Region of nationality refers to five broad regions, namely Asia, Africa, Europe (including Türkiye), Latin America and the Caribbean, and Canada/United States/Oceania.

In the EU, 35% of TCNs of working age are nationals of non-EU European countries. Next comes Asia, which accounts for the slightly lower share of 30%. Around one in five TCNs is the national of an African country, and one in six of a country in the remaining regions of origin. In Central and Eastern European countries (except Romania), most TCNs are nationals of non-EU European countries. The same holds true of Germany, Austria and Luxembourg, where many TCNs are Turks or nationals of former Yugoslavia. By contrast, TCNs are predominantly Asian nationals in the Nordic countries, which are home to comparatively high proportions of humanitarian migrants. In other European countries, post-colonial ties shape the make-up of TCN populations. For instance, nationals of African countries form the largest group of TCNs in Belgium and France, while in Spain and Portugal Latin American nationals do.

When it comes to gender, African TCNs in the EU are mostly men (60%), as are Asian nationals (55%). A likely reason is that men form the bulk of labour and humanitarian migrants who, in turn, form the bulk of TCNs from these regions. Women, by contrast, are overrepresented among TCNs with Latin American nationalities. Over the last decade, the number of TCNs with the nationality of a country in Asia has doubled EU-wide, mainly due to the surge in the intake of humanitarian migrants from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. Albeit to a lesser extent, the number of African nationals has also increased, while the size of TCN populations from other regions has remained stable. EU-wide, more than one in two TCNs has lived in their host country for 10 years or longer. Shares are even higher in some individual countries, e.g. Spain, Italy and Greece. As for the Slovak Republic, Sweden and Portugal, most TCNs have been residents less than five years.

As the native-born offspring of TCN parents tend to acquire the citizenship of their country of birth in most countries under certain conditions (e.g. age, status of their parents), native-born account for less than 2% of TCNs in most EU countries. In Germany and the Netherlands, however, the native-born comprised over 11% of the non-EU population in 2020. That share is falling in Germany, which now grants nationality to children whose parents are permanent foreign residents and who were born in the country since 2000. Shares of native-born offspring of TCNs in Latvia and Estonia are even higher, as many were not naturalised after independence.

### Main findings

- In the EU, 35% of TCNs of working age are nationals of a European country outside the EU.
- Over the last decade, the TCN population with the nationality of an Asian country has doubled in size EU-wide, mainly due to a surge in humanitarian migration from the Asian region.
- More than half of TCNs in the EU have lived in their host country for 10 years or longer. Shares are even higher in Spain, Italy and Greece.

Figure 8.3. Third-country nationals by region of citizenship and country of destination

15-64 year-olds, 2020





Figure 8.4. Third-country nationals by duration of stay

15-64 year-olds (Total = 100), 2020



Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

### 8.3. Educational attainment

#### Indicator context

The International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) divides educational attainment into three levels: i) low, no higher than lower-secondary (ISCED levels 0-2); ii) medium, upper-secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary (ISCED Levels 3-4); iii) high, tertiary education (ISCED Levels 5-8). See Indicator 3.1 for further details.

Across the EU, TCNs show much lower educational attainment than nationals: almost half of TCNs are low-educated, against one-fifth of their national peers. What is more, one non-EU national in five went no further than primary school, five times the share among nationals. More than 39% of TCNs have low levels of education in countries of longstanding immigration, recent Southern European destinations, and in Sweden and Denmark. By contrast, over 57% of non-EU nationals are highly educated in Ireland, Poland and Luxembourg – twice the share of their national peers. They also fare better than nationals in terms of education in most Central and Eastern European countries, which began only recently to take in TCNs. As for EU mobile citizens, they are more likely to be both poorly and highly educated than nationals in most countries. In Southern European countries, Germany and France, for example, their levels of educational attainment are lower than among nationals.

Most non-EU nationals who have settled in the EU over the last decade are educated to higher levels than previous cohorts. As for nationals, their level of educational attainment has also improved in all EU countries. The share of highly educated TCNs has not grown in destinations with significant intakes of low-educated labour migrants like Italy and Greece, or of low-educated humanitarian migrants like Finland or Sweden. In Sweden, the share of highly educated nationals was below that of TCNs in 2010, but exceeded it in 2020.

The share of poorly educated non-EU nationals fell EU-wide by 5 percentage points. The drop, however, was smaller than among nationals in most countries. The same trend was observed among people educated to very low levels (no further than primary education), with shares declining among TCNs in most countries, albeit to a lesser extent than among nationals. Between 2010 and 2020, the greatest drops (of 8 percentage points or more) in shares of very low-educated non-EU nationals came in Portugal, France and Spain. By contrast, shares of very low-educated TCNs climbed in the Nordic countries (bar Finland), Germany and the Netherlands.

#### Main findings

- Educational attainment among TCNs has improved virtually everywhere.
- Almost half of TCNs EU-wide are low-educated, a share that is over twice as high as among their national peers. The difference is particularly pronounced in Sweden, longstanding destinations, and Southern Europe.
- In the longstanding immigration countries with large numbers of non-EU migrants, around one fourth of TCNs are very low-educated, a share at least four times more than among their national peers.

Figure 8.5. Low- and highly educated, by citizenship

15-64 year-olds, 2020





Figure 8.6. How shares of the highly educated have evolved, by citizenship

15-64 year-olds, between 2010 (EU28/non-EU28 nationals) and 2020 (EU27/non-EU27 nationals)



Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 8.4. Employment and labour market participation

### Indicator context

The employment rate is the share of 15-64 year-olds who, during the reference week, worked at least one hour, or who had a job but were absent from work (ILO definition). The participation/activity rate is the share of that population which is active (employed and unemployed). See Indicator 3.4 for further details.

EU-wide, 56% of working-age TCNs are in employment, against 68% of nationals. Gaps are widest in longstanding immigration countries (e.g. Belgium) and in Nordic countries with large recent intakes of humanitarian migrants (e.g. Sweden). If TCNs educated to the same level as nationals had the same employment rate, overall rates would rise by at least 0.8 percentage point in 9 countries and by over 1 point in Spain, Austria, Latvia and Germany. At 6 percentage points, the labour market participation gap between nationals and non-EU nationals is narrower than the employment gap. As for EU mobile citizens, 70% work and 77% participate in the labour market EU-wide. They lag behind nationals in less than two countries in five in terms of employment and in 1 out of 12 in terms of participation.

In the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic in the EU, TCNs experienced a sharper decline in their employment rates than nationals. Notwithstanding this, the EU-wide employment rate increased among both TCNs and nationals between 2010 and 2020. In most countries, the increases were highest among TCNs, especially in the Baltic countries and in Central Europe. By contrast, TCN employment rates dropped in Southern European countries and Austria, while their labour participation rates also fell in one-third of countries, especially in Southern Europe, where the impact was particularly large. With regard to gender, TCN employment and participation rates are particularly low among women. Less than 50% of female TCNs have jobs in half of EU countries, especially in longstanding destinations and most Nordic and Southern European countries.

Although TCN men participate in the EU-wide labour market at the same rate as their national peers, their employment rate is 7 percentage points lower, partly due to lower levels of education (see Indicator 8.3). However, except for the Netherlands, the greatest employment gaps are observed at tertiary level, where employment among highly educated TCNs lags behind those of their national peers in all EU countries. In one-third of countries (especially in Southern Europe and the Czech Republic), low-educated TCNs are more widely employed than their national peers. Employment levels increase with duration of residence. Fewer than half of recently arrived TCNs have jobs –14 percentage points less than their settled peers EU-wide, and over 25 points less in Sweden and Italy. However, settled TCNs still lag behind nationals, with exceptions such as Greece, Italy and Luxembourg. Employment among settled TCNs is 8 percentage points lower than for nationals in the EU, with gaps of over 19 percentage points in the Netherlands and Belgium.

### Main findings

- In the EU, 56% of TCNs have a job, compared with 68% of nationals.
- Less than 50% of female TCNs have jobs in half of EU countries, especially in longstanding destinations (e.g. Belgium) and most Nordic and Southern European countries.
- EU-wide, the employment rate among highly educated TCNs is lower than among their national peers. The gap is wider than between low-educated TCNs and nationals, except in the Netherlands.

Figure 8.7. Employment and participation rates, by citizenship

15-64 year-olds, 2020





Figure 8.8. Employment rates of third-country nationals, by level of education

15-64 year-olds not in education, difference with nationals, 2020



Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 8.5. Unemployment

### Indicator context

An unemployed person is one without, but available for, work and who has been seeking work during the reference week (ILO definition). The unemployment rate is the percentage of unemployed in the labour force (the sum of employed and unemployed individuals). See Indicator 3.5 for further details.

Almost 17% of TCNs are unemployed in the EU, against only 7% of nationals and 10% of EU mobile citizens. Over one unemployed person in ten EU-wide is a non-EU national, over one in five in Austria and Germany, and almost one in four in Sweden. In longstanding destinations with many non-EU migrants, as well as in Nordic countries, TCN unemployment rates are over twice those of nationals. In Sweden, which has many humanitarian migrants among its TCNs, one-third of TCNs are unemployed, five times more than among their national peers. Differences in unemployment rates between EU mobile citizens and their national peers are narrower – less than 5 percentage points – in most countries.

Although unemployment rose in most of the European Union with the onset of COVID-19, it was still lower in 2020 than in 2010 in two-thirds of countries. Non-EU nationals, who suffered disproportionately from the 2008-09 economic downturn, have recovered better than other groups. Nevertheless, TCNs are still significantly more likely to be jobless than a decade ago in Greece, Sweden, Luxembourg and Austria.

TCN men recovered more strongly from the 2008-09 economic crisis. While the EU-wide TCN unemployment rate was higher among men than women in 2010, TCN men fared better than their female peers in 2020. By comparison, male and female unemployment rates are similar among nationals. TCN unemployment gender gaps of 11 percentage points and more are to be found in Greece (where even among nationals the gender gap is wide), Sweden, Luxembourg and Slovenia. By contrast, gender disparities among TCNs are much smaller or absent in longstanding destinations.

While the unemployment rate is higher among poorly educated nationals in all EU countries, the same is not always true of TCNs. EU-wide, unemployment among low-educated TCNs is 5 percentage points greater among those with tertiary degrees. However, in Greece, the Netherlands and Slovenia, low-educated TCNs show unemployment rates that are at least 5 percentage points lower than highly educated TCNs. Where unemployment is more common among TCNs than host-country nationals, gaps are wider among the highly than the poorly educated in most countries, especially in Greece and the Netherlands. Recently arrived TCNs are more likely to be unemployed than their settled peers in all countries, with the notable exception of Belgium – where settled TCNs show a 6 percentage points higher jobless rate – and some Central and Eastern European countries. In Sweden, for example, new non-EU arrivals (generally less well educated) are twice as likely to be without work than their settled peers.


### Main findings

- The TCN unemployment rate is 17%, over twice that of nationals (7%) EU-wide. TCNs make up one unemployed person in ten, with rates even higher in Austria, Germany and Sweden.
- TCN men, hit hard by the 2008-09 economic downturn, recovered more strongly than other citizens. TCN women are now more likely to be unemployed than 10 years previously.
- Low-educated and recent migrants are generally more likely to be unemployed. Where unemployment is more common among TCN than host-country nationals, gaps are wider among the highly than the poorly educated in most countries



Figure 8.9. Unemployment rates, by citizenship and level of education


15-64 year-olds, 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/6ec0sn>

Figure 8.10. How unemployment rates have evolved, by citizenship

15-64 year-olds, between 2010 (EU28 versus non-EU28 nationals) and 2020 (EU27 versus non-EU27 nationals)



StatLink <https://stat.link/yokz51>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 8.6. Self-employment

### Indicator context

The self-employed create and work in their own activities or firms. They include entrepreneurs, the liberal professions, artisans, traders, and other freelancers (excluding agriculture). See Indicator 3.13 for further details.

Around 11% of the working age population is self-employed in the EU, regardless of citizenship. TCNs are more likely to be self-employed than nationals in two countries out of five, especially in those with small non-EU populations, as in some Central and Eastern European countries, as well as in Spain and Portugal. In Poland, Italy and Greece, by contrast, TCNs are at least 6 percentage points less likely than their national peers to be self-employed.

Despite a slowdown due to the COVID-19 pandemic in many countries, the share of self-employed among non-EU nationals has increased over the last decade in most EU countries, while it fell in more than half of countries among nationals and EU mobile citizens. The increase in self-employment among TCNs was particularly striking in Lithuania and the countries worst hit by the 2008-09 economic crisis. In Southern Europe, except for Italy, TCNs appeared to resort to self-employment to avoid being marginalised in the labour market. Indeed, the growth observed in self-employment in Southern European countries was partly driven by sole proprietors with no employees. Self-employment was more likely among recent TCN migrants in 2020 than in 2010 in three out of five countries, particularly in Southern Europe and Austria. By contrast, the share of self-employed TCNs dropped steeply in most Central European and Nordic countries (including among newcomers). In the EU, about one-quarter of self-employed TCNs and EU mobile citizens have employees, against one-third of their national peers. Differences in firm size between non-EU citizens and nationals shrunk in the EU between 2010 and 2020. That trend is not true, however, in Sweden, Belgium, the Czech Republic and the Baltic and Southern European countries.


The profiles of the self-employed vary greatly from country to country. On average, there are around 5 percentage points more self-employed men than women, irrespective of citizenship. There are exceptions among non-EU nationals, however, with similar shares of both men and women in Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden. Highly educated workers are also more likely than the low-educated to be self-employed in most countries, though not among TCNs in countries such as Finland, Denmark and the Netherlands. Creating a business requires capital stock and professional networks, as well as adjusting to the host-country's business environment, regulations and language, all of which takes time. As a result, TCNs with at least 10 years of residence in the host country are twice as likely as new arrivals to be self-employed EU-wide: 15% versus 8%. One notable exception, though, is Portugal.

### Main findings

- TCNs are more likely than nationals to be self-employed in two countries out of five. EU-wide, only about one-quarter of TCN entrepreneurs have employees, compared to one-third of their national peers.
- While the incidence of self-employment has fallen in most countries over the last decade, it has grown among TCNs, especially in countries worst hit by the 2008-09 economic crisis, where self-employment is often a strategy for avoiding labour market marginalisation.
- Self-employment is more likely among recent TCN migrants than 10 years previously in three out of five countries, particularly in Southern Europe and Austria.

**Figure 8.11. Self-employed workers, by citizenship**


15-64 year-olds in employment, excluding the agricultural sector, 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/6184jt>

**Figure 8.12. The self-employed, by firm size and citizenship**

15-64 year-olds, excluding the agricultural sector (Total =100), 2020



Note: As this is a cumulative bar figure, the marker "National 11+ employees" is at 100%, thus not shown. The share of national entrepreneurs with 11 employees or more is between the marker "national with 10 employees or less" and 100%. Ex: In the EU, 68% of self-employed nationals have no employees, 27% have between 1 and 10 employees, and 5% have 11 employees or more.

StatLink <https://stat.link/vbufin>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 8.7. Overqualification

### Indicator context

The overqualification rate is the share of the highly educated (see Indicator 8.3), who work in a job that is ISCO-classified as low- or medium-skilled – i.e. ISCO Levels 4-9. See Indicator 3.12 for further details.

EU-wide, TCNs are twice as likely to be overqualified as nationals: 41% of highly educated non-EU nationals work in jobs below their formal level of qualification, compared to 21% of highly educated nationals. Indeed TCN overqualification is more widespread than among nationals in all EU countries but Ireland and Lithuania. It is highest in the Southern European countries, which offer highly educated labour migrants predominantly low-skilled jobs. Disparities in overqualification between non-EU citizens and nationals are widest in Italy, Portugal, Belgium and Greece. In the first two, TCNs are around four times as likely to be overqualified as their national peers.

Overqualification is particularly prevalent among immigrants who graduate abroad. In the EU, overqualification rates are lower among both TCNs (30%) and nationals (20%) who hold host-country degrees than among their foreign-educated peers – 45% for both TCNs and nationals. TCNs with a domestic degree show significantly lower overqualification than their peers with foreign degrees, notably in France (-28 percentage points), Sweden and Italy (both -26 points). However, non-EU nationals with domestic qualifications remain more prone to overqualification than their national peers in all countries, except for Ireland and Sweden. TCN women have higher overqualification rates than men throughout the EU, except in Austria. This is especially evident in Portugal, where the gender gap is 42 percentage points, and Cyprus, where it is 24 points. Gender differences in overqualification rates between national men and women are less pronounced or reversed in almost all countries.


Before the COVID-19 crisis struck, TCN overqualification had fallen by 6 percentage points between 2010 and 2019 in the EU. The pandemic further reduced it, as the overqualified were first to be laid off. Indeed, the EU-wide overqualification gap between TCNs and nationals narrowed, due both to a drop in overqualification among non-EU nationals and a slight rise among nationals. Overqualification among TCNs fell most steeply in Portugal. By contrast, in Austria and Belgium the opposite trend prevailed. EU mobile citizens, unlike their TCN peers, saw an overall increase in their overqualification rates.

### Main findings

- Overall, highly educated TCNs are twice as likely to be overqualified as nationals (around 4 times more in Italy and Portugal). While overqualification rates are lower among TCNs with host-country degrees, TCNs continue to fare worse than nationals in virtually all countries.
- TCN women generally experience greater overqualification rates than their male peers. EU-wide, overqualification gender gaps between TCNs are wider than among nationals.
- Over the last decade, gaps in overqualification between TCNs and nationals as well as TCNs and EU mobile citizens have narrowed. The COVID-19 crisis accelerated the decline further, as overqualified workers are the first to be affected by layoffs in times of economic crisis.


**Figure 8.13. Overqualification rates, by citizenship and gender**

Highly educated 15-64 year-olds, 2020



**Figure 8.14. How overqualification rates have evolved, by citizenship**

Highly educated 15-64 year-olds, between 2010 (EU28/non-EU28 nationals) and 2020 (EU27/non-EU27 nationals)



Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 8.8. Household income

### Indicator context

A household's annual equivalised disposable income is total earnings per capita from labour and capital, adjusted by the square root of household size. Median income separates households into two halves: one receives less and the other more. The 10% of the population with the lowest income are in the first decile and the 10% with the highest income are in the tenth. See Indicator 4.1 for further details.

The median annual disposable income of a TCN household in the EU is around EUR14 600, well below the figures for EU mobile citizens (EUR19 200) and nationals (EUR19 600). In fact, outside Central and Eastern Europe, it is lower than the household income of nationals in all EU countries. In France, Sweden, Belgium and Spain, it stands at even less than 65% of the median income in national households. As non-EU nationals are disproportionately overqualified for their jobs (Indicator 8.7), median income gaps between non-EU citizens and nationals tend to be widest among the highly educated.

Across the EU, non-EU nationals are overrepresented in the lowest income decile, where they account for 24% of households EU-wide, and underrepresented in the highest decile, at 8%. And, at one in three, shares of TCN households in the lowest decile are even greater in longstanding EU destinations (except Germany and Luxembourg). Furthermore, in these longstanding destinations (except for the Netherlands), as well as in most Southern European countries, the top income decile comprises less than 5% of TCNs. In the vast majority of EU countries, TCN household income in the highest decile is around three to six times greater than in the lowest. Indeed, income inequality tends to be wider among TCNs than nationals. It is worst in Lithuania, Bulgaria and Hungary, where TCN household income in the top decile is sevenfold that in the bottom decile. Among nationals it is between four- and sixfold. In countries such as the Czech Republic and Finland, by contrast, income inequality between non-EU nationals is lower than among nationals.


Across the EU, median TCN household income in 2020 had recovered slightly since the 2007/08 economic downturn, though by much less than among nationals, further widening the pre-crisis income differential. At the country level, however, there were considerable differences. For instance, median income gaps between TCNs and nationals widened significantly in the Netherlands and Austria, but narrowed in Greece.

### Main findings

- TCNs have lower annual disposable household incomes than nationals in virtually every country. In France, Sweden, Belgium and Spain, the median income in TCN households is nearly 65% of median income in national households.
- Almost one in four TCNs belong to the lowest household income decile, rising to one in three in countries such as Austria, Belgium and France.
- Across the EU, gaps in median income between non-EU and national households widened over the last decade.

**Figure 8.15. Third-country national income deciles**


16-year-olds and above, 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/c93ahl>

**Figure 8.16. Equivalised median annual disposable household income, by citizenship**

Purchasing power parities in national currencies per euro (EU=1.00), 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/rt4pnw>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 8.9. Relative poverty

### Indicator context

The relative poverty rate (or at-risk-of-poverty rate) is the proportion of individuals living below the country's poverty threshold. The Eurostat definition of the poverty threshold used here is 60% of the median equivalised disposable income in each country. See Indicator 4.2 for further details.

Across the EU, two in five TCNs live in relative poverty. Overall, they are more than 1.5 times as likely to be poor as EU mobile citizens and 2.5 times more than nationals. With the exceptions of Portugal and the Czech Republic, poverty is more widespread among TCNs than EU mobile citizens and nationals throughout the EU. Gaps in poverty rates between non-EU citizens and nationals are narrowest in Central and Eastern European countries, where less than one-fifth of TCNs live in relative poverty. However, in countries where many are low-educated – such as Sweden, Spain and Belgium – TCNs are three times more likely to be poor than nationals. The widest gaps come in France and Austria, where TCNs are around four times as likely to be poor.

Over the last decade, poverty rates among nationals remained stable in most countries. When it comes to TCNs, however, countries painted different pictures, with some seeing significant poverty alleviation and others the opposite. Overall, the greatest reductions in relative poverty among TCNs came in Portugal and Finland, where rates roughly halved. Greece also saw a steep poverty decline of 15 percentage points among TCNs. However, as median incomes also fell significantly, there was no real improvement in the standard of living of the Greek TCN population. By contrast, TCNs experienced strong rises in relative poverty in countries like Switzerland, Austria and the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, the rate more than doubled. Different country-specific trends were also observed among EU mobile citizens. Their relative poverty rates dropped sharply in most Central and Eastern European countries, and even more so in Portugal, but rose significantly in countries such as France.

The low-educated are especially at risk of poverty, regardless of their nationality. In fact, one-half of low-educated TCNs live in relative poverty in the EU, compared to one in three with medium or high levels of educational attainment. Significantly, poverty rates are only slightly lower (2 percentage points) among highly educated TCNs than among those educated to a medium level. Highly educated nationals across the EU are less than half as likely (8 points) as their medium-educated peers to be poor. Besides educational attainment, length of stay in the host country is linked to a reduction in TCNs' exposure to the risk of poverty. EU-wide, the poverty rate of recently arrived non-EU nationals is 8 percentage points higher than among those with at least 10 years of residence.


### Main findings

- Across the EU, two in five TCNs live in relative poverty. They are more than 1.5 times as likely to be poor as EU mobile citizens and 2.5 times as likely as nationals. Higher poverty rates than those of nationals are observed everywhere, bar the Czech Republic and Portugal.
- Poverty rates have increased significantly among TCNs and EU mobile citizens in around half of all countries, while remaining stable among nationals in most countries. In the Netherlands, poverty among TCNs has more than doubled.
- EU-wide, the poverty rate among recently arrived non-EU nationals is higher than among those with at least 10 years of residence.



Figure 8.17. Relative poverty rates, by citizenship


16-year-olds and above, 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/7uj3d1>

Figure 8.18. How relative poverty rates have evolved, by citizenship

16-year-olds and above, between 2010 and 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/m690nc>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 8.10. Housing tenure

### Indicator context

This indicator relates to the share of homeowners among individuals aged 16 and over, to tenants who rent accommodation at the market rate, and to those who rent at reduced rates. See Indicator 4.4 for further details.

In the EU, TCNs are three times less likely than nationals to own their own homes (24% versus 73%). In virtually all EU countries, most nationals own the dwellings they reside in, while only a minority of TCNs do so. The sole exceptions are the Czech Republic, Croatia and Lithuania where over 54% of TCNs are homeowners. EU mobile citizens, too, are less likely than nationals (by 37 percentage points) to own their own homes, but still 13 points more likely than TCNs. Across the EU, only 1% of homeowners are non-EU nationals, although they represent 4% of the adult population (16 years old and over). Overall, the gap between TCNs and nationals are widest (i.e. over 50 percentage points) in countries where most citizens are homeowners – such as Spain, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Portugal. Disparities in homeownership rates between nationals and foreigners, particularly TCNs, are attributable to factors like unfamiliarity with the host country's housing market, language barriers, discrimination, and lower income.

Shares of TCN homeowners do, though, increase with educational attainment – around one-third of highly educated non-EU nationals own their homes in the EU, compared to 19% of their low-educated peers. However, being highly educated does not close the gap in homeownership rate between TCNs and nationals in all countries.

Over the last decade, the EU-wide TCN homeownership rate fell, while remaining stable among nationals. In most countries, TCNs are less likely to own a home than a decade ago. In Sweden, the share of non-EU homeowners fell by almost one-quarter, possibly due to the inflow of humanitarian migrants, for whom finding accommodation is generally a greater struggle.


Analysis of non-owner tenants across the EU shows that (with the exception of Finland) TCNs are also less likely than their national peers to reside in subsidised accommodation – 13% versus 19%. That trend is true regardless of levels of education. Indeed, TCNs may usually not access subsidised housing until they have lived in the host country for several years. However, even with 10 years of residence, TCNs are still under-represented in dwellings rented at a reduced rate. The overall gap between nationals and non-EU citizens living in subsidised accommodation is widest in Ireland, at 49 percentage points.

### Main findings

- Across the EU, only 1% of homeowners are non-EU nationals, even though they represent 4% of the adult population. Only 24% of third-country nationals own their homes, while 73% of nationals do.
- Gaps in homeownership are widest in countries where it is particularly widespread among nationals (e.g. Southern Europe and Ireland).
- TCNs are underrepresented in housings rented at a reduced rate, even after living in their country of residence for many years.

**Figure 8.19. Rates of home ownership, by citizenship**


16-year-olds and above, 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/vxu4zo>

**Figure 8.20. How home ownership rates have evolved, by citizenship**

16-year-olds and above, between 2010 and 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/kpxsui>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 8.11. Reported health status

### Indicator context

Self-reported health status is measured by the share of individuals who rate their health as “good” or better. As health status is strongly age-dependent, the share of foreign nationals who report good health is adjusted to estimate outcomes as if the foreigners’ age structure were the same as those of the nationals. See Indicator 4.9 for further details.

Across the EU, three in five TCNs perceived in 2020 their health as good or very good. The share, which is adjusted by age, is lower than among nationals and EU mobile citizens (around 65%). Indeed, in Spain and all long-standing immigrant destinations, TCNs are less likely to report good health than nationals, even after controlling for age differences between the two groups. In Austria, TCNs are as much as 14 percentage points less likely to consider themselves in good health, and 12 points less so in France. By contrast, in most European countries with a smaller immigrant population, TCNs are more likely to feel healthy than their national peers, particularly in Portugal and the Central and Eastern European countries. As for EU mobile citizens, they express similar or better self-perceived health outcomes than nationals in most European countries. However, the opposite is true of Spain, France and Denmark, where EU mobile citizens are at least 5 percentage points less likely than nationals to say they are in good health.

In most EU countries, the proportion of TCNs and nationals reporting good health rose between 2010 and 2020. As the increase was more pronounced among TCNs than nationals in countries such as Belgium and Austria, self-reported health disparities between non-EU foreigners and nationals narrowed significantly in these countries. A climb in the proportion of non-EU nationals in self-perceived good health also came in Portugal, where the gap in favour of TCNs widened. By contrast, self-perceptions of health among EU mobile citizens and TCNs deteriorated in France, the Czech Republic and Spain between 2010 and 2020.


Factors such as gender, socio-economic status, lifestyle and satisfaction with the healthcare system shape self-perceived health status. For example, men tend to report better health than women. Across the EU, the self-perceived gender gap is widest among TCNs and EU mobile citizens. An even more important determinant of reported health status is educational attainment. EU-wide, the highly educated – who are generally better paid, enjoy better health insurance coverage, and tend to be more fully aware of lifestyle choices – are more than 20 percentage points more likely to report good health than the low-educated. The education-related gap holds true for TCNs, EU mobile citizens and nationals, though it is widest (at 26 points) among nationals.

### Main findings

- Across the EU, three in five TCNs report that they are in good health. That share, adjusted for age, is lower than among nationals and EU mobile citizens (65%). However, in Central and Southern European countries (bar Spain) TCNs are more likely to report good health.
- The share of TCNs and nationals who report good health has grown in most countries between 2010 and 2020.
- More men than women report being in good health, particularly among TCNs and EU mobile citizens.

**Figure 8.21. Self-reported good health status, by citizenship**


16-year-olds and above, 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/6s9t4d>

**Figure 8.22. How the shares of individuals in self-reported good health have evolved, by citizenship**

16-year-olds and above, between 2010 and 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/2wf6kx>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 8.12. Long-term residents

### Indicator context

A long-term resident is a third-country national who has been granted long-term resident status in accordance with Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003. The status may be granted to all non-EU citizens if they have resided legally and continuously for five years in an EU member state, have health insurance coverage, and enjoy sufficient financial resources not to rely on social assistance. Some countries may also have additional requirements, such as proficiency in the host-country language. Long-term residents enjoy the same rights of residence as EU nationals, particularly that of residing in an EU country other than the one where they were granted long-term residence. Having the same rights as EU nationals is a necessary requirement for TCNs if legal barriers are not to hamper their integration and if they are to enjoy greater equality of opportunity.

This indicator measures the share of long-term residents among third-country nationals who have a valid residence permit. Data include long-term residence permits under the EU framework, as well as other permanent residence permits under national frameworks, if the latter are more advantageous than the provisions in the Directive, even if they allow holders to live only in the EU country that delivered the permit (unlike long-term residence permits under the EU framework).

EU-wide, half of TCNs benefit from long-term resident status (under EU or national framework). However, at the country level shares vary greatly. In three-fifths of countries, under half of TCNs are long-term residents, with the ratio falling to less than one in five in Portugal, Romania, Croatia and Poland. By contrast, in Bulgaria, France, Austria and Sweden, over 60% of non-EU nationals enjoy long-term resident status, while that share exceeds 80% in Latvia and Estonia, where non-EU populations include national minorities.


The percentage of TCNs with long-term resident status fell between 2016 and 2021 in almost three-quarters of countries. Declines were steepest in countries with ageing non-EU populations, such as Lithuania and Croatia, which registered many deaths among their former non-EU migrant cohorts. That downward trend is also attributable to the growing share of recent arrivals from outside the EU – in Sweden or the Slovak Republic, for example. Indeed, they cannot benefit from long-term resident status until five years have elapsed and, as a rule, the more recent the TCN population, the lower the proportion of a country's long-term residents. The size of the third-country national population reflects changes in inflows from outside the EU, changes in outflows of TCNs, and changes in citizenship policies (naturalised TCNs are no longer considered foreigners). Such changes, together with the different lengths of time that countries have taken to implement Directive 2003/109/EC, prompt caution as to cross-country comparisons over time.

### Main findings

- Half of third-country nationals have long-term resident status in the EU.
- The percentage of TCNs who have long-term resident status fell slightly between 2016 and 2021 in almost three-quarters of countries. The decline may be associated with the ageing and related rise in mortality of the non-EU population, as well as the growing share of recent non-EU migrants in the total number of TCNs.

Figure 8.23. Proportions of third-country nationals with long-term resident status

All ages, 2021



StatLink  <https://stat.link/rj97dw>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 8.13. Voter participation

### Indicator context

Voter participation refers to the share of eligible voters (with host-country nationality) who report that they cast a ballot in the most recent national parliamentary election in the country of residence. See Indicator 5.2 for further details.

EU-wide, nationals born in a third country were slightly less likely to vote in national elections than their native-born peers between 2010 and 2018. Voter participation among non-EU born nationals was 71%, that of the native-born 79%, with that of nationals born in another EU country in between, at 77%. Turnout in national elections remained stable among naturalised non-EU migrants between 2002-10 and 2010-18, while dipping slightly among the native-born. Turnout did not change among the EU-born nationals.

Voter turnout is lower among nationals born outside the EU than the native-born in most EU countries – by more than 10 percentage points in countries with large recent intakes of non-EU migrants, such as Ireland, Southern European destinations and Nordic countries. Turnout is also considerably lower among non-EU born than native-born in some longstanding immigration countries, such as Germany, Austria and the Netherlands. By contrast, voter participation rates are similar among non-EU migrants and the native-born in France, Belgium, and in countries where the bulk of the non-EU born population is considered from a third country because of border changes or the presence of national minorities – as in Croatia and the Baltic countries. Nationals born in other EU countries show higher voter participation rates than their non-EU born counterparts, except in Ireland, Belgium, Spain and France. However, they vote less than the native-born in virtually all countries.

The highly educated are more likely to vote than the low-educated in virtually all EU countries, with at least 14 percentage points separating their voter turnout rates EU-wide, regardless of country of birth. At all levels of education voter participation among naturalised immigrants from third countries is around 8 percentage points lower than among the native-born. Notable exceptions include France and Lithuania, where highly educated nationals born in a non-EU country turn out in larger proportions than their native-born peers. In Belgium and Estonia, by contrast, naturalised non-EU migrants with low educational attainment are more likely to vote than the native-born educated to the same level.

The association between voter participation and gender is less clear-cut than with education. In the EU, men are more likely to vote than women. Voter participation among female nationals born in a third country is however 2 percentage points higher than among their male peers EU-wide, and by at least 5 percentage points in Estonia, Ireland, the Netherlands and Germany.


### Main findings

- Voter turnout among nationals born in a third country is lower than among their native-born peers in most EU countries. EU-wide, their self-reported turnout in the most recent national election was 71%, against 79% among the native-born.
- Nationals born outside the EU were more likely to vote in national elections in 2010-18 than in the previous decade, while native-born were slightly less likely.
- While men are more likely to vote than women in the EU, voter turnout among women born in a third country is 2 percentage points higher than among their male peers EU-wide.



**Figure 8.24. Self-reported participation of naturalised non-EU migrants in most recent national election, by place of birth**


18-year-olds and above with host-country nationality, 2010-18



StatLink <https://stat.link/cipej8>

**Figure 8.25. Self-reported participation of non-EU migrants with host-country citizenship in most recent national election, by level of education**

18-year-olds and above, difference with native-born nationals, 2010-18



StatLink <https://stat.link/2mnuzj>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 8.14. Acquisition of nationality

### Indicator context

This indicator relates to the share of immigrants who have resided in the host country for at least 10 years and hold its nationality. Indeed, although countries may require immigrants to reside for different lengths of time to be eligible for nationality in OECD and EU countries, that duration is generally no more than 10 years. See Indicator 5.1 for further details.

Across the EU, 57% of non-EU migrants with ten years of residence (settled migrants) have the citizenship of their country of residence. The share of EU-born migrant nationals is lower, at 44%. Among settled migrants born in a third country, shares of individuals with the host-country nationality are largest (over 90%) in Sweden, as well as in Croatia, the Slovak Republic and Lithuania, where the immigrant populations have been shaped by national minorities. As for the lowest citizenship rates (less than 50%), they come in the other Baltic countries, the Southern European countries (except Portugal), the Czech Republic and Luxembourg. These countries have stricter naturalisation procedures in place, do not allow dual citizenship, or have started to do so only recently (see Indicator 5.1).

As EU mobile citizens already benefit from the rights and privileges conferred by EU citizenship, they are less likely than their non-EU born peers to seek the nationality of the host country. They are particularly unlikely to do so in Ireland, Spain and Luxembourg, where less than one-fifth of settled EU-born have the host-country citizenship. In most Central and Eastern European countries, by contrast, well over five in six EU-born are nationals – a much higher share than among their non-EU born counterparts. The share of nationals born in the EU exceeds that of nationals born outside the EU by the greatest margin in the Czech Republic and Slovenia. Most EU-born in the Czech Republic were born in the Slovak Republic, obtaining the Czech citizenship after Czechoslovakia split. As for Slovenia, most residents were Croatian-born, becoming Slovenian nationals after the break-up of Yugoslavia.


Formal and informal requirements for naturalisation include a certain proficiency in the host-country language and a degree of economic self-sufficiency. Such requirements favour highly educated immigrants. Indeed, having the citizenship is more widespread among highly educated non-EU migrants than their low-educated peers in all EU countries (but Hungary) – 25 percentage points more widespread EU-wide. The gap is a much narrower – 2 percentage points – in Ireland and Sweden, where host-country language skills are not a requirement for naturalisation. For EU-born, however, a more mixed picture emerges. Again, the citizenship rate among highly educated EU-born exceeds the rate among their low-educated peers in many countries, although to a lesser extent. However, the reverse is true in Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark, as well as Central and Eastern European countries.

### Main findings

- Across the EU, 57% of non-EU migrants with 10 years of residence have the host-country nationality.
- Non-EU migrants are more likely than their EU-born peers to have the nationality of the host country. Exceptions are most Central and Eastern European countries, where the immigrant populations have been shaped by national minorities.
- In virtually all countries, highly educated non-EU migrants are more likely to have the nationality of the host country than their low-educated peers.

**Figure 8.26. Acquisition of nationality, by place of birth**


15-year-olds and above, settled immigrants (more than 10 years of residence) who became host-country nationals, 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/ixuwya>

**Figure 8.27. Acquisition of nationality, by level of education and place of birth**

15-year-olds and above, gap between highly and low-educated settled immigrants who became host-country nationals, 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/sqar9w>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

## 8.15. Perceived discrimination

### Indicator context

This indicator refers to the share of foreigners who consider themselves members of a group that is discriminated against on the grounds of ethnicity, nationality or race. See Indicator 5.6 for further details.

EU-wide, one in five TCNs feels that they belong to a group that is discriminated against on the grounds of ethnicity, nationality or race. That share is only one in twelve among EU mobile citizens. In around four out of five EU countries, self-perceived discrimination is more widespread among TCNs than their EU peers, with the lowest incidence in both groups in the Nordic countries and Ireland. Shares of non-EU nationals reporting discrimination are highest in France and Belgium, at one person in three – triple the share among EU-born foreigners.

Across the EU, the share of TCNs who feel part of a group subject to discrimination declined by 3 percentage points between 2002-08 and 2012-18, while the proportion of EU mobile citizens rose slightly. Perceived discrimination among TCNs has declined in all countries, except France and Belgium. In France, the share of TCNs self-reporting discrimination against their in-group increased by 3 percentage points and in Belgium by 17 points. As for EU mobile citizens, they reported a 3-point rise in France and 5-point in Belgium. By contrast, self-reported discrimination declined in Germany and Austria among both groups.

The grounds for perceived discrimination vary widely. On the grounds of origin, perceived discrimination is most widespread in the EU among TCNs from sub-Saharan Africa (30%) and North Africa (31%). Male TCNs, those close to retirement age, and those whose first language is not that of the host-country are more likely to report discrimination than their female TCNs, those who are younger and those whose first language is that of the host country. Labour market status does not seem to be a decisive factor – 21% of both employed and unemployed non-EU nationals feel discriminated against. However, the incidence of perceived discrimination abates with higher educational attainment – 25% among the low-educated versus 16% among the highly educated. EU-wide, it also declines with the length of stay, albeit only slightly.


EU mobile citizens report lower shares of discrimination than TCNs, regardless of the grounds. Although labour market status does not affect perceived discrimination among non-EU nationals, unemployed EU mobile citizens are twice as likely as those in work to report discrimination. Unlike their non-EU peers, shares of EU mobile citizens reporting discrimination are similar at all levels of educational attainment. Low-educated TCNs are twice as likely to feel discriminated against than their non-national peers with EU citizenship.

### Main findings

- Across the EU, 20% of third-country nationals report belonging to a group that experiences discrimination on the grounds of their ethnicity, nationality or race. Among EU mobile citizens the share is 10%. Shares of TCNs who perceive discrimination are largest in Belgium and France, where differences between EU mobile citizens and TCNs are also particularly wide.
- The share of TCNs who feel discriminated against fell between 2002-08 and 2012-18, except in Belgium and France.
- Not all TCNs are equally likely to report belonging to a group prone to discrimination. The incidence is lower among some groups, like women or highly educated TCNs.

**Figure 8.28. Self-reported discrimination, by citizenship**


15-64 year-olds, 2012-18



StatLink <https://stat.link/xkqwp>

**Figure 8.29. Self-reported discrimination by several characteristics and citizenship**

15-64 year-olds, 2012-18



StatLink <https://stat.link/mrn2hv>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.



# Annex A. Composition of immigrant populations and households

Access the data for tables in Annex A:

StatLink  <https://stat.link/w9xpz4>

Table A A.1. Size and composition, 2020/21 and 2011

## Total population

	Foreign-born population						Native-born population				Foreign-born - Change since 2011 (% points)	
	Total population (thousands)	% of the total population	0-14	65+	Women	Household size (Nb of persons)	0-14	65+	Women	Household size (Nb of persons)	% of the total population	Women
			% of the foreign-born population				% of the native-born population					% of the foreign-born population
Australia	7 529	29	6	20	51	3	11	62	50	2	2	1
Austria	1 797	20	6	14	51	2	6	63	50	2	5	-1
Belgium	2 079	18	7	15	51	2	7	62	50	2	3	-1
Bulgaria	202	3	14	10	50	-	5	64	50	2	2	-5
Canada	7 896	21	5	20	52	3	9	63	50	2	2	0
Chile	1 493	8	14	4	49	4	1	66	54	4	6	-10
Colombia	2 403	5	33	1	51	5	0	66	51	4	5	..
Costa Rica	431	8	12	14	54	4	6	65	49	3	-1	..
Croatia	532	13	1	32	51	3	13	64	51	3	0	..
Cyprus	201	22	6	8	55	2	3	62	50	3	-1	0
Czech Republic	903	8	4	16	42	2	8	63	51	2	1	0
Denmark	617	11	9	10	50	2	4	62	50	2	3	-1
Estonia	198	15	3	44	56	2	21	65	52	2	-1	-4
Finland	421	8	6	5	48	2	2	61	51	2	3	-2
France	8 571	13	5	25	52	3	10	61	52	2	2	1
Germany	13 561	16	7	17	49	2	8	62	51	2	3	-1
Greece	1 362	13	2	10	52	3	3	62	51	3	1	0
Hungary	598	6	6	21	49	2	11	65	52	2	2	-6
Iceland	69	20	..	..	46	2	..	..	48	2	9	1
Ireland	868	18	7	7	50	3	3	61	50	3	1	2
Japan	2 887	2	9	7	50	..	3	59	51	..	1	-3
Korea	1 889	4	5	14	45	..	9	72	50	..	1	2



	Foreign-born population						Native-born population				Foreign-born - Change since 2011 (% points)	
	Total population (thousands)	% of the total population	0-14	65+	Women	Household size (Nb of persons)	0-14	65+	Women	Household size (Nb of persons)	% of the total population	Women
			% of the foreign-born population				% of the native-born population					% of the foreign-born population
Latvia	230	12	4	46	60	2	22	65	53	2	-2	0
Lithuania	165	6	10	37	44	2	16	66	53	2	-1	-11
Luxembourg	302	48	7	12	49	2	4	59	50	2	9	-1
Malta	120	23	..	..	42	2	..	..	48	2	15	-7
Mexico	1 212	1	36	7	52	4	2	67	52	4	0	2
Netherlands	2 451	14	5	12	52	2	4	63	50	2	3	0
New Zealand	1 272	27	..	..	51	..	..	..	51	..	5	-1
Norway	878	16	6	12	48	2	7	62	48	2	5	-2
Poland	849	2	15	32	51	2	26	65	52	3	0	-6
Portugal	1 263	12	9	9	52	3	3	63	53	2	4	1
Romania	689	4	37	4	46	..	2	65	51	3	2	..
Slovak Republic	202	4	8	28	48	2	11	68	51	3	1	..
Slovenia	293	14	8	17	41	2	6	64	50	2	3	-2
Spain	7 215	15	3	8	52	3	2	63	50	2	2	4
Sweden	2 047	20	9	8	50	2	1	64	49	2	5	-2
Switzerland	2 630	30	..	..	51	2	..	..	51	2	4	-1
Türkiye	2 278	3	17	10	52	..	25	3	50	..	..	-4
United Kingdom	9 482	14	7	11	52	3	5	61	50	2	2	0
United States	45 273	14	5	16	52	3	7	63	51	2	1	2
<b>OECD total</b>	<b>141 243</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>EU total</b>	<b>53 998</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0</b>

Note: ".." value is missing, "-" value is below the sample size threshold.

Source: Totals: Indicator 2.1; Age: Indicator 6.1; Women: Indicator 2.2; Recent migrants: Indicator 2.8; Household size: Indicator 2.5.

Table A A.2. Defining characteristics of immigrant populations, 2020/21

15-64, total = 100

	Region of birth						Duration of stay			Advanced host-country language proficiency (%)
	Europe	Of which: EU	Africa	Asia	Latin America	North America and Oceania	<5 years	5 to 9 years	>10 years	
Australia	22	..	7	56	3	13	17	17	65	72
Austria	82	56	3	13	2	1	21	19	60	54
Belgium	56	59	28	11	4	1	19	19	62	59
Bulgaria	100	-	0	0	0	0	38	3	59	69
Canada	18	..	10	55	12	4	14	16	70	..
Chile	3	..	0	1	96	1	65	17	18	..
Colombia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Costa Rica	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Croatia	100	87	0	0	0	0	2	2	96	97
Cyprus	58	37	4	36	0	2	35	15	50	45
Czech Republic	84	50	1	11	1	2	19	15	66	73
Denmark	49	69	7	38	3	3	27	21	52	50
Estonia	91	90	1	7	0	1	11	9	80	19
Finland	41	70	11	42	3	3	13	26	62	45
France	20	82	61	11	6	2	13	13	74	59
Germany	63	65	5	29	2	1	17	22	61	55
Greece	80	82	2	15	0	3	6	9	84	58
Hungary	87	38	2	8	2	1	22	14	65	86
Iceland	71	39	4	15	3	6	19	12	68	..
Ireland	68	60	8	15	5	4	24	13	63	80
Israel	..	..	..	..	..	..	7	8	85	..
Italy	56	68	17	16	10	1	8	14	79	60
Japan	2	..	1	84	11	3	..	..	..	..
Korea	3	..	1	93	0	3	48	21	31	50
Latvia	53	88	0	39	4	4	7	2	91	32
Lithuania	90	89	0	10	0	1	8	4	88	63
Luxembourg	83	25	7	6	3	1	29	19	51	68

	Region of birth						Duration of stay			Advanced host-country language proficiency (%)
	Europe	Of which: EU	Africa	Asia	Latin America	North America and Oceania	<5 years	5 to 9 years	>10 years	
Malta	..	..	..	..	..	..	28	33	40	15
Mexico	7	..	0	3	35	55	..	..	..	..
Netherlands	40	76	18	22	18	3	10	12	78	44
New Zealand	7	..	3	14	1	75	17	19	64	..
Norway	50	61	13	30	4	3	20	25	56	56
Poland	100	79	0	0	0	0	..	..	..	64
Portugal	32	75	35	1	31	2	22	5	73	90
Romania	76	-	3	18	4	0	27	16	57	59
Slovak Republic	93	43	1	4	0	2	25	8	68	77
Slovenia	100	81	0	0	0	0	20	13	66	56
Spain	32	74	19	7	42	0	14	11	75	78
Sweden	39	76	11	44	5	2	30	20	50	61
Switzerland	76	43	7	9	6	2	23	20	58	66
Türkiye	41	69	6	52	0	1	..	..	..	..
United Kingdom	43	..	16	31	4	5	25	17	58	..
United States	11	..	6	30	51	2	13	11	76	72
<b>OECD total</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>67</b>
<b>EU total</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>62</b>

Note: ".." value is missing, "-" value is below the sample size threshold.

Source: Regions of Birth & Duration of Stay: Indicator 2.8; Language proficiency: Indicator 3.3.



## Annex B. Skills and the labour market

Access the data for tables in Annex B:


StatLink  <https://stat.link/y6fxs0>

Table A B.1. Distribution by level of education, 2020

Percentages, 15-64 year-olds not in education

	Foreign-born			EU-born			Non-EU born			Native-born		
	Very low (ISCED 0-1)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	High (ISCED 5+)	Very low (ISCED 0-1)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	High (ISCED 5+)	Very low (ISCED 0-1)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	High (ISCED 5+)	Very low (ISCED 0-1)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	High (ISCED 5+)
Australia	4	13	60	..	..	..	..	..	..	4	20	39
Austria	3	27	30	0	12	40	6	39	23	0	11	32
Belgium	16	33	34	9	23	43	22	40	28	5	18	42
Bulgaria	..	8	52	..	-	-	..	-	-	5	19	27
Canada	..	8	66	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	12	50
Chile	8	19	38	..	..	..	..	..	..	15	30	24
Colombia	10	35	22	..	..	..	..	..	..	22	38	28
Costa Rica	41	69	13	..	..	..	..	..	..	30	58	25
Croatia	3	21	21	0	9	29	4	23	19	1	12	24
Cyprus	9	23	38	7	21	36	10	24	39	8	15	45
Czech Republic	..	12	34	..	11	34	..	12	34	0	6	24
Denmark	5	28	40	1	13	53	7	34	34	2	18	38
Estonia	0	5	49	1	5	61	0	5	47	1	11	39
Finland	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
France	17	33	35	13	29	34	17	34	35	4	16	40
Germany	16	36	26	8	25	30	20	42	24	2	10	30
Greece	16	38	15	7	21	24	18	42	13	11	20	33
Hungary	1	14	39	2	15	35	..	11	46	1	15	25
Iceland	0	26	38	..	21	39	0	33	38	0	25	41
Ireland	3	8	56	3	6	49	3	10	61	5	18	45
Israel	..	11	56	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	13	41
Italy	9	50	12	4	37	13	11	56	12	4	36	20
Japan	1	12	47	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	5	53
Korea	9	28	31	..	..	..	..	..	..	3	10	52
Latvia	..	7	38	..	13	35	..	6	39	1	9	36

	Foreign-born			EU-born			Non-EU born			Native-born		
	Very low (ISCED 0-1)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	High (ISCED 5+)	Very low (ISCED 0-1)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	High (ISCED 5+)	Very low (ISCED 0-1)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	High (ISCED 5+)	Very low (ISCED 0-1)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	High (ISCED 5+)
Lithuania	1	4	38	1	6	46	1	4	38	1	5	43
Luxembourg	11	26	52	12	26	51	7	25	53	3	20	32
Malta	1	31	42	..	..	..	..	..	..	4	45	23
Mexico	11	35	25	..	..	..	..	..	..	20	51	17
Netherlands	12	27	38	5	17	48	15	30	35	4	18	42
New Zealand	..	12	49	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	27	29
Norway	4	20	42	3	11	46	5	27	39	0	18	43
Poland	1	3	60	..	2	63	1	3	56	1	7	31
Portugal	11	28	34	8	25	39	11	28	33	26	46	26
Romania	1	8	61	..	-	-	-	2	64	4	21	18
Slovak Republic	..	6	37	..	6	29	..	6	48	1	8	25
Slovenia	1	20	18	0	12	31	1	23	13	1	9	37
Spain	14	38	29	5	26	36	18	42	27	6	38	41
Sweden	9	29	42	1	15	53	12	34	38	0	9	41
Switzerland	5	22	42	4	18	48	7	28	35	1	5	43
Türkiye	..	43	27	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	59	20
United Kingdom	3	18	50	1	17	45	4	19	53	1	23	39
United States	8	21	43	..	..	..	..	..	..	0	9	47
<b>OECD total</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>36</b>
<b>EU total</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>32</b>

Note: ".." value is missing, "-" value is below the sample size threshold.

Source: Indicator 3.1.

Table A B.2. Distribution by level of education and gender, 2020

Percentages, 15-64 year-olds not in education

	Foreign-born men			Foreign-born women			Native-born men			Native-born women			Recent migrants (<5 years)		
	Low (ISCED 0-2)	Medium (ISCED 3-4)	High (ISCED 5+)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	Medium (ISCED 3-4)	High (ISCED 5+)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	Medium (ISCED 3-4)	High (ISCED 5+)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	Medium (ISCED 3-4)	High (ISCED 5+)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	Medium (ISCED 3-4)	High (ISCED 5+)
Australia	13	31	56	13	24	63	20	47	33	19	35	46	8	22	70
Austria	26	46	28	29	39	33	9	58	33	14	54	32	23	39	38
Belgium	33	34	33	33	31	35	20	44	36	16	37	48	27	26	47
Bulgaria	-	-	-	-	-	-	19	60	21	19	48	33	-	-	-
Canada	9	27	64	8	24	68	14	43	43	11	31	58	9	21	70
Chile	18	46	37	20	41	40	31	47	23	28	47	25	..	..	..
Colombia	38	43	20	32	44	25	41	34	25	35	35	30	..	..	..
Costa Rica	71	17	12	66	21	13	61	17	22	56	18	27	..	..	..
Croatia	15	64	21	26	52	21	11	70	20	14	57	29	-	-	-
Cyprus	25	40	35	21	39	40	16	46	38	14	34	52	30	36	33
Czech Republic	10	58	32	14	50	36	6	74	21	7	66	27	10	52	38
Denmark	30	32	38	25	32	43	20	47	32	16	40	44	31	20	49
Estonia	7	53	41	4	40	57	14	57	29	7	44	49	4	30	66
Finland	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	39	30	31
France	30	36	34	36	28	36	17	47	36	15	41	44	32	27	41
Germany	36	39	25	36	38	27	9	57	33	10	62	28	38	28	34
Greece	45	45	10	33	49	19	19	49	32	20	45	35	56	30	13
Hungary	13	52	35	14	44	42	14	65	21	17	54	30	15	48	37
Iceland	28	36	35	24	34	41	27	39	34	23	29	49	30	31	39
Ireland	9	37	54	8	34	58	21	39	41	14	37	49	6	23	71
Israel	11	36	52	11	31	58	15	48	37	11	43	46	16	26	59
Italy	55	36	9	45	39	15	37	46	17	34	44	23	53	29	18
Japan	11	39	49	13	42	45	7	42	51	4	41	55	..	..	..
Korea	28	42	30	29	38	33	8	38	54	11	39	50	..	..	..
Latvia	12	54	34	3	55	41	13	62	25	6	47	47	2	27	71
Lithuania	4	59	37	4	56	40	7	58	35	3	46	51	4	41	55
Luxembourg	26	22	52	25	23	51	21	49	30	20	45	35	12	14	75



	Foreign-born men			Foreign-born women			Native-born men			Native-born women			Recent migrants (<5 years)		
	Low (ISCED 0-2)	Medium (ISCED 3-4)	High (ISCED 5+)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	Medium (ISCED 3-4)	High (ISCED 5+)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	Medium (ISCED 3-4)	High (ISCED 5+)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	Medium (ISCED 3-4)	High (ISCED 5+)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	Medium (ISCED 3-4)	High (ISCED 5+)
Malta	32	29	39	29	26	45	45	33	22	45	31	24	25	25	50
Mexico	36	36	28	34	44	22	50	33	17	51	32	17	..	..	..
Netherlands	28	36	36	26	34	40	18	41	42	18	39	43	23	22	55
New Zealand	13	41	46	12	37	51	29	46	25	25	43	32	0	0	0
Norway	21	42	37	20	33	48	19	44	37	16	35	48	16	48	35
Poland	3	42	55	3	33	64	8	67	25	7	56	37	..	..	..
Portugal	30	42	28	26	35	39	50	30	20	42	27	31	15	44	41
Romania	-	-	-	-	-	-	19	65	16	22	59	19	-	-	-
Slovak Republic	9	53	38	4	61	36	7	72	20	9	61	30	0	67	33
Slovenia	15	71	14	26	52	22	8	62	30	9	47	44	18	64	18
Spain	40	33	27	36	33	31	41	21	37	34	21	44	26	32	42
Sweden	31	31	38	27	27	46	10	57	33	8	42	50	39	16	45
Switzerland	22	36	42	23	34	43	4	49	47	6	56	38	11	27	62
Türkiye	43	32	24	43	29	28	55	24	21	64	17	19	..	..	..
United Kingdom	19	34	47	18	30	52	24	40	37	22	37	41	17	31	52
United States	22	36	41	20	35	45	10	48	42	8	41	51	19	30	51
<b>OECD total</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>47</b>
<b>EU total</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>39</b>

Note: ".." value is missing, "-" value is below the sample size threshold, recent migrants refer to less than 10 years of residence for Canada, Korea and New Zealand.  
Source: Indicator 3.1.

Table A B.3. Distribution by level of education, evolution between 2010 and 2020

Change in percentage points, 15-64 year-olds not in education

	Foreign-born			EU-born			Non-EU born			Native-born		
	Very low (ISCED 0-1)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	High (ISCED 5+)	Very low (ISCED 0-1)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	High (ISCED 5+)	Very low (ISCED 0-1)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	High (ISCED 5+)	Very low (ISCED 0-1)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	High (ISCED 5+)
Australia	-3	-8	15	0	..	..	0	..	..	-3	-10	9
Austria	-1	-5	13	0	-1	15	-1	-6	10	0	-4	15
Belgium	-9	-8	5	-8	-11	8	-10	-7	3	-5	-10	7
Bulgaria	..	-	-	..	-	-	..	-	-	1	-3	5
Canada	..	-4	10	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	-5	9
Chile	..	-6	12	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	-13	7
Colombia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Costa Rica	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Croatia	-4	-9	6	-2	-1	1	-4	-9	4	-2	-9	6
Cyprus	-1	-6	3	0	-2	1	-2	-9	5	-8	-10	11
Czech Republic	..	-4	13	..	-7	14	..	0	10	0	-2	9
Denmark	3	0	7	1	0	5	3	0	8	2	-8	7
Estonia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Finland	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
France	-8	-13	11	-14	-15	9	-7	-13	11	-5	-11	11
Germany	2	1	6	..	..	..	..	..	..	0	0	4
Greece	-8	-11	1	-4	-11	5	-9	-12	1	-12	-16	9
Hungary	0	-3	7	1	-1	4	..	-6	10	0	-4	6
Iceland	-2	-8	6	..	-9	5	-3	-9	9	-1	-14	12
Ireland	-3	-13	10	-4	-18	9	0	-2	-4	-7	-11	11
Israel	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Italy	-3	4	1	-2	3	0	-4	3	1	-7	-10	6
Japan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Korea	1	-1	7	0	..	..	0	..	..	-4	-8	9
Latvia	..	-1	11	..	-7	12	..	-1	11	0	-5	11
Lithuania	0	0	8	-1	0	0	0	0	7	0	-4	12
Luxembourg	-4	0	9	-4	0	9	-2	3	10	-2	0	6

	Foreign-born			EU-born			Non-EU born			Native-born		
	Very low (ISCED 0-1)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	High (ISCED 5+)	Very low (ISCED 0-1)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	High (ISCED 5+)	Very low (ISCED 0-1)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	High (ISCED 5+)	Very low (ISCED 0-1)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	High (ISCED 5+)
Malta	-3	-19	16	-4	..	..	..	..	..	-12	-21	9
Mexico	..	3	-10	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	-12	2
Netherlands	-4	-11	11	-6	-11	13	-3	-10	10	-3	-9	11
New Zealand	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Norway	3	-7	6	2	-4	7	3	-8	5	0	-3	9
Poland	0	-5	25	..	-8	35	0	-6	24	0	-5	10
Portugal	-14	-21	14	-9	-13	12	-16	-24	15	-25	-24	12
Romania	-	-	-	..	-	-	-	-	-	-1	-7	5
Slovak Republic	..	-10	16	..	-11	9	..	-5	25	1	-1	9
Slovenia	-3	-13	7	-2	-8	12	-3	-16	6	-1	-7	13
Spain	-9	-8	8	-5	-6	9	-11	-10	9	-12	-11	10
Sweden	-2	-2	10	-5	-10	19	-2	0	7	-2	-8	12
Switzerland	-4	-8	12	-4	-8	12	-3	-8	12	0	-4	11
Türkiye	..	-1	4	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	-12	9
United Kingdom	2	-4	14	1	-2	14	2	-5	15	1	-6	8
United States	-4	-8	9	0	..	..	0	..	..	0	-2	7
<b>OECD total</b>	<b>-3</b>	<b>-6</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>-4</b>	<b>-7</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>-3</b>	<b>-7</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>-2</b>	<b>-5</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>EU total</b>	<b>-4</b>	<b>-5</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>-6</b>	<b>-7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>-5</b>	<b>-8</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>-5</b>	<b>-8</b>	<b>8</b>

Note: ".." value is missing, "-" value is below the sample size threshold.

Source: Indicator 3.1.

Table A B.4. Distribution by level of education and gender, evolution between 2010 and 2020

Change in percentage points, 15-64 year-olds not in education

	Foreign-born men			Foreign-born women			Native-born men			Native-born women			Recent migrants (<5 years)		
	Low (ISCED 0-2)	Medium (ISCED 3-4)	High (ISCED 5+)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	Medium (ISCED 3-4)	High (ISCED 5+)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	Medium (ISCED 3-4)	High (ISCED 5+)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	Medium (ISCED 3-4)	High (ISCED 5+)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	Medium (ISCED 3-4)	High (ISCED 5+)
Australia	-6	-7	13	-10	-6	16	-9	3	7	-12	1	11	-2	-8	10
Austria	-2	-8	10	-8	-7	16	-1	-12	14	-6	-11	17	-1	-11	12
Belgium	-7	4	4	-9	3	6	-9	5	4	-11	0	10	-9	-3	11
Bulgaria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-3	-2	5	-3	-3	6	-	-	-
Canada	-4	-6	9	-4	-6	11	-5	-2	7	-4	-6	11	-4	-6	9
Chile	-7	-2	9	-5	-9	14	-11	5	6	-14	6	8	..	..	..
Colombia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Costa Rica	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Croatia	-8	1	7	-10	6	4	-7	3	4	-11	2	9	..	..	..
Cyprus	-3	-1	4	-8	4	3	-8	1	7	-12	-4	15	-7	-1	8
Czech Republic	-2	-6	8	-7	-11	18	0	-5	5	-4	-8	12	-3	-15	18
Denmark	4	-7	3	-3	-7	10	-5	0	5	-10	1	9	5	-14	8
Estonia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Finland	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	10	-12	3
France	-15	5	10	-12	1	11	-9	-1	10	-12	-1	13	-10	0	9
Germany	4	-10	6	-2	-5	7	1	-5	3	-2	-3	4	10	-12	2
Greece	-12	11	0	-10	8	1	-18	11	7	-14	4	11	-5	1	4
Hungary	-1	-2	3	-5	-5	11	-3	-2	5	-6	-2	8	-3	6	-2
Iceland	-6	-4	10	-9	7	2	-11	2	9	-16	2	15	..	..	..
Ireland	-13	2	11	-13	3	9	-12	1	11	-11	-1	12	-16	-10	26
Israel	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Italy	6	-6	0	2	-4	2	-9	4	4	-12	4	7	3	-10	7
Japan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Korea	1	-9	8	-4	-3	7	-6	-2	8	-10	-1	11	-2	-8	10
Latvia	0	-9	9	-2	-11	13	-5	-2	7	-4	-10	15	..	..	..
Lithuania	-1	-10	11	1	-7	6	-4	-7	11	-5	-9	14	-	-	-
Luxembourg	2	-7	5	-1	-12	13	4	-5	1	-5	-6	11	1	-10	9

	Foreign-born men			Foreign-born women			Native-born men			Native-born women			Recent migrants (<5 years)		
	Low (ISCED 0-2)	Medium (ISCED 3-4)	High (ISCED 5+)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	Medium (ISCED 3-4)	High (ISCED 5+)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	Medium (ISCED 3-4)	High (ISCED 5+)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	Medium (ISCED 3-4)	High (ISCED 5+)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	Medium (ISCED 3-4)	High (ISCED 5+)
Malta	-17	0	17	-20	4	16	-19	10	9	-24	13	10	-	-	-
Mexico	5	3	-8	0	12	-12	-13	12	1	-12	9	3	..	..	..
Netherlands	-10	3	7	-11	-3	14	-8	-1	9	-11	-3	14	-12	-7	19
New Zealand	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Norway	-5	0	6	-8	2	6	-3	-6	8	-4	-7	11	-4	4	0
Poland	-5	-14	19	-5	-26	31	-4	-4	8	-5	-8	13	..	..	..
Portugal	-26	13	13	-17	2	15	-24	14	10	-25	11	14	-37	9	28
Romania	-	-	-	-	-	-	-4	1	4	-10	3	6	-	-	-
Slovak Republic	2	-15	13	-21	1	19	0	-6	6	-2	-10	13	-	-	-
Slovenia	-9	6	3	-17	6	11	-6	-4	11	-8	-7	15	-10	5	4
Spain	-9	1	8	-7	-1	8	-10	1	8	-13	2	12	-19	-1	20
Sweden	1	-8	8	-4	-8	12	-7	-2	9	-8	-6	15	5	-5	0
Switzerland	-6	-4	10	-10	-5	14	-2	-6	8	-6	-8	15	-4	-8	12
Türkiye	-1	-4	5	-1	-2	3	-10	3	8	-13	4	10	..	..	..
United Kingdom	-1	-11	12	-7	-10	16	-3	-3	6	-9	-1	9	-1	-20	21
United States	-9	0	9	-7	-2	9	-2	-3	5	-2	-7	9	-14	-1	15
<b>OECD total</b>	<b>-6</b>	<b>-3</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>-6</b>	<b>-3</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>-5</b>	<b>-1</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>-6</b>	<b>-2</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>-9</b>	<b>-6</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>EU total</b>	<b>-4</b>	<b>-2</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>-6</b>	<b>-2</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>-6</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>-9</b>	<b>-1</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>-7</b>	<b>-7</b>	<b>14</b>

Note: ".." value is missing, "-" value is below the sample size threshold, recent migrants refer to less than 10 years of residence for Australia, Canada and Korea.

Source: Indicator 3.1.

Table A B.5. Share of migrants with foreign education, 2020

Percentages, 15-64 year-olds not in education

	Total			Highly educated					Highly educated born in an EU country			Highly educated born in a non-EU country		
	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Recent (<5 years)	Settled (>=10 years)	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women
Australia	..	..	..	49	48	51	80	35	..	..	..	..	..	..
Austria	74	73	74	68	69	67	94	48	69	70	68	67	67	67
Belgium	71	72	71	65	67	63	98	44	71	75	68	58	59	57
Bulgaria	-	-	-	-	-	-	..	-	-	-	..	-	-	-
Canada	46	47	46	45	46	44	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Chile	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Colombia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Costa Rica	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Croatia	49	45	53	23	28	20	-	20	-	-	-	24	25	24
Cyprus	82	80	83	69	69	69	96	47	67	69	66	70	69	71
Czech Republic	69	68	70	53	47	59	99	31	37	33	42	69	63	75
Denmark	64	67	61	54	59	49	84	30	53	59	47	55	59	51
Estonia	38	40	35	39	43	35	94	20	57	64	49	36	39	34
Finland	53	54	52	37	34	38	83	25	25	22	28	42	40	43
France	54	53	56	41	37	44	84	26	48	58	41	39	33	45
Germany	67	66	67	61	59	63	96	38	61	59	62	62	59	64
Greece	75	74	76	54	47	57	..	47	46	15	60	58	60	57
Hungary	70	73	68	51	59	46	99	31	45	50	42	60	68	53
Iceland	59	59	59	43	39	46	84	22	38	29	46	49	55	45
Ireland	67	70	64	66	68	65	97	45	73	74	71	63	65	61
Israel	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Italy	75	73	77	57	51	60	96	46	47	44	49	62	54	65
Japan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Korea	94	95	92	85	88	81	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Latvia	34	38	31	35	41	30	..	22	70	64	-	30	37	25
Lithuania	76	78	75	59	63	56	-	54	-	-	-	59	61	58
Luxembourg	81	81	81	83	84	81	96	64	82	83	81	83	87	80

	Total			Highly educated					Highly educated born in an EU country			Highly educated born in a non-EU country		
	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Recent (<5 years)	Settled (>=10 years)	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women
Malta	79	80	78	82	84	80	..	46	..	..	..	..	..	..
Mexico	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Netherlands	44	41	46	44	42	46	87	33	52	53	51	41	38	43
New Zealand	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Norway	62	64	59	59	63	57	92	40	68	73	65	52	56	49
Poland	98	99	96	97	99	94	..	..	..	..	..	95	99	92
Portugal	44	40	47	36	35	36	99	12	21	16	24	42	42	41
Romania	50	-	-	-	-	-	..	-	..	..	..	-	-	-
Slovak Republic	63	66	61	46	46	46	..	29	25	-	-	64	-	71
Slovenia	70	70	69	47	44	50	98	20	29	29	29	53	49	56
Spain	74	73	75	64	63	64	95	48	60	64	57	65	63	67
Sweden	63	63	62	60	64	55	96	36	63	73	56	57	61	54
Switzerland	70	70	71	68	68	68	94	42	69	72	67	65	60	69
Türkiye	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
United Kingdom	53	56	51	41	45	38	86	20	42	50	36	41	43	39
United States	58	57	60	53	52	54	93	40	..	..	..	..	..	..
<b>OECD total</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>53</b>
<b>EU total</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>59</b>

Note: ".." value is missing, "-" value is below the sample size threshold.

Source: Indicator 3.1.

Table A B.6. Employment rates, 2021

Percentages, 15-64 year-olds

	Foreign-born									Native-born				
	Total	Men	Women	Low-educated	Highly educated	EU-born	Non-EU born	Recent (<5 years)	Settled (>=10 years)	Total	Men	Women	Low-educated	Highly educated
Australia	71	78	64	51	84	..	..	54	71	74	76	71	58	88
Austria	68	75	61	54	80	73	63	60	70	74	77	71	52	90
Belgium	59	68	51	42	80	70	52	55	60	67	69	65	47	89
Bulgaria	56	-	-	-	-	74	-	-	-	68	72	64	45	90
Canada	73	79	67	55	82	..	..	72	74	73	75	71	55	84
Chile	70	80	62	..	..	..	..	..	..	54	63	46	..	..
Colombia	66	83	49	..	..	..	..	..	..	60	74	48	..	..
Costa Rica	62	80	46	..	..	..	..	..	..	57	69	44	..	..
Croatia	65	74	57	43	85	69	64	-	66	63	68	59	42	86
Cyprus	71	77	66	71	74	74	69	69	71	71	77	65	58	88
Czech Republic	80	89	69	75	83	81	79	74	82	74	81	67	52	88
Denmark	70	75	64	59	84	77	66	67	71	76	79	74	62	90
Estonia	71	78	65	56	76	72	71	69	72	74	75	73	62	90
Finland	66	73	59	58	84	75	62	54	72	73	74	73	54	89
France	61	70	54	52	77	71	59	48	64	68	70	66	50	88
Germany	68	76	61	58	80	77	64	57	74	78	80	75	63	91
Greece	55	70	44	53	62	59	54	37	56	57	66	49	52	77
Hungary	80	85	76	80	88	84	74	63	85	73	78	68	57	91
Iceland	77	82	72	81	81	78	75	77	77	80	83	78	69	93
Ireland	72	78	66	58	85	75	70	74	71	69	73	65	50	88
Israel	78	79	77	70	85	..	..	70	79	64	66	62	41	88
Italy	59	74	47	58	69	61	59	36	63	58	66	50	48	86
Japan	77	85	71	..	..	..	..	..	..	77	83	70	..	..
Korea	67	80	51	69	72	..	..	61	73	67	76	58	62	77
Latvia	67	74	61	48	78	73	66	64	67	70	72	69	59	87
Lithuania	68	74	63	-	80	75	67	68	68	73	73	72	51	90
Luxembourg	73	77	68	71	88	75	67	77	72	65	67	63	61	94



	Foreign-born									Native-born				
	Total	Men	Women	Low-educated	Highly educated	EU-born	Non-EU born	Recent (<5 years)	Settled (>=10 years)	Total	Men	Women	Low-educated	Highly educated
Malta	79	87	72	74	87	87	76	80	77	73	81	65	62	93
Mexico	52	65	39	..	..	..	..	..	..	61	77	46	..	..
Netherlands	67	74	60	55	80	77	64	59	70	83	85	80	70	91
New Zealand	81	86	75	69	89	..	..	80	81	77	80	74	70	91
Norway	70	74	66	59	84	79	64	66	71	78	79	77	64	93
Poland	80	87	74	-	89	82	80	77	78	70	77	64	45	91
Portugal	76	82	72	75	90	81	74	..	..	70	72	67	70	91
Romania	54	57	-	-	-	20	-	-	66	62	71	52	42	90
Slovak Republic	74	81	66	-	89	72	77	65	75	69	73	66	27	89
Slovenia	68	76	59	48	83	70	67	67	69	72	74	69	48	91
Spain	60	68	54	58	71	65	59	51	63	63	68	59	57	83
Sweden	65	70	60	57	86	80	60	52	74	79	80	78	70	94
Switzerland	75	82	69	65	84	82	68	73	76	81	84	79	52	92
Türkiye	40	60	24	36	53	51	34	..	..	48	65	30	43	69
United Kingdom	75	82	70	68	85	82	72	65	78	75	78	73	56	87
United States	70	81	59	63	79	..	..	63	72	68	71	65	34	83
<b>OECD total</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>84</b>
<b>EU total</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>88</b>

Note: ".." value is missing, "-" value is below the sample size threshold.

Source: Indicator 3.4.

Table A B.7. Employment rates, evolution between 2011 and 2021

Change in percentage points, 15-64 year-olds

	Foreign-born									Native-born				
	Total	Men	Women	Low-educated	Highly educated	EU-born	Non-EU born	Recent (<5 years)	Settled (>=10 years)	Total	Men	Women	Low-educated	Highly educated
Australia	1	-1	2	-9	2	..	..	..	-3	0	-2	2	-9	1
Austria	2	2	2	0	1	3	0	1	2	2	0	3	-1	0
Belgium	7	7	7	2	6	8	6	6	6	3	1	5	-1	3
Bulgaria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	12	10	10	8
Canada	5	4	5	2	3	..	..	14	3	1	0	1	0	-1
Chile	2	0	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	-3	-8	2	..	..
Colombia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Costa Rica	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Croatia	13	15	11	9	9	10	13	-	14	8	7	9	-3	8
Cyprus	0	5	-3	-6	2	-2	2	-6	5	4	3	6	-2	2
Czech Republic	12	9	15	37	2	16	6	12	15	8	7	10	10	3
Denmark	11	12	9	7	2	10	10	14	11	3	3	3	1	3
Estonia	7	8	4	18	5	8	7	-	7	8	8	9	6	7
Finland	6	7	4	3	14	4	8	5	5	5	4	6	-2	4
France	2	3	2	1	3	2	4	5	4	3	1	4	-5	3
Germany	2	1	3	2	-1	..	..	2	6	5	3	6	8	2
Greece	-3	0	-3	-12	1	-2	-3	-19	-1	3	1	4	-1	2
Hungary	15	14	16	38	2	18	13	7	19	15	17	14	19	7
Iceland	1	4	-2	3	-3	1	1	-3	3	2	2	1	-6	1
Ireland	12	12	11	9	8	8	14	12	13	9	9	9	7	4
Israel	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Italy	-2	-1	-3	-2	-4	-2	-2	-13	-3	2	1	4	0	4
Japan	12	8	14	..	..	..	..	..	..	6	3	10	..	..
Korea	-7	-6	-7	..	..	..	..	-9	2	-6	-11	-2	..	..
Latvia	5	9	2	3	6	16	4	15	5	10	11	8	13	3
Lithuania	6	7	5	-	8	-	5	-	4	13	13	12	18	2
Luxembourg	3	-2	7	2	4	2	5	3	4	5	1	10	8	4

	Foreign-born									Native-born				
	Total	Men	Women	Low-educated	Highly educated	EU-born	Non-EU born	Recent (<5 years)	Settled (>=10 years)	Total	Men	Women	Low-educated	Highly educated
Malta	19	11	24	18	14	..	..	17	15	16	7	23	13	3
Mexico	-2	1	-4	..	..	..	..	..	..	0	-1	1	..	..
Netherlands	2	2	2	-2	3	3	1	9	5	5	3	7	2	4
New Zealand	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Norway	0	0	-1	-4	0	-2	0	-3	-1	2	2	2	-3	0
Poland	27	26	27	-	15	30	26	-	24	13	13	12	10	5
Portugal	11	14	8	6	-3	10	10	..	..	8	6	10	6	7
Romania	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	12	8	8	5
Slovak Republic	12	8	16	-	15	15	7	-	19	8	8	9	5	1
Slovenia	6	8	5	-2	6	13	4	10	6	8	7	8	4	7
Spain	6	10	2	7	2	6	5	0	6	5	3	6	5	2
Sweden	2	3	2	2	4	7	2	7	4	4	3	4	0	2
Switzerland	1	-1	3	-2	2	2	-1	-1	2	1	-1	4	-12	0
Türkiye	-5	-4	-5	..	..	2	1	..	..	-1	-4	2	..	..
United Kingdom	8	5	11	8	4	4	9	4	11	4	3	6	3	2
United States	2	3	2	2	2	..	..	5	2	3	3	3	0	2
<b>OECD total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>-6</b>
<b>EU total</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>

Note: ".." value is missing, "-" value is below the sample size threshold.

Source: Indicator 3.4.

Table A B.8. Unemployment rates, 2021

Percentages of the labour force, 15-64 year-olds

	Foreign-born									Native-born				
	Total	Men	Women	Low-educated	Highly educated	EU-born	Non-EU born	Recent (<5 years)	Settled (>=10 years)	Total	Men	Women	Low-educated	Highly educated
Australia	7	7	8	9	6	..	..	16	6	6	7	6	10	4
Austria	11	11	12	18	8	9	14	14	10	5	5	5	14	2
Belgium	11	10	12	18	6	6	15	13	11	5	6	5	11	3
Bulgaria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	6	5	16	2
Canada	8	8	9	13	7	..	..	9	8	7	8	6	13	5
Chile	10	8	12	..	..	..	..	..	..	13	12	14	..	..
Colombia	6	6	6	..	..	..	..	..	..	6	7	5	..	..
Costa Rica	18	11	27	..	..	..	..	..	..	17	13	22	..	..
Croatia	7	7	8	10	5	9	7	-	-	8	7	8	11	5
Cyprus	10	11	9	10	8	8	11	13	9	7	6	8	8	6
Czech Republic	3	3	4	7	3	3	3	6	3	3	2	3	14	1
Denmark	8	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	5	..	..	..	..
Estonia	10	8	12	16	8	9	10	11	10	6	7	5	13	3
Finland	14	12	16	18	9	11	15	18	12	7	8	6	12	4
France	12	12	13	15	9	7	14	17	11	7	7	7	15	5
Germany	6	7	6	9	5	4	8	10	5	3	3	3	8	2
Greece	23	17	29	25	20	19	24	22	23	14	11	18	16	10
Hungary	3	4	3	4	3	3	4	7	2	4	4	4	11	2
Iceland	11	9	13	7	10	12	9	13	10	5	5	5	8	2
Ireland	7	7	8	..	..	7	8	..	..	6	6	6	..	..
Israel	5	5	4	5	4	..	..	7	4	5	5	5	6	3
Italy	13	11	16	14	11	12	14	26	12	9	9	10	14	4
Japan	5	5	5	..	..	..	..	..	..	4	4	3	..	..
Korea	6	5	8	6	6	..	..	6	6	4	4	4	4	4
Latvia	8	8	9	19	6	8	8	12	8	8	9	7	14	5
Lithuania	10	7	13	-	5	6	10	-	-	7	8	7	17	4
Luxembourg	6	5	7	7	4	5	10	8	4	4	5	4	7	1

	Foreign-born									Native-born				
	Total	Men	Women	Low-educated	Highly educated	EU-born	Non-EU born	Recent (<5 years)	Settled (>=10 years)	Total	Men	Women	Low-educated	Highly educated
Malta	4	4	5	6	1	3	5	4	3	3	4	2	5	1
Mexico	5	5	6	..	..	..	..	..	..	4	4	4	..	..
Netherlands	8	7	9	8	6	6	9	13	6	4	4	4	5	2
New Zealand	3	3	3	4	2	..	..	4	3	4	4	4	6	2
Norway	9	9	9	13	6	6	11	11	7	3	4	3	6	1
Poland	5	4	6	-	-	2	6	6	6	3	3	3	9	2
Portugal	8	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	7	..	..	..	..
Romania	4	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	6	6	5	14	2
Slovak Republic	8	6	11	-	-	10	5	11	7	7	7	7	42	3
Slovenia	7	4	10	10	6	7	7	8	6	5	4	5	8	3
Spain	22	19	25	25	17	18	23	27	20	13	12	15	20	7
Sweden	19	17	22	28	8	7	23	29	13	6	6	5	10	2
Switzerland	8	7	9	12	6	6	11	10	7	4	4	4	13	2
Türkiye	16	15	18	15	14	..	..	..	..	13	13	15	13	12
United Kingdom	5	4	5	5	3	4	5	7	4	3	4	3	5	2
United States	6	5	6	7	4	..	..	6	5	5	6	5	12	3
<b>OECD total</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>EU total</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>4</b>

Note: ".." value is missing, "-" value is below the sample size threshold.

Source: Indicator 3.5.

Table A B.9. Unemployment rates, evolution between 2011 and 2021

Change in percentage points, 15-64 year-olds

	Foreign-born									Native-born				
	Total	Men	Women	Low-educated	Highly educated	EU-born	Non-EU born	Recent (<5 years)	Settled (>=10 years)	Total	Men	Women	Low-educated	Highly educated
Australia	2	2	2	1	3	..	..	0	1	1	2	1	3	1
Austria	2	1	2	5	1	1	3	4	2	1	1	1	3	1
Belgium	-4	-5	-3	-6	-2	-2	-5	-6	-2	-1	0	-2	-1	0
Bulgaria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-7	-8	-6	-15	-3
Canada	0	0	0	-1	-1	..	..	-5	0	0	0	0	-1	0
Chile	4	4	5	..	..	..	..	..	..	5	5	4	..	..
Colombia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Costa Rica	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Croatia	-9	-9	-8	-12	-2	-6	-9	-	-	-6	-6	-6	-7	-4
Cyprus	0	-1	0	3	-2	-5	2	4	-4	0	-1	0	-1	0
Czech Republic	-5	-3	-7	-22	-1	-6	-3	0	-6	-4	-4	-4	-10	-1
Denmark	-7	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	-3	..	..	..	..
Estonia	-7	-8	-6	-5	-7	-6	-7	-	-	-6	-6	-6	-12	-4
Finland	-2	-5	1	-4	-5	1	-5	0	-3	-1	-1	-1	0	0
France	-3	-2	-3	-4	-2	0	-4	-7	-2	-1	-1	-2	0	0
Germany	-2	-2	-3	-6	0	..	..	0	-4	-2	-2	-2	-9	0
Greece	0	-5	6	3	0	3	0	2	-2	-4	-4	-4	-3	-2
Hungary	-6	-5	-6	-14	0	-6	-6	-1	-6	-7	-7	-6	-14	-2
Iceland	0	-3	2	-4	4	0	-1	1	4	-2	-2	-1	-1	-2
Ireland	-10	-12	-9	..	..	-11	-10	..	..	-9	-12	-6	..	..
Israel	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Italy	2	1	2	2	3	1	2	8	2	1	1	1	3	-1
Japan	-3	-4	-2	..	..	..	..	..	..	-3	-3	-2	..	..
Korea	2	2	3	2	2	..	..	2	1	1	1	1	2	0
Latvia	-10	-12	-8	-5	-7	-14	-9	-	-	-9	-10	-7	-13	-3
Lithuania	-9	-10	-8	-	-	-	-8	-	-	-8	-10	-6	-22	-2
Luxembourg	0	1	-2	-1	-1	0	-1	0	-1	1	2	0	-1	0

	Foreign-born									Native-born				
	Total	Men	Women	Low-educated	Highly educated	EU-born	Non-EU born	Recent (<5 years)	Settled (>=10 years)	Total	Men	Women	Low-educated	Highly educated
Malta	-3	-5	-2	-5	-3	-	-3	-5	-4	-3	-2	-5	-4	0
Mexico	-2	-3	0	0	0	..	..	..	..	-1	-1	-1	..	..
Netherlands	-4	-5	-3	-5	-3	-2	-4	-6	-5	-2	-1	-2	-1	-1
New Zealand	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Norway	1	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
Poland	-7	-6	-9	-	-	-	-9	-	-	-7	-6	-7	-11	-3
Portugal	-10	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	-7	..	..	..	..
Romania	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-4	-4	-4	-2	-3
Slovak Republic	-7	-6	-10	-	-	-5	-12	-	-	-7	-7	-7	-12	-2
Slovenia	-5	-6	-4	-8	-2	-4	-5	-4	-6	-3	-4	-3	-6	-2
Spain	-10	-14	-5	-12	-4	-11	-9	-4	-10	-6	-7	-5	-7	-3
Sweden	3	1	6	6	1	-1	3	-1	1	-1	-1	-1	0	0
Switzerland	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	3	0	0	1	0	4	0
Türkiye	5	5	5	..	..	..	..	..	..	4	4	5	..	..
United Kingdom	-2	-3	-1	-2	-2	-2	-2	0	-2	-3	-4	-2	-4	-1
United States	-4	-4	-3	-5	-2	..	..	-4	-4	-4	-4	-3	-11	-1
<b>OECD total</b>	<b>-3</b>	<b>-3</b>	<b>-2</b>	<b>-4</b>	<b>-1</b>	<b>-3</b>	<b>-6</b>	<b>-3</b>	<b>-2</b>	<b>-2</b>	<b>-2</b>	<b>-2</b>	<b>-4</b>	<b>-1</b>
<b>EU total</b>	<b>-4</b>	<b>-5</b>	<b>-3</b>	<b>-6</b>	<b>-2</b>	<b>-4</b>	<b>-4</b>	<b>-4</b>	<b>-1</b>	<b>-3</b>	<b>-3</b>	<b>-3</b>	<b>-3</b>	<b>-1</b>

Note: ".." value is missing, "-" value is below the sample size threshold.

Source: Indicator 3.5.

Table A B.10. Overqualification rates, 2021

Percentages of the highly educated employed 15-64 year-olds, not in education

	Foreign-born											Native-born		
	Total	Men	Women	Recent (<10 years)	Settled (>=10 years)	Foreign- educated	Host-country educated	EU-born	Non-EU born	Non-EU born, foreign- educated	Non-EU born, host- country educated	Total	Men	Women
Australia	30	30	31	34	28	33	28	..	..	..	..	22	23	21
Austria	39	40	39	41	38	44	26	33	47	54	30	26	25	26
Belgium	26	23	28	29	25	33	22	21	32	50	25	20	19	21
Bulgaria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	21	23	20
Canada	57	54	61	60	56	62	51	..	..	..	..	54	53	54
Chile	48	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	23	..	..
Colombia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Costa Rica	56	62	48	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	32	34	31
Croatia	15	16	14	-	15	15	10	-	12	-	10	15	15	15
Cyprus	43	34	50	42	43	48	42	42	43	55	42	30	26	33
Czech Republic	22	17	28	22	22	-	-	12	35	31	33	13	11	16
Denmark	24	26	22	..	..	37	16	20	26	46	21	12	12	12
Estonia	38	40	36	34	42	36	40	-	39	42	41	19	22	18
Finland	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
France	26	23	29	31	24	40	20	23	27	46	20	20	19	20
Germany	31	30	32	33	30	39	19	31	31	38	22	18	18	18
Greece	55	61	52	44	56	55	53	35	67	63	63	33	35	30
Hungary	14	12	15	20	12	19	10	11	18	28	6	13	13	14
Iceland	42	40	44	58	27	-	17	43	38	47	26	10	10	10
Ireland	32	..	..	..	..	36	29	41	28	30	25	26	..	..
Israel	33	32	33	56	29	..	..	..	..	..	..	17	18	16
Italy	49	45	52	54	49	64	33	36	54	72	37	19	15	21
Japan	65	60	72	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	66	67	65
Korea	73	76	67	76	65	76	53	..	..	..	..	61	65	56
Latvia	20	19	21	10	23	17	22	9	22	26	23	18	22	17



	Foreign-born											Native-born		
	Total	Men	Women	Recent (<10 years)	Settled (>=10 years)	Foreign- educated	Host-country educated	EU-born	Non-EU born	Non-EU born, foreign- educated	Non-EU born, host- country educated	Total	Men	Women
Lithuania	29	31	27	28	30	21	21	-	31	23	20	22	24	20
Luxembourg	5	5	6	5	6	5	6	4	10	9	6	4	3	6
Malta	33	25	40	37	23	29	-	27	37	..	..	12	10	15
Mexico	35	33	38	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	42	45	39
Netherlands	24	22	26	25	23	37	17	22	25	46	14	14	13	15
New Zealand	27	24	31	32	25	..	..	..	..	..	..	21	18	23
Norway	31	29	33	41	26	39	17	30	32	40	17	11	12	9
Poland	30	24	36	41	17	-	-	-	37	46	-	19	20	18
Portugal	..	..	..	..	..	45	16	..	..	51	..	..	..	..
Romania	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	17	16
Slovak Republic	33	29	38	-	20	35	5	26	44	-	-	23	19	25
Slovenia	26	30	22	37	23	23	15	14	33	29	19	18	18	17
Spain	52	50	53	51	52	60	44	48	53	61	44	34	34	34
Sweden	21	23	19	25	18	34	10	15	24	41	10	10	11	10
Switzerland	19	17	21	19	20	20	17	16	25	26	21	19	20	17
Türkiye	32	..	..	27	32	..	..	..	..	..	..	34	..	..
United Kingdom	31	28	33	33	30	34	25	33	29	31	25	25	23	27
United States	35	35	35	37	35	40	32	..	..	..	..	34	37	31
<b>OECD total</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>34</b>
<b>EU total</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>21</b>

Note: ".." value is missing, "-" value is below the sample size threshold.

Source: Indicator 3.12.

Table A B.11. Overqualification rates, evolution between 2011 and 2021

Change in percentage points, 15-64 year-olds, not in education

	Foreign-born					Native-born		
	Total	Men	Women	Recent (<10 years)	Settled (≥10 years)	Total	Men	Women
Australia	2	4	0	-	3	1	3	0
Austria	9	10	7	13	5	3	-2	11
Belgium	-5	-4	-7	-5	-4	0	1	-2
Bulgaria	-	-	-	-	-	-2	-5	0
Canada	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Chile	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Colombia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Costa Rica	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Croatia	-4	4	-11	-	-4	2	5	0
Cyprus	-9	-8	-7	-14	-2	2	2	2
Czech Republic	5	9	-4	4	6	2	1	2
Denmark	3	..	..	..	..	1	..	..
Estonia	..	..	..	0	0	..	..	..
Finland	..	..	..	-9	-3	..	..	..
France	0	1	-2	-5	0	1	3	-1
Germany	7	10	4	9	5	6	8	4
Greece	-6	4	-14	-26	-2	10	10	10
Hungary	0	-1	2	10	-3	0	0	1
Iceland	11	8	14	14	-2	3	4	2
Ireland	-7	..	..	..	..	-1	..	..
Israel	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Italy	-3	-1	-5	-11	3	3	3	2
Japan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Korea	8	8	8	14	19	4	5	4
Latvia	-6	-6	-5	-	-4	0	1	-1
Lithuania	9	-	7	-	8	6	6	7
Luxembourg	0	0	-1	1	-1	1	0	2

	Foreign-born					Native-born		
	Total	Men	Women	Recent (<10 years)	Settled (>=10 years)	Total	Men	Women
Malta	15	14	17	-	14	1	2	-1
Mexico	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Netherlands	-1	-2	-1	-12	0	0	1	0
New Zealand	-3	-5	0	..	-2	-10	-16	-6
Norway	2	2	3	6	2	1	4	-2
Poland	9	-	-	-	-	0	0	0
Portugal	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Romania	-	-	-	-	-	4	5	3
Slovak Republic	21	-	-	-	-	9	6	11
Slovenia	11	18	5	-	9	9	7	9
Spain	-1	3	-6	-9	7	1	1	1
Sweden	-11	-12	-10	-17	-8	-1	-1	-1
Switzerland	-2	-3	-1	-1	-3	-3	-2	-4
Türkiye	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
United Kingdom	-2	-3	-2	-10	4	1	2	-1
United States	-3	-3	-3	-1	-3	-2	-1	-2
<b>OECD total</b>	<b>-1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>-2</b>	<b>-3</b>	<b>-1</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>EU total</b>	<b>-1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>-3</b>	<b>-8</b>	<b>-1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>

Note: ".." value is missing, "-" value is below the sample size threshold.

Source: Indicator 3.12.



## Annex C. Living conditions

Access the data for tables in Annex C:

StatLink  <https://stat.link/8endma>

Table A C.1. Relative poverty rates, 2020

Percentages, population aged 16 and above

	Foreign-born							Native-born		
	Total	EU-born	Non-EU born	Low-educated	Highly educated	Recent (<10 years)	Settled (>=10 years)	Total	Low-educated	Highly educated
Australia	22	..	..	..	..	..	..	19	..	..
Austria	31	26	37	44	20	42	23	11	22	7
Belgium	30	22	35	43	15	34	29	13	28	5
Bulgaria	27	-	25	-	-	-	30	24	53	8
Canada	19	..	..	..	..	..	..	15	..	..
Chile	17	..	..	..	..	..	..	28	..	..
Colombia	33	..	..	..	..	..	..	34	..	..
Costa Rica	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Croatia	27	15	28	51	8	-	27	20	44	5
Cyprus	30	26	32	55	14	37	26	14	35	5
Czech Republic	13	16	8	37	4	10	14	12	36	3
Denmark	24	18	27	34	15	37	16	12	19	6
Estonia	32	..	..	48	26	20	32	21	39	14
Finland	18	13	21	..	11	18	16	14	27	5
France	28	21	30	34	18	40	25	11	17	5
Germany	17	..	..	27	12	..	..	15	32	7
Greece	31	23	33	37	19	35	30	17	25	6
Hungary	15	20	6	-	8	-	16	15	33	5
Iceland	16	16	17	8	17	..	..	11	15	6
Ireland	19	15	22	31	16	19	18	15	30	8
Israel	21	..	..	..	..	..	..	23	..	..
Italy	32	29	34	36	26	34	32	19	26	6
Japan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Korea	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Latvia	31	..	..	49	22	-	32	22	43	10
Lithuania	26	-	25	21	25	-	23	29	24	29

	Foreign-born							Native-born		
	Total	EU-born	Non-EU born	Low-educated	Highly educated	Recent (<10 years)	Settled (>=10 years)	Total	Low-educated	Highly educated
Luxembourg	24	19	35	34	11	25	23	11	13	4
Malta	23	..	..	28	16	..	..	19	29	2
Mexico	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Netherlands	29	21	32	41	22	39	26	13	19	7
New Zealand	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Norway	26	16	32	35	13	33	22	12	21	4
Poland	23	22	24	38	17	-	29	17	36	6
Portugal	15	18	14	18	9	14	16	18	25	4
Romania	-	..	..	..	-	..	..	23	50	1
Slovak Republic	12	11	-	-	9	..	..	13	36	5
Slovenia	24	..	..	32	16	..	..	13	35	4
Spain	40	33	42	49	26	35	40	18	26	8
Sweden	33	21	36	38	18	43	24	14	27	7
Switzerland	21	16	28	36	13	19	19	14	36	9
Türkiye	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
United Kingdom	21	15	24	31	14	21	21	20	31	12
United States	32	..	..	56	16	34	32	24	56	13
<b>OECD total</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>EU total</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>6</b>

Note: ".." value is missing, "-" value is below the sample size threshold.

Source: Indicator 4.2.

Table A C.2. Relative poverty rates, 2020

Percentages, by age groups

	Foreign-born					Native-born				
	Adult population (16-year-olds and above)	Children in an immigrant household (0-15 year-olds)	Youth with two foreign-born parents (16-34 year-olds)	Elderly (65-year-olds and above)	Elderly (75-year-olds and above)	Adult population (16-year-olds and above)	Children in a native-born household (0- to 15-year-olds)	Youth with two native-born parents (16-34 year-olds)	Elderly (65-year-olds and above)	Elderly (75-year-olds and above)
Australia	22	..	..	43	..	19	..	..	43	..
Austria	31	43	20	34	33	11	11	10	16	18
Belgium	30	35	23	35	41	13	10	7	20	25
Bulgaria	27	-	-	-	-	24	26	18	41	49
Canada	19	32	..	24	..	15	..	..	26	..
Chile	17	..	..	..	..	28	..	..	..	..
Colombia	33	..	..	..	..	34	..	..	..	..
Costa Rica	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Croatia	27	29	17	40	46	20	16	11	35	40
Cyprus	30	46	20	19	26	14	12	8	37	49
Czech Republic	13	12	-	29	36	12	13	7	25	32
Denmark	24	31	-	16	-	12	8	15	11	18
Estonia	32	30	23	47	56	21	14	11	45	56
Finland	18	26	29	-	-	14	9	12	19	26
France	28	37	27	21	25	11	12	10	11	14
Germany	17	15	21	21	..	15	11	10	19	..
Greece	31	40	39	31	38	17	21	17	15	16
Hungary	15	-	-	16	-	15	14	11	16	17
Iceland	16	21	..	-	-	11	15	..	12	17
Ireland	19	22	-	41	31	15	18	11	25	32
Israel	21	..	33	28	..	23	..	21	24	..
Italy	32	41	26	31	29	19	24	20	19	21
Japan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Korea	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..



	Foreign-born					Native-born				
	Adult population (16-year-olds and above)	Children in an immigrant household (0-15 year-olds)	Youth with two foreign-born parents (16-34 year-olds)	Elderly (65-year-olds and above)	Elderly (75-year-olds and above)	Adult population (16-year-olds and above)	Children in a native-born household (0- to 15-year-olds)	Youth with two native-born parents (16-34 year-olds)	Elderly (65-year-olds and above)	Elderly (75-year-olds and above)
Latvia	31	14	17	50	61	22	15	12	51	60
Lithuania	26	-	-	37	37	29	42	16	38	42
Luxembourg	24	32	20	16	16	11	18	10	8	10
Malta	23	31	-	22	-	19	23	10	37	38
Mexico	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Netherlands	29	45	21	26	22	13	10	8	13	17
New Zealand	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Norway	26	41	23	19	-	12	11	13	11	18
Poland	23	33	-	30	32	17	13	13	23	24
Portugal	15	25	26	19	15	18	20	15	21	25
Romania	-	..	-	..	..	23	..	23	..	38
Slovak Republic	12	69	-	14	-	13	18	13	17	20
Slovenia	24	30	14	20	20	13	9	7	24	29
Spain	40	62	35	46	57	18	20	18	20	26
Sweden	33	46	15	34	42	14	10	12	21	30
Switzerland	21	33	11	41	44	14	..	8	31	37
Türkiye	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
United Kingdom	21	32	..	31	34	20	27	..	25	32
United States	32	51	30	41	48	24	32	22	29	36
<b>OECD total</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>27</b>
<b>EU total</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>22</b>

Note: ".." value is missing, "-" value is below the sample size threshold.

Source: Adults: Indicator 4.2; Children & Youth: Indicator 7.18; Elderly: Indicator 6.2.

Table A C.3. Relative poverty rates, evolution between 2010 and 2020

Change in percentage points, 16-year-olds and above

	Total	EU-born	Foreign-born				Native-born				
			Non-EU born	Low-educated	Highly educated	Recent (<10 years)	Settled (>=10 years)	Total	Low-educated	Highly educated	
Australia	-5	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	-4	..	..
Austria	0	-3	3	6	-11	-1	-3	-2	-5	0	0
Belgium	-3	-1	-7	-2	-1	-5	0	-1	2	0	0
Bulgaria	0	-	0	-	-	-	7	3	10	2	2
Canada	-7	..	..	..	..	..	..	-3	..	..	..
Chile	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Colombia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Costa Rica	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Croatia	1	-4	1	15	-1	-	1	-3	0	0	0
Cyprus	-1	3	-6	13	-6	-2	4	-2	1	1	1
Czech Republic	-2	-1	0	10	-2	-2	-2	2	11	0	0
Denmark	-2	-4	-1	7	-3	-11	2	-2	-1	-1	-1
Estonia	7	..	..	..	..	..	..	3	..	..	..
Finland	-13	..	..	..	..	..	..	-1	..	..	..
France	4	3	4	4	8	3	5	0	1	0	0
Germany	-4	..	..	-5	-1	..	..	..	5	-1	-1
Greece	-11	-10	-11	-14	-5	-12	-13	-2	-2	1	1
Hungary	8	12	-	-	-	-	8	3	11	2	2
Iceland	-8	-8	-7	-16	8	..	..	0	-1	1	1
Ireland	2	-1	1	8	8	2	1	0	7	-1	-1
Israel	-2	..	..	..	..	..	..	-3	..	..	..
Italy	2	-1	3	0	8	1	5	1	2	1	1
Japan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Korea	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Latvia	6	..	..	10	6	-	8	0	6	3	3
Lithuania	8	-	7	-2	16	-	6	8	-5	19	19
Luxembourg	2	1	0	3	5	-2	3	2	1	-1	-1

	Foreign-born							Native-born		
	Total	EU-born	Non-EU born	Low-educated	Highly educated	Recent (<10 years)	Settled (>=10 years)	Total	Low-educated	Highly educated
Malta	-3	..	..	-6	-4	..	..	2	7	-3
Mexico	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Netherlands	10	4	12	17	10	5	11	2	6	0
New Zealand	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Norway	7	5	8	14	5	7	8	0	2	-1
Poland	2	10	-3	14	-	-	-8	0	4	1
Portugal	-7	6	-10	-8	5	-13	-7	-1	4	2
Romania	-	..	..	..	-	..	..	1	12	0
Slovak Republic	-6	-8	-	-	-	..	..	..	9	0
Slovenia	4	..	..	2	8	..	..	-1	4	1
Spain	2	-4	3	5	4	35	40	-1	2	2
Sweden	8	2	8	5	1	-2	3	-1	2	0
Switzerland	1	0	0	3	4	3	-2	-1	0	0
Türkiye	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
United Kingdom	-3	1	-3	-3	2	-5	-1	1	-1	3
United States	-2	..	..	2	0	-5	0	1	5	3
<b>OECD total</b>	<b>-2</b>	<b>-1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>-3</b>	<b>-2</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>EU total</b>	<b>-1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>-1</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>

Note: ".." value is missing, "-" value is below the sample size threshold.

Source: Indicator 4.2.

Table A C.4. Overcrowding housing rates, 2020

Percentages, population aged 16 and above

	Foreign-born											Native-born						
	Total	Owners	Tenants	EU-born	Non-EU born	Low-educated	Highly educated	Recent (<10 years)	Settled (>=10 years)	Youth with two foreign-born parents (16-34)	Children in a foreign-born household (0-15)	Total	Owners	Tenants	Low-educated	Highly educated	Youth with two native-born parents (16-34)	Children in a native-born household (0-15)
Australia	9	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	4	..	..	..	..	..	..
Austria	28	9	36	18	36	42	15	35	24	27	44	5	1	13	8	3	8	7
Belgium	14	5	21	8	17	16	10	22	11	14	23	2	1	7	3	1	2	4
Bulgaria	46	-	-	-	52	-	-	-	49	-	-	31	28	72	40	27	49	54
Canada	2	..	6	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	2	..	..	..	..
Chile	11	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	7	..	..	..	..	..	..
Colombia	69	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	36	..	..	..	..	..	..
Costa Rica	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Croatia	21	19	61	23	21	23	20	-	21	33	49	25	23	66	24	21	35	44
Cyprus	4	1	7	2	5	6	3	6	3	..	7	1	0	2	1	0	1	0
Czech Republic	18	11	33	15	22	27	15	26	17	-	32	10	6	28	19	7	15	18
Denmark	19	6	27	19	18	23	12	28	13	-	31	7	2	14	5	4	12	6
Estonia	8	7	-	..	..	7	7	11	8	25	29	9	7	23	11	6	13	15
Finland	15	1	24	11	17	..	9	19	12	11	18	6	2	18	6	4	12	8
France	16	4	27	10	18	17	12	31	13	21	24	4	1	12	4	4	6	4
Germany	12	1	17	..	..	20	6	26	8	..	..	4	1	8	7	3	..	..
Greece	37	21	47	26	39	40	24	70	37	56	57	16	15	23	16	11	25	28
Hungary	7	8	-	10	3	-	3	-	9	-	-	12	11	26	21	7	19	30
Iceland	15	4	26	15	15	14	12	..	..	..	23	6	2	18	8	3	..	8
Ireland	6	2	10	10	3	1	7	9	5	-	6	2	1	4	2	1	1	2
Israel	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Italy	43	22	53	36	45	50	25	52	40	45	59	17	15	26	16	13	24	27
Japan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Korea	37	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	10	..	..	..	..	..	..

	Foreign-born											Native-born						
	Total	Owners	Tenants	EU-born	Non-EU born	Low-educated	Highly educated	Recent (<10 years)	Settled (>=10 years)	Youth with two foreign-born parents (16-34)	Children in a foreign-born household (0-15)	Total	Owners	Tenants	Low-educated	Highly educated	Youth with two native-born parents (16-34)	Children in a native-born household (0-15)
Latvia	32	29	57	..	..	41	22	-	32	60	58	36	32	62	45	28	44	50
Lithuania	13	12	-	-	13	10	11	-	11	-	-	20	18	44	20	19	26	30
Luxembourg	9	3	16	7	15	12	6	12	8	5	10	3	1	17	4	3	3	2
Malta	0	0	1	..	..	1	0	..	..	-	..	1	1	5	2	0	3	3
Mexico	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Netherlands	8	3	13	7	9	9	4	17	5	14	15	3	1	6	2	2	4	2
New Zealand	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Norway	14	4	26	10	17	22	7	20	11	16	19	4	1	17	4	2	7	2
Poland	33	20	62	26	35	24	46	65	19	-	-	28	24	58	39	20	37	42
Portugal	9	8	13	4	10	9	5	12	9	13	23	4	3	11	4	2	8	10
Romania	-	-	68	..	..	-	..	..	..	-	..	33	33	..	35	32	48	56
Slovak Republic	22	18	-	21	-	-	20	-	-	-	-	21	19	58	37	15	31	34
Slovenia	19	9	36	..	..	17	7	..	..	16	35	6	4	25	8	4	8	10
Spain	12	6	16	4	15	21	7	14	11	12	22	2	2	6	3	1	3	3
Sweden	26	9	37	13	30	27	15	41	14	22	46	9	4	21	6	7	15	7
Switzerland	8	1	10	5	13	14	5	12	6	7	9	3	1	4	5	2	3	1
Türkiye	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
United Kingdom	5	2	8	5	5	9	4	6	5	..	11	1	0	4	2	1	..	3
United States	19	9	33	..	..	32	12	29	19	..	36	8	4	17	16	4	..	15
<b>OECD total</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>EU total</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>20</b>

Note: ".." value is missing, "-" value is below the sample size threshold.

Source: Indicator 4.5; Children and youth: indicator 7.19.

Table A C.5. Overcrowding housing rates, evolution between 2010 and 2020

Change in percentage points, 16-year-olds and above

	Foreign-born									Native-born				
	Total	Owners	Tenants	EU-born	Non-EU born	Low-educated	Highly educated	Recent (<10 years)	Settled (>=10 years)	Total	Owners	Tenants	Low-educated	Highly educated
Australia	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	0	..	..	..	..
Austria	3	-3	6	5	4	8	2	5	2	0	-1	0	1	-1
Belgium	3	4	2	4	2	4	2	3	4	1	0	2	1	0
Bulgaria	6	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	16	-5	-5	-7	2	-5
Canada	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Chile	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Colombia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Costa Rica	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Croatia	-15	-13	-7	20	16	-16	-6	-	-14	-7	-7	5	-6	-1
Cyprus	0	0	0	0	-1	2	0	0	1	0	0	-3	0	0
Czech Republic	-1	0	-1	-3	0	7	5	-2	-2	-5	-4	-8	-2	-2
Denmark	5	-3	8	-6	-26	4	-3	9	-4	2	0	3	1	0
Estonia	-27	-27	-	..	..	..	..	..	-27	-23	-23	-37	..	-18
Finland	7	-2	13	-21	-19	..	..	..	3	1	0	1	..	0
France	3	1	2	-25	-31	1	1	4	3	-1	-1	0	-1	-1
Germany	1	-4	5	..	..	8	0	13	-2	-1	-1	0	-1	0
Greece	-4	-6	-4	16	31	-11	-13	5	-1	4	3	6	2	5
Hungary	-31	-28	-	-2	-	-	-	-	-16	-24	-23	-41	-20	-18
Iceland	2	0	-2	-9	-23	-5	2	..	..	1	0	1	2	0
Ireland	2	2	4	-17	-32	0	5	5	3	1	1	0	1	1
Israel	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Italy	10	-5	15	27	28	12	-1	16	10	3	4	-3	2	4
Japan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Korea	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Latvia	-14	-14	-13	..	..	-12	-13	-	-13	-11	-12	-12	-9	-7
Lithuania	-23	-24	-	-	10	-26	-19	-	-25	-17	-18	-30	-12	-11
Luxembourg	-1	2	-3	2	-2	-1	-1	-3	-1	1	0	6	1	2

	Foreign-born									Native-born				
	Total	Owners	Tenants	EU-born	Non-EU born	Low-educated	Highly educated	Recent (<10 years)	Settled (>=10 years)	Total	Owners	Tenants	Low-educated	Highly educated
Malta	-1	0	-6	..	..	-1	0	..	..	0	0	-1	0	0
Mexico	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Netherlands	6	3	8	-2	-11	6	2	10	4	1	1	3	1	1
New Zealand	..	0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Norway	2	0	-2	-4	-25	8	0	4	0	0	0	-2	2	0
Poland	6	-2	-	14	26	-11	-	-	-1	-10	-9	-12	-4	-4
Portugal	-8	-5	-11	-8	-8	-15	0	-18	-4	-3	-2	-5	-4	-1
Romania	-	-	-	..	..	-	-	..	..	-8	-9	..	-4	0
Slovak Republic	4	5	-	8	-	-	-	-	-	-5	-5	7	7	-5
Slovenia	-22	-22	-41	..	0	-36	-9	..	..	-18	-16	-40	-21	-12
Spain	4	0	7	-2	-3	10	3	14	11	1	1	2	1	1
Sweden	10	3	9	4	10	13	2	8	1	0	0	-1	0	0
Switzerland	2	0	3	1	3	7	2	5	1	0	0	0	1	0
Türkiye	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
United Kingdom	-4	-3	-7	-7	-3	3	-2	-8	-2	0	0	-2	0	0
United States	-5	-2	-6	..	..	-9	0	-8	-3	0	0	0	1	1
<b>OECD total</b>	<b>-1</b>	<b>-2</b>	<b>-1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>-5</b>	<b>-2</b>	<b>-1</b>	<b>-1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>-1</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>EU total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>-2</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>-2</b>	<b>-2</b>	<b>-1</b>	<b>-1</b>	<b>-1</b>

Note: ".." value is missing, "-" value is below the sample size threshold.

Source: Indicator 4.5.

Table A C.6. Self-reported health, 2020

Percentages, adjusted by age, 16-year-olds and above

	Foreign-born								Native-born			
	Total (age adjusted)		EU-born (age adjusted)		Non-EU born (age adjusted)		Elderly reporting to be in good health		Total		Elderly reporting to be in good health	
	Good health status	Unmet medical needs	Good health status	Unmet medical needs	Good health status	Unmet medical needs	65-year-olds and above	75-year-olds and above	Good health status	Unmet medical needs	65-year-olds and above	75-year-olds and above
Australia	86	6	..	..	..	..	72	..	84	5	75	..
Austria	68	1	76	1	59	1	46	43	75	0	45	36
Belgium	68	6	71	6	65	7	45	41	75	2	56	47
Bulgaria	75	-	-	-	77	-	-	-	67	4	25	14
Canada	90	-	..	..	..	..	77	70	88	6	81	76
Chile	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Colombia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Costa Rica	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Croatia	68	10	72	11	67	10	20	10	65	6	19	11
Cyprus	83	1	86	1	82	1	59	50	75	0	37	23
Czech Republic	61	2	58	1	67	3	24	16	63	3	28	16
Denmark	65	9	67	8	63	10	55	-	68	8	56	49
Estonia	57	20	..	..	..	..	11	6	62	15	21	15
Finland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	45	36
France	64	6	65	6	63	6	42	30	70	5	45	34
Germany	66	2	..	..	..	..	42	0	65	1	44	..
Greece	81	31	80	31	82	32	55	47	78	25	47	32
Hungary	67	5	65	5	66	5	31	-	62	7	19	11
Iceland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	56	49
Ireland	81	-	87	-	79	8	67	64	83	-	70	65
Israel	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Italy	77	-	80	-	76	-	47	40	71	4	40	28
Japan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Korea	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..



	Foreign-born								Native-born			
	Total (age adjusted)		EU-born (age adjusted)		Non-EU born (age adjusted)		Elderly reporting to be in good health		Total		Elderly reporting to be in good health	
	Good health status	Unmet medical needs	Good health status	Unmet medical needs	Good health status	Unmet medical needs	65-year-olds and above	75-year-olds and above	Good health status	Unmet medical needs	65-year-olds and above	75-year-olds and above
Latvia	53	10	..	..	..	..	11	6	53	11	13	9
Lithuania	42	3	-	2	43	3	7	3	45	3	9	4
Luxembourg	74	1	73	1	75	2	49	34	74	1	50	42
Malta	83	0	..	..	..	..	47	-	73	1	37	26
Mexico	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Netherlands	69	-	75	-	66	-	48	40	76	-	60	53
New Zealand	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Norway	75	4	81	2	71	5	50	-	71	3	62	58
Poland	63	24	63	17	64	24	16	14	62	25	24	15
Portugal	59	3	55	2	59	3	24	18	50	4	14	10
Romania	-	-	..	..	..	..	-	-	73	..	26	15
Slovak Republic	64	6	62	6	-	-	19	-	65	8	23	10
Slovenia	-	5	..	..	..	..	44	39	-	-	35	25
Spain	68	5	69	-	67	-	47	30	73	3	44	32
Sweden	-	-	76	-	-	-	54	44	74	-	61	53
Switzerland	79	-	80	-	78	-	61	59	85	-	71	65
Türkiye	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
United Kingdom	72	8	78	-	69	8	52	41	72	8	58	51
United States	87	13	..	..	..	..	69	60	87	-	79	76
OECD total	<b>79</b>	..	<b>74</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>50</b>
EU total	<b>68</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>28</b>

Note: ".." value is missing, "-" value is below the sample size threshold/ response rate threshold. Data for Australia reports whether a person with medical needs went to the hospital.

Source: Good health: Indicator 4.9; Medical needs: Indicator 4.11; Elderly health status: Indicator 6.4.

Table A C.7. Self-reported health, evolution between 2010 and 2020

Change in percentage points, adjusted by age, 16-year-olds and above

	Foreign-born								Native-born			
	Total (age adjusted)		EU-born (age adjusted)		Non-EU born (age adjusted)		Elderly reporting to be in good health		Total		Elderly reporting to be in good health	
	Good health status	Unmet medical needs	Good health status	Unmet medical needs	Good health status	Unmet medical needs	65-year-olds and older	75-year-olds and older	Good health status	Unmet medical needs	65-year-olds and older	75-year-olds and older
Australia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Austria	6	-3	6	-2	4	-3	6	22	4	-2	7	11
Belgium	1	5	0	5	1	5	6	11	1	2	8	6
Bulgaria	13	-	-	-	15	-	-	-	-1	-10	8	4
Canada	1	..	..	..	..	..	5	6	-1	..	4	4
Chile	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Colombia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Costa Rica	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Croatia	-	-6	23	1	15	-6	-	-	-	-9	-	-
Cyprus	0	-5	2	-6	2	-6	-1	-	3	-6	8	3
Czech Republic	-2	-2	-3	-3	-2	1	3	0	1	-1	8	5
Denmark	-	-	-9	2	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-
Estonia	14	10	..	..	..	..	4	1	4	10	3	2
Finland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
France	-1	-1	-2	-1	0	-1	13	7	1	0	9	8
Germany	1	-6	..	..	..	..	6	..	-1	-5	5	..
Greece	5	-	0	-	6	-	15	29	3	17	14	12
Hungary	5	-4	7	-4	-	-	16	-	7	-1	7	5
Iceland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ireland	-5	-	1	-	-8	-	1	-	0	-	5	7
Israel	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Italy	8	-	11	-	6	-	16	24	5	-3	13	11
Japan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Korea	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..

	Foreign-born								Native-born			
	Total (age adjusted)		EU-born (age adjusted)		Non-EU born (age adjusted)		Elderly reporting to be in good health		Total		Elderly reporting to be in good health	
	Good health status	Unmet medical needs	Good health status	Unmet medical needs	Good health status	Unmet medical needs	65-year-olds and older	75-year-olds and older	Good health status	Unmet medical needs	65-year-olds and older	75-year-olds and older
Latvia	2	-12	..	..	..	..	1	0	1	-10	2	3
Lithuania	-6	0	-	-	-5	0	-	-	-7	0	3	-
Luxembourg	2	-2	1	-3	7	-1	0	-8	-2	-2	2	2
Malta	4	-2	..	..	..	..	-4	-	6	-5	10	7
Mexico	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Netherlands	-2	-	-7	-	-1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
New Zealand	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Norway	3	0	8	0	-	-	-	-	-4	1	-	-
Poland	1	12	-2	10	3	10	7	7	3	10	12	7
Portugal	5	0	-3	0	7	0	6	-	2	1	3	3
Romania	-	-	..	-	..	-	-	-	2	-	6	2
Slovak Republic	-7	-1	-8	0	-	-	6	-	1	2	9	2
Slovenia	-	-	..	..	..	..	-	-	-	-	-	-
Spain	-6	-1	-7	0	-5	-1	-10	-21	2	-3	10	4
Sweden	-	-	-3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Switzerland	3	-	2	-	5	-	4	10	2	-	4	7
Türkiye	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
United Kingdom	-6	4	-6	-	-7	3	0	-10	-7	5	-4	-4
United States	0	-5	..	..	..	..	0	-2	-1	-	3	3
<b>OECD total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>-1</b>	<b>-1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>-1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>EU total</b>	<b>-1</b>	<b>-2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>-1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>-2</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>7</b>

Note: ".." value is missing, "-" value is below the sample size threshold/ response rate threshold.

Source: Good health: Indicator 4.9; Medical needs: Indicator 4.11; Elderly health status: Indicator 6.4.



## Annex D. Civic engagement and social integration

Access the data for tables in Annex D:

StatLink  <https://stat.link/6mtn1c>

Table A D.1. Acquisition of nationality, 2010 and 2020

Percentages of host-country nationals among settled immigrants aged 15 and above

	2020					2010						
	Total (thousands)	Total	Men	Women	EU-born	Non- EU born	Total (thousands)	Total	Men	Women	EU-born	Non- EU born
Australia	3 713	81	..	..	..	..	2 291	83	..	..	..	..
Austria	2 053	46	45	46	43	48	1 601	59	55	62	64	55
Belgium	1 206	63	61	65	41	79	797	62	58	65	42	84
Bulgaria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Canada	5 421	90	..	..	..	..	4 592	92	..	..	..	..
Chile	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Colombia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Costa Rica	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Croatia	363	99	99	99	95	99	378	99	99	98	99	99
Cyprus	95	38	32	42	24	47	44	55	48	61	58	52
Czech Republic	253	53	49	56	65	33	194	81	79	83	89	56
Denmark	246	48	46	49	37	51	161	57	57	56	30	64
Estonia	152	37	29	43	49	37	174	36	29	41	41	36
Finland	162	63	57	68	62	63	79	71	70	72	76	67
France	5 775	62	61	64	48	67	4 947	63	61	66	51	69
Germany	8 570	55	53	56	54	56	8 759	65	63	66	..	..
Greece	480	41	40	41	43	40	476	32	28	35	43	29
Hungary	152	86	82	89	88	82	111	84	84	85	88	73
Iceland	17	74	..	..	64	88	18	55	..	..	..	..
Ireland	560	47	45	48	17	64	198	62	62	62	62	65
Israel	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Italy	4 439	33	31	36	31	34	2 186	47	40	53	61	40
Japan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Korea	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Latvia	169	35	..	..	47	34	264	26	..	..	47	24

	2020						2010					
	Total (thousands)	Total	Men	Women	EU-born	Non- EU born	Total (thousands)	Total	Men	Women	EU-born	Non- EU born
Lithuania	129	91	89	92	88	91	116	92	90	93	92	92
Luxembourg	148	24	23	26	20	44	109	19	17	21	17	37
Malta	17	56	..	..	..	..	10	62	..	..	39	..
Mexico	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Netherlands	1 406	75	75	75	45	84	1 248	77	77	78	56	83
New Zealand	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Norway	515	61	58	64	29	80	194	71	72	71	50	85
Poland	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Portugal	552	87	87	87	84	88	394	78	77	78	82	76
Romania	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Slovak Republic	39	89	88	90	86	95	27	86	84	88	88	75
Slovenia	138	76	70	84	90	70	147	91	88	94	95	89
Spain	4 768	37	35	39	18	45	1 905	40	37	44	37	42
Sweden	926	87	86	88	75	92	790	84	84	85	72	92
Switzerland	1 447	45	39	51	43	49	1 256	45	36	52	42	48
Türkiye	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
United Kingdom	5 468	59	60	58	27	74	3 542	69	70	68	44	79
United States	35 854	66	64	69	..	..	29 641	60	57	63	..	..
<b>OECD total</b>	<b>84 757</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>..</b>	<b>..</b>	<b>66 217</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>..</b>	<b>..</b>
<b>EU total</b>	<b>32 816</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>25 141</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>62</b>

Note: ".." value is missing, "-" value is below the sample size threshold.

Source: Indicator 5.1; Breakdowns by EU origin: Indicator 8.14.

Table A D.2. Voter participation rates, 2012-20

Percentages of the population aged 18 and above with the nationality of the country of residence

	Foreign-born						Native-born				Native-born aged 18-34					
	Total	Men	Women	EU-born	Non-EU born	Low-educated	Highly educated	Recent (<10 years)	Settled (>=10 years)	Total	Men	Women	Low-educated	Highly educated	with native-born parents	with foreign-born parents
Australia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Austria	72	68	74	73	70	67	-	71	..	85	87	84	77	95	74	57
Belgium	88	89	87	80	92	90	90	90	90	94	93	94	89	97	93	90
Bulgaria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	75	76	75	71	82	61	..
Canada	85	86	85	..	..	..	..	86	81	87	87	87	..	..	81	76
Chile	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Colombia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Costa Rica	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Croatia	72	76	70	-	73	58	-	74	-	71	75	69	69	82	54	-
Cyprus	-	-	-	-	-	..	-	-	-	81	83	80	85	80	70	-
Czech Republic	52	55	51	56	-	-	-	-	-	63	65	61	45	79	47	-
Denmark	94	93	94	96	92	-	98	95	-	95	94	95	91	98	89	50
Estonia	76	72	78	-	75	60	87	76	-	74	70	77	54	88	63	61
Finland	73	75	71	80	67	-	82	77	-	85	84	87	80	93	75	-
France	69	71	67	72	68	65	82	69	-	71	72	69	71	80	48	34
Germany	75	74	75	83	68	67	84	75	-	87	88	86	68	96	81	64
Greece	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Hungary	77	-	79	75	-	-	-	76	-	74	76	74	63	86	61	-
Iceland	78	-	78	89	64	-	-	80	-	93	92	94	89	97	86	-
Ireland	61	54	68	27	67	58	71	66	30	81	81	81	82	87	59	-
Israel	86	87	85	89	85	86	88	87	63	83	82	85	78	92	71	75
Italy	64	66	62	68	61	53	-	68	-	81	84	79	75	92	80	-
Japan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Korea	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Latvia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	..	74	71	76	62	84	64	-



	Foreign-born						Native-born						Native-born aged 18-34			
	Total	Men	Women	EU-born	Non-EU born	Low-educated	Highly educated	Recent (<10 years)	Settled (>=10 years)	Total	Men	Women	Low-educated	Highly educated	with native-born parents	with foreign-born parents
Lithuania	60	55	64	-	61	-	69	-	60	62	62	62	56	71	42	-
Luxembourg	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Malta	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Mexico	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Netherlands	70	67	72	85	68	56	79	-	70	85	83	76	94	78	63	63
New Zealand	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Norway	80	79	81	85	80	-	86	70	84	91	92	86	96	83	-	-
Poland	78	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	83	71	70	63	83	63	63	-
Portugal	64	66	63	77	60	57	81	-	68	74	73	71	85	65	-	-
Romania	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Slovak Republic	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	75	76	74	68	82	..	-
Slovenia	70	74	66	80	64	58	83	-	70	72	71	73	63	82	62	37
Spain	73	75	72	76	73	70	82	55	78	82	83	82	79	89	75	-
Sweden	85	84	86	88	84	76	90	59	87	95	95	93	99	99	92	72
Switzerland	60	59	60	68	50	54	73	-	60	72	75	69	63	86	60	32
Türkiye	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
United Kingdom	71	69	73	60	75	72	80	49	76	77	78	76	71	89	55	63
United States	73	74	72	..	..	56	83	61	74	80	82	78	42	91	70	66
<b>OECD average</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>58</b>
<b>EU total</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>58</b>

Note: ".." value is missing, "-" value is below the sample size threshold.

Source: Indicator 5.2, Native-born by parents' country of birth; Indicator 7.20.

Table A D.3. Immigrants who report discrimination based on ethnicity, nationality or race, 2012-20

Percentages, 15-64 year-olds

	2012-20						Change between 2002-10 and 2012-20					
	Total	Men	Women	EU-born	Non-EU born	Foreigner	Host-country national	Recent (<10 years)	Settled (>=10 years)	All foreign-born	Men	Women
Australia	14	12	12	..	..	15	12	..	..	-3	-5	-4
Austria	16	19	14	8	23	14	19	14	17	-6	-12	-1
Belgium	18	20	15	9	25	20	15	19	17	9	10	8
Bulgaria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Canada	19	17	20	..	..	19	19	..	..	3	1	5
Chile	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Colombia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Costa Rica	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Croatia	3	2	4	-	4	-	3	-	3	0	-1	2
Cyprus	10	12	9	8	13	13	-	15	6	-2	2	-5
Czech Republic	12	11	12	11	14	12	12	9	13	1	5	-3
Denmark	12	13	10	4	16	9	14	12	12	-3	-3	-2
Estonia	14	17	12	10	15	16	11	10	15	-2	1	-4
Finland	10	9	11	2	15	11	9	12	8	-1	-3	0
France	20	23	18	7	24	23	18	23	20	3	5	1
Germany	10	13	7	3	13	11	9	13	9	-5	-2	-7
Greece	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Hungary	9	-	8	7	-	20	8	-	9	3	-	-
Iceland	9	9	9	8	9	-	4	-	4	-	-	-
Ireland	6	6	6	8	5	8	3	8	4	-7	-9	-5
Israel	8	9	7	..	..	-	7	15	7	2	2	2
Italy	21	24	17	17	23	26	10	24	19	-	-	-
Japan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Korea	20	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Latvia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lithuania	11	6	13	-	9	-	11	-	11	7	-	-

	2012-20						Change between 2002-10 and 2012-20					
	Total	Men	Women	EU-born	Non-EU born	Foreigner	Host-country national	Recent (<10 years)	Settled (>=10 years)	All foreign-born	Men	Women
Luxembourg	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Malta	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Mexico	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Netherlands	19	19	18	6	22	14	20	18	19	-1	1	-2
New Zealand	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Norway	9	9	10	5	12	7	12	8	12	1	0	2
Poland	-	-	-	-	-	..	-	-	-	-	-	-
Portugal	12	11	12	5	13	21	6	18	9	-6	-6	-5
Romania	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Slovak Republic	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-2	-	-
Slovenia	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	-1	-1	-1
Spain	13	13	13	10	14	15	9	17	10	-5	-6	-3
Sweden	12	11	13	7	14	6	14	10	12	0	-2	3
Switzerland	9	8	9	7	11	10	7	10	8	1	-1	2
Türkiye	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
United Kingdom	15	15	15	12	16	13	16	12	16	1	-2	4
United States	11	14	7	..	..	15	7	..	..	-1	0	-2
<b>EU total</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>-1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>-2</b>

Note: " ." value is missing, "-" value is below the sample size threshold. Changes between 2012-13 and 2020 for Australia, between 2009 and 2020 for Canada, between 2010 and 2020 for New Zealand, and between 2006-10 and 2018 for the United States.  
Source: Indicator 5.6.



## Annex E. Young people with foreign-born parents

Access the data for tables in Annex E:


StatLink  <https://stat.link/xtdq15>

Table A E.1. Composition of the young population with foreign-born parents, 2021

Percentages, 15-34 year-olds

	2021 (%)				Change since 2011 (% points)				Father's region of birth of native-born with foreign-born parents (Total =100)				
	Native-born with foreign-born parents	Native-born with mixed parentage	Foreign-born arrived before 15	Foreign-born arrived as adults	Native-born with foreign-born parents	Native-born with mixed parentage	Foreign-born arrived before 15	Foreign-born arrived as adults	Europe	Africa	Asia	Latin America	North America and Oceania
Australia	10	13	10	20	0	-1	1	4	38	5	45	3	10
Austria	10	7	8	13	4	2	1	1	87	4	8	0	0
Belgium	7	10	6	11	0	1	1	1	41	52	5	1	1
Bulgaria	0	0	0	0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Canada	11	9	9	10	1	0	1	1	23	8	47	20	2
Chile	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Colombia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Costa Rica	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Croatia	5	14	0	4	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Cyprus	2	8	0	30	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Czech Republic	1	3	0	5	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Denmark	6	7	3	11	2	1	0	1	41	13	45	1	0
Estonia	4	10	0	5	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Finland	1	6	3	7	1	3	0	2	46	25	28	1	0
France	7	10	4	7	-1	0	0	1	21	65	10	3	0
Germany	8	5	6	14	0	3	-1	6	..	..	..	..	..
Greece	4	3	0	5	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Hungary	1	1	0	3	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Iceland	1	7	0	20	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Ireland	5	7	0	24	5	3	-5	7	..	..	..	..	..
Israel	10	12	7	4	-4	-3	-2	-1	..	..	..	..	..
Italy	2	5	0	13	2	3	-4	3	..	..	..	..	..
Japan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..

	2021 (%)				Change since 2011 (% points)				Father's region of birth of native-born with foreign-born parents (Total =100)				
	Native-born with foreign-born parents	Native-born with mixed parentage	Foreign-born arrived before 15	Foreign-born arrived as adults	Native-born with foreign-born parents	Native-born with mixed parentage	Foreign-born arrived before 15	Foreign-born arrived as adults	Europe	Africa	Asia	Latin America	North America and Oceania
Korea	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Latvia	4	14	0	4	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Lithuania	1	3	0	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Luxembourg	18	9	0	49	5	1	-13	28	96	3	1	1	0
Malta	0	7	0	24	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Mexico	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Netherlands	8	9	4	6	1	1	-1	1	34	31	14	20	0
New Zealand	7	10	12	16	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Norway	4	6	5	14	1	1	0	-1	..	..	..	..	..
Poland	0	0	0	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Portugal	3	7	3	5	2	5	-1	0	..	..	..	..	..
Romania	0	0	0	0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Slovak Republic	0	1	0	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Slovenia	3	7	0	8	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Spain	3	4	0	20	0	0	0	0	..	..	..	..	..
Sweden	7	8	8	15	1	0	1	3	41	13	39	6	0
Switzerland	13	13	9	18	1	1	0	-1	..	..	..	..	..
Türkiye	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
United Kingdom	8	2	5	10	0	0	0	0	..	..	..	..	..
United States	11	5	6	7	2	1	-1	0	4	4	24	67	1
<b>OECD total</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>-1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>EU total</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>-1</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>0</b>

Note: ".." value is missing, "." value is below the sample size threshold.

Source: Indicator 7.1; region of origin: Indicator 7.3.

Table A E.2. Reading literacy, 2018

PISA score points, 40 points roughly equal to one year of education, pupils aged 15

	Native-born with foreign-born parents							Foreign-born			Native-born with native-born parents				
	Total	Men	Women	Lowest ESCS	Highest ESCS	Host-country language at home	Foreign language at home	Total	Lowest ESCS	Highest ESCS	Total	Men	Women	Lowest ESCS	Highest ESCS
Australia	523	511	534	483	563	530	508	503	445	547	502	486	519	463	549
Austria	446	435	457	430	514	471	436	428	406	476	501	486	517	459	540
Belgium	459	450	467	438	518	476	445	438	413	502	511	501	521	455	557
Bulgaria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	413	-	451	426	407	445	371	480
Canada	535	523	548	507	570	540	527	510	464	539	522	507	536	485	554
Chile	447	427	466	-	513	458	-	445	418	494	456	447	465	418	504
Colombia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	417	-	492	415	409	420	375	461
Costa Rica	408	399	418	388	462	406	429	414	373	475	430	423	438	396	476
Croatia	473	458	487	460	510	473	464	478	454	511	481	466	497	455	522
Cyprus	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Czech Republic	459	437	480	430	-	453	463	428	401	475	495	479	512	444	548
Denmark	447	435	459	435	498	459	432	470	425	516	511	497	524	474	544
Estonia	492	481	506	475	501	495	471	492	-	515	532	517	546	503	570
Finland	456	441	470	444	-	478	443	451	402	513	529	503	556	493	567
France	461	452	472	448	514	470	446	442	425	496	504	490	517	446	556
Germany	477	468	488	450	560	504	453	424	398	510	523	509	539	467	569
Greece	420	394	445	416	442	433	394	408	394	423	465	445	484	421	507
Hungary	510	520	502	-	-	513	-	475	-	517	476	461	490	420	534
Iceland	412	396	425	393	-	-	404	463	413	509	480	460	500	445	507
Ireland	509	492	523	475	537	514	494	518	479	552	518	505	532	483	558
Israel	493	464	518	451	548	493	492	425	374	497	476	455	494	406	529
Italy	445	431	459	441	465	471	424	440	425	461	483	470	496	438	515
Japan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	460	-	-	505	494	515	466	538
Korea	-	-	-	-	..	-	..	536	-	-	515	504	527	479	552
Latvia	467	459	476	442	495	483	411	486	-	540	481	464	497	449	514



	Native-born with foreign-born parents							Foreign-born			Native-born with native-born parents				
	Total	Men	Women	Lowest ESCS	Highest ESCS	Host-country language at home	Foreign language at home	Total	Lowest ESCS	Highest ESCS	Total	Men	Women	Lowest ESCS	Highest ESCS
Lithuania	454	450	458	-	484	470	-	474	-	529	478	459	497	434	524
Luxembourg	450	433	467	419	541	513	432	462	401	550	498	481	514	447	533
Malta	433	399	461	-	-	501	381	455	398	496	450	426	475	409	495
Mexico	332	-	322	-	-	330	-	393	-	438	425	418	431	385	467
Netherlands	433	421	444	426	454	446	420	438	390	493	501	487	514	467	543
New Zealand	518	512	525	477	571	522	512	509	456	564	505	490	520	461	558
Norway	463	447	476	445	497	461	465	465	429	515	509	487	530	469	536
Poland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	491	-	515	514	498	529	471	562
Portugal	483	471	495	450	543	485	476	446	395	496	492	481	504	451	543
Romania	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	444	-	482	430	414	447	374	489
Slovak Republic	424	-	-	-	-	-	-	416	362	478	461	444	478	408	512
Slovenia	464	437	497	458	-	473	457	431	423	482	504	484	525	471	544
Spain	464	456	472	450	514	468	461	447	428	482	483	470	496	448	520
Sweden	471	460	482	459	506	487	460	438	386	512	526	509	542	489	558
Switzerland	453	437	472	433	527	479	436	452	414	521	506	492	521	456	546
Türkiye	474	-	-	-	-	481	-	471	-	501	466	454	478	438	513
United Kingdom	493	475	507	478	530	496	486	496	446	569	509	500	518	476	549
United States	512	502	522	477	585	522	504	486	443	551	509	499	519	458	556
<b>OECD total</b>	<b>495</b>	<b>485</b>	<b>505</b>	<b>465</b>	<b>563</b>	<b>503</b>	<b>486</b>	<b>469</b>	<b>429</b>	<b>528</b>	<b>487</b>	<b>476</b>	<b>497</b>	<b>443</b>	<b>531</b>
<b>EU total</b>	<b>463</b>	<b>452</b>	<b>474</b>	<b>444</b>	<b>519</b>	<b>479</b>	<b>445</b>	<b>442</b>	<b>415</b>	<b>497</b>	<b>496</b>	<b>482</b>	<b>511</b>	<b>448</b>	<b>542</b>

Note: "." value is missing, "-" value is below the sample size threshold.

Source: Indicator 7.6.

Table A E.3. Reading literacy, evolution between 2009 and 2018

Changes in PISA score points, 40 points roughly equal to one year of schooling, pupils aged 15

	Native-born with foreign-born parents							Foreign-born			Native-born with native-born parents				
	Total	Men	Women	Lowest ESCS	Highest ESCS	Host-country language at home	Foreign language at home	Total	Lowest ESCS	Highest ESCS	Total	Men	Women	Lowest ESCS	Highest ESCS
Australia	-8	-5	-10	-15	-6	-4	-19	-16	-8	-15	-9	-6	-11	-4	-9
Austria	19	27	12	18	41	31	8	27	47	-29	19	26	13	23	11
Belgium	4	11	-3	10	0	-3	3	-19	-4	-47	-12	-10	-14	-17	-15
Bulgaria	-	-	-	-	-	..	-	31	-	-	-9	1	-18	2	-22
Canada	13	20	6	3	7	10	10	-5	-7	-17	-5	-4	-6	-11	-8
Chile	-	-	-	-	-	..	-	-9	-	-	4	6	3	7	2
Colombia	-	-	-	-	-	..	..	17	-	-	-1	-1	0	1	-2
Costa Rica	-11	-12	-11	-2	-	-6	-	-18	-18	-21	-16	-16	-15	-22	-16
Croatia	8	21	-13	21	1	7	-	17	19	7	2	12	-10	14	7
Cyprus	..	..	..	..	..	..	-	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Czech Republic	12	21	-3	-	-	-7	-	-45	-	-21	15	22	6	5	25
Denmark	1	5	-1	7	-18	-5	-8	16	7	-5	9	11	8	12	7
Estonia	22	26	22	12	9	22	18	9	-	-9	24	31	16	23	29
Finland	-37	-39	-	-	-	..	-33	-35	-36	-15	-10	-7	-12	-16	0
France	12	37	-11	17	-9	0	13	-10	9	-34	-3	5	-9	-5	-1
Germany	20	34	8	14	35	21	6	-31	-33	-14	11	17	6	13	15
Greece	-36	-35	-43	-23	-	-23	-	-34	-28	-107	-24	-19	-28	-20	-20
Hungary	-17	-	-	-	-	-14	-	-33	-	-	-18	-14	-23	-15	-18
Iceland	-	-	-	-	-	..	-	-24	-8	-32	-24	-22	-24	-32	-20
Ireland	1	-	-	-	-	3	-	29	45	16	19	24	15	24	18
Israel	6	-1	11	2	21	8	-31	-47	-62	-31	3	1	2	-10	6
Italy	-1	3	-12	19	-49	1	-19	14	28	-30	-9	1	-18	-9	-12
Japan	-	-	-	-	-	..	-	-	-	-	-16	-8	-26	-19	-19
Korea	-	..	-	..	-	..	..	-	-	-	-25	-19	-32	-26	-21
Latvia	-6	-3	-6	19	-24	-1	-	-8	-	-	-4	3	-11	-9	-6
Lithuania	6	26	-13	-	-	35	-	26	-	-	6	17	-5	1	6

	Native-born with foreign-born parents							Foreign-born			Native-born with native-born parents				
	Total	Men	Women	Lowest ESCS	Highest ESCS	Host-country language at home	Foreign language at home	Total	Lowest ESCS	Highest ESCS	Total	Men	Women	Lowest ESCS	Highest ESCS
Luxembourg	11	16	8	4	26	12	-8	8	11	6	-3	-4	-2	12	9
Malta	..	-	-	-	-	..	-	25	-	8	3	16	-6	7	-9
Mexico	-9	-	-15	-	-	-17	-	23	-	-4	-6	0	-12	-6	-4
Netherlands	-37	-39	-33	-33	-71	-31	-43	-41	-59	-62	-15	-16	-14	-15	-11
New Zealand	20	35	4	23	-3	6	42	-15	-6	-15	-17	-10	-26	-19	-19
Norway	0	1	-5	16	-	-23	11	-1	-3	4	0	1	-2	-8	-2
Poland	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	-	-	-	12	20	3	7	10
Portugal	7	18	6	25	17	-1	-	-25	-47	-14	2	9	-4	-2	2
Romania	..	-	-	-	-	..	..	-	-	-	5	10	1	-9	21
Slovak Republic	-	-	-	-	-	..	-	-58	-	-	-18	-9	-27	-29	-10
Slovenia	17	18	22	13	-	7	18	2	17	-	15	21	8	23	10
Spain	3	4	2	1	25	2	3	17	23	-4	-5	-4	-6	-1	-7
Sweden	18	25	11	37	7	14	14	-6	-13	-25	18	24	12	22	12
Switzerland	-17	-16	-17	-21	0	-19	-29	-10	-6	-23	-6	-1	-12	-15	-6
Türkiye	-	-	-	..	-	..	-	4	-	-	1	9	-9	14	-1
United Kingdom	1	7	-11	18	2	-8	16	20	14	35	12	13	10	24	3
United States	28	33	25	20	20	25	31	-3	-5	-9	3	5	1	8	-2
<b>OECD total</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>-3</b>	<b>-2</b>	<b>-12</b>	<b>-4</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>-10</b>	<b>-4</b>	<b>-6</b>
<b>EU total</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>-5</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>-7</b>	<b>-1</b>	<b>-22</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>-6</b>	<b>-1</b>	<b>1</b>

Note: ".." value is missing, "-" value is below the sample size threshold.

Source: Indicator 7.6.

Table A E.4. Distribution by level of education of young adults, 2020

Percentages, 25-34 year-olds not in education

	Native-born with foreign-born parents		Native-born with foreign-born parents, EU parentage		Native-born with foreign-born parents, non-EU parentage		Native-born with mixed parentage		Foreign-born arrived before 15		Native-born with native-born parents	
	Low (ISCED 0-2)	High (ISCED 5+)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	High (ISCED 5+)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	High (ISCED 5+)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	High (ISCED 5+)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	High (ISCED 5+)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	High (ISCED 5+)
Australia	2	51	..	..	..	..	2	44	1	57	3	38
Austria	20	22	15	42	21	18	15	36	23	23	7	40
Belgium	-	-	18	43	23	35	-	-	-	-	10	55
Bulgaria	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Canada	6	67	..	..	..	..	7	61	7	67	11	50
Chile	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Colombia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Costa Rica	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Croatia	-	-	..	..	..	..	-	-	-	-	5	33
Cyprus	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Czech Republic	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	32
Denmark	-	-	17	55	27	45	-	-	-	-	-	55
Estonia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15	43
Finland	24	23	..	..	..	..	18	29	23	21	10	38
France	14	47	9	52	15	45	9	54	17	47	10	49
Germany	28	18	18	25	32	15	19	26	24	21	11	31
Greece	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Hungary	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Iceland	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Ireland	-	-	..	..	..	..	-	-	-	-	..	..
Israel	4	55	..	..	..	..	5	58	5	53	10	48
Italy	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	0	..
Japan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Korea	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Latvia	-	-	..	..	..	..	-	-	-	-	10	45
Lithuania	-	-	..	..	..	..	-	-	-	-	10	54

	Native-born with foreign-born parents		Native-born with foreign-born parents, EU parentage		Native-born with foreign-born parents, non-EU parentage		Native-born with mixed parentage		Foreign-born arrived before 15		Native-born with native-born parents	
	Low (ISCED 0-2)	High (ISCED 5+)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	High (ISCED 5+)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	High (ISCED 5+)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	High (ISCED 5+)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	High (ISCED 5+)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	High (ISCED 5+)
Luxembourg	-	38	-	37	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	41
Malta	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	35	37
Mexico	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Netherlands	19	40	20	40	19	40	12	56	17	40	9	53
New Zealand	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Norway	27	51	19	58	27	50	22	53	37	35	19	49
Poland	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Portugal	-	-	..	..	..	..	-	-	-	-	33	33
Romania	-	-	..	..	..	..	-	-	-	-	20	28
Slovak Republic	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Slovenia	-	-	..	..	..	..	-	-	-	-	5	43
Spain	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30	49
Sweden	5	52	7	49	5	53	11	41	9	45	4	49
Switzerland	6	40	-	-	-	-	3	53	7	32	2	54
Türkiye	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
United Kingdom	4	70	..	..	..	..	7	58	7	62	8	49
United States	6	51	..	..	..	..	5	56	11	47	4	51
<b>OECD total</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>47</b>
<b>EU total</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>40</b>

Note: ".." value is missing, "-" value is below the sample size threshold.

Source: Indicator 7.10.

Table A E.5. Distribution by level of education of young adults, by gender, 2020

Percentages, 25-34 year-olds not in education

	Men						Women					
	Native-born with foreign-born parents		Foreign-born arrived before 15		Native-born with native-born parents		Native-born with foreign-born parents		Foreign-born arrived before 15		Native-born with native-born parents	
	Low (ISCED 0-2)	High (ISCED 5+)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	High (ISCED 5+)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	High (ISCED 5+)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	High (ISCED 5+)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	High (ISCED 5+)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	High (ISCED 5+)
Australia	2	43	2	50	4	28	1	61	1	65	2	48
Austria	23	17	21	20	7	35	17	27	25	27	7	45
Belgium	-	-	-	-	14	44	-	-	-	-	-	66
Bulgaria	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Canada	7	59	9	60	14	39	4	77	5	75	9	62
Chile	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Colombia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Costa Rica	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Croatia	-	-	-	-	-	25	-	-	-	-	-	41
Cyprus	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Czech Republic	-	-	-	-	-	23	-	-	-	-	-	40
Denmark	-	-	-	-	-	46	-	-	-	-	-	65
Estonia	-	-	-	-	21	31	-	-	-	-	9	57
Finland	30	17	28	16	12	29	17	30	18	27	7	47
France	20	43	19	46	12	45	9	50	16	47	9	53
Germany	32	15	27	21	12	29	22	21	21	22	10	32
Greece	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Hungary	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Iceland	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Ireland	-	-	-	-	..	..	-	-	-	-	..	..
Israel	6	43	6	43	13	38	3	65	3	62	7	57
Italy	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Japan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Korea	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Latvia	-	-	-	-	14	30	-	-	-	-	-	61

	Men						Women					
	Native-born with foreign-born parents		Foreign-born arrived before 15		Native-born with native-born parents		Native-born with foreign-born parents		Foreign-born arrived before 15		Native-born with native-born parents	
	Low (ISCED 0-2)	High (ISCED 5+)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	High (ISCED 5+)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	High (ISCED 5+)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	High (ISCED 5+)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	High (ISCED 5+)	Low (ISCED 0-2)	High (ISCED 5+)
Lithuania	-	-	-	-	-	48	-	-	-	-	-	61
Luxembourg	-	-	-	-	-	37	-	-	-	-	-	46
Malta	-	-	-	-	38	33	-	-	-	-	31	42
Mexico	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Netherlands	26	29	20	35	10	49	11	52	10	48	7	58
New Zealand	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Norway	33	43	44	27	22	40	20	59	29	44	16	60
Poland	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Portugal	-	-	-	-	42	23	-	-	-	-	25	43
Romania	-	-	-	-	17	24	-	-	-	-	24	32
Slovak Republic	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Slovenia	-	-	-	-	7	30	-	-	-	-	3	61
Spain	-	-	-	-	35	41	-	-	-	-	24	58
Sweden	7	43	11	37	5	38	4	61	7	55	3	61
Switzerland	6	37	5	26	2	51	6	44	10	41	2	56
Türkiye	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
United Kingdom	6	71	8	61	10	45	3	69	7	62	6	54
United States	7	46	12	44	5	45	5	56	10	50	4	57
<b>OECD total</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>53</b>
<b>EU total</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>46</b>

Note: ".." value is missing, "-" value is below the sample size threshold.

Source: Indicator 7.10.

Table A E.6. Dropout rates, 2020

Percentages, 15-24 year-olds not in education

	Native-born with foreign-born parents			Native-born with mixed parentage	Foreign-born arrived before 15			Native-born with native-born parents
	Total	EU parentage	Non-EU parentage		Total	EU parentage	Non-EU parentage	
Australia	1	..	..	1	1	..	..	2
Austria	10	7	10	8	18	14	20	4
Belgium	8	6	8	7	8	6	9	6
Bulgaria	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Canada	4	..	..	6	4	..	..	9
Chile	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Colombia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Costa Rica	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Croatia	4	..	..	4	-	..	..	2
Cyprus	5	-	-	3	15	-	-	4
Czech Republic	-	..	..	-	-	..	..	4
Denmark	14	10	14	11	14	14	15	10
Estonia	9	..	..	9	-	..	..	8
Finland	14	13	14	11	22	21	22	6
France	10	5	10	9	14	12	15	8
Germany	11	9	12	8	15	14	15	7
Greece	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Hungary	-	..	..	-	-	..	..	11
Island	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Ireland	-	-	-	3	1	1	-	5
Israel	3	..	..	3	4	..	..	5
Italy	28	-	29	15	29	-	27	18
Japan	8	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
Korea	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Latvia	-	..	..	-	-	..	..	6
Lithuania	-	..	..	-	-	..	..	3
Luxembourg	8	8	10	3	5	5	-	9



	Native-born with foreign-born parents			Native-born with mixed parentage	Foreign-born arrived before 15			Native-born with native-born parents
	Total	EU parentage	Non-EU parentage		Total	EU parentage	Non-EU parentage	
Malta	-	..		11	-	..	..	19
Mexico	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Netherlands	7	8	7	7	10	11	9	5
New Zealand	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Norway	11	7	11	10	16	13	17	9
Poland	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Portugal	15	-	14	4	9	-	-	8
Romania	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Slovak Republic	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Slovenia	2	..	..	..	-	..	..	2
Spain	6	-	8	11	25	-	24	12
Sweden	9	12	12	9	12	12	12	9
Switzerland	22	..	..	18	19	17	21	17
Türkiye	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
United Kingdom	5	..	..	6	5	..	..	6
United States	7	..	..	7	9	..	..	7
<b>OECD total</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>EU total</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>8</b>

Note: ".." value is missing, "-" value is below the sample size threshold. Japan data only includes children in the age group 15 to 18.  
Source: Indicator 7.11.

Table A E.7. NEET (Neither in Employment, Education or Training) rates, 2020/21

Percentages, 15-34 year-olds

	Native-born with foreign-born parents								Native-born with native-born parents					
	Total	Men	Women	Low-educated	Highly educated	EU parentage	Non-EU parentage	15-24 year-olds	Total	Men	Women	Low-educated	Highly educated	15-24 year-olds
Australia	11	10	12	11	8	..	..	8	14	12	16	19	7	11
Austria	13	13	13	14	8	11	14	10	8	8	8	13	4	7
Belgium	26	25	27	30	15	20	27	23	15	15	15	26	8	19
Bulgaria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	..	18	15	22	29	9	..
Canada	9	10	9	11	8	..	..	..	13	12	13	20	7	..
Chile	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Colombia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Costa Rica	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Croatia	19	14	23	16	18	-	16	21	16	13	18	11	14	23
Cyprus	7	11	3	2	-	-	-	-	14	13	15	9	12	30
Czech Republic	17	10	-	19	-	-	-	0	14	5	24	12	17	..
Denmark	17	19	16	20	15	16	18	13	12	12	13	17	9	9
Estonia	18	15	21	-	11	-	22	-	12	10	15	13	9	23
Finland	18	20	15	15	9	19	18	16	15	17	13	16	7	13
France	24	21	26	20	20	15	25	17	16	15	17	18	11	14
Germany	10	10	10	-	-	..	11	8	8	6	9	51	8	6
Greece	14	16	13	7	25	..	..	..	21	17	25	11	25	..
Hungary	4	7	2	-	-	-	-	-	13	9	17	19	6	23
Island	8	13	-	-	-	..	..	..	8	8	9	13	6	..
Ireland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18	19	18	68	11	21
Israel	12	13	12	9	7	..	..	13	20	17	23	14	14	18
Italy	20	19	21	15	24	-	-	-	24	21	27	26	16	43
Japan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Korea	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Latvia	21	16	28	-	17	-	19	-	14	12	16	11	8	23
Lithuania	18	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13	13	14	14	8	29
Luxembourg	10	11	9	11	8	16	-	25	7	6	7	14	3	27

	Native-born with foreign-born parents								Native-born with native-born parents					
	Total	Men	Women	Low-educated	Highly educated	EU parentage	Non-EU parentage	15-24 year-olds	Total	Men	Women	Low-educated	Highly educated	15-24 year-olds
Malta	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	7	12	21	4	15
Mexico	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Netherlands	12	11	13	11	7	14	11	8	6	5	7	8	4	4
New Zealand	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Norway	14	15	12	48	14	13	14	10	11	11	10	44	7	8
Poland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	..	14	10	19	16	8	..
Portugal	17	-	-	-	-	-	18	-	17	16	19	28	11	24
Romania	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	..	22	14	30	38	9	..
Slovak Republic	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	..	15	12	19	21	11	..
Slovenia	10	10	9	-	-	-	16	-	8	8	9	9	7	15
Spain	19	22	16	20	32	-	-	-	18	19	18	26	16	38
Sweden	11	11	11	14	5	13	11	12	9	9	9	13	4	11
Switzerland	10	10	9	10	4	..	..	9	6	6	6	5	4	6
Türkiye	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
United Kingdom	13	12	13	29	9	..	..	13	12	11	13	36	7	13
United States	19	18	21	19	17	..	..	17	19	18	21	19	13	17
<b>OECD total</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>EU total</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>12</b>

Note: ".." value is missing, "-" value is below the sample size threshold.

Source: Indicator 7.12.

Table A E.8. Youth with foreign-born parents who report discrimination based on ethnicity, nationality or race, 2012-20

Percentages, 15-34 year-olds

	Native-born with foreign-born parents			Native-born with mixed parentage			Foreign-born arrived before 15			Foreign-born arrived after 15		
	Total	EU parentage	Non-EU parentage	Total	EU parentage	Non-EU parentage	Total	EU-born	Non-EU born	Total	EU-born	Non-EU born
Australia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Austria	13	-	16	8	-	-	16	-	19	13	6	-
Belgium	20	-	27	4	0	11	19	-	28	24	12	32
Bulgaria	..	..	..	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	..	-
Canada	24	..	..	..	..	..	21	..	..	..	..	..
Chile	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Colombia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Costa Rica	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Croatia	-	-	-	..	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cyprus	-	..	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Czech Republic	-	-	..	4	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Denmark	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	10	-	-
Estonia	16	-	17	10	-	11	-	-	-	-	-	-
Finland	-	-	-	13	-	-	16	-	-	14	-	17
France	30	-	31	13	3	18	24	-	27	27	-	29
Germany	14	12	15	11	0	21	8	-	10	13	3	18
Greece	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Hungary	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Iceland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ireland	8	-	-	1	-	0	5	-	5	7	9	6
Israel	11	..	..	2	..	..	14	..	..	7	..	..
Italy	-	-	-	6	-	-	26	-	-	27	-	-
Japan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Korea	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Latvia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	..	-	-	..	-
Lithuania	-	-	-	3	-	0	-	..	-	-	-	-
Luxembourg	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..

	Native-born with foreign-born parents			Native-born with mixed parentage			Foreign-born arrived before 15			Foreign-born arrived after 15		
	Total	EU parentage	Non-EU parentage	Total	EU parentage	Non-EU parentage	Total	EU-born	Non-EU born	Total	EU-born	Non-EU born
Malta	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Mexico	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Netherlands	36	-	36	15	-	18	33	-	36	24	-	-
New Zealand	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Norway	-	-	-	5	-	-	19	-	22	10	-	12
Poland	-	-	..	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	..
Portugal	-	-	-	2	-	1	-	-	-	27	-	29
Romania	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Slovak Republic	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	..	-	-	-
Slovenia	5	-	6	1	1	1	-	-	-	4	-	-
Spain	-	-	-	3	-	4	14	-	14	16	-	16
Sweden	23	-	30	3	..	..	16	-	18	12	-	12
Switzerland	11	1	20	2	0	6	8	2	12	12	13	9
Türkiye	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
United Kingdom	20	-	22	10	-	11	17	-	22	14	13	14
United States	8	..	..	2	..	..	10	..	..	12	..	..
<b>EU total</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>22</b>

Note: ".." value is missing, "-" value is below the sample size threshold.

Source: Indicator 7.21.

# Glossary

**Accompanying family of workers:** Immigrants who are entitled to arrive at the same time as the principal applicant. This is only possible for some categories of labour migrants (mostly highly skilled). Other family migrants joining their spouse at a later stage, through the family reunification procedure, for instance, are included under the family migrant category.

**Category of entry** (alternatively, admission category): Refers to the legal categorisation of permanent migrants based on the circumstances of and reasons for their entry into the host country. The OECD's international migration database distinguishes six different categories of entry: (i) labour migrants, (ii) migrants accompanying family of workers, (iii) family migrants, (iv) humanitarian migrants, (v) other migrants and (vi) free movement migrants.

**Children with foreign-born parents** (alternatively, native-born children/offspring of immigrants): Individuals aged between 0 and 14 with two foreign-born parents (or one foreign-born parent and one parent which country of birth is unknown). If explicitly stated, children with foreign-born parentage may be foreign-born themselves.

**Children with mixed parentage:** Individuals aged between 0 and 14 with one foreign-born and one native-born parent.

**Children with native-born parents** (alternatively, native-born children/ offspring of native-born): Individuals aged between 0 and 14 with two native-born parents (or one native-born parent and one parent which country of birth is unknown).

**Duration of stay:** Refers to the time that has passed since an immigrant first moved to the host-country (and took up usual residence). This publication distinguishes (i) recent migrants who arrived in the host country within the last 5 years (or the last 10 years for some indicators where sample sizes are smaller) and (ii) settled migrants who arrived at least 10 years ago.

**Elderly people:** Individuals aged 65 and older.

**EU average:** When it is not possible to calculate the EU total, the unweighted EU average is used. It considers each EU country as a single entity with equal weight. The "EU average" is thus the arithmetical average derived from all countries with available data. The number of countries used in the calculations is shown in brackets.

**EU-born:** For the sake of simplicity, an EU-born is a person born in a country benefitting from the EU/EFTA free mobility agreement, i.e. a country from the EU/EFTA area, who settles in another EU/EFTA (or former EU/EFTA) country.

**EU mobile citizen:** An EU mobile citizen, a notion to be understood in the context of the European Union, is a national from an EU country, excluding nationals of the country of residence.

**EU total:** The EU total is the summary statistic generally used for EU countries. It takes differences in population size into account. It is thus the weighted average for EU countries. The number of countries used in the calculations is shown in brackets.

**Europe:** In the context of this publication, Europe comprises 54 countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Romania, Slovenia, and Sweden, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Andorra, Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Belarus, Faroe Islands, Guernsey, Gibraltar, Isle of Man, Jersey, Monaco, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Republic of Moldova, Serbia, Russian Federation, San Marino, Türkiye, Ukraine, Holy See, former Czechoslovakia, the former Soviet Union, and former Yugoslavia.

**European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA):** In 2023, the EFTA comprises Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland.

**European Union:** In 2023, the EU comprises 27 countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Romania, Slovenia, and Sweden.

**Family migrant:** Immigrant who arrives to join family members.

**Free movements:** Movements of people who enjoy free mobility agreements between countries (including EU/EFTA, Australia-New Zealand, Ireland-United Kingdom).

**German-speaking countries:** In the context of this publication, this group comprises countries in which German is an official language: Austria, Germany, Luxembourg and Switzerland.

**Guest worker:** This historical term refers to labour migrants who were recruited initially on a temporary basis in a number of Western European countries in the 1950s and 1960s to fill the labour shortages of the post-war era.

**Highly educated persons:** People falling into ISCED groups 5-8 are those with tertiary education degrees. They have at least completed the first stage of tertiary education.

**Highly skilled job:** In accordance with the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO), a highly skilled job describes those who work as senior managers, professionals, technicians and associate professionals (ISCO Levels 1-3).

**Host country:** The country in which an immigrant is residing.

**Host-country citizenship:** The citizenship of the country in which an immigrant is residing.

**Host-country language:** A language that is one of the official languages of the country of residence of immigrants.

**Household:** Refers to a group of persons who share the same dwelling. This publication distinguishes four categories, (i) single-person households (one adult, no children), (ii) adults without children, (iii) single-parent families (single-parent households with at least one child), (iv) families (adults with at least one child).

**Humanitarian migrant:** Immigrant who moves or is forced to move for humanitarian reasons and has eventually obtained an international protection status.

**Immigrant** (alternatively, foreign-born or migrant): A person born abroad.

**Immigrant household** (alternatively, foreign-born household): Refers to a group of persons who share the same dwelling, where all responsible persons for the household are immigrants.

**Immigrants arrived as adults:** Immigrants who arrived at the age of 15 or after.

**Immigrants arrived as children:** Immigrants who arrived before the age of 15.

**International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED):** A classification developed by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) to facilitate comparisons of education statistics and indicators across countries on the basis of uniform and internationally agreed definitions. See <http://uis.unesco.org/en/topic/international-standard-classification-education-isced>.

**International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO):** ISCO is a tool developed by the International Labour Organization (ILO) for organising jobs into a clearly defined set of groups according to the tasks and duties undertaken in the job. It is intended for use in statistical applications and lends itself to international comparisons. See <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/isco88/>.

**Labour migrant:** Immigrant who moves primarily for the purpose of employment.

**Longstanding European destinations:** In the context of this publication, this group comprises Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. See Chapter 1 Group 2 for more details.

**Low-educated persons:** People falling into ISCED groups 0-2 are described as having no or low education. They have no more than a lower-secondary level of education.

**Low-skilled job:** In accordance with the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO), a low-skilled job describes those who work in elementary occupations that require simple, routine tasks and, often, physical effort (ISCO 9).

**Man:** Person whose self-declared gender is male.

**Mixed household:** Refers to a group of persons who share the same dwelling, where one of the responsible persons is an immigrant and the other one is native-born.

**National:** Person with the nationality of the country of residence.

**Native-born:** Person born in the country of residence.

**Native-born household:** Refers to a group of persons who share the same dwelling, where all responsible persons were born in the country of residence.

**Non-EU migrant (alternatively, Non-EU born):** For the sake of simplicity, a non-EU migrant is a person born outside the EU/EFTA area who settles in a EU/EFTA country.

**Nordic countries:** In the context of this publication, this group comprises the five member countries of the Nordic council: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.

**OECD average:** When it is not possible to calculate the OECD total, the unweighted OECD average is calculated instead. It takes each OECD country as a single entity with equal weight. The “OECD average” is thus the arithmetical average derived from all countries with available data. The number of countries used in the calculations is shown in brackets.

**OECD total:** The OECD total is the summary statistic generally used for OECD countries. It takes differences in population size into account. It is thus the weighted average for OECD countries. The number of countries used in the calculations is shown in brackets.

**Permanent immigrant (alternatively, permanent flow):** Permanent immigrants are foreign nationals who received a residence permit that either grants them the right to stay permanently or can be indefinitely renewed.

**Recent migrant:** An immigrant who entered the host country within the last 5 years or within the last 10 years. Employment and skill indicators (including Chapter 8) refer to recent migrants as those who arrived within the last 5 years, while all other indicators, if not otherwise stated, refer to recent migrants as those who arrived within the last 10 years.



**Responsible person of a household:** Defined differently depending on the data source. The EU Survey of Income and Living Conditions (EU SILC) identifies one or two persons “responsible for the household”. It considers that they are the person(s) owning or renting the accommodation or the person(s) to whom the accommodation is provided if it is provided free. If more than two persons share the responsibility, only the oldest two are registered.

Under the Israeli Labour Force Survey, the responsible person of the household is the one who fills in the household questionnaire. His/her partner (if any) is the second responsible person.

The United States Current Population Survey defines the term “householder” as the person (or one of the persons) in whose name the housing unit is owned or rented (maintained) or, if there is no such person, any adult member, excluding roomers, boarders, or paid employees. If the house is owned or rented jointly by a married couple, the householder may be either the husband or the wife.

The concept of the responsible person of the household is not used in Australia, New Zealand or Canada. Instead, the person with the highest wage and his/her partner (if any) are identified as the responsible person of the household in this publication.

**Settled migrant:** A migrant who has lived in the host country for at least 10 years.

**Settlement countries:** In the context of this publication, this group comprises Australia, Canada, Israel, New Zealand and the United States. See Chapter 1 Group 1 for more details.

**Third countries:** All countries that are not members of the European Union in 2022. It comprises EFTA countries.

**Third-country national (TCN):** A third-country national, a notion to be understood in the context of the European Union, is a national with a third-country nationality who resides in the European Union.

**Very low-educated persons:** People falling into ISCED groups 0-1 are described as having no or very low education. They have no more than a primary level of education.

**Very old people:** Individuals aged 75 and older.

**Woman:** Person whose self-declared gender is female.

**Youth from EU parentage:** Individuals aged between 15 and 34 who are native-born with two foreign-born parents, at least one of whom is born in an EU/EFTA country (or one EU-born parent and one parent which country of birth is unknown).

**Youth from non-EU parentage:** Individuals aged between 15 and 34 who are native-born with two foreign-born parents born outside the EU/EFTA (or one non-EU born parent and one parent which country of birth is unknown).

**Youth with foreign-born parents:** Individuals aged between 15 and 34 who are native-born with two foreign-born parents (or one foreign-born parent and one parent which country of birth is unknown).

**Youth with mixed parentage:** Individuals aged between 15 and 34 who are native-born with one foreign-born and one native-born parent.

**Youth with native-born parents:** Individuals aged between 15 and 34 who are native-born with two native-born parents (or one native-born parent and one parent which country of birth is unknown).

# Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2023

## SETTLING IN

This joint OECD-European Commission publication presents a comprehensive comparison of the integration outcomes of immigrants and their children in OECD, EU and selected other countries. It includes 83 indicators covering three main areas: labour market and skills; living conditions; and civic engagement and social integration. The publication also provides detailed data on the characteristics of immigrant populations and households. Three special chapters are dedicated to focusing on the integration outcomes of specific groups: elderly migrants, youth with foreign-born parents, and third-country nationals in the European Union and European OECD countries.



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